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Land is a crucial yet scarce resource in Rwanda, where 
about 90% of the population is engaged in subsistence 
farming, and access to land is increasingly becoming a 
source of conflict. This study examines the effects of land-access 
and land-tenure policies on local community relations, including 
ethnicity, and land conflicts in post-conflict rural Rwanda. Social relations have been characterized 
by (ethnic) tensions, mistrust, grief and frustration since the end of the 1990-1994 civil war and the 
1994 genocide. Focusing on southeastern Rwanda, the study describes the negative consequences 
on social and inter-ethnic relations of a land-sharing agreement that was imposed on Tutsi 
returnees and the Hutu population in 1996-1997 and the villagization policy that was introduced 
at the same time. More recent land reforms, such as land registration and crop specialization, 
appear to have negatively affected land tenure and food security and have aggravated land 
conflicts. In addition, programmes and policies that the population have to comply with are 
leading to widespread poverty among peasants and aggravating communal tensions. Violence has 
historically often been linked to land, and the current growing resentment and fear surrounding 
these land-related policies and the ever-increasing land conflicts could jeopardize Rwanda’s 
recovery and stability.
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Introduction 
‘If there is ever violence again in Rwanda, it will be because of land’. This is 
what a Rwandan friend told me in February 2011, just a few weeks after I re-
turned home from my last period of fieldwork in Rwanda. I nodded more or less 
intuitively in response because this was in line with what other Rwandans had 
told me, and some had even said ‘when’ instead of ‘if’; it was only later that I 
would fully grasp the seriousness of his remark. It should be read in the context 
of Rwanda’s post-independent history in which ethnic violence dominated, lead-
ing to a civil war (1990-1994) and culminating in the 1994 genocide that targeted 
the Tutsi population. 
With still about 90% of the population engaged in subsistence farming, access 
to land is of crucial importance in present-day Rwanda (Ansoms 2009b: 299). 
Land remains a scarce resource in a country that has the highest population den-
sity in Africa and where many people were displaced as a result of massive vio-
lence in the past. It is estimated that the average Rwandan cultivates 0.75 ha 
(Huggins 2013: 1) but most peasants have only about 0.5 ha and this is spread 
across several small plots (Huggins 2014a: 2).1 Because of its importance and its 
increasing scarcity, land has become a growing cause of conflict in recent years 
(Musahara & Huggins 2005; Ansoms & Claessens 2011: 4). 
During my first fieldwork period in 2008, respondents tended to deny or 
downplay conflicts over land. Although they more or less confirmed that such 
conflicts did exist, they rarely admitted that they had been party to any conflict 
themselves and always stressed that the local authorities had been able to solve 
these conflicts. However, during my last fieldwork period in November and De-
cember 2010, it seemed that land disputes were omnipresent. It was at this time 
                                                 
1 According to Huggins, statistics on the average size of land holdings vary slightly and the average size 
decreased by 25% between 1990 and 2000. In a 2012 report used by Huggins (2013: 1), the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Animal Resources estimated that the average size was 0.76 ha, which was higher 
than previous estimates.
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that land registration, which was introduced in the 2005 (and later 2013) Land 
Law, was being carried out in the research area and my research assistant and I 
were often confronted with land disputes. We witnessed them when watching the 
demarcation procedure during land registration. They were mentioned, often 
without any probing on our part, by many of the people we encountered: villag-
ers who were queuing to meet the village authority, the authorities themselves 
and numerous other respondents. Sometimes people even called on us for advice 
about solving their problems. Most conflicts that came before local mediators 
also concerned land and, indirectly, these conflicts often had to do with land 
sharing between the Hutu population and returned Tutsi refugees that took place 
in 1996 and 1997.  
The tensions and conflicts we came across were an indication of the state of 
social relations among Rwanda’s rural population, which were already strained
following the 1994 genocide and the ethnically-related violence that occurred 
around the time of Rwanda’s independence.2 In addition, recent, but also older, 
land-tenure policies like the above-mentioned land registration and land sharing 
seem to have had a negative impact on social relations between Rwanda’s vari-
ous ethnic and social groups. The central question in this thesis is: 
How do government policies concerning access to land and land tenure in rural post-conflict 
Rwanda influence local community relations (including ethnicity) and land conflicts?  
The reason why I wanted to research land issues was because I am ultimately 
interested in Rwanda’s current social relations and the role of ethnicity in these 
relationships. Land access is thus used as a lens through which to look at present-
day Rwandan society and its current social tensions.  
This introduction is divided into four parts. The first discusses Rwanda’s re-
cent history and examines the 1994 genocide that targeted the Tutsi population, 
the issue of land scarcity and conflict and genocide-related violence. The second 
section takes us to present-day Rwanda and considers the nature of the Rwandan 
government, its strong social-engineering policies and the role ethnicity plays in 
social relations and politics. The third part of the chapter presents a brief intro-
duction to the research area, the research questions and some general remarks 
about the research itself. It does not, however, delve into the research methods 
used as these are described in Chapter 2. The last section discusses the way land 
access is related to social relations and authority in general and applies this to the 
Rwandan context, before finishing with an outline of the chapters. 
                                                 
2 This ethnic violence is described in more detail in Chapter 3.
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Living through a Genocide 
Twenty years after the event, ‘the horror of the 1994 genocide is still omnipres-
ent in Rwanda. It serves as a foundation for private arguments and public poli-
cies; the individual and collective raison d’être of the nation and its people is 
built around the genocide’ (Buckley-Zistel 2006: 136, italics in original). Rwan-
da’s social fabric was largely destroyed after the genocide and the population is 
still haunted by memories of both it and the 1990-1994 civil war between the 
Hutu-dominated government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that was 
operating from southern Uganda and northeastern Rwanda. The rebel army con-
sisted mainly of (descendants of) Tutsi refugees who had fled Rwanda thirty 
years earlier when the Hutu majority took over power from the Belgians. The 
genocide started on 6 April 1994 when the presidential plane with Hutu President 
Habyarimana on board was shot down near Kigali Airport. Within hours, Hutu 
hardliners, who had opposed peace negotiations between Habyarimana and the 
RPF, took power and the first Tutsi as well as Hutu moderates were killed. The 
violence was restricted to the capital Kigali in the first few days, but the killings 
then spread to the rest of the country. The genocide ended in early July when the 
RPF defeated the Rwandan army and took power.3
In southeastern Rwanda where this research took place, Nyarubuye Catholic 
Church was named as a spot where one of the ‘most devastating massacres of the 
genocide’ took place (Des Forges 1999: 211). About 35,000 people were said to 
be killed in or near this church (website Genocide Archive Rwanda)4 and some 
of my respondents described to me how they survived the killings there. Some 
regions suffered for shorter periods of time because the RPF established power 
there fairly quickly (Prunier 1995: 261, 702) and it was already in power in my 
research area by the end of April 1994 (Des Forges 1999: 295). Many respond-
ents recounted how the RPF’s aim had been to establish security by placing the 
remaining population (genocide survivors and Hutu) in camps. 
The genocide was notorious for its cruelty, thorough organization, mass partic-
ipation and speed. It was a deliberate, systematic and state-led attempt to exter-
minate the country’s Tutsi minority and can be regarded as ‘the twentieth centu-
ry’s most rapid extermination campaign’ (Straus 2006: 1). In only 100 days, 
more than half a million people, mostly Tutsi but also Hutu who opposed the 
genocidal regime, were killed and almost two million people fled Rwanda. The 
violence was public (Ibid.), with ordinary citizens involved in killing their neigh-
                                                 
3 For more detailed accounts, see the many publications on the course and causes of the genocide. For 
example Guichaoua (2010), Mamdani (2002), Verwimp (2013), Newbury & Newbury (1999), 
Newbury (1998), Prunier (1995), Straus (2006), Wagner (1998) and Fujii (2009).
4 http://genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php?title=Nyarubuye_Memorial&gsearch=Nyarubuye, 
accessed 21 June 2015.
209573-L-bw-ASC
4
bours, helped and incited by militia groups formed by various political parties. 
The most infamous was the Interahamwe5 − the Presidential Guard and local 
self-defence groups that had been armed by the authorities in the months preced-
ing the genocide (Zorbas 2004: 31). Every sector of society was involved in the 
killings: farmers, doctors, nurses, teachers, government officials of all levels and 
even children, nuns and priests. Tutsi and moderate Hutu were not only killed on 
the streets and in their own homes but also in schools, hospitals and churches 
where they sought refuge (Kindiki 2001: 66). The killers often knew their victims 
as they were neighbours, fellow students and teachers, colleagues or even rela-
tives (Newbury 1998: 78).  
Accounts of the massacres are horrific and it is hard to believe that so many 
ordinary people could have participated in the killings. In the words of Straus, 
people were killed in a ‘low-tech’ way with ordinary farm tools, such as hoes, 
machetes and clubs covered with nails (Straus 2006: 1). Many killers did not just 
kill their victims but took the time to torture them first, to rape and mutilate them, 
chopping off their limbs, noses and/or breasts. Some victims were burned alive 
and women were raped, even when they were already badly wounded 
(Magnarella 2000: 21). In the end, about 75% of the Tutsi population were mas-
sacred and, today, even after many Tutsi returned following the RPF victory, on-
ly 5% of the current population are survivors of the genocide (personal commu-
nication Dr J.P. Kimonyo, August 2004). After its military victory, the RPF in-
herited a devastated country when it took office on 19 July 1994. In addition to 
the casualties, who amounted to almost 13% of the population, two million refu-
gees were living abroad. Over one million were IDPs (internally displaced per-
sons), tens of thousands of genocide survivors were deeply traumatized and over 
half a million Tutsi refugees returned to Rwanda. There was a lot of material 
damage as a result of the genocide: the country’s basic infrastructure was de-
stroyed, banks and businesses had been plundered, the civil service, healthcare 
facilities and educational establishments were in chaos and crops and livestock 
had been lost (Reyntjens 2004: 178).  
Straus researched the local dynamics of genocidal violence and interviewed con-
victed perpetrators who had pleaded guilty. He states that three key factors ex-
plained the switch individuals made from seeing people of the other ethnic group 
as neighbours to seeing them as enemies who should be killed (Straus 2006: 
225).6 The first was the war (1990-1994) that legitimized violence and led the 
                                                 
5 This militia grew out of a youth wing of the then ruling party and translates into ‘those who work 
together’. After the genocide, the label Interahamwe was used for everyone who had participated or 
was suspected of having participated in the genocide (Ingelaere 2012: 11).
6 Straus (2006: 107-108) describes these perpetrators as ordinary adult men in terms of age, education, 
family status and occupation.
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perpetrators to defend themselves against the advancing RPF rebels. As one of 
his respondents explained: ‘We believed that if the Inyenzi [Rwandan word for 
cockroaches by which the RPF was meant] arrived, they would find no one, that 
they would no longer have the force to kill us or take power’ (Ibid.: 160-161). 
Furthermore, the war and the assassination of President Habyarimana generated 
fear, anger and uncertainty, which instigated violence among some Rwandans. 
Straus believes that the genocide would not have happened if there had not been 
a war but that the war alone did not cause the genocide. A second essential factor 
concerns the role of the Hutu hardliners who controlled the state and, after realiz-
ing that they were losing the war, decided to exterminate all Tutsi in order to stay 
in power (Ibid.: 224-227). They could mobilize part of the population because 
‘the state in Rwanda is a powerful tool for executing decisions and mobilizing 
citizens. By controlling it, the hardliners had the coercive means to enforce their 
position nationwide’ (Ibid.: 224-225). Related to this is the strong intra-group 
enforcement and coercion that made many Hutu men feel they had no other 
choice than to participate in the violence. In fact, intra-ethnic coercion seems to 
have been a more important determinant than interethnic enmity (Ibid.: 148, 
151). Interethnic enmity is linked to the third factor, namely collective ethnic 
categorization, due to widely recognized and pre-existing categories and ethni-
cally based political ideologies (Ibid.: 173, 225-226). Without these conditions, 
the call from the authorities to kill Tutsi would not have ‘resonated’ (Ibid.: 226). 
Many of the perpetrators claimed that ‘the enemy is one, it is the Tutsi’ and Tutsi 
became ‘a single entity with identical-and permanent-intentions’ (Ibid.: 173).  
Straus concluded that material gain was only the motivation for a small pro-
portion of the perpetrators, with 5.2% of his respondents naming it as one of sev-
eral motives for participating in the killings and that, for most perpetrators, the 
looting and appropriation came only after the killings had taken place (Ibid.: 136-
138, 149). The next paragraph examines the link between land scarcity and vio-
lence in Rwanda. 
Land Scarcity and Violence in Rwanda 
Rwanda’s history of land access has been characterized by the insecurity of land 
tenure and increased land scarcity7 that have led to growing landlessness8 and 
land conflicts. Many researchers have stressed the context of increasing land 
scarcity and limited off-farm employment opportunities in Rwanda and pointed 
                                                 
7 Growing land scarcity in relation to the implementation of land policies in the research area is 
discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. 
8 According to Huggins (2011: 255, 260, Note 3), at least 11.5% of the population are landless and 
about 30% of Rwandan households own less than 0.2 ha, whereas the UN estimates that 0.7 ha is 
necessary to be food secure. 
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to aggravating factors like overpopulation (435 people per km2 in 2012),9 rapid 
demographic growth (of 2.7% average for 2010-2015)10 as well as environmental 
degradation. As a result, many plots are too small today to be viable (Musahara 
& Huggins 2005: 299-301; Pottier 2002: 184; André & Lavigne Delville 1998: 
162; Blarel 1994: 71). Chapter 4 discusses the issue of land access and scarcity 
since the 1980s, while the focus here is on the relationship between land scarcity 
and conflict in Rwanda, with the emphasis on the 1994 genocide and whether 
Rwanda was (and possibly still is) in a ‘Malthusian trap’.11
During research into the causes and the course of the genocide throughout 
Rwanda, Des Forges and her team found that people who killed took over and 
contested the ownership of property of massacred Tutsi families in many parts of 
the country. This led her to conclude that ‘the prompt parcelling out of the vic-
tim’s land demonstrated the solid advantage to be gained by joining in attacks 
and no doubt tempted some to kill who would not otherwise have done so’ (Des
Forges 1999: 300).12 Rose (2007) interviewed some 120 Hutu prisoners accused 
of genocide and about 15 prison officers (mostly Tutsi directors and social work-
ers) to hear their perspectives on the appropriation of land during and after the 
genocide. She found four connections between land and the Rwandan genocide. 
Firstly she mentions Hutu participation in the genocide to gain land as a reward. 
A second connection concerns Hutu activities in the genocide that were aimed at 
preventing any loss of land to the invading RPF that would, it was assumed, re-
distribute land to returning Tutsi refugees. A third aspect is that both Hutu and 
Tutsi used the uncertainty and insecurity surrounding land ownership and rights 
during and after the genocide to seize land. The fourth point concerns genocide 
accusations following the genocide, which were mostly made by Tutsi in an at-
tempt to take over land owned by Hutu. Although the prisoners interviewed 
acknowledged all four connections, they mainly complained about the last two, 
indicating that their imprisonment jeopardized their right to land. (Rose 2007: 53, 
65). By comparing prisoners’ and prison officers’ perspectives on land and geno-
cide, Rose found that both groups agreed that land theft had occurred during all 
the phases of the genocide and that land seizures were politicized, were orga-
                                                 
9 Source UN Data: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=rwanda. Accessed 17 December 
2014.
10 Source UN Data: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=rwanda. Accessed 17 December 
2014. Rwanda had the highest fertility rate (8.3) in the world in the 1980s (Musahara & Huggins 
2005: 299).
11 According to Malthus, food production would not be able to keep up with population growth and this 
would result in famine, disease and/or war (Verpoorten 2011: 2). Malthusian can be explained as ‘of 
or relating to Malthus or to his theory that population tends to increase at a faster rate than its means 
of subsistence and that unless it is checked by moral restraint or by disease, famine, war, or other 
disaster widespread poverty and degradation inevitably result’ (Merriam-Webster Dictionary: 
http://www.merriam-webster.com).
12 This observation is supported by Prunier (1995: 142) and Mamdani (2002: 197).
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nized by local or national leaders and were ethnic in nature. However, the prison-
ers suggested that the appropriation of land continued after the genocide, and 
they regarded the villagization and land-sharing policies as examples of orga-
nized forms of land theft (see Chapter 4). Officials in turn denied there being any 
organized, politicized or ethnic aspects behind the land looting and considered 
the post-genocide theft of land as individual acts. These officials felt that many 
prisoners had been involved in killings in order to seize their victims’ land and 
that prisoners’ land-grabbing accusations were meant to divert attention away 
from their genocidal crimes (Ibid.: 64-65). For their part, the prisoners acknowl-
edged that they had taken the land or other property of Tutsi victims but under-
lined that this was done randomly and was not premeditated (Ibid.: 55-56). While 
Rose maintains that both during and after the genocide individuals took ad-
vantage of the situation to seize land that they would not otherwise have been 
able to access, her data show that land played a significant role. It was, neverthe-
less, not the main factor that motivated people to kill others (Ibid.: 66). 
André & Platteau (1998) have argued that, in the years prior to the 1994 geno-
cide, land inequality and absolute poverty increased significantly because quasi 
landlessness (especially among young people) and land fragmentation were 
growing rapidly and most land-poor families were unable to generate additional 
off-farm income.13 They describe how this negatively affected the social fabric of 
their community of study and led to an increase in (land) conflicts, tensions and 
violence. Due to these increasing inter- and intra-family land conflicts, they 
placed the 1990-1994 civil war and 1994 genocide in a context of extreme land 
pressure and concluded that people took the opportunity to settle old scores dur-
ing the genocide and/or expand their land holdings. They based their analysis on 
fieldwork in 1988 and 1993 in a community in north-western Rwanda. When the 
genocide started, the only Tutsi in this community was the first to be killed. 
However, many other people died before and during the genocide and can be cat-
egorized in two groups: people who were seen as ‘troublemakers’, and those with 
comparatively large landholdings (André & Platteau 1998: 38-40).14 Somewhat 
hidden in a footnote, André & Platteau (1998: 40) reveal that ‘it is not rare, even 
today, to hear Rwandans argue that a war is necessary to wipe out an excess of 
                                                 
13 Their observation is supported by Uvin (1998: 195) who mentions that several studies have shown 
that people who acquired a significant income from off-farm activities were able to increase their 
agricultural productivity, thus implying that the inverse was also the case.
14 The former group was made up of people who were suspected/ accused of poisoning or had a violent 
nature and were involved in all kinds of conflicts, including land disputes. Almost half of these people 
were massacred: two out of three suspected poisoners and three of the eight violent persons. The land-
rich group consisted of either older people (50+) who had accumulated a lot of land and of whom 18% 
perished (or 35% if only the men are considered) or younger persons who had purchased numerous 
parcels with their regular off-farm income and had aroused jealousy and hatred because of this 
economic success, and of whom one third were killed (André & Platteau 1998: 38-40). Land-rich 
people had a higher risk of dying violently during or shortly after the genocide (Verwimp 2013: 442).
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population and to bring numbers into line with the available land resources’. Alt-
hough they clearly state that land scarcity and the lack of off-farm employment 
opportunities were not a direct cause of the civil war and genocide, they also 
stress that these circumstances can explain why violence spread so quickly and 
devastatingly throughout the country. They concluded that: 
… the prevailing state of land hunger created a troubled environment which made the most 
desperate people (particularly young people with only bleak prospects) ready to seize any 
opportunity to change their present predicament or reverse the present order of things. More-
over, the climate of violence which had got a hold over the people in the area produced the 
right predispositions and circumstances for the slaughter that was to ensue. (André & 
Platteau 1998: 38)  
As the title of their often-cited article ‘Land Relations Under Unbearable Stress: 
Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap’ suggests, André & Platteau consider that 
Rwanda is indeed in a Malthusian trap.15 However this is denied in Uvin’s 1998 
Aiding Violence. The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, in which the author 
disagrees with the ‘hard’ Malthusian argument that overpopulation and land 
scarcity16 will unavoidably result in social conflict and communal violence. He 
concludes that he is also no adherent of the ‘soft’ Malthusian argument. This 
‘soft’ argument claims that, even though resource scarcity may cause social ten-
sions, outcomes vary because of the nature of social relations and the state as 
well as other intervening variables. It concludes that the role land scarcity played 
in processes that led to the genocide cannot therefore be understood in isolation 
from political processes (Uvin 1998: 180-184).17 Uvin (1998: 184) is convinced 
of a third school of thought that does not see a direct relationship between land 
scarcity and violence ‘for the main reason that it does not consider the former to 
be a natural construct but a social one, the result of human agency’. History, poli-
tics and economics are thus the independent variables that influence if and to 
what extent violence occurs. According to his analysis of the coping strategies of 
Rwandan farmers and the government, the country’s pre-genocide agriculture 
was very traditional, in ‘the very early stages of progress’ (Ibid.: 195) and addi-
tional intensification was still possible.18 He also claims that the fact that pre-
genocide Rwanda had run out of land was not an abrupt, discrete event that took 
                                                 
15 Interestingly, Verwimp (2013: 27-28) found that President Habyarimana, who was in power from 
1973 until his death at the onset of the genocide on 6 April 1994, showed Malthusian beliefs in his 
speeches in the mid-1980s and referred to the demographic problem several times, claiming that 
Rwanda’s annual population growth was higher than its production growth. Verwimp analysed the 
relationship between the 1994 genocide and Rwanda’s development system.
16 Uvin used the term resource scarcity but mainly addressed land-related problems and therefore I use 
the term land scarcity instead.
17 Uvin is not clear about his opinion of André & Platteau’s position as he does not mention them as 
examples of the ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ Malthusian argument.
18 Uvin (1998: 149), citing Marysse (1982) and Voyame et al. (1996), estimates that the budget for 
agriculture in the 1970s and 1980s never exceeded 5% (which resulted in agriculture coming in 10th
place in the government’s 1980 budget) and most of it went on promoting export crops.
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place in 1994 but was rather a process that, at least until the mid-1980s, had al-
ways been coped with quite well.  
Uvin presented two hypotheses on the possible link between land scarcity and 
genocidal violence (Ibid.: 195-200). The first states that severe land scarcity and 
limited off-farm opportunities created strong feelings about land. As a result, 
land conflicts were frequent and fears of losing land provoked profound insecuri-
ty. In turn, fear and intense feelings regarding land could engender violence and 
conflict ‘either as (perceived) self-defence against threats or through a process of 
opportunism’ (Ibid.: 199). These fears were aggravated by the civil war because 
the invasion of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in October 
1990, which is discussed in the next section, instigated anxiety among many Hu-
tu. Especially those farmers who had taken over the land of Tutsi who had fled 
earlier massacres in the 1960s and early 1970s feared that, in the case of an RPF 
victory, they would lose land to these Tutsi (Ibid.: 198-199). This reasoning was 
previously suggested by Rose, and Verwimp also argues that several groups 
within Rwandan society feared they would lose their benefits and that ‘the per-
spective of losing one’s assets, one’s opportunities or even one’s life can drive 
people to strike pre-emptively’ (Verwimp 2013: 177).19
Uvin’s second hypothesis deals with the economic crisis in the mid-1980s that 
led to a sharp decline in food production and resulted in desperate situations, es-
pecially for the younger generation. As the 1990-1994 civil war led to massive 
displacement and a further decline in food production, ‘the agricultural crisis, 
compounded by the RPF invasion, set in motion processes of impoverishment 
and marginalization that provided a fertile breeding ground for extremism and 
violence’ (Uvin 1998: 199).20
However, in the end, Uvin dismissed these hypotheses as ‘circumstantial’, ar-
guing that the hard facts are missing: there is hardly any ‘micro-information’ 
about who killed who and for what reason. What is also missing is what Uvin 
calls ‘automaticity’ because the violence did not spontaneously erupt among the 
land-poor but needed an external intervention, in this case an urban impetus by 
the ruling elite and associated extremists. The target was culturally defined be-
cause people’s anger did not turn against the political elite ‘whose policies con-
tributed to the crisis and who were visibly enriching themselves and buying up 
land’. Instead, this elite led the population in the massacres (Ibid.: 200). Due to 
the ecological, economic and political processes that play a role in violent con-
flicts, Uvin ultimately − and to his own surprise − dismissed the link between 
ecological scarcity and the genocide. However, he concluded that ‘even though 
                                                 
19 Verwimp (2013: 177) also explains this fear by referring to interviews with prisoners who said that ‘if 
we did not act first, the Tutsi would kill us all’.
20 He specifically refers to a new Lumpenproletariat of mainly young, urban men who were relegated to 
begging, a situation that provoked frustration and a loss of self-respect (Uvin 1998: 199). 
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political conflicts may not be “caused” in any direct way by environmental issues 
(but rather by long-standing political strategies and social constructions), the dy-
namics related to ecological resource scarcity will play a role in the conflict’ 
(Uvin 1996, as cited in Uvin 1998: 201).21
Verpoorten (2011: 3) introduces a more moderate view regarding the Malthu-
sian trap, suggesting that a global catastrophe is unlikely but that ‘the world may 
experience local catastrophes if local market and non-market institutions fail to 
enable households to meet their subsistence requirements and cannot resolve the 
tensions that may stem from this failure’. Analysis of the relationship between 
population pressure and genocidal massacres in 1294 small administrative units 
found that the death toll was significantly higher in communities where there was 
high population pressure. Furthermore, in areas where many young men were 
still single (which Verpoorten considered to be an indication of landlessness),22
fewer Tutsi survived the genocide. These two factors, when combined, contribut-
ed to the killings. The question remains as to whether the killers were driven by 
need, by the opportunity to loot or by the fear that they would lose the little land 
they had. Other explanations could be that, in densely populated areas, there were 
more assets to loot or that the elite could more easily mobilize the population 
because of land and labour-related dependency relations (Ibid.: 1-2, 16-19). In 
line with Uvin’s final conclusion and in support of André & Platteau’s and 
Rose’s views, Verpoorten (2011: 19) argues that:
These findings do not indicate that extreme scarcity of land resources caused the onset of the 
genocidal campaign, but they clearly indicate that, once the bandwagon was set in motion, 
resources were a significant factor in explaining the intensity of the violence.  
All these authors highlight the relationship between land scarcity and violence 
when they conclude that land scarcity played a role in the genocide even though 
a direct causal link cannot be determined. As Ansoms states in her research on 
rural poverty in Rwanda, the question as to whether Rwanda will be caught in a 
Malthusian trap remains unresolved. She suggests that, with all arable land now-
adays in use, Rwanda has reached the point of ‘total resource depletion’ and that 
‘successfully coping with land scarcity is, therefore, entirely conditional upon the 
ability of the rural sector to go beyond the current ecological and productivity 
boundaries of the natural resource base’ (Ansoms 2009a: 149). I will return to the 
question as to whether Rwanda is caught in a Malthusian trap in Chapter 8. The 
                                                 
21 his conclusion is supported by Mamdani (2002: 198, italics in original) who claims that ‘we need to 
keep in mind that there is no necessary connection between a drastic reduction in resources and deadly 
human conflict […] The connection between the constraints under which we live and the choices we 
do make is mediated through how we understand and explain these constraints and the resources we 
can muster to change them’. 
22 Young people in Rwanda can only marry after the groom has acquired a plot on which to build a 
house.
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next section is again about violence and deals with the structural violence in 
which the genocide occurred and with massacres and other acts of violence that 
took place during and shortly after the genocide. 
Genocide-Related Violence 
The context of structural violence in which the genocide occurred is an important 
factor because, according to Uvin, this violence was addressed against the major-
ity of the population and manifested itself ‘in a deep and widening inequality of 
life chances; corruption, arbitrariness, and impunity; the permanence of social 
and economic exclusion; lack of access to information, education, health and 
minimal basic needs; and an authoritarian and condescending state and aid sys-
tem’ (Uvin 1998: 107). The aid system preserved and contributed to the structur-
al violence, negatively affecting the effectiveness of development programmes 
(Ibid.: 110), while interaction between the population and these systems led to 
‘processes of humiliation and disempowerment’ and ‘deprive[d] people of their 
self-respect and creativity, making them vulnerable to manipulation and simplis-
tic ideas’ (Uvin 1998: 109). He connects this with the genocide when stating that 
‘as such, it creates anger, resentment, and frustration, which contribute to the 
erosion of social capital and norms in society. A population that is cynical, angry, 
and frustrated is predisposed to scapegoating and projection, vulnerable to ma-
nipulation, deeply afraid of the future, and desperate for change’ (Ibid.). And he 
concludes that the context of the economic and political crises in the 1990s in-
creased the danger of structural violence becoming acute (Ibid.: 107).23
In addition to genocidal violence, the country − primarily the north and the 
east − was also the scene of massacres and other acts of violence against the Hutu 
population by the RPF that fought the Hutu hardliners (Prunier 1995: 359; Des 
Forges 1999). Since this violence also took place in my research area, it is im-
portant to discuss it too. Des Forges argues that when the RPF advanced to take 
power after the start of the genocide, hundreds of thousands of civilians fled be-
fore its forces arrived, having heard stories about RPF atrocities or because the 
local authorities ordered them to flee (Des Forges 1999: 702). Amnesty Interna-
tional has investigated killings and abductions committed by the RPF between 
April and August 1994 and concluded that hundreds if not thousands of unarmed 
civilians and armed opponents were ‘summarily executed or otherwise deliber-
ately and arbitrarily killed’ (Amnesty International 1994: 3). Most killings took 
place in northeastern Rwanda but the report also mentions assassinations of un-
armed people in the southeast of the country (Ibid.: 4). Most of these massacres 
                                                 
23 In Aiding Violence. The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, Uvin (1998) argues that the international 
development community in Rwanda preserved and contributed to structural violence.
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were not committed in combat but during community meetings, for example 
when people were instructed to assemble to receive salt or food and were then 
attacked by RPF soldiers (Des Forges 1999: 705-706).  
The Gersony Report, which was named after a UNHCR head of mission in-
vestigating the speeding-up of the repatriation of the nearly two million refugees, 
provides a more detailed account of the violence committed by the RPF.24 In a 
presentation on 10 October 1994 to a UN commission of experts on Rwanda, 
Gersony stated that the unarmed Hutu population had been systematically killed 
and persecuted by the RPF, particularly in southern and eastern Rwanda and near 
Kigali. He estimated that between 5000 and 10,000 people were killed in these 
regions each month between late April and the end of August 1994 (Gersony 
1994). Des Forges estimates that, from the evidence gathered, the minimum 
number of dead can be put at between 25,000 and 30,000 (Des Forges 1999: 
734), although Prunier argues that the number of those killed by the RPF could 
well have reached 100,000.25 In line with Des Forges’s findings, Gersony states 
that the massacres not only happened at community meetings but also during 
house-to-house searches, in attacks on villages and displacement camps and 
among people who were in hiding. He also reported the assassination of returned 
refugees and of the sick and elderly who were not able to flee or hide and were 
killed in their own homes. The countryside of southern and eastern Butare and 
southern Kibungo, where my research took place, was virtually deserted 
(Gersony 1994).26 Chapter 4 discusses RPF violence used against some of my 
                                                 
24  Amnesty International produced a report in 1994 on the atrocities committed by the RPF: ‘Amnesty 
International has known for several years that the RPF closely monitored and controlled movements 
of foreigners in areas under its control. Journalists and representatives of humanitarian organizations 
rarely talked to Rwandese citizens under RPF control without an RPF official being present. This 
ensured that before the new government came to power on 19 July 1994 very limited information 
about abuses by the RPA [Rwandan Patriotic Army, RPF’s military wing] could be gathered or made 
public by independent observers’ (Amnesty International 1994: 2). However, Gersony and his two 
colleagues were allowed to travel freely and spoke to many witnesses in Rwanda as the newly 
installed government believed that the mission’s work would support its efforts and encourage 
refugees to return to Rwanda (Des Forges 1999: 727). 
25 Prunier (1995: 360) also mentions the practice of ‘corpse confusion’ when fresh corpses were laid 
beside the bodies of genocide victims. This finding is supported by Buckley-Zistel (2006: 138) who 
quotes a woman whose husband was in prison as saying ‘First of all, we cannot identify the people 
they put into the memorial sites. They took all the bones. And no particular ethnicity died, all Hutu 
and Tutsi died’. An informant also mentioned an inquiry into genocide memorials in which the 
population revealed that genocide survivors had been told to exhume the corpses of Hutu victims and 
put them with Tutsi genocide victims.
26 The results of Gersony’s investigations were shared with relevant UN and US representatives. 
However, as Des Forges states, ‘leading authorities at the U.N. and in national [U.S. and Rwandan] 
governments were troubled by this information. They wanted the slaughter to end but they were 
reluctant to make any criticisms that might weaken the new Rwandan government’ (Des Forges 1999: 
731). Although the main findings were leaked to the press, Gersony was told not to write a report or to 
talk about his findings. UNHCR then only produced a confidential note for internal use and an even 
shorter statement for the special rapporteur on Rwanda of the Human Rights Commission. Des Forges 
209573-L-bw-ASC
13
respondents in more detail. When the civil war and genocide ended in July 1994, 
the RPF took power and it has governed Rwanda ever since. The next three sec-
tions examine the current Rwandan state in more detail. 
Remaking Rwanda 
The focus of this thesis is on social relations and the way they are being affected 
by land and land(-related) policies, and hence the role of the Rwandan state is 
another dominant theme, especially its engagement in ambitious social engineer-
ing (Straus & Waldorf 2011: 8). Referring in their title (Remaking Rwanda) and 
introduction (Seeing Like a Post-Conflict State) to James Scott’s widely read 
book Seeing like a State, Straus & Waldorf show how the Rwandan government 
has been engaged in social engineering with high-modernist ambitions and tac-
tics as described in Scott’s book. With its ‘highly ambitious policy of reconstruc-
tion and development’, the government not only wants to change governance and 
economic structures but also to ‘alter social identities, cultural norms and indi-
vidual behaviour’ (Ibid.: 4). They describe how the RPF intends to radically 
change the social order that resulted in the genocide and prevent future violence 
by practising social engineering in four main domains: the political arena, the 
economic sector, the spatial arena and the behavioural and cultural arena (Ibid.:
8-10). Examples of all four arenas are found throughout this thesis.  
With regard to the political arena, the current government is using every pos-
sible way of dismantling or weakening political opposition, an independent civil 
society and independent media. In addition, the ruling RPF has been trying to 
incorporate more ordinary citizens into the party (that they refer to as the 
umuryango [family or lineage]) through recruitment drives and ‘animation’ ses-
sions. Straus & Waldorf highlight how this policy shows remarkable resem-
blances to the former Hutu-dominated, one-party regime where all citizens were 
‘born’ members of the then ruling party (Ibid.: 10). 
Social engineering is being applied to the economy too and this sector is dom-
inated by the RPF’s developmental state agenda that envisages Rwanda becom-
ing the ‘Singapore of Africa’ and a major African ICT hub. The agenda is being 
determined to fundamentally transform the agricultural sector into larger agri-
businesses and ranching enterprises (Ibid.: 9-10). With land reform as a central 
theme in this thesis, we will return to this subject in more detail later. 
The third arena involves what Straus & Waldorf describe as the spatial config-
uration of Rwanda. As an example, they mention the villagization policy that 
creates village structures ‘in order to modernize, rationalize, and control the 
                                                 
(1999: 730-731) shows that when the latter asked for more information in March 1996, the UN High 
Commissioner responded that the ‘Gersony Report’ did not exist.
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countryside’ (Ibid.: 9). As this policy was rigidly carried out in my research area, 
villagization is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Other examples include the re-
drawing of the map of Rwanda in 2005 when the names of many cities, towns 
and other places were changed and Rwanda’s ten provinces were reduced to four 
with the rather ‘rationalistic, legible names’ of Northern, Southern, Western and 
Eastern. As part of its decentralization policy, the state’s administrative units 
were transformed and their powers and responsibilities redistributed. Finally, the 
government introduced a new flag and national anthem and added English as a 
national language (Ibid.).
Social engineering has also focused on the behavioural and cultural arena. The 
coercion accompanying the policy of national unity and the reconciliation and re-
education programmes with which numerous Rwandans are being confronted 
have already been discussed.27 In addition, compulsory meetings at gacaca
courts28 were used to teach the population about the bad governance of the geno-
cidal regime and to promote new social values. The population is also forced to 
comply with new regulations concerning personal hygiene and appearance. For 
example, some cultural habits, like drinking banana beer together through a 
shared straw that was a symbol of reconciliation and social trust, have now been 
banned (Ibid.: 8-9). Chapter 5 will discuss other social obligations and prohibi-
tions that are altering people’s behaviour.
Scott has described the government’s high-modernity ideology as a ‘strong, 
one might even say muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence about scientific 
and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of 
human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and, above all, the 
rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of 
natural laws’ (Scott 1999: 4). This high modernist ideology is considered an im-
portant element of large-scale reform programmes like collectivization in Russia 
or villagization in Tanzania and forms part of Rwanda’s aforementioned social 
engineering strategies. Scott mentions other elements too, such as the administra-
tive ordering of nature and society (that the Rwandan government has also mas-
tered), an authoritarian state that is willing and able to ‘use the full weight of its 
coercive power’ to reform (which is also the case in Rwanda) and a ‘prostrate 
civil society that lacks the capacity to resist these plans’ (also a reality in Rwan-
da) and concludes that all four make the state-enforced social engineering project 
potentially ‘lethal’ (Ibid.: 4-5). This thesis considers various land or land-related 
reforms, one of which is the villagization that was part of Scott’s study, and ex-
                                                 
27 With regard to re-education programmes for released prisoners, Bouka stresses that ex-prisoners feel 
intimidated because they are repeatedly told that they have to set a good example, answer immediately 
when authorities call on them, obey orders and refrain from ‘causing trouble’ (Bouka 2013: 116).
28 Gacaca are local courts that functioned between 2005 and 2012. They were based on a traditional 
conflict-resolving mechanism that was transformed to try certain categories of genocide suspects.
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amines whether these reforms and other state-led social engineering projects are 
likely to have similar ‘lethal’ outcomes. This rather gloomy question is related to 
the nature of the current Rwandan government, to which we turn in the next sec-
tion.
The Rwandan Government: ‘Tutsification’ and RPF Dominance
The most important features of the current government are its ‘Tutsification’ and 
the dominance of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Reyntjens (2004: 187-189) alleg-
es that, with the ‘Tutsification’ process, the RPF has ensured that access to 
wealth, power and knowledge are reserved for Tutsi. As a result, by the year 
2000, about 80% of the key office holders (ministers, secretaries of state, gover-
nors, ambassadors, MPs, judges, army commanders and CEOs) were RPF mem-
bers and about 70% were Tutsi. 
An analysis of the ethnic breakdown of the current Rwandan government shows Tutsis hold 
a preponderant percentage of senior positions. Hutus in very senior positions often hold rela-
tively little real authority, and are commonly "twinned" with senior Tutsis who exercise real 
power. The military and security agencies are controlled by Tutsis, generally English speak-
ers who grew up as refugees with President Kagame in Uganda. The 28-member cabinet is 
evenly split among Tutsis and Hutus, but most key ministries are in the hands of Tutsis. 
This quote does not come from a critical researcher but is the start of a summary 
of a cable called ‘Ethnicity in Rwanda: Who Governs the Country?’ that was 
written by the US Embassy in Rwanda on 5 August 2008 and that was published 
by Wikileaks (US Embassy in Rwanda 2008).29 It includes a list of the then min-
isters and secretaries of state and concludes that, of the 118 senior positions the 
embassy analysed, about 65% were occupied by Tutsi. It claims to see a trend as 
another analysis several years earlier showed a similar 66%: 33% split. Important 
ministers, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the heads of the army and the air force, 
military district commanders and the heads of the Rwanda National Police and 
the National Security Service are all Tutsi and, like President Kagame, grew up 
in Uganda and are English-speaking (Ibid.).30
As for RPF dominance, the current government can be equated with the RPF 
because Rwanda is in fact a one-party state. In an article in African Affairs in
2004, Reyntjens shows that the Rwandan government had become fully dominat-
ed by the RPF by 2000: the RPF had monopolized power and eliminated all criti-
cal and opposing voices. He (2011: 32) summarizes these processes as follows:  
                                                 
29 http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08KIGALI525.html. Accessed 20 December 2014.
30 See also Zorbas (2004: 44) on the dominance of English-speaking Tutsi returnees in the higher 
political and economic echelons. Chapter 5 discusses the dominance of Tutsi and RPF members in 
local authorities.
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Having eliminated individual domestic and external troublemakers one at a time, he [presi-
dent Kagame] had neutralized the political opposition by 2003, and civil society by 2004; be-
tween 2000 and 2010, the manipulation of elections allowed him to confer a layer of demo-
cratic legitimacy on what was in reality the gradual closing off of political space; the intro-
duction of legal instruments allowed his regime to tighten its grip.31
His analysis is in line with Longman’s, who claims that the government has 
become an authoritarian regime as it has ‘systematically intimidated, co-opted, 
and suppressed civil society, so that Rwanda today lacks independent social or-
ganizations capable of articulating most public interests.32 The regime tolerates 
very little public criticism, strictly limiting freedoms of speech, press, and asso-
ciation. Political parties are restricted and intimidated, while constraints and ma-
nipulation of the electoral process have prevented elections from being truly free 
and fair’ (Longman 2011: 26). It is within this context of Tutsification, authori-
tarianism and restriction that we need to look into the issue of ethnicity and the 
ways Rwandans and the Rwandan government deal with it, also in relation with 
the past.  
Ethnicity and Ethnicity Politics in Rwanda 
Recent violence in Rwanda has mainly erupted along ethnic lines. Ethnicity is 
still a dominant feature in Rwandan social relations and thus an important theme 
in this thesis. It is, however, an extremely sensitive issue and difficult to research 
because it can never be discussed openly. With regard to ethnicity, I follow Da-
vid & Catherine Newbury’s argument that it ‘is best understood neither as an 
enduring, unchanging element to social formations nor as an instantaneous, re-
cent invention. Instead we see it as an identity contextually configured, one 
which can be understood only through close familiarity with the history of social 
relations and political power’ (Newbury & Newbury 1999: 294). While the gene-
sis of Rwanda’s ethnic identity is explored in Chapter 3, this section is dedicated 
to present-day perceptions of ethnicity and the ethnicity politics of the current 
government. To show how ethnicity and perceptions of ethnic differences are 
still playing a role in everyday life, let me start with some personal anecdotes.33
                                                 
31 Reyntjens’s claims are confirmed in Human Rights Watch 2014 World Report that states that ‘the 
government obstructed opposition parties and independent civil society organizations, and threatened 
its critics. […] The leadership of one of the last remaining independent human rights organizations 
was taken over by pro-government elements’ (Human Rights Watch 2014). 
32 This claim is, in turn, confirmed by Gready (2011: 90), who nevertheless argues that civil society may 
occasionally have some room that is created by electoral and decentralization politics and 
development initiatives.
33 To nuance the role ethnicity plays, I refer to Eltringham (2011: 277) who suggests that if ordinary 
Rwandans were allowed to freely reflect on ethnicity, it could be nuanced and relativized. To support 
his claim, he mentions Scott Straus’s conclusion that Hutu did not participate in the genocide because 
they hated Tutsi, adhered to an ethnic nationalist vision of society or because of racism, and argues 
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Patrice, a driver who worked with me, was a former RPF soldier and had a 
Hutu father and a Tutsi mother. He told me how one of his friends would some-
times tell him sick jokes in which he claimed that it was a good thing that Pa-
trice’s father had died because he had married a Tutsi. His father had to die be-
cause he was a Hutu, his ‘friend’ proclaimed.
My friend Alice, who had been a student at the National University and resi-
dent of its campus, told me that students of different ethnicities do not often en-
gage in (romantic) relationships. She gave the example of a female Tutsi geno-
cide survivor who dated a boy who she thought was a Tutsi survivor but broke up 
with him the moment she found out that he was in fact a Hutu.  
On several occasions, my friend Peter argued that there were now hardly any 
friendships between Hutu and Tutsi. As a Tutsi himself who had returned after 
the genocide, he admitted that he could never marry a Hutu girl. Even though he 
might know that she had not committed any crimes during the genocide, he 
would never know what her family might have done and would feel uneasy be-
cause the Hutu might turn against Tutsi at some time in the future. To illustrate 
this, he added that sometimes when a Tutsi child misbehaves, his family will tell 
him that he is behaving like an Interahamwe.34 This indicates how impossible it 
would be for such a family to incorporate someone from the other ethnic group. 
Peter claimed that behavioural differences between Hutu and Tutsi still exist. 
As an example, he argued that a Hutu will obey an order without asking ques-
tions, whereas a Tutsi will always ask ‘why’. He supported this with an anecdote 
about an American who was involved in the building of the new US Embassy in 
Rwanda. The labour force was working shifts and each shift had a team leader. 
The American wanted to know the difference between Hutu and Tutsi and some-
one volunteered to show him. He asked for a Hutu to come over and ordered him 
to move some bricks from A to B and then back from B to A. The Hutu complet-
ed the task without questioning it. He then called a Tutsi over and asked him to 
do the same but the Tutsi replied that he was part of the ‘cement shift’ and only 
took orders from his team leader. Although this example may seem a bit simplis-
tic, it is still painfully telling because the obedient response of the Hutu popula-
                                                 
that ‘such a discovery, one that should reassure the Rwandan government, was, of course, only 
possible when ethnicity could be freely discussed’.
34 See Footnote 5 for an explanation of Interahamwe. Buckley-Zistel (2006: 141) supports this anecdote 
with two references to Rwanda’s current popular culture in which a rich person, regardless of his 
ethnic identity, is referred to as ‘a Tutsi’ and in which the phrase ‘I am not your Hutu’ is used to fend 
off exploitation and refers to the servitude status of many Hutu in pre-independence Rwanda. 
Nyirubugara, who studied what he calls Rwanda’s ‘memory traps’ because he considers that ethnic 
identities and related memories form a deadly trap, comes with some more proverbs that reveal ethnic 
ideologies: ‘When you lodge a Tutsi in your house, he chases you out of your bed’ (Erny 2005, as 
cited in Nyirubugara 2013: 82) and ‘If you teach a Hutu to shoot a bow, he’ll shoot an arrow into your 
stomach’ (Twagilimana 2003, as cited in Nyirubugara 2013: 82).
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tion to the order to kill Tutsi is often mentioned as an important contributing fac-
tor to the outcome of the genocide.  
All these anecdotes show that ethnicity is still an important social variable. 
Having studied the reconciliation process in post-genocide Rwanda, Zorbas 
(2004: 42) suggests that distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi are more rigid than 
ever. Buckley-Zistel (2006: 131, 135, 139) also believes that there are long-
lasting social, economic and political cleavages between Hutu and Tutsi that are 
based on unchanged prejudices and antagonisms that run even deeper today than 
they did prior to the genocide. Any research has thus to take ethnicity into ac-
count. Ingelaere (2010) feels this is inevitable because ‘Rwanda is a bi-polar so-
ciety with Hutu (approximately 84 per cent) and Tutsi (approximately 14 per 
cent) as the main identity groups marking the social and political landscape’ 
(Ingelaere 2010b: 275, italics in original). To support this statement, he refers to 
a report by Penal Reform International, an international NGO that claims that 
Rwandans do not contest that they are all Rwandans but that their feelings of 
ethnic belonging have not decreased (Ibid.: 275-276). In his research on peas-
ants’ perspectives of the post-genocide political transition, he found that re-
spondents’ ethnic identity seems to have influenced their experiences of this tran-
sition and how they perceive political representation (Ibid.: 291). 
Buckley-Zistel (2006: 134, 142) studied how Rwandans remember their past and 
found that ordinary Rwandans use the coping mechanism of ‘chosen amnesia’. 
All Rwandans, she claims, whether they are Tutsi survivors, released prisoners, 
Hutu with family members in prison, Hutu widows who lost their Tutsi husbands 
or Tutsi returnees, have chosen to ‘forget’ the causes of the genocide and the 
decades of tension between Hutu and Tutsi since independence.35 In spite of the 
many difficulties and compromises they face in their daily lives, enabling some 
form of coexistence means that people refrain from discussing conflicts publicly 
in order to avoid tensions and the destruction of the still-fragile social balance. 
Although bad memories may still be ‘stored in their minds’, people deliberately 
choose not to access them because amnesia serves their current needs better. Re-
membering to forget is essential for local coexistence because ‘a traumatic event 
is deliberately excluded from the discourse in order to prevent a sense of closure 
and to undermine the drawing of fixed boundaries of who is inside and who is 
outside a particular we-group’ (Ibid.: 134).  
When looking at the history of the genocide, Buckley-Zistel remarks that Hutu 
and Tutsi agree on the importance of remembering it and how it targeted the Tut-
si as an ethnic group, but the two groups disagree fundamentally about the de-
                                                 
35 See also Nyirubugara (2013, particularly Chapter 2) for an explanation of parallel remembrances and 
what he calls ‘self-imposed amnesia’. 
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marcation between victims (officially supposed to be Tutsi) and perpetrators (of-
ficially considered to be Hutu).36 This is because many Hutu feel they were also 
victims of the war, of the violence in the refugee camps, of post-genocide RPF 
killings or because they lost family members as a result of the harsh prison con-
ditions. In addition, many Hutu families have endured poverty and sometimes 
destitution due to the imprisonment of family members as the absence of (male) 
labour leads to reduced (agricultural) productivity and families have to provide 
food for imprisoned family members (Ibid.: 137, 139). These Hutu often consider 
themselves as destitute as genocide survivors and feel anger and resentment that 
affect personal and community relations and perpetuate Hutu and Tutsi cleavag-
es. As a result, ‘a lack of understanding and compassion for the other group pre-
vails amongst survivors on one hand and accused and their families on the other, 
and discussion about hierarchies of suffering – debating which victim is more 
severely affected – are common’ (Ibid.: 139).37
Another important memory-related problem is Rwanda’s contested past, 
which is also drawn along ethnic lines. This involves several versions of Rwan-
da’s history, all of which are closely connected to (ethnic) identities because they 
revolve around the nature of the cleavages between Hutu and Tutsi (and Twa)38
and the genesis of Tutsi pre-independence domination. In short, the current gov-
ernment, which is dominated by Tutsi returnees, and Tutsi returnees in general 
adhere to a version of history that claims that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa lived together 
in harmony until the arrival of their colonizers, namely the Germans and then the 
Belgians, who manufactured a local Tutsi elite with whom they ruled Rwanda 
(Zorbas 2004: 41-42). Thomson suggests that the government is able to dictate 
this version of Rwandan history because it controls all public information. It mis-
represents the current level of peace and reconciliation among the population 
(Thomson 2013: 112), while Pottier argues that the government, with the help of 
sympathetic and ill-informed academics and journalists, is eager to rewrite 
Rwanda’s history and history books (Pottier 2002: 127-128). 
The current ‘official’ version of history contrasts sharply with what Rwandans 
were being taught before 1994, when history books suggested that Tutsi were 
foreign invaders who arrived in the region at some point to subjugate and exploit 
the Hutu and Twa (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 2004: 22, as 
cited by Thomson 2013: 50). Chapter 3 delves into Rwanda’s pre-independence 
history and discusses a more nuanced version that nevertheless still shows how 
socio-ethnic tensions prevailed before, during and after the colonial project. Be-
                                                 
36 See Mamdani (2002: 266-267) for a categorization along ethnic lines.
37 This is mentioned again in Chapter 5 that describes the current social relations in my research 
community.
38 The Twa, who represent only about 1% of the population, belong to a Pygmy group.
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sides different narratives related to Rwanda’s pre-independence history, Waldorf 
points out that there is also a narrative concerning the genocide that was con-
structed by the RPF. This claims that the 1994 genocide was a culmination of 
small-scale genocides against Tutsi that were committed in the period around 
independence. According to Waldorf, the RPF believes that the genocide hap-
pened as a result of a colonial policy of divide and rule, bad leadership, extremist 
political parties and ‘a virulently anti-Tutsi ideology, the “hate media” that dis-
seminated this ideology, and an uneducated peasantry steeped in habits of obedi-
ence’ (Waldorf 2011: 50). This narrative as well as the RPF discourse on Rwan-
da’s pre-independence history are being taught in solidarity and re-education 
camps and at civic education training courses (Straus & Waldorf 2011: 8; 
Waldorf 2011: 50).39
Pottier, who studied the current regime’s efforts to recontextualize and ‘re-
imagine’ Rwanda and Rwandan history, proposes that the Tutsi-led government 
uses its version of history as a political tool in its representation of an idyllic and 
harmonious society with no ethnic divisions or ethnic tension. In his view, it has 
‘glossed over significant social complexities not only to mask the pre-colonial 
origins of ethnicity in Rwanda, but also to intellectually justify a system of lead-
ership by Tutsi minority rule’ (Pottier 2002: 110-111, italics in original).  
Although people are trying hard to live together again, Buckley-Zistel has found 
that her respondents took little confidence from any encouraging signs of peace-
ful coexistence like helping neighbours, sharing a beer or inter-ethnic marriage. 
They feel they are only managing to coexist as a result of government coercion, 
fear of the other ethnic group or pure pragmatism, or a combination of all three 
(Buckley-Zistel 2006: 142). Chapters 4 and 5 deal with issues of pragmatism and 
fear in detail. Here we will only briefly examine the question of coercion, to 
which Thomson (2013: 112-113) also refers with regard to compliance with the 
policy of unity and reconciliation, as it is strongly connected to current politics of 
ethnicity. Government coercion is geared towards mitigating (the importance of) 
ethnicity with an official reconciliation discourse that underlines how colonizers 
invented and politicized ethnicity and that, consequently, claims that ethnicity 
                                                 
39 Rwanda scholar Thomson researched the effects on ordinary Rwandans of Rwanda’s national unity 
and reconciliation policy and was ordered to undergo re-education because the government felt that 
her research went against this policy and was sent to an education camp. She described re-education 
as a unity and reconciliation-promoting mechanism that is divided into re-education camps for 
released prisoners, ex-combatants, former soldiers, prostitutes and street children and solidarity camps 
for politicians, civil society and church leaders, gacaca judges and incoming university students 
(Thomson 2011). Participants are lectured for twelve weeks about government programmes, Rwandan 
history (especially the officially recognized version of pre-colonial Rwanda and the genocide) and 
unity and reconciliation (Thomson 2013: 120). 
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never even existed.40 In addition, Rwanda’s National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission (NURC) highlighted in its 2000 Annual Report of Activities how 
the different ethnic groups merely had a socio-political instead of an inborn na-
ture.41 As a result, all references to Tutsi, Hutu, Twa or ethnicity in general have 
been suppressed as they are seen as being divisive (Buckley-Zistel 2006: 142). 
However, ‘the official narrative of “national unity and reconciliation” is broadly 
understood to mean that survivors (read Tutsi) forgive while perpetrators (read 
Hutu) tell the truth about what they did during the genocide’ (Thomson 2013: 
114). Mourning is only officially accepted during the recognized official week of 
mourning in April and this is limited to Tutsi survivors (Ibid.: 116). Many of 
Thomson’s interviewees felt that the RPF was manipulating the way the genocide 
is being remembered ‘to maintain their positions of power and wealth rather than 
truly seeking to unify the country’ (Ibid.: 117). In addition, Waldorf, recognizing 
that the government initially made serious efforts to avoid ethnic labelling, even 
in discourses on the genocide, has observed that ethnicity has been reemphasized 
in official discourses since 2007. A good example is an amendment to the 2003 
Constitution that has replaced the word ‘genocide’ with ‘the 1994 Tutsi geno-
cide’. Waldorf concludes that ‘this emphasis on collective Tutsi victimization 
implicitly imposes collective guilt on Hutu and consequently makes it more diffi-
cult to achieve sustainable coexistence in Rwanda’ (Waldorf 2011: 49; see also 
Nyirubugara 2013, Chapter 3). An interesting development in this respect is that 
President Kagame gave a speech to a group of Rwandan youth in June 2013 in 
which he claimed that every Hutu was guilty of belonging to a group that killed 
on his/her behalf and that all Hutus should stand up and apologize.42 Thomson 
too discusses the collectivization of Hutu guilt for the genocide, arguing that it 
eventually limits the opportunities open to many Hutu when it comes to partici-
pating in community life. She also problematizes the accompanying politiciza-
tion of Tutsi victimhood and individual mourning because, with only Tutsi being 
officially recognized as victims, the experiences of Hutu who were victims of 
RPF-led violence or come from ethnically mixed families are silenced (Thomson 
2013: 115-118).  
Connected to Hutu guilt, collectivization and victimization are the (ex) prison-
ers and their families who are often neglected as they are a controversial and un-
                                                 
40 See also Thomson (2011: 336) and Warshauer Freedman et al. (2011: 301). 
41 For an account of the NURC’s policy and practices on reconciliation and unity, see (Zorbas 2004: 38-
39; Thomson 2013: 110-125).
42 I checked the translation of his speech with two Rwandan acquaintances and they both agreed with the 
given interpretation and felt it would aggravate an already tense situation. In the same speech, 
Kagame threatened to hit the Tanzanian president for suggesting starting negotiations with a Hutu 
rebel group based in eastern DRC that comprises former génocidaires. See 
http://therisingcontinent.wordpress.com/2013/07/04/kagame-publicly-threatening-to-hit-president-
kikwete/. Accessed 4 January 2014. 
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popular group. At the height of the imprisonments, the country’s prisons con-
tained some 130,000 prisoners and almost every Rwandan had at least one and 
probably several family members or acquaintances in jail. Tertsakian (2011: 111) 
describes the horrific circumstances in which prisoners lived and concluded that 
these unacknowledged abuses would negatively affect the government’s recon-
struction and reconciliation efforts because:  
What Rwanda’s prisoners and former prisoners think and do is not a peripheral matter. It af-
fects a significant proportion of the Rwandan population: not only these individuals them-
selves, but the next generation. Children who have seen their parents imprisoned for years 
without justice have grown up harbouring feelings of ethnic victimization. Unless these 
problems are addressed, they will continue to undermine Rwanda’s social and ethnic cohe-
sion, and threaten the country’s future unity. 
In the meantime, the Rwandan government is hoping to promote Rwandan unity 
by replacing ethnic terms with a discourse of all-inclusive ‘Rwandaness’ 
(Buckley-Zistel 2006: 142) or ‘Banyarwanda’ (Zorbas 2004: 43) and with the 
slogan ‘one Rwanda for all Rwandans’ (Thomson 2013: 113). Zorbas (2004: 43, 
italics in original) states that: 
References to identities other than the officially sanctioned Banyarwanda identity are regu-
larly met with informal public shaming campaigns, labelling any individuals who utter these 
propositions as génocidaires [those who committed genocide] sympathisers and even nega-
tionists [concerning the genocide], and can result in formal charges being brought against 
people on the grounds that they are promoting ‘divisionism’.43
There are several legal instruments in place regarding the formal charges that can 
be brought against people: the 2003 Constitution and the 2003 Law Punishing 
Genocide criminalize revisionism, negationism and the trivialization of the geno-
cide, while the 2008 Genocide Ideology Law punishes acts and expressions of 
genocide ideology (Waldorf 2011: 50-56). Although the wording in all three in-
struments is vague and avoids any clear definitions of the crimes they deal with, 
the Genocide Ideology Law is especially problematic because, according to Wal-
dorf, its lack of clarity seems to be deliberate and the law ‘also purposefully con-
flates criminal defamation (and a host of lesser offences) with genocide’ (Ibid.:
55). Waldorf describes how the Rwandan government has used this law to make 
‘sweeping accusations’ of genocide denial and genocide ideology against it crit-
ics (Waldorf 2011: 56), including any political opponents, and that genocide-
related laws as well as a fierce campaign against genocide ideology were used 
against national and international human rights and non-profit organizations,44
the Voice of America and the BBC’s Kinyarwanda radio service. It is argued that 
                                                 
43 See also Eltringham (2011) and Waldorf (2011).
44 Trócaire, Care International, Norwegian People’s Aid and Human Rights Watch are mentioned in 
(Waldorf 2011: 48, 53, 56).
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this demonstrates the current government’s abuse of these laws for personal and 
political gain (Ibid.: 52-59). 
This section has shown how ethnicity is a lived reality and that ethnically 
based antagonisms still exist but are being suppressed in attempts to coexist 
peacefully. ‘Chosen amnesia’ and government coercion are playing an important 
role here. With regard to this amnesia and the different narratives concerning pre-
independent Rwanda and the genocide, it is interesting to note that history has 
not been taught in Rwandan schools since 1994 (Zorbas 2004: 41).45 Buckley-
Zistel’s alarming observation in this context is that, although chosen amnesia 
may be essential for coexistence, it ‘bears the danger of not challenging the so-
cial cleavages that rendered the genocide possible in the first place, and so ob-
structing their transformation in the future’ (Buckley-Zistel 2006: 131). In the 
fight against genocide ideology and negationism, there is an inherent tension be-
tween the government’s reconciliation discourse that aims to eradicate ethnicity 
and its genocide narrative that inevitably emphasizes ethnicity (Eltringham 2011, 
as cited in Waldorf 2011: 49). Instruments that criminalize genocide ideology, 
revisionism or negationism are often used as a political tool to stifle political op-
position and anyone who criticizes the government. With this rather gloomy con-
clusion we end this part on present-day Rwanda and turn to the third part that 
discusses the research.
The Research 
The findings in this volume are based on fieldwork that was carried out in Mu-
binda in Southeast Rwanda. How the fieldwork was carried out is described in 
Chapter 2, while Chapter 4 discusses the post-genocide history of Mubinda and 
Chapter 5 analyses its current social relations and the role of the state. This sec-
tion only provides some brief information about the area around Mubinda and a 
general description of the population of the village. Mubinda is not the real name 
of the village. To ensure the safety of my respondents, I decided at the outset of 
my fieldwork to rename the research village Mubinda and not to specify the sec-
tor in which Mubinda lies. In addition, I have changed the names of all my re-
spondents, informants and research assistants. They are only mentioned by a fic-
titious first name, which is often done in monographs on Rwanda. The decision 
not to mention the real names of my respondents and informants was taken be-
fore the research started but it was only during the writing process that I also al-
tered the names of my two research assistants after one of them read parts of the 
                                                 
45 Warshauer Freedman, Weinstein, Murphy & Longman (2011) describe their efforts to develop 
materials and skills to reinstate history teaching in secondary schools and how tensions regarding 
ethnicity and the official narrative of Rwandan history, which conflict with a critical examination of 
Rwanda’s past, have inhibited curricular reform.
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thesis and realized that being so closely associated with the project made her feel 
uneasy. Chapter 2 explains, to some extent, why she reacted this way and dis-
cusses the very significant contribution these assistants made to the quality of the 
research data. 
Map Rwanda 
The Research Area 
Rwanda can be divided into three main agricultural zones and eastern Rwanda is 
a virtually flat and relatively low plateau with high temperatures, low annual 
rainfall and a tree-covered savannah type of vegetation. Eastern Province used to 
be a region of low population density and attracted many internal migrants who 
moved there from the centre and the south. This happened in particular around 
the time of independence in 1962 and again in 1972 when more than half of the 
Tutsi population fled the country after ethnically motivated violence. Vast tracts 
of pasture land and wetlands, which had been used for dry-season pasture, were 
appropriated by the remaining population and newcomers (Cambrézy 1984, 
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Grosse 1994, Olson 1994, Clay, Reardon & Kangasniemi 1995 and Campbell 
1994, as cited in Uvin 1998: 185-187). 
Mubinda is a village in Ngoma District in Rwanda’s Eastern Province some 20 
km from the town of Kibungo.46 It is a village of some 5000 inhabitants, with 
about 1000 houses spread along a long, dirt main road. It is a part of a region that 
has a market, several primary schools, two secondary schools, two medical cen-
tres and five churches. The area is considered to be relatively well-off because of 
its bananas, which are transported to Kigali for sale on a daily basis. With a few 
exceptions, the people of Mubinda are peasants who cultivate their fields full-
time, mainly for their own consumption. Many of them do not have much land of 
their own and therefore engage in (temporary) agricultural labour on someone 
else’s field when they can.47 Some respondents also own cows and/or goats.48
Mubinda’s economy is not well connected to economic opportunities beyond 
the local level. Most people only have access to financial resources by selling 
part of their harvest or through agricultural labour. Depending on the season, 
they work as labourers two or three times a week. Wages in 2008-2009 for four 
hours’ work were RWF 500 (the equivalent of approx. € 0.70),49 but people are 
sometimes paid in kind, for instance in beans or bananas. Of the 45 respondents 
questioned, almost a third indicated that they made use of labourers to cultivate 
their land or herd their animals. About 20% of these respondents had another job 
from which they earned an additional income, for example as a bricklayer or re-
pairman.  
When the RPF took control of the region in April 1994, many of Mubinda’s 
Hutu residents fled to Tanzania. Shortly afterwards, hundreds of thousands of 
mainly Tutsi refugees decided to return to the country after many years of exile 
and settled in the southeast due to its proximity to the border and because it was 
                                                 
46 Rwanda’s administrative structure is as follows: there are four provinces that are divided into districts 
with each district containing several sectors. Before the administrative reforms of 2005, Mubinda was 
part of the smaller Kibungo Province. 
47  43 respondents were asked if they knew the sizes of the plot(s) they cultivated. These data led me 
conclude that half of the respondents cultivated less than 0.5 ha and about 30% had between 0.5 and 
1.5 ha. However, a survey conducted by Gasarasi & Musahara (2004: 34) in the same area in 2004 
estimated that, based on 20 interviews, 65% of the population in this region had plot sizes between 0.5 
and 1 ha and that no one had less than 0.5 ha, although 10% of the people were landless. I prefer not 
to specify the exact amount of land people have access to because these figures do not tally and the 
sustainability of land tenure is not clear as the status of plots, which may be inherited, purchased, on 
loan or borrowed, was not systematically researched.
48 Having livestock, especially cows, is important as they are a form of capital that can be sold in times 
of need. Their milk provides an additional source of income and animal manure improves soil fertility. 
49 RWF = Rwandan francs. On 3 December 2008, RWF 500 was € 0.73. Compared to other areas of 
Rwanda, this is relatively good. For an overview of wages, see Ansoms (2009a: 224-260, Annex 2).
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under RPF control. Today Tutsi returnees constitute about 20% of the popula-
tion.50
Research Questions 
The central question in this thesis is: 
How do government policies concerning access to land and land tenure in rural post-conflict 
Rwanda influence local community relations (including ethnicity) and land conflicts?  
It is important to note that the concept ‘conflict’ instead of ‘dispute’ will often be 
used in this thesis to show how, as Nijenhuis (2013: 50) suggests, conflict is a 
social process. I therefore follow her distinction because ‘conflict’ ‘refers to 
deeply rooted, long-term and on-going differences between values and interests, 
“disputes” can be considered the specific, identifiable episodes that are part of 
larger continual conflicts and that may flare up from time to time’. 
Social relations are mainly discussed at community level and not within fami-
lies. When answering the central question, the role and interaction of ethnicity in 
social relations and in land-related policies are taken into account. In addition, as 
the quote from my Rwandan contact in the first sentence of this chapter suggests, 
I plan to reflect on the pertinent question of whether future land-related violence 
is likely to occur.  
The sub-questions are: 
1. What is the role of the Rwandan state in land access and tenure? 
2. How are land access and ethnicity related historically? 
3. What is the influence of the Rwandan state in daily life and how does this affect social re-
lations, including ethnicity?  
4. What are the consequences of the recent land reforms and how are they affecting com-
munity life? 
Relevance and Limitations 
In their ‘Review Essay - Bringing the Peasants Back in: Agrarian Themes in the 
Construction and Corrosion of Statist Historiography in Rwanda’, Newbury & 
Newbury (2000: 833, Note 3) mention that Rwanda’s bibliography is one of the 
most extensive in Africa. However, they also argue that as far as historiography 
goes, ‘politics have often been removed from rural life and agricultural practices 
separated from political life’ (Ibid: 833). They thus plead for ways ‘to bring 
Rwandan peasants into the understanding of politics and politics into the under-
standing of rural society’ (Ibid.: 834). Even today, most researchers are con-
cerned with state politics and macro-level developments, although quite a few 
scholars have written monographs and articles focusing on rural matters, for ex-
                                                 
50 This figure is based on Human Rights Watch (2001: 10) research from 1996 that found that the 
percentage of Tutsi returnees in southeastern Rwanda in late 1996 was about 19%.
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ample livelihood conditions (Koster 2008), poverty (Ansoms 2009a), transitional 
justice and political transition (Ingelaere 2012), resistance to the policies of unity 
and reconciliation (Thomson 2013), agricultural reform (Huggins 2014b), geno-
cide understandings (Fujii 2009; Straus 2006), prison experiences (Tertsakian 
2008) and youth (Sommers 2012). In line with Newbury & Newbury’s sugges-
tion, this thesis aims to add to this list of publications by connecting politics with 
rural life and examining the repercussions for peasants’ social relations. These 
themes are highly relevant for other Rwandan scholars interested in (rural) 
Rwanda as well as for policy makers who aim to strengthen Rwanda’s social fab-
ric and promote economic progress.  
Data collected in Mubinda are used to answer the research question. The re-
gion of which Mubinda is part (Ngoma District and Kirehe District) has, like 
every other region in Rwanda, its own specific history of violence, refugee flows 
and corresponding ethnic composition with, in this case, a high percentage of 
Tutsi returnees. What is also specific to the research area is that the land-sharing 
and villagization policies were mainly restricted to this part of Rwanda. Conse-
quently, parts of this thesis that discuss these policies (Chapter 4) and connect 
them to the 2013 Land Law and land policy (Chapter 6) and the current land con-
flicts (Chapter 7) are only relevant to the southeastern region, as are parts of 
Chapter 5 that discuss Mubinda’s social life. All the other information in this the-
sis that helps to answer the above-mentioned sub-questions can be applied to 
Rwanda as a whole. 
The thesis focuses on the socio-political aspects of land access and tenure and 
limited attention is given to the gender aspects of land, the role of religion and 
the church in peasants’ daily lives, and to conflict resolution regarding land and 
other conflicts. It also does not examine the cultural aspects of land in depth, alt-
hough I acknowledge that Rwandans are still attached to their land in a cultural 
sense.51 I believe that, due to the widespread violence, the extensive population 
movements, increased land scarcity, conflicts and policies like land sharing and 
villagization, Rwandan peasants have had to detach themselves significantly 
from any cultural connotations they may have had with land and land tenure. In
the research area, the two most important groups were the returned Tutsi refu-
gees, who had often grown up in neighbouring Tanzania and who were thus rela-
tively unfamiliar with any cultural aspects, and Hutu families who, because of 
having to obey policies of land sharing, villagization and land reform, simply 
                                                 
51 The cultural aspect is noted in a 2013 study of the land registration policy by the Rwandan NGO 
Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development (RISD) that argues that: ‘Land is a commodity unlike 
any other. It has symbolic and social value, works to connect the living to the dead through inheritance 
and burial, and establishes a person’s sense of belonging in place’ (Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable 
Development 2013: 6).
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could not afford to consider their cultural attachments to land too much, as this 
thesis will demonstrate.  
Tilling the Land: Peasants or Farmers 
Rwandans engaged in agriculture have often been referred to as farmers in this 
introduction but they will mostly be called peasants in the rest of this book. Alt-
hough the word peasant is often used in a belittling or degrading manner, this 
choice was a deliberate decision and was based on Bryceson’s criteria that con-
cern farm, family, community and class. The farm criterion implies that peasants’ 
livelihoods combine subsistence farming with commodity production. Family
refers to the internal social organization that is based on family labour because 
the family is the production, consumption, reproduction, socialization, welfare 
and risk-spreading unit. The community that peasants are part of refers to a vil-
lage settlement and to traditional conformist attitudes, while class signifies that 
there is ‘external subordination to state authorities as well as regional or interna-
tional markets, inferring surplus extraction and class differentiation’ (Bryceson 
2000: 2).  
This thesis will demonstrate that the position of Rwanda’s small-scale farmers 
is reflected in these criteria. Rwandan peasants are merely subjects when it 
comes to their contacts with local authorities and other government representa-
tives and the 2013 Land Law does not take into account the vulnerable position 
of these peasants. Chapter 6 suggests that the implementation of programmes like 
land consolidation and crop specialization is a further threat to peasants’ liveli-
hoods, which are also jeopardized by increasing land scarcity. Looking at land 
tenure and scarcity in Africa in general, Berry (2002: 639) summarizes the situa-
tion as follows:  
Rapid population growth, environmental degradation, and slow rates of economic develop-
ment that leave many people dependent on small-scale farming, livestock raising and forag-
ing have transformed Africa from a continent of land abundance in the first half of the twen-
tieth century to one of increasing land scarcity by its end.  
Competition for land ‘has followed myriad social fault lines’ (Ibid.). While em-
phasizing the importance of the historical context in which land relations and 
conflicts have been shaped, she observes that ‘struggles over land in postcolonial 
Africa have been as much about power and the legitimacy of competing claims to 
authority, as about control of property per se’ (Ibid.: 639-640). The next part of 
this chapter considers how social relations are connected to these concepts.  
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Access to Land, Social Relations and the  
Construction of Authority  
This chapter previously discussed how increasing land scarcity and the lack of 
off-farm employment opportunities were factors that drove some Rwandans to 
use violence against their neighbours. It also showed how land inequality and 
changing land security affect local communities, possibly causing tensions and 
(violent) conflicts. It revealed the connection between land and social relations 
and supports the argument that access and property rights to land are fundamen-
tally about social relations as ‘they are not about the link between a person and a 
thing (object of property), but rather about the relations between people with re-
gard to a thing’ (Meinzen-Dick & Mwangi 2009: 7). Since land tenure is derived 
from social relationships and institutions, changed property rights lead to rede-
fined social relationships and this has implications for the entire social fabric of 
rural communities (Bates 1998, as cited in Berry 1993: 102; Meinzen-Dick & 
Mwangi 2009: 37).  
Peters (2004: 269) expressed her concern about the growing inequality and so-
cial conflicts over land, arguing that the current literature on land issues in Africa 
focuses too much on the ‘flexibility, negotiability and indeterminacy in analyses 
of social relationships over land’ and finds that ‘the pervasive competition and 
conﬂict over land call into serious question the image of relatively open, negotia-
ble and adaptive customary systems of landholding and land use and, instead, 
reveal processes of exclusion, deepening social divisions and class formation’ 
(Ibid.: 270). Land relations, she feels, are not just socially embedded but are em-
bedded in unequal social relationships (Ibid.: 304) and she criticizes others for 
putting too much emphasis on people’s social agency and too little attention on 
inequalities within social relations that inhibit certain individuals or groups from 
advocating their access or property rights (Ibid.: 278-279). While analysing the 
role of the state, elites and international actors in land issues, Peters (Ibid.: 294) 
concludes that: 
One may well agree that state action does not determine outcomes, that a multitude of ‘small 
acts’ can subvert or refashion the promulgations and acts of the mighty, and that the relative 
autonomy of institutional arenas facilitates renegotiation of social claims and responsibilities. 
But one must also pay attention to the fact that small acts and even large-scale responses are 
as often swept away by powerful agencies (as in the villagization schemes of the Tanzanian 
Ujama policy).  
Let us now consider the connection between land tenure and social relations 
through the access theory of Ribot & Peluso (2003) and the focus on (political) 
authority and legitimacy with regard to land claims, as explained by Sikor & 
Lund (2009) and Lund & Boone (2013). To define and analyse access, Ribot & 
Peluso, who make a strong argument for differentiating access from property, 
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make a distinction between several access mechanisms with which they refer to 
the processes, means and relations that enable people or groups to gain, control 
and maintain access: legal rights-based mechanisms and structural and relational 
mechanisms. In short, legal rights-based access derives from law, customs or 
conventions. These can, however, involve ambiguities, for instance when laws 
issued in the same period contradict each other, when it is not so much rights, but 
rather privileges that are delegated to the population or when systems of legiti-
macy overlap (Ribot & Peluso 2003: 159). Illegal access, which is also part of 
this mechanism, is considered a rights-denying mechanism of access as it is ‘a 
form of direct access defined against those based on the sanctions of custom, 
convention, or law’. Illegal access through violence or theft is based on notions 
of morality and legitimacy because what ‘one group calls theft can be considered 
moral or legitimate by others’ (Ibid.: 164).  
Structural and relational mechanisms concern political-economic and cultural 
frames that shape access to resources. They can be divided into access to tech-
nology, capital, markets, labour and labour opportunities, knowledge, authority, 
social identities and (other) social relations (Ibid.: 164-165). Although all these 
mechanisms may be regarded as forms of social relations (Ibid.: 172), the last 
three categories are those most concerned with the social aspects of land access: 
access to authority; access through social identity and access through the negotia-
tion of other social relations.  
Access to authority is, evidently, of importance as it allows people to gain 
and/or maintain access to land and other resources and a person’s social or eco-
nomic status may influence their ability to have access to the authorities. Status is 
closely related to group or community membership and someone’s social identity 
and their ability to gain or control access through this identity. Having a certain 
identity can facilitate or hinder access to certain resources, for instance when 
members of a social group are subject to a certain law from which others are ex-
empted (Ibid.: 170-171). Access relations are always changing and depend on 
someone’s or a group’s position and power in these relationships. The level of 
power an individual or group can exercise varies according to the relationship as 
well as over time as ‘different political-economic circumstances change the terms 
of access and may therefore change the specific individuals or groups most able 
to benefit from a set of resources’ (Ibid.: 158). Berry (2002: 663) therefore sug-
gests that people who are unable to take their case to the authorities or to court 
will find that their exclusion in land-claim negotiations reinforces rather than 
challenges authority. Other social relations embedded in friendship, reciprocity, 
trust, patronage, dependence and obligations are also important and people tend 
to invest a great deal in economically based ties to benefit from resources (Berry 
1993: 15; Ribot & Peluso 2003: 172).  
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The connection between access and property to power and authority is also 
explored by Sikor & Lund and Lund & Boone. The latter underline that, as land 
issues also involve social and political relationships, land struggles not only deal 
with access to property but also with the scope and structure of authority and 
state formation, ‘with land claims being tightly wrapped in questions of authori-
ty, citizenship, and the politics of jurisdiction’ (Lund & Boone 2013: 1). Authori-
ty is not only represented or reflected by land control and control over political 
identity but is also produced by it (Lund & Boone 2013: 2; see also Berry 2002: 
656-660). If, for example, land is sold as a commodity, the way the transaction is 
interpreted by the actors involved depends on social relations around land use 
and the political power of authorities to impose a certain interpretation. The in-
terpretation that prevails not only has implications for the parties involved but 
also for the institutional arrangements that structure land tenure (Lund & Boone 
2013: 3). Prevailing interpretations and power balances can consequently be de-
stabilized by policy changes, administrative reforms or changes in institutions or 
individuals that deal with land access and dispute resolution. Lund & Boone 
(Ibid.) conclude that: 
The politics that generate modifications and change in such interpretations can shape au-
thority relations and the distribution of control over resources in enduring ways. There are 
consequences not only for the institutionalization of authority but also for economic devel-
opment, constitution and recognition of social groups, and class formation.  
They have distinguished three dimensions of land control in which (political) 
authority is established and maintained: the categorization of people and groups 
engaged in land; tenure forms; and land-control jurisdiction. And they define 
three kinds of jurisdiction: functional (exercised by different authorities); territo-
rial; and jurisdiction over persons (for instance when different tribunals deal with 
land claims from different ethnic or religious groups). Tenure forms are divided 
into customary or communal rights, use rights, market-based rights and alloca-
tion rights and involve the question as to which authorities enforce and control 
these rights and with what results (Ibid.: 4-8). The final dimension involves the 
categorization of people and concerns issues of citizenship, political status and 
political identity. Lund & Boone (2013: 8-9) mention categories, such as insid-
ers/outsiders, nobles/commoners, men/women, different ethnic groups and 
old/young, that are important when people legitimize land claims. Their 
(re)production and erosion are thus political processes. As products of social and 
political processes, these categorizations cannot be regarded as fixed because 
they are reproduced and change according to changing social and power relations 
as ‘various actors, both individuals and institutions, actively reproduce these so-
cial relations and confirm distinctions, including those pertaining to property 
rights’ (Ibid.: 9). 
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Territorial jurisdiction is clearly connected to the categorization of people and 
is mentioned by other authors as an important notion because states exercise 
power partly through territorial control (Berry 2009: 24) and classification, regis-
tration and mapping techniques and policies control the spatial ordering of peo-
ple. Such ordering and control not only structures physical space but also allows 
and prevents forms of land use and access and regulates mobility. As territorializ-
ing strategies can differentiate rights to resources, they contribute to the ‘structu-
ration of citizenship’ (Sikor & Lund 2009: 14). 
Power and authority are linked to legitimacy. However what is considered to 
be legitimate or illegitimate can change over time, such as when a government 
nullifies a legal practice or an established right and turns private land into public 
land (Ibid.: 7). Legitimate or successfully legitimized power determines the au-
thority of politico-legal institutions and authorities that may support property or 
access claims. As a result of institutional pluralism, state institutions may be in-
compatible with one another and authority may not always be exclusively vested 
in the state. Authority can also overlap or change over time, for example when 
chieftaincy is abolished as a political institution and replaced by another authori-
ty that, in turn, results in ambiguity, complexity and uncertainty in access and 
property relations (Ibid.: 8-10). In cases of legal pluralism, i.e. the coexistence of 
statutory and customary systems (Musahara & Huggins 2005: 285), not only can 
claimants go ‘forum shopping’ to find authorization for their claims but institu-
tions too can shop for claims to authorize if they need to compete for authority to 
build and solidify their legitimacy (Sikor & Lund 2009: 10). In addition, Sikor & 
Lund (2009: 14-15) conclude that: 
… regardless of the origin of access and power, there is an inherent drive to legitimize the 
exercise of power; to launder power as authority, as it were. But there is no reason to expect 
that the quest for legitimacy is conducted by legitimate means alone, especially if one recog-
nizes that what may be illegitimate to some may be seen as legitimate by others.  
When applying Ribot & Peluso’s access theory to Rwanda, it is clear that access 
relations − and consequently social relations − have constantly changed and be-
come increasingly unequal because of the growing power of the authorities. A 
strong and centralized state has become the ultimate owner of all land and con-
trolled land tenure, leaving the population little to no room to negotiate land 
claims. This is described in Chapter 3, which also discusses the history of state 
centralization and clientelism and shows how land rights, particularly of the Hutu 
population, weakened considerably. Chapter 5 examines the current nature of 
state-population relations and will also reveal how, over history, one ethnic group 
has tried to dominate and rule the other group, jeopardizing the land rights of the 
group that was being ruled. For instance, when large numbers of Tutsi were 
killed or fled the country between 1959 and 1964 and again in 1973 as a result of 
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ethnically motivated killings, the Hutu-dominated government allowed their Hu-
tu neighbours take over Tutsi land and properties. When Tutsi refugees returned 
after the 1994 genocide, they were not supposed to reclaim their land. This policy 
had a legal basis because it was part of the peace agreement described in Chapter 
4. It contrasts with the 1996-1997 land-sharing agreement between returning Tut-
si and the Hutu population, which was not supported by a law or decree and 
therefore had no legal basis. This latter agreement is still resented by many Hutu 
families who contest its legitimacy but, as a result of their weak(ened) position 
vis-à-vis the authorities, have no way of challenging it or other land-related poli-
cies. These examples, in line with Berry’s suggestion, show that authority is 
merely reinforced and not challenged when authorities or the courts are inacces-
sible to members of a particular group. From a broader perspective, this applies 
to the entire peasant population that is today often unable to gain access to the 
courts. Seen from a historical perspective, it refers to longstanding patron-client 
relations, in which the Hutu population in particular suffered from an inferior 
status.  
 
Various observations can be made about Lund & Boone and Sikor & Lund’s re-
marks about power, authority, legitimacy and territoriality. As previously sug-
gested, it is force and coercion that have allowed pre- and post-genocide gov-
ernments to legitimize their control over land. In turn, authority in Rwanda has 
been largely produced by land control and control over identity. When analysing 
the current nature of the state and its relationship with today’s population, it is 
clear that authorities have enough power to impose certain interpretations, which 
is in line with Lund & Boone’s suggestions. The aforementioned land arrange-
ments, which are the result of various massive population movements due to eth-
nic-related violence around the time of independence, the 1990-1994 civil war 
and the 1994 genocide, have significantly upset many people’s already insecure 
land rights. Categorization has been an important element in this respect because 
it was used by the pre-independence Tutsi-dominated and post-independence 
Hutu-dominated governments to curtail the land-tenure rights of the other ethnic 
category, making land access increasingly a socio-political affair. Although the 
present Tutsi-dominated regime seems to be targeting both groups equally with 
its land policies, many Hutu in the research area feel their rights regarding land 
access have been greatly reduced and this has problematized relations with local 
(often Tutsi) authorities. Chapter 6 will show that territorial jurisdiction in the 
Rwandan context of the Land Law, which introduced land registration, land con-
solidation and crop specialization, is about the control of space and the physical 
control of the population and the structuration of citizenship. 
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Outline of the Chapters 
Chapter 2 describes the research methods used and explains how the nature of the 
Rwandan state and the behaviour of Rwandan respondents affected the research 
and the researcher. It highlights how these issues inform the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter 3 analyses Rwanda’s pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history in a 
context of power relations, clientship, oppression and violence and focuses on 
ethnicity, land access and the way these themes interact. Chapter 4 then discusses 
how, shortly after the genocide, Mubinda’s inhabitants were confronted with two 
land-tenure policies − land sharing and villagization − and the impact these poli-
cies had on social relations. Chapter 5 focuses on the role and position of the 
Rwandan state in peasants’ daily lives, the nature of Mubinda’s social life and 
how the two are linked. Chapter 6 describes and analyses Rwanda’s current land 
reform programme with its land registration, crop specialization and land consol-
idation being the main features of the 2013 Land Law. Chapter 7 is dedicated to 
the increasing land conflicts in Mubinda, some of which have arisen because of 
land registration and are connected with land-sharing grudges. Finally, Chapter 8 
offers the overall conclusions. 
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Researching Rwanda
After five months of fieldwork in Rwanda, the day of my departure had come. 
That day I was in a very bad mood. Due to a misunderstanding, my friend and 
research assistant Cécile arrived over an hour late to escort me to the airport. Alt-
hough we arrived in time, I reacted in a rather agitated manner. When I was sit-
ting on the plane waiting for take-off later that day, a thought would not leave my 
mind: ‘I can leave’. After just having said goodbye to some loving friends, I was 
shocked at this thought and it really upset me. After a stopover in Nairobi a few 
hours later, I boarded a KLM plane and when I was greeted by Dutch-speaking 
air hostesses I was so relieved to see them and hear Dutch again that I could 
hardly resist the temptation to throw myself into their arms. 
Fieldwork in Rwanda can be a difficult and exhausting activity. As a research-
er, you are your own tool of research and much depends on your physical and 
psychological wellbeing. After a challenging first fieldwork period in 2008, I 
gradually discovered that more scholars encounter and describe psychological 
difficulties during fieldwork. In his article ‘Fieldwork Ain’t Always Fun: Public 
and Hidden Discourses on Fieldwork’, Lecocq (2002: 274) argues that: 
In professional discourse among practitioners of the field, the “just-like-a-holiday” attitude 
to questions about one’s stay in the field serves to maintain or establish one’s credibility as a 
capable researcher. While everyone knows that fieldwork is not always fun, not too many are 
willing to admit this in public since it might damage their reputation.  
In this chapter, I am willing to run this risk in order to provide a better under-
standing of Rwandan society and my position in it as a researcher. 
My fieldwork and research methods are the focus of the first part of the chap-
ter, while the second describes my personal state of mind during and after my 
2008 fieldwork. This description is not meant to raise sympathy or compassion 
from the reader but aims at showing the conditions under which this research was 
conducted and to offer insight into Rwandan society today. In the third section, I 
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analyse how the Rwandan state influenced my research both directly and indi-
rectly. The fourth part deals with some important constraints in Rwandan society 
and how this affected the research and here I have relied heavily on reflections 
and analyses of fellow (Rwanda) researchers and have combined them with my 
own experiences. The concluding section describes the consequences of all this 
for my research.  
Fieldwork and Research Methods 
I had already had fieldwork experience in Rwanda in 2004 when I conducted re-
search in Southern Province for three months for my MA thesis on Rwanda’s 
gacaca courts. When I started my fieldwork for this research in July 2008, I had 
not decided which part of Rwanda would be the focus for my study of land ac-
cess. Every region in Rwanda faces different problems related to land, mainly 
because of their different histories, especially with regard to the war and the gen-
ocide. The sub-theme of this research is ethnicity and how it influences land ac-
cess and this meant that the region under study should have substantial numbers 
of Tutsi genocide survivors, returned Tutsi and Hutu. After consulting several 
experts, I decided that the most interesting region would be Eastern Province. 
Shortly after the genocide, many Tutsi had settled here after returning from exile 
in neighbouring Tanzania. When the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took over 
the region in May 1994, large numbers of Hutu fled to Tanzania. They returned 
to their homes after two or three years in exile and were settled in newly formed 
villages alongside returned Tutsi and Tutsi genocide survivors.  
Fieldwork 
I conducted three periods of fieldwork in Rwanda: five months in 2008, five 
weeks in 2009 and a final two months in 2010. I held some 100 interviews with 
peasants, local authorities and local NGO representatives in Mubinda and the 
wider Ngoma District, and also held interviews in Kigali with representatives of 
governmental and non-governmental organizations. The first fieldwork period 
started in Kigali where I arranged several fact-finding interviews in order to es-
tablish the research area and the research topic. After moving to Mubinda, my 
interpreter and I asked if it would be possible to stay overnight but we were told 
that there were no guesthouses in or near the village. We also noted that respond-
ents’ living conditions were too poor to accommodate long-term guests. In addi-
tion, we felt that it would be wise to have a certain physical distance between 
ourselves and the research area so that we could reflect more clearly on the data 
we had collected and avoid close surveillance by local authorities. I therefore 
decided to stay in a guesthouse in Kibungo for all three fieldwork periods and 
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made arrangements with taxi drivers based there to drive me back and forth to 
the research area. 
As respondents spoke neither French nor English and I only have some basic 
knowledge of the Rwandan language, I worked with an interpreter/research assis-
tant when I interviewed the peasant population and some local authorities. I 
worked with Cécile in 2008 and 2009 and with Honorée in 2010.1 Of course the 
presence of an interpreter always influences one’s conversation and the transla-
tion can result in a loss of information and/or subtlety because the interpreter 
paraphrases and summarizes both the questions and the answers. When reading 
quotes from Mubinda residents in this volume, the reader should note this point. 
However, in the case of Rwanda, I would argue that the presence of an interpret-
er also helped a great deal in establishing trust on both sides and in gaining more 
insight into the lives and circumstances of my respondents and the reasons be-
hind some of their answers or silences. My conclusion is that I ultimately gained 
a lot from working with an interpreter.  
In retrospect, my three fieldwork periods could be compared to diving. My 
first fieldwork period from July until December 2008 was like an initial plunge 
into the water when one is just some metres from the still visible surface. During 
the interviews in Kigali, I learned about land access, land problems and land re-
forms in general. In Mubinda, I held semi-structured interviews with peasant re-
spondents and some local authorities that introduced me to peasant life. These 
familiarized me with the economic situation of the peasant population: how much 
land they had, what they grew, how much they earned and spent, and how they 
had obtained their land. Issues like land problems, ethnicity, land-related policies 
and land reforms were sometimes touched on but most people avoided giving 
details and I felt uneasy probing into these matters. Besides the usual lack of trust 
in and fear of an unknown white foreigner who they were meeting for the first 
time, most respondents did not feel comfortable talking about land as it was a 
sensitive and politicized topic. Political circumstances contributed to this: par-
liamentary elections in September 2008 and the arrest of a high-ranking govern-
ment official in Germany in November 2008. These events will be described in 
the third section. As a consequence, my findings remained close to the surface. 
However, subconsciously, I learned a lot more about the political and social cir-
cumstances my respondents were living in than I was aware of at the time.  
During this fieldwork period I worked with Cécile, a woman in her twenties 
with whom I became friends during my previous visit to Rwanda in 2004. In 
June 2009, I asked Cécile to hold some interviews in Mubinda on her own. Be-
hind this decision was the need to have some more data, but mostly my feelings 
                                                 
1 As explained in the introduction, I altered the names of my two research assistants to ensure their 
safety.
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of uneasiness of the lack of trust I had experienced among most of the 2008 re-
spondents. I therefore wanted to find out if people would feel more comfortable 
talking to Cécile alone. She conducted ten interviews and, after analysing them, I 
concluded that there were hardly any differences with regard to openness and 
trust on the part of the respondents. 
My second fieldwork period in July and August 2009 lasted five weeks, when 
I again worked with Cécile and mainly conducted fieldwork in Mubinda. The 
people who knew me from the first time reacted positively to my return and even 
though we interviewed mainly new respondents, Cécile and I noticed that people 
were talking more openly about social and land-related problems. We attributed 
this to the building up of trust. Because we had returned, people seemed more 
comfortable talking to us. During these interviews, which were much less struc-
tured than in 2008 as this increased openness decreased my need for pre-
formulated questions, we were able to find out more about (ethnic) relations, land 
problems and the way people had received the land-related policies. However, 
we still felt we had to show restraint when asking sensitive questions or pushing 
the respondents a bit further. But I felt I was much deeper in the water now, fur-
ther from the surface and was able to see things that had been ‘invisible’ before. 
I conducted my third and last fieldwork period in November and December 
2010 in a period of great political tension that had emerged in the run-up to the 
presidential elections that were held on 9 August 2010. Grenades had exploded at 
busy places in Kigali in March, April and May; the independent press had been 
silenced; a journalist had been murdered; two political opponents were impris-
oned; a vice president of an opposition party was assassinated; and an RPF dissi-
dent exiled in South Africa survived an assassination attempt. In addition, I heard 
stories from several sources about rifts at the core of the ruling RPF party from 
President Kagame’s former allies who had fled the country and were speaking 
out against the regime and calling him a dictator. Rumours were also circulating 
of a coup attempt by Tutsi from within the RPF. I feared that people would be 
reluctant to talk to me because of these developments, but it turned out that this 
was not the case at all. In general, people were very outspoken, including some 
local authorities and NGO representatives, and I could ask even the sensitive 
questions I had not dared to ask in previous years. I have three explanations for 
this change in the attitudes of my respondents. Firstly, it was my third visit to 
Mubinda and this made people feel that I was genuinely interested in their lives. 
Secondly, my new interpreter Honorée was much older than Cécile and more 
experienced regarding research and life in general and she combined thorough-
ness and wit with experience and empathy. Thirdly, we held our interviews in the 
weeks that peasants in Mubinda had to register their land, which meant that prob-
lems regarding registration were uppermost in their minds during our presence. 
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The previous fieldwork experiences had helped me to see more clearly what 
opinions, ideas and emotions people had below the surface and this last fieldwork 
period was comparable to a deep dive. 
Research Methods 
The data used in this thesis were mainly collected from structured and semi-
structured interviews with respondents and conversations with informants, 
friends and acquaintances, both Rwandan and non-Rwandan. Observations while 
visiting, for instance, a community meeting, a land demarcation team and a land 
consolidation attempt provided additional information, as did books, (newspaper) 
articles, reports, websites and government documents.  
During my MA fieldwork, I had experienced how local authorities attempted 
to influence my research by suggesting who I talk to. I discussed this with my 
interpreter at the start of my first fieldwork period and we decided to try to avoid 
this by restricting our visits to local officials and simply walking around Mubin-
da and randomly asking people we met in the streets or fields if they would be 
prepared to talk to us. Most people were willing to be interviewed right away 
although we sometimes arranged to return at another time. As we drove into Mu-
binda every morning, we would decide which part of the village we would visit 
that day. In some cases, we asked a respondent if s/he could introduce us to 
someone. For example, we asked genocide survivor Spéciose if she could help us 
find other genocide survivors. Mubinda’s authorities tolerated this approach 
throughout my fieldwork, never once intervening. 
The risk connected to this method of interviewing people randomly is that it 
could have led to some degree of overrepresentation of a certain group if, for in-
stance, most interviewees had turned out to be Hutu. This would have resulted in 
a subsequent underrepresentation of genocide survivors or Tutsi who had re-
turned after the genocide, or both. After some weeks, we concluded, however, 
that this was not the case. Of the 43 interviews that I held during my first field-
work period, 9.3% were with genocide survivors, 46.5% with Hutu and 28% with 
Tutsi who had returned after the genocide. 4.7% of the interviews were with peo-
ple of mixed Hutu/Tutsi descent and I was not sure about the ethnic backgrounds 
of four persons and one couple (11.6% of the interviews) but I inferred that they 
were Hutu from various comments they made. 
As was explained in the introduction, ethnicity is an extremely sensitive topic 
and a researcher cannot ask about it directly. From answers that the respondents 
gave to the question about how long they had been living in Mubinda, I could 
reason that someone who had left the country in 1994 after the arrival of the RPF 
and had lived in exile for a few years was Hutu, although some Tutsi fled in this 
period too. When someone stated that s/he had lived in exile in Tanzania for a 
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substantial period of time and came to Mubinda in 1994, I assumed that s/he was 
a Tutsi returnee, although there were also some Hutu among these refugees. I 
carefully correlated data from other sources as well to assess the ethnic back-
ground of my respondents but am aware that there may be some inaccuracies 
here. Most genocide survivors I interviewed were willing to reveal how they sur-
vived the genocide. 
Initially I had planned to organize a survey among Mubinda’s population in 
order to systematically gather information about their socio-economic status. As 
indicated earlier, I experienced fear and a lack of trust during my first fieldwork 
period because land was such a sensitive and politicized topic. In addition, the 
political situation during my first and third fieldwork periods was very tense and 
I feared that respondents would give what they considered were sociably desira-
ble answers. This made me decide against a large-scale survey. A negative con-
sequence of this was that this thesis does not offer much information about the 
respondents’ livelihoods.2
Fear, distrust and the generally tense political situation also negatively influ-
enced my own well-being during my first fieldwork period, as is described in the 
next section. 
Functional Dissociation and Other Inconveniences 
Before my first period of fieldwork in 2008, I was insecure and nervous, presum-
ably just as every other PhD student feels as they embark on their new research 
project. However I reassured myself that I had fieldwork experience in Rwanda 
and enough knowledge of the country to proceed as I had done three months of 
research in Rwanda in 2004 for my MA thesis. I had not encountered difficulties 
then so I believed that I would still be able to cope with the sadness, trauma and 
distrust I would encounter in the local population. Despite my bleak research top-
ic in 2004, I had enjoyed fieldwork and felt my overall well-being had been 
sound both during and after this period. This was not however the case during my 
2008 fieldwork when certain thoughts and feelings were evoked that gradually 
led me to feel uneasiness, fear and dejection. These mainly became manifest after 
my return to the Netherlands.  
The first clear signs of these negative feelings appeared on the day I left 
Rwanda, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Some weeks after I re-
turned home, I felt emotionally unstable and depressed: I lacked energy, concen-
                                                 
2 For instance, authors such as Ansoms (2007), Ingelaere (2007) and Thomson (2013) refer to six socio-
economic categories that are officially used to define peasants’ socio-economic living conditions. 
These categories are abatindi nyakujya (the most vulnerable), abatindi (the vulnerable), abakene (the 
poor), abakene bifashije (the non-poor), abakungu (the wealthy) and umukire (the very wealthy) 
(Ansoms 2011: 127).
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tration and motivation. I also had feelings of resentment when I thought of 
Rwanda and the idea that, to continue my research, I had to go back some time 
soon. One of the first people who noticed my depressed state of mind and emo-
tional state was my dance teacher. When I first saw her after I returned, she 
looked at me in surprise and before I had said a word about my stay in Rwanda, 
she uttered: ‘I can tell that you have suffered quite a bit!’.
In the following dance class, it suddenly occurred to me that I had not felt 
welcome in Rwanda. When I discussed my feelings with Erik Flapper, a psy-
chologist, he assured me that it was a normal reaction to abnormal circumstanc-
es.3 Erik explained my state of mind by arguing that I had gradually had to 
change my expectations during my stay there. These expectations mainly con-
cerned notions that a certain amount of trust normally exists, that you are treated 
kindly or at least neutrally, and are appreciated for who you are and what you do. 
I constantly had to lower these expectations because of the vast amount of dis-
trust and fear (and sometimes even resistance) I often met. This negative experi-
ence had caused too much (and accumulating) stress and I had gradually started 
to feel fear and distrust myself.4 While talking to Erik I became conscious that I 
also had developed a certain degree of anger towards my respondents because I 
felt let down. While I was trying to do my research with the best of intentions, 
they had not been willing to put their trust in me.  
Erik also explained why these negative feelings had mostly occurred after I re-
turned from Rwanda. He attributed this to prior functional dissociation, which is 
the ability to temporarily disconnect from what one feels and what one thinks. It 
is a subconscious process that enables people to block negative feelings or panic 
that would otherwise go beyond what one could control. These feelings are only 
acknowledged and recognized when one’s circumstances seem safe once again. 
So I gradually learned that, subconsciously, my well-being had severely deterio-
rated in Rwanda and that I had been able to hide this from myself during most of 
my first fieldwork period. With this insight, I started to doubt my qualities as a 
researcher. Why hadn’t I maintained a more professional distance from my re-
search subjects? Why hadn’t I been able to study them more objectively? I felt I 
had failed. Only after some months did I begin to realize that I had in a way in-
ternalized the fear and distrust that was being felt by the majority of Rwandans 
all the time. I then also understood that this in itself already contained important 
                                                 
3 Erik Flapper works for the Antares Foundation, a Dutch institute that provides psychosocial support to 
staff working abroad for humanitarian and development organizations. It is part of a research 
consortium that conducts academic studies on stress due to humanitarian work. See 
http://www.antaresfoundation.org/. 
4 Begley (2013) describes similar experiences of fear when she was conducting fieldwork for her 
research into the government’s use of the genocide ideology law.
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information for me about how Rwandan society actually works. I will explain 
this in more detail in the next section. 
When the Rwandan State Meets the Researcher 
Most researchers have to deal with the state in some way while doing fieldwork, 
even if only when applying for research permits. Normally these encounters have 
no influence on the content and course of their research. However Rwanda is one 
of those states where government control of and even interference with research 
is a potential risk that can influence one’s research directly and indirectly. Au-
thorities can directly interfere, as happened for instance to Susan Thomson when 
the Rwandan government stopped her research on peasants’ everyday acts of re-
sistance to the national reconciliation policy (Thomson 2013). But the authorities 
can also indirectly influence research when a possible or real threat of control 
and interference leads to feelings of fear, distrust or anger because the ‘personal 
state of mind not only has an impact on one’s view on matters studied, it is deci-
sive on whether or not one does see anything in the first place, or even on wheth-
er or not one wants to see anything at all’ (Lecocq 2002: 274, 280). This section 
considers two important features of the Rwandan state: its omnipresence and ma-
nipulation and the ways in which they influenced my research and my state of 
mind.5
Big Brother 
As mentioned in the introduction, Rwanda is characterized by a strong state that 
controls the daily lives of its citizens. The state is organized as far down as the 
umudugudu, which is the smallest administrative unit of 75 to 150 households. 
As a researcher, you have to go through all the levels from ministerial to village 
(‘cell’) to obtain permission to do research. The authorities therefore know what 
you are researching. After permission is granted and researchers start their field-
work, they are closely monitored, for instance by neighbourhood committees. 
These consist of a chairperson, who reports to the village authorities, and four 
coordinators who are responsible for information, security, development and so-
cial life. The committee members, who are often just ordinary peasants, know 
exactly what is going on in their neighbourhood, including when and with whom 
a researcher has talked. I experienced this monitoring myself when a respondent 
                                                 
5 I do not want to suggest that the features described here are typical only for Rwanda, as they also 
occur in other parts of the world too. My supervisor Sandra Evers for instance had similar experiences 
in the Seychelles (Evers 2010).
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told me that she knew I had talked to several people in her area as she also hap-
pened to be the information coordinator.6
Experiences of surveillance are not always as innocent as this previous remark 
may suggest, as two disturbing incidents during my last fieldwork period in 2010 
show. Firstly, some men told our driver that local authorities had questioned 
some people we had spoken to.7 These men stated that it was only because the 
authorities understood that we had permission for the research that they were not 
imprisoned. After some inquiries, we got the impression that the people in ques-
tion were an old lady (who I interviewed in 2008 and 2009) and her daughter, 
who we had only briefly visited just to greet them. After discussing this incident, 
the respondents involved agreed that, in cases of politically sensitive research, 
authorities often visit people after interviews and interrogate them. From then 
onwards I decided to tell respondents that, in case authorities would question 
them, they should not be too specific in these interrogations about the matters 
discussed.
The second incident involved some pictures I took in Daniel’s backyard. Dan-
iel was a respondent in Mubinda and I took pictures of his kitchen and cowshed 
whose grass-thatched roofs had been removed. These pictures were taken after he 
and several other respondents had complained about a government policy that 
insisted that the roofs of all thatched houses and their annexes be replaced by 
iron sheets.8 People did not agree with the measure and the rigidity with which it 
was implemented as the policy had left some widows and their children without a 
roof over their heads during the rainy season. Unfortunately (and unethically) I 
had not asked Daniel’s permission before taking the pictures as he was not at 
home when I decided to take them. A day later, I was informed that the district 
authority had passed by to question Daniel about my actions and this had made 
him feel very uncomfortable. 
Another phenomenon linked to the government’s omnipresence is spying. This 
was explained to me at the beginning of my 2008 fieldwork by John Baldwin, a 
Western journalist who was living in Rwanda at the time.9 According to him, 
every Rwandan is constantly spying on his/her fellow Rwandans and this has 
become part of daily interaction.10 People do this because they feel that security 
                                                 
6 See also Bouka (2013: 111-112) for similar experiences who also confirms that ‘snooping’ neighbours 
facilitate state surveillance.
7 Thankfully, this driver was an old friend of my interpreter and willing to share this information with 
us.
8 See Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of this policy of removing grass-thatched roofs.
9 For reasons of security I prefer not to mention the journalist’s real name. 
10 This is confirmed by Bouka (2013: 111) who conducted research among released prisoners of the 
genocide who states that ‘conducting research in Rwanda means learning to mitigate the constant 
voyeurism of the government and an inquisitive population prone to reporting things to the 
authorities’. 
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is vital and they do not want violence to erupt again. People will thus report 
someone to the authorities if a person says or does something that is not in line 
with what s/he ought to say or do, as for instance happened in the case of the pic-
tures I took of Daniel’s annexes.11 As a consequence, Rwandans do not easily 
talk about their feelings and opinions in a group and will only voice them among 
family and close friends. This reluctance to discuss issues publicly is often no-
ticed by journalists when they try to discuss politics in public and find that the 
interviewee ‘fell silent whenever a waiter came within earshot, underscoring 
widespread belief that restaurant staff are paid to report people's conversations to 
Rwandan intelligence officials’ (Childress 2010). 
The government also spies on its citizens with well-equipped and well-staffed 
intelligence services. According to Dorsey (2000: 323), the intelligence services 
are the pillar of popular supervision and have succeeded in creating the idea of 
their omnipresence. Their presence creates self-censorship reflexes. He quotes a 
Rwandan intellectual as saying: ‘if ten young men walk down the street, six of 
them are from military intelligence’. A Rwandan I met in 2008 was adamant that 
one in three people had links with the intelligence services and that these people 
were all Tutsi. Spying is not a new phenomenon in Rwanda and spying and sur-
veillance were common under the pre-colonial monarchy when chiefs used to spy 
on each other and they themselves were in turn spied on by higher authorities 
(Vansina 2000, as cited in Straus 2006: 215).  
Journalist John Baldwin was convinced that researchers like me were also tar-
gets of the intelligence services. By that time, I had interviewed about ten people 
from different NGOs in Kigali and John estimated that I would be known to the 
Rwandan authorities because of these interviews. According to him, at least one 
of the interviewees would be a member of the intelligence services and some 
others would have reported their interview with me to the authorities and passed 
on my contact details for further monitoring. Another way of spying on research-
ers is through their interpreters. Two Western researchers told me they knew of 
several cases in which interpreters denounced the activities and opinions of the 
researchers they worked with. Fujii (2008: 22), who did research in Rwanda on 
local participation in the genocide, had heard stories of authorities imprisoning 
interpreters and research assistants who had worked with foreign researchers and 
NGOs. 
Manipulation 
Spying and the omnipresence of the Rwandan government go hand in hand with 
manipulation and pressure. For instance, if someone wants a job in the public 
sector, s/he first has to become a member of the RPF ruling party. A friend told 
                                                 
11 This is mainly a result of coercion and not of trust in the authorities, as Chapter 5 will show.
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me the story of her sister who had asked the local authorities for help after some-
one broke into her house. The authorities reacted negatively by asking what she 
wanted them to do as she did not adhere to government programmes. Her sister 
objected saying that she did follow the authorities’ orders but they responded by 
asking ‘Did you pay your contribution to the party yet?’. This reaction is a clear 
example of how the authorities put pressure on Rwandan citizens. 
After spending some weeks in Rwanda during my first fieldwork period, I 
gradually started to feel the pressure and manipulation myself. It was especially 
tangible in Kigali in September 2008 during the elections. In the three months 
prior to the parliamentary elections, civil servants had to contribute a third of 
their salaries to the RPF. Peasants were also targeted and expected to contribute. 
According to one informant, they had to pay RWF 200 (about € 0.30) but another 
insisted that it was much more as she argued that some peasants had to sell a goat 
before they could make their payment. When official campaigning for the elec-
tions finally started, the whole of Kigali was covered in the colours and logo of 
the incumbent RPF. People in the streets were wearing t-shirts and baseball caps 
bearing the RPF logo, RPF advertisements dominated billboards and public TV 
screens and there were lists of RPF candidates hanging everywhere. If you had 
had no prior knowledge of what was going on, you would have been inclined to 
think that it was a very cheerful and optimistic period. However, John Baldwin 
and others had warned me that local authorities often forced and coerced the 
population to vote for the ruling RPF or to become a party member. This did not 
necessarily happen in a subtle way, as I experienced when I met a respondent in 
Mubinda who chaired the supposedly neutral local election committee. During 
our first meeting, he was wearing an RPF cap and at the second he had on an 
RPF t-shirt. A woman from rural western Rwanda told me about a local training 
course she had attended and how, at the end of the day, she and her fellow partic-
ipants were not allowed to go home if they had not yet registered as members of 
the RPF. She and other informants explained that people simply felt obliged to 
vote for the RPF because if they did not, they would regret it later when local 
authorities refused them certain services, as the story of my friend’s sister illus-
trates. In the end, the incumbent RPF won with 79% of the votes, probably after 
‘reverse rigging’.12
Other cases of manipulation were visible in the government’s reaction after 
the arrest of Rose Kabuye, a high-ranking government official who was then 
Head of Protocol of President Kagame and a former major under his command 
during the war. She was arrested in Germany in November 2008 as the result of 
                                                 
12 Reverse rigging means that the RPF victory was downplayed by lowering the percentage of the votes 
they had won. In reality, the RPF obtained 98% of the votes but this was reduced to 78.76% so that it 
appeared less ‘Stalinist’ (Reyntjens 2011: 11).
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an international arrest warrant issued by the French judge Bruguière. He had in-
vestigated the shooting down of President Habyarimana’s plane that marked the 
start of the genocide on 6 April 1994. He did this on behalf of the families of the 
French crew members who also died in the crash when the plane was supposedly 
hit by the RPF, which was then a rebel movement.13 Rose Kabuye was arrested 
on suspicion of sheltering the RPF soldiers who shot down the plane. Eight other 
senior RPF members, including President Kagame, were on Bruguière’s list. In 
the weeks following her arrest in Germany and detention in France there were 
demonstrations outside the German Embassy in central Kigali.14 Billboards, pub-
lic TV screens, banners, newspapers and all the other government-controlled me-
dia vehemently protested against her arrest. A banner attached to the entrance to 
a shopping centre in Kigali read: ‘The management of the UTC centre supports 
Rose Kabuye and her family’. Various TV screens around the city claimed ‘60 
years after the Holocaust Germany arrests a woman who stopped the 1994 geno-
cide’. And for weeks, the RPF-owned newspaper The New Times announced the 
number of days Kabuye had been detained and had a proverb or slogan on the 
front page. For instance, ‘Day 33: First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, 
then they fight you, then you win’ (The New Times, 11 December 2008). Alt-
hough these protests appeared to be spontaneous and genuine, it emerged that the 
government was always behind them. Several times, text messages were sent out 
via the mobile telephone provider MTN to incite the population of Kigali to pro-
test in organized demonstrations during which businesses had to be closed and 
public life came to a standstill. In the rural areas too, the authorities organized 
demonstrations and it was understood that, after each demonstration, the authori-
ties drew up lists of people who had not shown up to protest against Rose Ka-
buye’s detention.
In the end, I started to feel very uneasy about these protests, especially when a 
Rwandan friend explained that both the protests and Kagame’s fierce speeches 
about Kabuye’s arrest were not just directed at Germans but at white people in 
general. I experienced this myself when I was walking in the direction of the 
German Embassy one day and a group of protesters came towards me. They had 
obviously finished their protest and were walking to the arranged minibuses that 
I had already spotted. However, as soon as they noticed me they raised their ban-
ners once again and sang their protest songs while looking directly at me, the 
only white person around. I was concerned and could not help but think: ‘I have 
                                                 
13 His investigations were reopened by two other judges, Marc Trévidic and Nathalie Poux, who 
concluded the opposite in early 2012 and indicated that it was the FAR (Force Armée Rwandaise or 
Rwandan Armed Forces) that fired the missiles and brought down the presidential plane 
http://www.france24.com/en/20120111-judicial-report-france-rwanda-investigation-habyarimana-
genocide-kagame-diplomacy/. Accessed 21 December 2014.
14 The German ambassador had already been expelled by this time.
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had nothing to do with this arrest, I am only carrying out well-meant research and 
these manipulated and ill-informed people are raising their banners and shouting 
at me!’. In retrospect, I am aware that my assessment was perhaps not totally jus-
tified, but what I felt at that moment was a mixture of uneasiness and irritation. 
Around the same time, my interpreter Cécile also showed unease with the situa-
tion when she proposed not asking sensitive questions in Mubinda because she 
feared it could get us into trouble with the authorities. 
The Rwandan authorities are also able to directly influence one’s research, as 
happened to researcher Susan Thomson. She discovered that a representative of a 
Rwandan local partner association who had recommended possible interviewees 
told these people what they could and could not say to her. In the end, the author-
ities were not pleased with her research and forced her to stop (Thomson 2013: 
34).
There were two incidents during my 2010 fieldwork when the authorities tried to 
intervene. One day, Honorée and I wanted to visit a land demarcation team and 
we asked some local people involved in the land registration process where we 
could find them. We were then accompanied by a young man who volunteered to 
take us there. When we reached the fields where the land demarcation team, local 
authorities and others involved were busy, some of the people concerned ex-
plained to us that some land conflicts had emerged in the demarcation process. 
Then the young man who had taken us to the demarcation team said that we had 
to leave. He told Honorée it was not good that this ‘white person’ heard about 
these conflicts. Honorée explained to him that the chairman of the neighbour-
hood committee had just read and accepted our research ‘approval’ letter. When 
we eventually left the site, another man approached Honorée to say that he was in 
a position of authority and that she had to give him her phone number. Honorée 
and I managed to enter our car before the man could further insist. 
An experience that could have led to greater government interference occurred 
at the beginning of my first fieldwork period in 2008 when I had to introduce 
myself to the Rwandan National Ethics Committee. Through a Dutch colleague 
who was also working on Rwanda at the time, I had learned that every researcher 
whose research involved the Rwandan population needed a research permit from 
this committee. I reasoned that this was a good idea because it would be efficient 
to have a national research permit that would allow entrance to all the ministries 
and local authorities. 
An ethical dilemma then arose. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, eth-
nicity is an important theme in this thesis but it is very sensitive and cannot be 
discussed openly. For this reason, I had never mentioned to the Rwandan authori-
ties that ethnicity was one of my research themes as I was (and still am) quite 
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sure that they would not have agreed to me researching the ethnic aspects of land 
access practices and government policies. It seemed, however, not very ethical to 
withhold this from the National Ethics Committee. After lengthy consideration, I 
decided that I would hand in an adapted version of my research proposal. I rea-
soned that I could not take the risk of being denied access to my research field or 
even to Rwanda. This decision and the following presentation to the five commit-
tee members made me very nervous and uncomfortable. A few days afterwards, I 
received a letter from the Committee that announced that approval was pending. 
The letter read: 
1. We require a Rwandan co-investigator when the PI [Principal Investigator] is foreign to 
the country 
2. The committee would like to receive a copy of your previous publication 
3. Provide an approval letter from the Ministry of Land Affairs [Mirena] 
4. Please specify the region(s) where you will collect data 
5. Provide approval letter from local authorities 
6. Provide copy of announcement/recruitment plan 
Besides these conditions, I had been told I had to pay a research fee of about € 
1000 a year (although a discount for subsequent years was negotiable) and I also 
had to provide an annual report of my progress and findings. 
After reading this letter, I felt trapped. A permit given by the National Ethics 
Committee would surely give access to ministries and local authorities, but 
would have a high price both literally and metaphorically. The Committee, and 
therefore the Rwandan government, would be able to closely monitor my re-
search by reading details about my research area, my progress and any prelimi-
nary findings in my annual reports. As a consequence, I would not be able to 
safeguard the anonymity, and thus the security, of my respondents, which was 
already difficult due to tight surveillance by the local authorities.15
The presence of a co-investigator, which is not common in anthropological 
PhD projects, would also have influenced my research. This may be understand-
able from the perspective of the National Ethics Committee that might expect 
something in return from a foreign researcher. I felt, however, that it would be 
uncomfortable discussing my sensitive research with a Rwandan researcher, es-
pecially in view of what I had been told about interpreters sometimes spying on 
foreigner researchers they were working with. I would also worry that interview-
ing respondents in the presence of a Rwandan co-investigator could increase dis-
trust and fear in my respondents and influence their answers. I decided to meet 
                                                 
15 Historian Jan Vansina has done extensive fieldwork in Rwanda. In his 1996 book In Pursuit of 
History, which discusses historians’ fieldwork in Africa, he argues that many African governments 
began to use research permits after independence as a tool to control field access, monitor researchers 
and limit the research topics that were acceptable (Vansina 1996: 134).
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the conditions formulated under points 2, 3 and 4, protest against the co-
investigator (point 1) and the research fee, and ignore points 5 and 6 for the time 
being. When I got the letter of approval from the Ministry (point 3) some weeks 
later, I decided to use this to start my local fieldwork. After much consideration, I 
decided to break off contact by not contacting the Committee again and I contin-
ued my research.  
The descriptions in this section concerning the omnipresence, spying and manip-
ulation by government officials show how they can directly and indirectly influ-
ence research and researchers. In my case, the indirect effect was substantial as 
they affected some of my choices, behaviour and feelings. For instance, after I 
heard stories of spying by interpreters, I decided not to look for an experienced 
but unknown interpreter and chose to go for a friend I knew I could trust. With 
Rwandans from national organizations and NGOs, I was cautious not to be too 
open about my research, my opinions and my intentions. And when dealing with 
authorities, I always described my research as briefly and vaguely as possible and 
avoided talking about sensitive topics like land conflicts and ethnicity. On the 
day of the parliamentary elections, I was, unfortunately, not sufficiently careful. 
At the end of the afternoon, I phoned a friend and talked about the expected elec-
tion results with overtones of irony. We were then suddenly disconnected and I 
had to redial. I made some other slightly sarcastic remarks and the connection 
was again broken off. Then my friend phoned back sounding worried and sug-
gested that we postpone the conversation.  
Following these experiences, I began to behave like an ordinary Rwandan, al-
ways on my guard, trying to guess the intentions, thoughts, position and behav-
iour of my interlocutors. Like Rwandans, I would be aware of my surroundings 
at all times and whenever I had a conversation about Rwanda in public or on the 
phone, I would avoid using sensitive and charged words like Hutu, Tutsi, survi-
vors or Kagame, even if I was speaking Dutch. Even with a Rwandan host with 
whom I became friends, I avoided talking about politics at first. Experiences like 
these and my change in behaviour also affected my emotional well-being and I 
started to gradually develop feelings of anxiety, paranoia,16 distrust and fear. 
These feelings increased significantly when a Rwandan friend, who used to work 
for an international human rights NGO, told me in September 2008 that he feared 
for his life and left Rwanda in a hurry because he had learnt that the government 
was looking for him. Although I was well informed about disappearances and 
detentions of government critics, this person’s situation shocked me as it con-
                                                 
16 By paranoia, I do not mean the medical term that describes a psychological disorder but rather the 
feeling that one is constantly being observed. 
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cerned someone I cared about. My emotional well-being was seriously affected 
by his sudden departure.  
In retrospect, I realize that the behaviour and emotional changes I underwent 
were unpleasant but they also gave me important information about the way 
Rwandan society works. They allowed me to gain additional insight into the fear 
and distrust that the majority of Rwandans face every day. In the next section we 
will turn to constraints in Rwandan society and how they affect research. 
When Rwandans Meet the Researcher 
In the previous chapter and in those that follow, I describe how the Rwandan 
population is living in a repressive and oppressive environment where the gov-
ernment has a rigid structure, a strong hierarchy and excessive control. Distrust is 
rampant within society as well as towards outsiders. As a consequence, research-
ers in Rwanda often have difficulty establishing the true feelings and opinions of 
Rwandan respondents. Although this is not often dealt with in the literature, 
scholars researching the Great Lakes Region have recently started to reflect on 
the issue. For instance, Bouka’s interviews with released prisoners, who lived 
under constant surveillance by the authorities that created a feeling of constant 
fear of being sent back to prison, revealed that many respondents use a variety of 
strategies to ‘covertly relay their intended message so as not to directly affront 
the authorised discourse [on justice]’ (Bouka 2013: 108). Fujii (2010: 233) states 
that the degree or level of access a researcher can achieve is determined by the 
way s/he is identified by respondents. ‘If people suspect the researchers are state 
agents, informants may invoke a party line in interviews and conversations rather 
than reveal their deeper thoughts’. King (2010) did research in Rwanda on the 
relationship between formal schooling, violent conflict and peace building. Re-
garding communication with respondents, she claimed that ‘problems such as 
historical memory and selective telling illuminate political structures, group rela-
tions, and societal cleavages’. These problems should not, therefore, be regarded 
as data problems but as ‘data points’ (King 2010: 127; see also Bouka 2013). 
Fujii (2010: 232) points to the same issues with her concept of ‘metadata’ as she 
problematizes the trustworthiness of narratives that are generated in politically 
sensitive, post-violent contexts. Metadata are ‘the spoken and unspoken expres-
sions about people’s interior thoughts and feelings, which they do not always 
articulate in their stories or responses to interview questions’. These include ru-
mours, inventions, silences, denials and evasions and are valuable because they 
are data in themselves and ‘indicate how the current social and political land-
scape is shaping what people might say to a researcher’ (Ibid.; see also Bouka 
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2013). This section aims to connect some of my experiences with Fujii, King and 
Bouka’s observations and with James Scott’s (1990) public and hidden transcript 
theory. I will also describe related features, such as the role of secrecy in Rwan-
dan culture and the use of the Rwandan language Kinyarwanda. We first turn to 
the issue of keeping up appearances. 
Appearance or Reality? 
A Rwandan friend once explained that Rwandans always try to look smart and 
impeccably even though in reality they may often not be doing well at all. As an 
example, she explained how her neighbours made fun of her old, worn-out furni-
ture. Recently these neighbours had bought new furniture and a big television but 
my friend knew that, as a result, they could only afford one decent meal every 
two days. Another example she gave was of a woman she knew who wore beau-
tiful dresses, but they were all borrowed. I had similar experiences during my 
fieldwork in 2008 when walking around Kigali’s city centre. Unlike on my pre-
vious visit in 2004, I noticed that everyone in Kigali was wearing shoes and I did 
not see any beggars or informal economic activities. But my observations were 
always contradicted by explanations discrediting these seemingly positive devel-
opments: wearing shoes was now compulsory; beggars had been transported to 
the outskirts of town; and informal economic activities had been officially 
banned. However, these activities took place after dark as I saw myself when 
Cécile took me to the city centre one evening to help me buy a shirt.  
Questions regarding appearance or reality occurred at a political level too. For 
example, people who were rallying to support the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front 
during the 2008 parliamentary election campaign seemed to be paid to do so. 
And after Rose Kabuye’s arrest in Germany, women erected a tent in front of the 
German Embassy to protest against her detention. Eventually, various informants 
told me that it was not on their own initiative but that the government had paid 
these women to protest. Not everything was as it initially appeared. 
Rumours and Covert Communication 
In her description of how the genocide unfolded, Des Forges (1999) talks of the 
power of rumours, for instance that spread by local authorities that Tutsi were 
supporting the RPF and were ready to kill their Hutu neighbours (Des Forges 
1999: 372; see also Verwimp 2013: 184-185). Oldenburg studied decision-
making by the citizens in the DRC city of Goma when they were threatened with 
renewed violence and argues that rumours are highly situational, as they usually 
occur in times of uncertainty and can therefore be seen as symptoms of societal 
crisis (Oldenburg 2010: 70; see also Begley 2013). In line with Oldenburg’s 
analysis, Fujii argues that rumours play a prominent role in periods of extreme 
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uncertainty because they reflect insecurities that linger from past violence. One 
of Fujii’s respondents explained that rumours in Rwanda were part of everyday 
life and that ‘even if you stay at home, you always hear rumours about yourself’. 
Rumours can be the root cause of fears about talking to a researcher. For exam-
ple, one male respondent in prison revealed that other prisoners had warned him 
that Fujii wanted to take the prisoners to the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (based in Tanzania) to be tried for genocide (Fujii 2010: 232-233).  
Most of the rumours I became familiar with involved the state and were often 
connected to the above-mentioned appearances issues. For example, in the case 
of people rallying for the RPF and women protesting an official’s arrest, there 
was no clear evidence that people were indeed being paid to do this. Another 
quite persistent rumour I heard was about the 2008 so-called ‘0ne dollar cam-
paign’ when every Rwandan was supposed to donate a dollar to help construct 
houses for orphans of the genocide. Several times people told me that the cam-
paign involved building houses for only about 200 orphans but as the campaign 
had raised more than US$ 1 m, it was suggested that the RPF would use the rest 
of the money for their election campaign. Rumours also surrounded the land reg-
istration that took place in Mubinda in 2010. Several respondents indicated that 
they did not know the government’s objectives regarding registration and feared 
that ultimately the state would take their land. These examples highlight the inse-
curities and uncertainties felt by Rwandans: they do not trust and in fact often 
fear the intentions and activities of their government.  
A more personal rumour I heard supports Oldenburg’s statement that rumours 
are symptomatic of societal crisis. It demonstrates how rumours can have a nega-
tive impact on one’s well-being. The narrator and victim of this rumour was 
Françoise (not her real name), a Hutu mother of four who successfully managed 
to give all of her children a university education abroad. One of her sons studied 
in India where he died in the summer of 2010 following a car accident. After his 
death, Françoise heard a rumour circulating in her neighbourhood that her son 
had died because he had been pushed out of a window (or off a balcony) by some 
Rwandan genocide survivors after he had denied the genocide. After hearing the 
rumour, she was naturally very shocked and felt uneasy for some time. She in-
vestigated the circumstances of his death in more detail to be sure that it had in-
deed been a car accident. Gradually she realized that all her neighbours knew of 
the rumour and she suspected that it came from some genocide survivors she 
knew. She was so upset about this that she arranged a meeting with some of these 
genocide survivors and a local RPF chairman. At the meeting, the RPF repre-
sentative told Françoise that she had to prove to the party that her son had died in 
a car accident. On hearing this, Françoise became very angry and told everyone 
present that it was the fault of Rwandan politics that such vicious rumours arise. 
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A few days after the meeting, she decided to phone the survivors who had been 
present to explain to them that it had not been her aim to hurt them. To her sur-
prise and horror, she then learned that the survivors had intended to go to the au-
thorities to accuse Françoise of menacing them but that, because of her phone 
call, they now would refrain from doing so. It also upset Françoise that some of 
the people involved were later present at her son’s funeral.
The rumour concerning Françoise’s son’s death had been invented to hurt her 
feelings and it goes without saying that it succeeded in doing so. The incident 
demonstrates how social relations are still very strained, to the extent that people 
are playing unpleasant tricks on others involving jealousy, resentment and hypoc-
risy. It also shows the often powerful position of the genocide survivors and the 
way they and others view and relate to Hutu who, in turn, can be marginalized by 
or with the help of local (RPF) authorities.  
With regard to rumours involving my research assistant and/or me, one re-
spondent in Mubinda warned me during the first weeks of fieldwork in 2008 that 
fear and distrust could easily evoke such rumours. He told me that the recorder I 
was using would make respondents suspicious and reluctant to talk because they 
would assume that I was a BBC journalist or was from Voice of America, both of 
which broadcast in Rwanda, and that their stories would be aired. After these 
comments, I decided not to use the recorder anymore.  
Rumours can be informative and denials, silences, lies and evasions should not 
be regarded as obstacles but as valuable data. In Fujii’s interviews, Hutu women 
used to deny that there had been violence in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994. 
Instead they focused on the 1997 violence that the RPF committed against them. 
Through these denials, Fujii (2010: 235-238) learned that these women were in-
dicating a social division between genocide survivors and the Hutu population 
that had suffered RPF violence. Silence can also show how conditions in the pre-
sent shape narratives of the past. This is the case when people are reluctant to 
talk about their involvement in pillaging during the genocide because they fear 
they may have to compensate the victims.  
Fujii (2008: 231) noted how the stories people tell, whether they are lies, in-
ventions or not, ‘are valuable because they reflect the speaker’s state of mind, 
aspirations, and desires’, while Berckmoes (2013: 137), who studied urban youth 
in post-war Burundi, found that lies have different meanings and motives and are 
‘part and parcel’ of post-conflict social relations. Fujii (2010: 231, 234-235) 
gives the example of a woman who was (presumably) Hutu but was targeted in 
1994 because her mother was Tutsi. She told Fujii how she managed to escape 
and survive the genocide but that she is currently not regarded as a genocide sur-
vivor. After a few interviews, Fujii started to question whether her story about 
her escape was true. However, she gradually learned that the woman’s narratives 
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hinted at the value she placed on being recognized as a survivor and victim. Her 
story was probably not about what was, but rather about what should have been, 
according to this respondent. Such a narrative can embody all sorts of truths 
(emotional, psychological and moral) and understanding it is crucial in research-
ers’ analyses. 
My respondents’ lies, silences, denials and evasions contained similar interest-
ing data. When discussing land-tenure policies, respondents mainly focused on 
the technical process. They avoided talking about their personal feelings and 
opinions and stated that there had been no problems. The usual answer to ques-
tions concerning Mubinda’s social life was also positive: ‘social relations were 
good’. This attitude sometimes led to strange twists in my interviews. I spoke for 
instance with a Hutu couple, Daniel and Beatrice, who were very outspoken 
about government policies and felt deprived because the Tutsi with whom Hutu 
had to share their land never gave anything in return. They argued that after they 
had shared their land and moved to the village, they had remained poor, while 
Tutsi who had received land had become (relatively) rich and that current poli-
cies were aggravating their situation. When we then asked about current social 
relations, Beatrice answered: ‘You cannot regain lost time, there is no way we 
can change things. We had a nice house, property, what can we do? But we have 
good relations.’17 Daniel, however, admitted their denial and evasion indirectly 
by adding: ‘In Rwanda we have learned to make things go over our heads. We 
tread on eggs without breaking them.’18 This statement is telling as it reflects the 
way people deal with tense social relations and government policies. Many Hutu 
feel vulnerable and see themselves as victims of the Tutsi-dominated govern-
ment. It also reveals people’s lack of trust and their fear about openly criticizing 
the authorities, why they give politically correct answers and their nostalgic feel-
ings for the time when social relations were still good.  
Despite this lack of openness, some respondents explained their silence or 
evasion by stating that they had previously been unwilling to speak frankly with 
me. These statements reflected their distrust of my position and objectives as a 
researcher and were voiced mainly in 2008. Sometimes they addressed me direct-
ly, like local authority and genocide survivor Spéciose, who stated that she used 
to hate white people because of what the French did during the genocide but that 
after she got to know me better, she started to develop positive feelings towards 
                                                 
17 Bouka (2013: 118-119) had similar experiences with ex-prisoners who responded that there was no 
problem (Nacibazo in Kinyarwanda) even though they sometimes felt they had been wrongly accused. 
This often happened after they had given detailed accounts of their suffering in prison or of injustices. 
Nacibazo was also repeated in my interviews. After a man told Bouka about the impact on him of his 
lengthy pre-trial detention and his eventual conviction for stealing a goat, he ended with ‘As you can 
see, all is good’ (Ibid.: 119). This is similar to Daniel and Beatrice’s concluding remark.
18 Interview with Daniel and Beatrice, December 2010.
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me. Respondent Jean meant to address only Cécile when he said: ‘Of course in 
our country there are hypocrites. For instance with your friend here [meaning the 
researcher] to whom you should not say everything because they [the Whites] 
also were behind the genocide.19 Sometimes they make fun of us.’20
Public and Hidden Transcripts 
Fujii’s metadata show how people resort to self-censorship. This issue was also 
raised when discussing the role of spying. Self-censorship is closely connected to 
Scott’s notion of public and hidden transcripts. Public transcripts occur when ‘the 
power of social forms embodying etiquette and politeness requires us often to 
sacrifice candor for smooth relations with our acquaintances.’ (Scott 1990: 1). 
These acquaintances are seen as people who may be able to harm or help us in 
some way. Thus, in a situation of social subordination, the public discourse of the 
subordinate will normally be shaped to appeal to the expectation of the powerful 
out of prudence, fear and the desire to find favour. The concept of public tran-
script describes the open interaction between subordinates and those who domi-
nate and is unlikely to tell the whole story about power relations. Furthermore, 
the greater the power inequality between the dominant and the subordinate and 
the more arbitrarily power is exercised, the more the public transcript of subordi-
nates will take on a stereotyped, ritualistic cast. So when power is more threaten-
ing, the mask becomes thicker and disguise and surveillance play key roles in 
power relations (Ibid.: 2-3). A public transcript is, therefore, in close conformity 
with how the dominant group would wish to have things appear.  
The opposite of public transcript is hidden transcript, which refers to the dis-
course that takes place ‘offstage’. It is beyond direct observation by power hold-
ers and ‘consists of those offstage speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, 
contradict or inflect what appears in the public transcript’ (Ibid.: 4-5). Scott does 
not, however, want to argue that what is said in power-laden contexts is false and 
what is said offstage is true nor that the former is a realm of necessity and the 
latter a realm of freedom. What is clear is that the hidden transcript is produced 
for a different audience and under different constraints of power than the public 
transcript. The discrepancy between the two reveals the impact of domination on 
public discourse (Ibid.). In most circumstances, the hidden transcripts of the 
dominant and the subordinate are never in direct contact. Each participant will 
thus be familiar with the public transcript and the hidden transcript of his group 
but not with the hidden transcript of the other (Ibid.: 15).  
                                                 
19 Both Jean and Spéciose hinted at the role of the French government that supported the regime before 
the genocide by training militias and supplying weapons.
20 Interview with Jean, October 2008.
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In the case of Rwanda, the public transcript is clearly visible, for instance in po-
litically correct answers given in meetings when the population does not dare to 
contradict the local authorities or ask critical questions. As the power inequality 
gap between the authorities and ordinary citizens is big in Rwanda, Scott’s ob-
servation of disguise and surveillance plays an important role. At the same time, 
pronouncing the hidden transcript is problematic because of the high level of dis-
trust, grievances and fear. Even amongst close friends there is not enough trust. 
An example here is that of a good friend who is a genocide survivor and then 
lived with several other survivors with whom she was very close. In a private 
conversation, she explained why she strongly objected to becoming a member of 
the RPF in order to have greater job opportunities. I asked her about her friends’ 
ideas on this moral question. She then looked at me with a mixture of surprise, 
disappointment and disapproval and said she could not discuss this with them 
because you keep these thoughts to yourself in Rwanda. Only to me, as an out-
sider and friend with an interest in her well-being did she dare to talk about such 
an issue. 
Secrecy and Language 
The problem of pronouncing the hidden transcript and low levels of trust are 
connected to secrecy and Kinyarwanda, the Rwandan language. Secrecy is an 
important component of Rwandan culture, as anthropologist De Lame (2005: 14) 
described in her study of a Rwandan community in the 1980s. According to her, 
secrecy is pervasive and Rwandans skilfully hold back information to keep out-
siders at a distance, particularly by using linguistic codes. Secrecy is not some-
thing exceptional but is present in ordinary life, for instance in the vague descrip-
tions of the location of one’s house or in the way the rooms of a house are set up 
to conceal one’s stock and property. 
Secrecy persisted as a cultural habit well beyond pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda where 
people, subjected to a climate of constant insecurity, were at the mercy of capricious chiefs 
whose intrigues affected their lives. (Codere 1962, as cited in De Lame 2005: 15)  
This insecurity was also evoked by spying among chiefs and high-ranking au-
thorities. One of Thomson’s respondents referred to secrecy when he criticized 
the current government’s programme of unity and reconciliation:  
Peace is for those with power; not [poor] people like me. All I can say right now is that I 
don’t know any Hutu who hold hatred for their Tutsi brothers like the government says they 
do. If they did, how would I even know? Rwandans keep secrets easily. And my [Hutu] 
brothers are hardly going to tell me about their inner secrets [..] (Thomson 2013: 53)  
The role of secrecy can partly be explained by examining the role of Kinyarwan-
da in social relations. Historically, what someone said did not necessarily corre-
spond with reality. Before colonization, Rwanda was a traditional, complex and 
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hierarchical society with different social classes. Every Rwandan was confronted 
with at least three chiefs above them and these chiefs had to report to other chiefs 
who were at a higher level again. People had to maintain good relations with 
their chiefs as well as maintaining or improving their own social position. Com-
munication served and was directly defined by the relationship and status be-
tween them or by the broader socio-political context in which the conversation 
took place. In this power game, communication played an essential role and 
served mainly as a survival strategy. One had to internalize a specific communi-
cation code to be able to match the interests and demands of the different authori-
ties. It was not important that someone provided objectively correct information 
but that s/he consolidated his/her social position and put the superior in the right 
mood to be granted favours. Communicating was a means to an end instead of an 
end in itself. Therefore one would only communicate what one thought was use-
ful to oneself and would serve one’s own interests and goals. This meant that 
what one said did not necessarily correspond to what one thought and made the 
Rwandan communication system esoteric because what people said revealed and 
yet concealed things. This is expressed in the Rwandan proverb ‘What is inside 
the drum is known to the drummer and the owner of the drum’, which means that 
nobody knows the secrets of a person but himself and his confidant. The drum-
mer may communicate through drumming but the drum will not reveal his se-
crets. He can reveal but at the same time hide something and can even be saying 
something different than the words in fact suggest. So no one can gain total in-
sight into the motives of someone else. Since the drum in Rwanda symbolizes 
power, the proverb also refers to the fact that rulers use communication to stay in 
power (Ingelaere 2007a: 25; Overdulve 1997: 272; see also Rukebesha 1985). 
According to Overdulve (1997: 272-275), this impenetrable and vague form of 
communication has always characterized Rwanda and created an environment of 
distrust and extreme caution that has penetrated the everyday lives of every 
Rwandan citizen. The fact that it has become second nature to Rwandans is 
acknowledged by present-day institutions like the Rwanda Chamber Foundation 
that promotes business and investments in Rwanda. It established some commu-
nication rules and expectations on its ‘Rwanda Etiquette’ webpage and warns: 
Rwandans may avoid telling the truth if it might hurt or upset the person they are speaking 
with. While it may be seen as lying by some, most Rwandans feel that they are being sensi-
tive to the person’s feelings’ and that ‘Rwandans tend to be very indirect, talking around is-
sues instead of discussing them directly.21
The high degree of self-censorship that the population has developed is what 
Ingelaere calls ‘rehearsed consensus’. This is the dominant and dominating pub-
                                                 
21 The Rwanda Chamber Foundation is a private independent organization. 
See http://www.rwandachamber.org//rwanda+etiquette. Accessed 1 April 2011.
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lic transcript in post-genocide Rwanda that authorities are passing on to the 
population in sensitization campaigns, commemoration ceremonies, speeches, re-
education programmes and communal labour activities. Rehearsed consensus is 
reflected in the Kinyarwanda word ubwenge, which is a specific way of com-
municating whereby what one says does not necessarily correspond with what 
one thinks. Instead, it is the status of (and connection between) the partners in a 
conversation or their relationship with the surrounding socio-political environ-
ment that needs to be served in a conversation. With this communication code, 
truth and lies stand in a dialectical relationship (Ingelaere 2010a: 53). Thomson 
also found that Rwandan culture has strict codes about who can speak out against 
injustices when they interact with local authorities.  
Indeed, there is no strong historical record of individuals speaking out against the oppressive 
actions of others who are more socially or economically powerful than they are. Individual 
facility in the art of disguising and concealing one’s real feelings or opinions on a given mat-
ter is self-taught and culturally sanctioned; dissimulation and acquiescence are both com-
mon. This leads outsiders, as well as RPF élites, to conclude that ordinary Rwandans are 
obedient and comply without any reflection to their demands. (Thomson 2013: 144) 
Rwandans are experts in the use of euphemisms that convey and disguise their 
true intentions. During the genocide, killing was often referred to as ‘tree felling’, 
‘bush clearing’ or ‘pulling up the roots of bad weeds’, while people nowadays 
may refer to the war and genocide as ‘the events’. References like these to agri-
cultural labour served to disguise the horror and, at the same time, reminded peo-
ple of their duty to obey and take part in it (Hintjens 1999: 268). Another im-
portant characteristic connected to the use of language is self-control and control-
ling one’s sentiments and emotions. These are among the most important values 
in Rwandan social life. Erny argues that Rwandans control their emotions, both 
positive and negative, and can just as easily greet their friends as their enemies. 
In general, people tend to suppress spontaneity too (Erny 1983, as cited in 
Overdulve 1997: 278). 
Foreigners cannot know this place. We cheat. We repeat the same little things to you over 
and over and tell you nothing. Even among ourselves we lie. We have a habit of secrecy and 
suspicion. You can stay a whole year and you will not know what Rwandans think or what 
they are doing. (Gourevitch 2000: 256) 
When communicating with strangers, most Rwandans are even more reserved 
and cautious. They usually do not react unexpectedly or without thinking, but are 
cautious in everything they do. If you ask a Rwandan a question, s/he cannot re-
spond before s/he has understood why the question is being asked. If a person has 
to take a decision or make a judgement, s/he will not pronounce categorically and 
clearly what s/he thinks. Nor will s/he confirm nor deny anything but will instead 
manage the situation. This results in a form of ‘social hypocrisy’ in which a per-
son can say ‘yes’ when ‘no’ is meant and ‘no’ for ‘yes’ in order to not compro-
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mise oneself (Erny 1983, as cited in Overdulve 1997: 278). This analysis was 
confirmed by my (Dutch) Kinyarwanda teacher who had also noticed in her en-
counters with Rwandans that they never said what they meant as a way of avoid-
ing being cornered.  
A more recent notion of the problematic communication between strangers 
and Rwandans is expressed in the Kinyarwanda word amalenga that Rwandans 
use to qualify what Whites cannot understand and therefore do not know because 
it is not meant for outsiders (Willame in Reyntjens 1995: 7; Hintjens 2001: 41). 
Pottier refers to amalenga as ‘coded language’ (Pottier 2002: 193). He also men-
tions ‘La parole est à deux personnes’ by which he means that, in a conversation, 
no knowledge is safe in the presence of a third person. This proverb refers to the 
Rwandan chiefs and king before and during colonial times who would speak to 
their subjects in private one-on-one conversations because ‘his information and 
knowledge never belonged to the public sphere’ (Pottier 1989: 474). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered various themes that provide data and insight into 
Rwandan society and its political culture. As a consequence of the government’s 
omnipresence, manipulation and spying activities, there is a Rwandan attitude of 
distrust and fear in which metadata like rumours, appearances, silences and lies 
emerge. These, as well as problematic features of Rwandan society like self-
censorship, secrecy and the role of language, show how most respondents cannot 
easily talk about sensitive and controversial topics in the current power constella-
tion. Instead, most respondents censor their answers and stick to safe public tran-
scripts when discussing topics like social life, matters of ethnicity and the conse-
quences of the land-sharing and villagization policies. Asking too direct a ques-
tion at an untimely moment could easily have jeopardized this research as re-
spondents could have clammed up out of fear or distrust because they knew that 
they are not allowed to say anything negative and might end up in trouble if the 
authorities find out what they have been saying. However, researchers also have 
to be careful as people may turn out to be in a position of authority or connected 
to the authorities. It was fortunate that, for reasons previously discussed, people 
were more willing to reveal hidden transcripts during my final fieldwork period. 
Another important aspect that contributed to the collection of metadata came 
from the feelings of uneasiness, stress, fear and agitation that I encountered, es-
pecially during my 2008 fieldwork. These proved ultimately to be a valuable 
source of information concerning the way Rwandan society works and made me 
realize that the Rwandan population has to deal with situations of oppression, 
manipulation and deception on a daily basis.  
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At this point, readers may wonder if it is possible to do research at all in such 
a tense political climate with an omnipresent state that spies upon, manipulates 
and represses its citizens and does not shy away from intervening in outside re-
search. The answer to this question is ‘yes’, if the research is conducted with 
great care and an awareness of the situation and the risks involved, and provided 
that necessary precautions are taken. Following my previous research experience 
in Rwanda, I was well aware of the sensitivity of my research topic and the over-
all socio-political situation. I took precautions by avoiding too much contact with 
local government officials, living some distance from Mubinda and selecting my 
interpreters from among my friends. Respondents were interviewed in their own 
homes. I also decided to conduct fieldwork during three shorter periods instead 
of one long period so as to build up trust over time. Of course some luck was also 
involved and my interpreters turned out to be able to put respondents at ease and 
encourage them to talk. In addition to this, frustration among my respondents 
was so rampant during the third and final fieldwork period that they were much 
more outspoken than before and were eager to speak about their problems. 
Thanks to my interpreters, I was also able to assess the socio-political situation 
and interpret rumours, denials and the like and discuss public and hidden tran-
scripts and language matters. These precautions, my former knowledge, metada-
ta, hidden transcripts and an analysis of my own positioning meant that I was 
able to understand and interpret what appears in the following empirical chapters.  
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Coercive Clientelism: 
Kings, Clients and Land
Certain themes emerge when studying the history of Rwanda: power, clientship, 
oppression and violence.1 They all come together in Codere’s 1962 article ‘Pow-
er in Ruanda’ that challenges the assumption that, within a particular society, a 
minority cannot ruthlessly and enduringly monopolize and use power. She ar-
gued against the then dominant anthropological theory that an African society 
was a ‘functioning whole continuing in time through its mutually reinforcing 
structures and institutions and its vast web of reciprocities which benefit and ob-
ligate every one of its members’ (Codere 1962: 49) in which power was con-
trolled by rules and reciprocities ‘at the service of the governed and with their 
consent’ (Ibid.: 51). In the case of Rwanda, she argued that: 
power can be held and exercised by a minority against the interests and without the consent 
of the governed; that this state of affairs can last for long periods of time, that power is a fac-
tor that can be independent of the social order or capable of shaping a kind of social order 
that becomes the only kind known to the people; and lastly, that revolution is a possibility. 
(Ibid.: 51-52, italics added) 
The word ‘minority’ here refers to the pre-independent Tutsi elite that ruled over 
their subjects, the majority of whom were considered to be Hutu. Such a classifi-
cation is central to Rwanda’s history and this chapter tries to explain how and 
why it came about and what the consequences were. Tutsi rule, exercised by a 
strong and well-organized kingdom through clientship and the oppression of its 
subjects, eventually led to the 1959 Hutu Revolution and the ethnic violence that 
ultimately resulted in the 1990-1994 civil war and the 1994 genocide.  
                                                 
1 These themes are obviously not limited to Rwanda and, in many African countries, clientship relations 
developed in which power was not exercised over territory but over people, and violence and 
oppression played a significant role. See, for instance, Abbink (2004). 
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Newbury, who examined ethnicity and clientship in Kinyaga in southwestern 
Rwanda, describes clientship as a formalized instrumental friendship between 
two persons of unequal socio-economic status where the patron exchanged his 
protection for services from the client. The claims and obligations involved could 
vary according to the individual status of the partners and the political context 
(Newbury 1988: 74). In the words of Lemarchand, clientship in Rwanda could be 
seen as a ‘highly personalised, precarious relationship’ between a patron and his 
clients that involved the exchange of certain commodities and services 
(Lemarchand 1970: 36). In return, the client would receive certain privileges, 
mainly usufruct rights to cattle and agricultural land, and also protection, some-
thing that was of utmost importance to clients because of the hierarchical and 
centralized political structure (Ibid.: 36-37). Lemarchand compared clientship in 
Rwanda to the economic and close personal ties that linked a European medieval 
lord to his vassal. Codere too felt that the use of the term ‘vassalage’ was justifi-
able and she classified Rwanda as being among history’s most oppressive feudal 
regimes (Codere 1962: 53; Codere 1993: 95).  
Besides giving a historical context to my research on land issues and social rela-
tions in southeastern Rwanda, this chapter aims to demonstrate how and why 
Rwanda has developed into an extremely hierarchically structured society. Now-
adays, one of the most important features of its governance is the power and om-
nipresence of the Rwandan state and the coercion it exercises. After having ex-
amined the origins of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, the second and third section of this 
chapter explore how the power of the state and its structure developed over time 
and are reflected in socio-political relations past and present. It will be seen that 
clientship was an important element here and resulted in unequal political and 
social relationships when, from the reign of King Rwabugiri, power became cen-
tralized and monopolized. The sections that follow discuss the political nature of 
ethnicity to show how power and, hence, clientship became ethicized with Tutsi 
authorities controlling land, cattle and people.2 The resulting socio-economic in-
equality in which Hutu held a subordinate status led to the emergence of ethnic 
awareness. The chapter finishes with the Hutu-Tutsi swap of power.3
 
                                                 
2 For reasons of clarity I preferred to explain Rwanda’s political structure and its different forms of 
clientship first and then go into the political nature of ethnicity and the ethnic dimensions of 
clientship.
3 Although central power is the main focus of this chapter, it is important to acknowledge Rwanda’s 
numerous regional variations with nine regions, which all have their own autonomous histories. In 
their 2000 essay on historiography in Rwanda and its emphasis on hegemonic (elite, court) history, 
Newbury & Newbury (2000: 851) claim that for several regions, its autonomy continued well into the 
19th century and, for some, even into the colonial era.
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The Origins of Hutu and Tutsi 
Much has been written about the origins of Hutu and Tutsi (and Twa) and the 
way these groups migrated into the region and assimilated or integrated with 
each other to create a single cultural community that shares the same language, 
religion and cultural habits. It is widely believed that the Twa, a pygmy people of 
hunters and potters, were the first inhabitants of the region and were followed by 
Hutu who were Bantu-speaking agriculturalists. Then the pastoralist Tutsi, often 
considered to be of Ethiopian origin, arrived in the area some time before the 15th
century (Codere 1962: 47-48; see also Lemarchand 1970: 19). Others, however, 
find analysis of the genesis of the three groups difficult. Catherine Newbury 
(1988: 10), for instance, mentions that the labels ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ are probably 
very old, while Mamdani (2002: 79) argues that Tutsi may have migrated from 
outside Rwanda but that they do not claim any foreign origin in their royal 
myths.4 Vansina, in a 1993 article on Tutsi origins, draws several conclusions 
about their migration into Rwandan territory. Based on archaeological research in 
ceramics, he claims that Tutsi migrated from northern Tanzania in about the 8th
century, while analysis of biological data shows that Tutsi are a distinct biologi-
cal group. In addition, Vansina found that the word ‘-tuusi’, which exists in the 
languages of northern Tanzania and refers to nomadic herders who do not inter-
mingle much with the agriculturalist population, is related to the word Tutsi. 
‘Tutsi’ is known in the languages of Rwanda, Burundi, Buha and Sumbwa (the 
latter two are former Tanzanian principalities) and is used to indicate people who 
belong to the highest social group (Vansina 1993). In another publication, he 
stresses that it is most likely that Tutsi referred to a social class and political elite 
among pastoralists. He claims that, in the 17th century, when farming was the 
normal way of life in Rwanda, the terms ‘Twa’, ‘Hima’ and ‘Tutsi’ were used to 
indicate smaller groups that did not farm and that, by the end of the 19th century, 
the ruling class called all pastoralists Tutsi as opposed to farmers (Vansina 2004: 
36).5
As Vansina (2004: 37) puts it, ‘the growth in prestige of the term “Tutsi” went 
hand in hand with the growth of the [Nyiginya] kingdom. Gradually all nontrans-
humant herders in the kingdom claimed this designation even if their social con-
dition was modest’. Vansina (1993: 320, Note 1) argues that Tutsi − and, there-
fore, also Hutu − are not a caste or ethnic group but merely a politically signifi-
cant social class, whereas scholars such as Lemarchand (1966: 608) and Codere 
                                                 
4 They do claim, however, a sacred origin (Mamdani 2002: 79-80). This is shown in a royal myth about 
sacred King Kigwa and his sons Gatwa, Gatutsi and Gahutu, which is described in the next section.
5 According to Vansina (2004: 36-37), the label ‘Tutsi’ originated from the south and ‘Hima’ from the 
north. He claims that it is not clear if the word ‘Tutsi’ was applied to all herders at the time but that 
gradually the Nyiginya Kingdom abandoned the ethnonym ‘Hima’ in favour of ‘Tutsi’. 
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(1962: 47-48; Codere 1993: 94-95) think that the use of the term ‘caste’ is justi-
fied because of Tutsi dominance over other groups, their occupational specializa-
tion, cultural differences, racial distinction and endogamy due to a lack of inter-
marriage between the three groups. Maquet, an anthropologist who headed a re-
search institute in Rwanda in the 1950s, agreed with them (Maquet 1954, as cited 
in Newbury 1988: 3). However, Lemarchand argues that Maquet in his later 
work linked Rwanda’s castes with a class system because he felt that the rela-
tions of dominance and subordination between castes were a reflection of une-
qual access to economic resources between different classes (Lemarchand 1970: 
6).
The significance of social and economic distinctions between the three groups 
is emphasized throughout this chapter. The fact that many of these scholars, 
whose fieldwork was carried out primarily in the turbulent socio-political period 
of Rwanda’s independence, are ambiguous in their interpretations of the nature 
of the group distinctions indicates, in my view, the political nature of ethnicity.  
The Kingdom of Rwanda  
As mentioned above, Tutsi pastoralists are assumed to have arrived in Rwanda 
and gradually infiltrated the indigenous Hutu societies from the 15th century. Ac-
cording to Lemarchand (Lemarchand 1970: 19; Lemarchand 1966: 598-599, 
605), these Tutsi initially established a peaceful and symbiotic relationship with 
Bantu-speaking Hutu agriculturalists and either became minor chiefs who con-
trolled a few hills or they entered into commercial relations by exchanging cattle 
for agricultural products, progressively assimilating Hutu customs and traditions 
into their culture. He argues that, ‘this period of peaceful coexistence was usually 
brought to an end by a series of brutal encounters resulting in the pacification of 
the conquered territories and the establishment of military rule’ (Lemarchand 
1966: 599). An embryonic administration was then installed and, at a later stage, 
it was strengthened and regular army contingents were brought into peripheral 
areas to maintain order. How the assimilation of newly conquered regions hap-
pened depended on the ethnic composition of the area under siege. If a dominant 
Tutsi lineage ruled the area, rapid assimilation was often the result (Ibid.: 599-
600). The political organization of Hutu-dominated societies was diverse, with 
societies organized in autonomous lineage groups that existed side by side with 
small-scale centralized kingdoms. These kingdoms had in many respects the 
same political structure as neighbouring Tutsi states and, while conquering them, 
the Tutsi adopted some of these kingdoms’ rituals and political symbols, like the 
royal drum. Despite the similarities, Lemarchand claims that absorbing these Hu-
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tu societies was most likely a long and difficult affair (Ibid.: 599, 605).6 Using a 
distinction of Max Weber, he argues that traditional Rwanda was a mix of two 
distinctive situations: ‘a situation of optimum functional integration, character-
ized by a caste structure; and a situation of “ethnic coexistence”’ (Ibid.: 608). 
With the assimilation of other Hutu- and Tutsi-dominated areas, an amalgama-
tion of some autonomous Tutsi kingdoms resulted in a bigger kingdom that was 
led by a royal Tutsi lineage.7 This transformation probably took place in the re-
gion of present-day Kigali in the 15th century under the reign of King Ruganzu 
Bwimba (Lemarchand 1970: 19). He died around 1480 (Newbury 1988: 229) and 
was the first Rwandan king for whom oral data exist (Vansina 2004: 10).8 A sec-
ond phase started in the 16th century when neighbouring areas were incorporated. 
King Ruganzu Ndoli, who founded the Nyiginya Kingdom in the 17th century, 
then launched several invasions against formerly independent Hutu societies and 
created what could be called a unitary state (Lemarchand 1966: 598). The territo-
ry of Rwanda was at that time limited to what is nowadays regarded as central 
Rwanda and was still divided into several small political entities, often compris-
ing only a few hills, that were ruled by kings and their queen mothers (Vansina 
2004: 23, 38-39). People lived on these hills at a certain distance from each other 
and, as marshy areas surrounding them were difficult to cross, each hill formed 
an isolated geographical unit where people felt they belonged to a neighbourhood 
set apart from other areas (Ibid.: 15, 23, 25).  
The population consisted of a minority of herders, who were sedentary be-
cause of their relatively small herds of about fifty cows, and a majority of farm-
ers who also often owned one or two cows.9 Herders’ pastures were on the slopes 
so they lived separated from the farmers but the activities of both groups were 
interwoven and needed some form of coordination (Vansina 2004: 23-25). 
Mamdani (2002: 51) is less pronounced about this division of labour and states 
that both farming and herding were carried out jointly as many Hutu had cattle 
and Tutsi tended to also be farmers. It is, therefore, too simplistic to divide the 
                                                 
6 To illustrate this, Lemarchand (1966: 600) explains that Tutsi penetration in some areas was difficult 
because of natural barriers or resistance, which resulted in minimal contact between the Hutu 
population and the Tutsi rulers. It was only in the early 1920s, and with the help of the colonizers, that 
a unified administration could finally be established.
7 According to Lemarchand (1966: 601), little is known about the circumstances that led to this shift in 
power allocation but the history of neighbouring countries, like the Buganda Kingdom in present-day 
Uganda, shows similar processes.
8 Several Tutsi kings preceded Ruganzu Bwimba. The first known king, Ndahiro Ruyange, ruled around 
1370 while the last, King Kigeri Ndahindurwa, was deposed in 1960 (Newbury 1988: 229; Vansina 
2000: 51). However, Mamdani points out that the founding date of the Rwandan kingdom is 
contested, with dates ranging from 1312 to 1532 (Mamdani 2002: 61). Newbury suggests that the 
royal chronology might be quite different and shorter than that presented in official sources (Newbury 
2009, Chapter 11).
9 Vansina (2004: 23, 36) also mentions the Batwa or Twa, a pygmy people of nomadic foragers, who 
were a small minority and lived mostly in forest and marshland areas and are not considered here.
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population into the agriculturalist Hutu and the pastoralist Tutsi. Although it was 
much more egalitarian then, Rwanda has always known social classes and had a 
wealthy elite that enjoyed better living standards than the majority of the popula-
tion. Wealth was measured mainly in cattle and all social payments, like bride 
wealth, fines, debts and dues, were paid in cattle (Vansina 2004: 32).  
With regard to ethnicity, it is interesting to describe one of the many royal 
myths that tries, in the form of a poem, to justify ‘a divinely ordained social 
structure in which each individual was assigned a specific caste, and each caste a 
specific rank’ (Lemarchand 1970: 33). The poem starts with the reign of Kigwa 
who descended from heaven and had three sons: Gatwa, Gahutu and Gatutsi. To 
find out which son should succeed him, King Kigwa gives them the task of 
watching over a pot of milk during the night. The next morning it turns out that 
Gatwa has drunk all the milk, Gahutu has fallen asleep and spilled it, and only 
Gatutsi has stayed up and carefully watched his milk. King Kigwa now knows 
that his son Gatutsi is most suitable to succeed him and that he should be freed of 
any menial tasks, while Gahutu should be his serf. As Gatwa proved to be unreli-
able, his position in society should be that of a pariah. According to Lemarchand, 
this myth gave the moral justification for a society in which a small minority 
ruled and exploited the majority of the Rwandan population (Ibid.).10
It is also important to touch on the issue of the eighteen clans to which Rwandans 
belonged. Contrary to lineages that only go back some four or five generations 
and have a link to a recognized ancestor, a clan and its common ancestor were 
supposed to go back many more generations. While a lineage could be seen as a 
political unit that enjoyed solidarity between its members and had a head who 
had powers to, for instance, preside over collective activities or judge internal 
disputes, a clan did not have a leader or collective activities and its members did 
not show internal solidarity (Mamdani 2002: 54-55). An important and rather 
puzzling feature of these clans was that they were ethnically mixed and were 
comprised of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, which raises the question ‘how could such 
unchanging descent groups each include members of different descent groups?’ 
(Newbury 2009: 189). Newbury concluded that clans should not be regarded as a 
biological descent group but seen as having a social and, therefore, changing 
identity. The clan was a tool of incorporation in newly conquered areas and al-
lowed people to be integrated into a new political domain. They were, therefore, 
included in one of the eighteen major clan groups that were associated with 
                                                 
10 Lemarchand (1970: 34) argues that neighbouring former kingdoms had similar myths to justify 
distinctive social categories. However, ‘Rwanda is unique in the sheer abundance of traditions 
purporting to show the superiority of the Tutsi over the other castes, and in the cumulative impact of 
these traditions on society as a whole’.
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Rwanda’s political culture (Newbury 2009: 190; see also Mamdani 2002: 55-
56).11
Rwanda’s Early Political Structure
Land already became a scarce resource in pre-colonial Rwanda. According to 
Vansina (2004: 41-42), this was mainly because of the growth of herds that all 
needed pasture. Maquet & Naigiziki (1957: 340, 348), who wrote about land 
rights in pre-colonial Rwanda in 1957, argued that it was under the reign of King 
Yuhi Gahindiro in the early 1800s that land came to be considered as property 
and that the king was the ultimate owner of all land that was exploited collective-
ly. From the 17th century until the mid-19th century, Rwanda’s political structure 
was founded on two types of land tenure: ubukonde and igikingi-isambu.
Ubukonde tenure was held by the lineages that arrived first and cleared the 
land. They were regarded as the owners of that terrain and held rights collective-
ly. Lineage chiefs granted long-term, exclusive usufruct rights to individual 
households and these could only be passed on to sons through inheritance. If land 
was unused or abandoned, the lineage held alienation rights and could grant the 
land to another lineage household. Families that migrated into the region at a lat-
er date became land-tenure clients as they were granted land by lineage chiefs 
and had to pay ‘rent’ by providing certain food products and sometimes labour 
for their land patron (Newbury 1988: 79-80; see also Vansina 2004: 39-40 and 
Blarel 1994: 80). According to Maquet & Naigiziki (1957: 355-357), these late-
comers could also become tenants and both tenants and clients considered each 
other as collaborators as they had close relations that did not involve many obli-
gations. Ubukonde initially led to some sort of ‘agricultural nomadism’ because 
lineages would abandon land they had cleared and went deeper into the forest if 
their land became degraded or if officials tried to make them their clients. They 
suggest that the king and his entourage let these lineages carry on their reclama-
tion efforts because they resulted in larger areas of productive land. However, the 
court anticipated that it might be difficult to subdue such autonomous lineage 
chiefs, who could become dangerous opponents, and they therefore made them 
representatives of the king. By adopting this policy, the court attempted to inte-
grate ubukonde and another type of land tenure, namely igikingi-isambu land 
tenure.  
Igikingi and isambu land tenure became common at the beginning of the 19th
century and gradually replaced the ubukonde system. Igikingi and isambu in-
                                                 
11 For similar explanations, see also Vansina and Catherine Newbury (Vansina 2004: 33-35; Newbury 
1988: 96). Newbury adds that members of certain clans did occasionally perform ritual functions like 
the termination of a mourning period (Newbury 1988: 266, Note 4). To my knowledge, clans do not 
play a role in ordinary Rwandans’ social life anymore.
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volved land that was granted by the king to a cattle-owning lineage, often his 
army chiefs or other favourites. These chiefs in turn could allow others − pastor-
alists for igikingi and agriculturalists for isambu − to live on their land but they 
were then expected to provide labour, cows or other services to their patrons 
(Newbury 1988: 79-80; see also Maquet & Naigiziki 1957: 344-345). Maquet & 
Naigiziki (1957: 345-346) relate how an igikingi client was obliged to give one 
or more heifers to his patron (who was also a political authority) and this gift had 
to be repeated whenever a new chief took over. The lineage let its lineage herd 
graze on certain allocated land and the lineage chief had the right to allow others 
to graze their cattle on this land in return for rent (a jar of beer for a season, a bull 
calf for a year and a heifer for two years) and/or other privileges. Only sons were 
allowed to inherit land from their client fathers, while patrons always had the 
right to reclaim a client’s land for personal use or to pass it on to another lineage. 
In isambu clientship, the client chief was allocated a certain amount of land on 
which he could cultivate whatever crops he wished or he could rent it out (for 
part of its harvest, beer, hoes or small cattle) or allocate it to sub-clients.12 Sons 
could inherit the allocated land from their father. However women were in a 
weak position because daughters could not inherit from their fathers, widows 
without children could not claim any right to their deceased husband’s land and 
widows with children could only exercise rights through their sons. As with 
igikingi land, the client had to pay dues (agricultural products, jars of beer, fab-
ric) and the patron could always decide to take back his land (Ibid.: 348-355). 
The introduction of igikingi and isambu had an important effect on land tenure 
as lineage control over occupied and unoccupied land changed to control by the 
king and his authorities. Land that had been occupied and used by several gen-
erations was now ‘granted’ to these lineages (Newbury 1988: 85; Mamdani 2002: 
66; Newbury 1978: 20), which broke the power of lineage heads and enhanced 
the extractive capacity of the state (Pottier 2002: 183). Lineages no longer held 
usufruct and alienation rights collectively as it was the political chief who now 
held alienation rights and allocated usufruct rights individually. This chief took 
over the important functions of the lineage chief and became responsible for dis-
tributing unoccupied land, resolving land conflicts and regulating access to for-
merly communal land (Blarel 1994: 80; Newbury 1978: 20). As a result, land 
tenure was primarily based on political decisions instead of on notions of kinship 
                                                 
12 Maquet & Naigiziki (1957: 348-355) argue that isambu clientship developed when lineage or family 
members who encountered land conflicts on their collectively worked land turned to a political or 
otherwise powerful authority for arbitration. To end conflicts, this person would then allocate land to 
different claimants and end its collectivity. Although most authors stress the coercive aspect of the 
igikingi-isambu land tenure system, it is possible that in some regions this clientship system started 
voluntarily and only later became more oppressive. However, as Newbury points out, Maquet & 
Naigiziki’s results could represent the view of the central court on how the system was ‘supposed’ to 
have functioned as they probably based their analysis on Tutsi informants. 
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and was, therefore, less secure than the ubukonde tenure system (Blarel 1994: 
80).
In addition to land clientship, there were two forms of cattle clientship. The 
first − ubugabire − dated from the 17th century and was when cattle-poor line-
ages joined the service of cattle-rich lineages in exchange for a cow. The client 
had to give back calves on a regular basis and had to work for his patron when-
ever needed. Despite their unequal relationship, both parties could end the client-
ship (Vansina 2004: 32-33). Umuheto clientship started in the mid-18th century 
and its growth reflected central government efforts to exercise influence as it 
linked client lineages to patrons who were central chiefs and acted as protectors 
of the lineage’s cattle, for which they received dues or services. In an early stage, 
only cattle-owning lineages or other wealthy lineages that could provide luxury 
items like honey, fibre bracelets or mats were sought as clients, while other line-
ages were obliged to pay umuheto dues later on. However, obligations in this 
form of clientship were moderate and were shared by an entire lineage. A client 
lineage had to send a cow to its umuheto patron every one or two years. Umuheto 
clientship normally lasted for several generations. Being a form of mutual alli-
ance with reciprocal obligations, it was characterized by strong affective ties be-
tween lineages and their patron and by mutual respect (Mamdani 2002: 66-67; 
Newbury 1988: 75-78, 125; Newbury 1978: 18-19). According to Newbury 
(1978: 19), ‘Umuheto clientship initially resulted from local status considera-
tions; it indicated, rather than bestowed, prestigious status. Umuheto was an alli-
ance, a bond of elites, rather than the arbiter of hierarchical status differences’.
The political structure changed drastically during the reign of King Rwabugiri 
who ruled from 1876 until his death in 1895 (Vansina 2004: 211-212). Using 
military force, he significantly expanded his kingdom and dismissed long-time 
authorities to consolidate and strengthen his hold on power. He then appointed 
people from outside the region who became directly dependent on him.13 These 
newly installed local chiefs were frequently transferred or dismissed to ensure 
that ‘no chief could become powerful enough to oppose the king. The stakes 
were high, official positions were well rewarded but risky, since the penalty for 
losing favor was often death’ (Newbury 1988: 40). Frictions emerged in the re-
cently conquered Kinyaga region as newly appointed chiefs from central Rwanda 
felt disdain or total mistrust towards the local Kinyagans, regarding them as 
crude and boorish, and they feared being poisoned by eating local food (Ibid.: 
50). The new chiefs acquired privileges and appropriated control over people, 
cattle and land by dividing and weakening the autonomy, unity and size of the 
lineages under their control (Ibid.: 39). The status of lineage groups and their 
                                                 
13 For an overview of Rwabugiri’s military campaigns, see Chapters 5 and 6 in The Land Beyond the 
Mists (Newbury 2009).
209573-L-bw-ASC
70
relations with political authorities subsequently changed and social identities 
were affected (Ibid.: 108).  
King Rwabugiri appointed provincial chiefs in each province who appointed 
hill chiefs to govern the populations of one or two hills. Hill chiefs would collect 
dues in the form of food products or other items from the population in return for 
access to land. The hill chiefs gave a portion of these dues to their superiors who, 
in turn, sent a part to the central court. Hill chiefs replaced lineage heads as local 
authorities and thereby weakened the latter’s political role. A hill chief had quite 
a different position as, unlike a lineage head, he was appointed from above and 
needed support from politically more powerful superiors rather than from the 
lineages he ruled. Later, smaller administrative units were consolidated into larg-
er ones and the smaller units were then headed by sub-chiefs. These sub-chiefs 
were appointed from local lineages at first but were replaced by non-locals under 
colonial rule. At the beginning of the 19th century, the royal court decided to di-
vide the provinces into districts, which were headed by a land chief and a pastur-
age chief who were positioned between the provincial chief and the hill chief 
(Ibid.: 42, 108). In addition to these territorial chiefs, the umuheto or social army 
chief, who often lived in central Rwanda, also collected dues. As the land and 
pasturage chief were also supposed to collect dues that would be sent to court, 
this could potentially create conflict. With these appointed chiefs and their in-
creased power at the expense of lineages and their lineage chiefs, King Rwabugi-
ri installed a hierarchy of authority from top to bottom. Newbury (1988: 83-84) 
describes how a umuheto chief called Ntiizimira was installed in Kinyaga and 
delegated the collection of dues to representatives from wealthy Kinyagan fami-
lies who, in turn, would instruct others to collect them. Officials at each level 
took a portion of everything collected as a reward, which made these positions 
highly alluring.14
The introduction of clientship and the need to pay services to patrons in return 
for access to land led the population to realize that chiefs were controlling the 
land, something that had not been the case in the past when lineages controlled 
their land. Newbury thus claims that the new forms of clientship were often met 
with resistance by the local population and dues had to be collected by force or at 
least the threat of force (Ibid.: 85-86).15
With these major changes in Rwanda’s political structure, the nature of clientship 
relations changed significantly when the newly appointed authorities increased 
                                                 
14 Each official was allowed to keep a third of the dues he collected (Codere 1962: 60).
15 This claim is supported by René Lemarchand (1966: 606) who gives the example of a revolt that 
broke out after the appointment of a new (Tutsi) chief and of some chiefs who decided to leave their 
posts because they felt resistance towards them was too great .
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their control even further by introducing two new forms of clientship: ubuhake
and uburetwa (Ibid.: 82).16
Ubuhake17 clientship gradually replaced umuheto cattle clientship and signifi-
cantly altered relations between patrons and clients. In an umuheto clientship, the 
client lineage gave cattle to its patron in return for protection, but the transfer of 
cattle was reversed under ubuhake, with the patron giving a cow in usufruct (but 
not ownership) to clients. While umuheto clientship was primarily limited to lin-
eages that were wealthy in cattle and had a relatively higher status, ubuhake
tended to involve people who had not previously had cattle. Furthermore, the 
reversed transfer of cattle from patron to client strengthened the dependency of 
the client as he risked having his cattle confiscated (Mamdani 2002: 65; Vansina 
2004: 47; Newbury 1988: 75-78).18
Another important difference was the fact that, in umuheto, the client was 
normally an entire lineage and umuheto clientship could thus reinforce small-
scale horizontal ties. In ubuhake, on the other hand, the client was usually an in-
dividual and if several members of a single lineage had different patrons, this 
could weaken local solidarities (Newbury 1988: 98; see also Mamdani 2002: 65). 
Although Mamdani and Vansina both suggest that reciprocity was eroded with 
ubuhake and inequality and coercion in the patron-client relationship intensified, 
Newbury argues that ubuhake clientship still offered the client some form of pro-
tection and symbolized a special status in relation to the patron despite the une-
qual relationship (Mamdani 2002: 65; Vansina 2004: 47; Newbury 1988: 136, 
140). The early ubuhake forms linked elites because lineages that entered into 
ubuhake relations benefited because: 
for such lineages, alliance with Ntiizimira [a local powerful chief] offered the chance to 
broaden their political network; they could expect not only enhanced prestige but also greater 
access to resources with which to enlarge their personal followings- increased power in the 
local context. (Newbury 1988: 90) 
However, the lineage member who had to collect dues on behalf of the patron 
was not always the lineage head and this could cause competing leadership 
claims within lineages. Reinforced by its individual nature, the introduction of 
                                                 
16 According to Vansina, ubuhake clientship had existed in central Rwanda since the 17th century, while 
Newbury suggests that this form of clientship was introduced much later when peripheral areas came 
under the central kingdom’s control (Vansina 2004: 47-48; Newbury 1988: 82). Like Newbury, 
Vansina (2004: 130) also dates uburetwa as starting in the late 19th century. 
17 Ubuhake means a cattle contract or contract of pastoral servitude. This form of clientship existed in 
Burundi as well where it was, contrary to Rwanda, separate from and subsidiary to the political 
structure. It involved fewer clients and a system of dues that was much less burdensome than in 
Rwanda (Lemarchand 1970: 36, 39-40).
18 Interestingly, Newbury explains (1988: 78) that the Rwandan court considered all cattle as the ‘King’s 
cattle’ and could thus confiscate them. The population was not concerned with this distinction and 
considered them to be personal property as they were often acquired through marriage or as a gift, 
reward or purchase.
209573-L-bw-ASC
72
ubuhake thus led to internal divisions in lineages and eroded their unity even fur-
ther. When ubuhake was extended to a larger part of the Rwandan population at 
the end of the 19th century,19 it further reduced the autonomy and political role of 
lineages and the authority of lineage heads (Newbury 1988: 98-111; Newbury 
1978: 22). 
With the introduction of ubuhake, a chief would often also be a patron, and chief-
taincy and clientship became ‘two faces of the same coin’ (Lemarchand 1970: 
37). This ‘substitutability of roles’ (Lemarchand 1966: 594) frequently set the 
pattern of power, with economic and political power being in the same hands 
(Lemarchand 1970: 38). Newbury thus concluded that this development led to 
the growing control of land by the chiefs and ‘to an increasing dependence of the 
population on political authorities, and an increasing power of the chiefs over the 
population through fragmentation of local social units’ (Newbury 1978: 22). A 
chain of clientship emerged from which the king alone was exempted and that 
ran from those who were simultaneously vassal and patron to the majority of the 
population who were only clients (Codere 53). The next section on the political 
nature of ethnicity will demonstrate how clientship became ethnic in nature be-
cause most patrons were Tutsi. 
The development of a sophisticated clientship and administration structure had 
some other consequences too. For instance, the co-existence of several chiefs of 
approximately the same rank (land chief, pasturage chief, umuheto chief) created 
structural competition and tension as each chief tried to increase the number of 
his own clients at the expense of the others (Newbury 1988: 46). This hierar-
chical administration led to spying and sabotage. According to Vansina (2000: 
55), the land chief and the pasturage chief spied on each other and were, in turn, 
spied on by their chief, while the provincial chief was sabotaged by all other au-
thorities except for his sub-chiefs whom he appointed himself. As a result of this 
diffusion and fragmentation of power, which ultimately served the king, clients 
could try to avoid exploitation by playing one chief off against another. But ulti-
mately ubuhake clientship had a negative effect on the position of clients 
(Lemarchand 1966: 603).  
Around 1870, the position of clients deteriorated again with the introduction of 
uburetwa clientship, where relations involved little reciprocity and became es-
sentially exploitative (Mamdani 2002: 66; Newbury 1988: 90, 140; Vansina 
                                                 
19 It remains unclear what percentage of the population was eventually involved in ubuhake. Newbury 
suggests that it was only about 20% (Newbury 1988: 98-111; Newbury 1978: 22), a figure based on a 
1974 study by Jean-François Saucier in southern Rwanda (Newbury 1988: 134; Newbury 1978: 27, 
Note 15).
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2004: 134).20 Uburetwa was imposed when patrons started to consider their land 
clients as tenants, who were then subjected to all sorts of obligations as payment 
for occupying the land. Farmers had to give away a significant part of their crops 
and to work for their patron for about half of their time. Certain chiefs exploited 
the farmers mercilessly (Newbury 1988: 111; Vansina 2004: 134; see also 
Codere 1962). 
During the period of German administration21 between 1899 and 1916, the 
central court continued and extended the role of hill chiefs. Their power contin-
ued to grow, to the disadvantage of their clients. With German support, many of 
these hill chiefs, who were responsible for collecting goods and services, man-
aged to increase their wealth as ‘chiefs, their kinsmen, and their clients used 
power to extract surplus from the common people, or forcibly to create surplus 
where there was none’ (Newbury 1988: 127-128). When the Belgians arrived in 
1916 and the Germans were forced to retreat, new demands were made on the 
rural people that again strengthened the hill chiefs’ coercion. Every resident was 
made to perform akazi or corvée (unpaid labour), for example by making or 
maintaining paths and secondary roads. A head tax was introduced in 1917 and 
increased regularly from 1926 onwards. Seen by the Belgians as administrative 
tools, these obligations often turned into political weapons in the hands of the 
chiefs (Ibid.: 131-132). The major reason behind the chiefs’ increasing power 
was that they combined two distinct roles − of socio-political patron and admin-
istrative chief – and this resulted in a much reduced capacity for clients to bar-
gain and manoeuvre (Newbury 1978: 22). In addition, this development led to 
numerous abuses, such as when chiefs made people work for them instead of for 
communal projects or when they put collected cattle into their own herds. It also 
resulted in a decline in land tenure security, ‘since refusal to comply with any of 
the demands the hill chief made would expose a person to the possibility of los-
ing his land […]’ (Newbury 1988: 132). It was often in the direct interests of the 
chief to expel a local landholder because his successor would be directly depend-
ent on him, while the farmer expelled had to then present himself to another chief 
elsewhere (Newbury 1980: 105). 
The institutions and developments described above show how the rural peas-
ant population faced declining (lineage) autonomy and land tenure security be-
                                                 
20 According to Mamdani (2002: 66), uburetwa could be imposed because most cultivators had lost their 
land rights when igikingi-isambu replaced ubukonde and lineage control over land changed to being 
under the control of the king and his officials.
21 Lemarchand (1970: 47) stresses that Western and Arab influences were late in arriving in Rwanda 
(and Burundi): ‘At a time when the Zanzibar Arabs were already plying their trade deep into Congo, 
the people of Rwanda and Burundi continued to live in a state of splendid isolation, owing as much to 
the natural bulwark of swamps and mountains as to the fearsome reputation they had earned among 
their neighbours’. The Germans only established a military station in Burundi’s Bujumbura in 1899 
and had but a handful of administrators to rule the two countries (Ibid.: 48-49).
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cause they were forced to enter into clientship relations and had to comply with 
the demands of newly installed chiefs. Under King Rwabugiri, a strong hierar-
chical state emerged but society became more fragmented and individualized, 
driving the masses into a position of powerlessness amid fear and insecurity. This 
was related to ethnicity. 
The Political Nature of Ethnicity 
Although the origins and categorization of the three ethnic groups Hutu, Tutsi 
and Twa may remain contested and appear of limited relevance, as suggested by 
Mandani,22 many authors agree on the political significance of ethnicity. Cathe-
rine Newbury argues that ‘the meanings attached to these categories and the po-
litical significance of membership in them changed significantly over time’. In 
line with Vansina’s observations, she found that the label ‘Hutu’ had little politi-
cal importance before central Rwandan rule was introduced in the Kinyaga re-
gion in southwest Rwanda (Newbury 1988: 10) and that: 
… it would seem that Hutu identity (at least in this area) emerged only recently, becoming a 
strong identitive category cutting across clan and lineage divisions only when there had oc-
curred social and political transformations which facilitated horizontal linkages beyond the 
limits of ‘traditional’ social groups. (Newbury 1978: 17)23
In accordance with both Vansina and Newbury, Mamdani (2002: 73) argues that 
the ethnic identity of Tutsi may have preceded the formation of the Rwandan 
state under King Rwabugiri and this Tutsi identity was further reinforced by state 
mechanisms. Hutu identity was constructed by the state because ‘if subject popu-
lations only came to be defined as Hutu after being incorporated into Rwandan 
state structures, we cannot speak of these as Hutu before that incorporation’.
King Rwabugiri’s state-building efforts made the population increasingly 
aware of ethnic differences and, under his rule, Hutu and Tutsi became political 
labels and a form of classification. Ethnicity gained political importance because 
it determined someone’s chances and relations with regard to authorities. Being 
considered a Tutsi was not so much a matter of descent but more an issue of 
wealth (particularly in cattle) and control over political power. Cattle-rich line-
ages that were or had links to powerful chiefs were regarded as Tutsi and this 
category became self-defined as an elite, while other lineages were considered to 
                                                 
22 He criticized the idea held by mainly Western historians that ‘development’ in Africa had to be the 
result of an external impulse, like migration, with one-way assimilation. He argues that even if 
historical research shows that Hutu and Tutsi have separate origins (a possibility he does not deny), 
the fact that both groups lived on the same territory in shared cultural communities with the same 
language and religious practices should not be ignored (Mamdani 2002: 49-50).
23 According to Newbury (1978: 18), traditional social groups with political significance were lineages 
and neighbourhood groups and the principal political authorities were the lineage heads.
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be Hutu (Newbury 1988: 11-12, 51-52). In newly conquered Kinyaga, Newbury 
found that:  
… with the arrival of Ndugan [central Rwandan] authorities, lines of distinction were altered 
and sharpened, as the categories of Hutu and Tuutsi assumed new hierarchical overtones as-
sociated with proximity to the central court - proximity to power. Later, when the political 
arena widened and the intensity of political activity increased, these classifications became 
increasingly stratified and rigidified. More than simply conveying the connotation of cultural 
difference from Tuutsi, Hutu identity came to be associated with and eventually defined by 
inferior status. (Newbury 1988: 51; see also Newbury 1978: 21) 
The two ethnic categories became state-enforced identities that were merely po-
litical by nature (Mamdani 2002: 73-74) as a result of the powerful Rwandan 
state. It was able to restructure social relations and ‘a whole array of institutions 
− from the army to clientship − enforced and undergirded the reproduction of 
Hutu and Tutsi as polarized political identities’ (Ibid.: 56).  
Social polarization between Hutu and Tutsi emerged with state centralization 
that allowed an increase in the powers of the Tutsi king. And certain social pro-
cesses, particularly changes in clientship, led to the social degradation of Hutu 
and changed Hutu and Tutsi into bipolar political identities (Ibid.: 73-74). Three 
ideological and social institutions played a role in this process: 
… the court rituals (ubiiru) through which important Hutu lineages were incorporated into 
the court as ritualists (abiiru), the patron-client relationships through which the pastoralist 
hierarchy was organized, and the military and administrative systems that were the true 
backbone of the state- as they changed over the next century. Together, these changes sug-
gest both a centralization of state power and a reorganization of society along hierarchically 
exploitative lines. (Ibid.: 63) 
Social relations and clientship changed drastically under the reign of King 
Rwabugiri. The shift from ubukonde land tenure, i.e. land held by lineages that 
had arrived first and cleared the land, to the igikingi-isambu tenure system where 
the king became the owner of the land, ‘most certainly led to a decline in the so-
cial position of the Hutu’ as many lineage heads who formerly acted as land 
chiefs were Hutu (Ibid.: 66) and were replaced by Tutsi patrons. While umuheto
cattle clientship mainly involved cattle-rich families and therefore mostly Tutsi 
lineages,24 ubuhake tended to involve people without cattle and resulted in many 
more Hutu becoming individual clients of Tutsi patrons (Mamdani 2002: 65; 
Newbury 1988: 76). There were, in fact, two ubuhake systems for Hutu and Tutsi 
clients: Hutu clients found themselves in a position of exploitation and coercion, 
while clientship was much more profitable for Tutsi as it involved a social and 
political alliance (Codere 1962: 54-55; see also Newbury 1988: 260, Note 2).
As was previously mentioned, Ubuhake clientship ultimately had a negative 
effect on the position of clients and meant that all Hutu needed to have the pro-
                                                 
24 Newbury (1988: 84) describes how umuheto was extended to include non-cattle-owning lineages that 
were expected to give hoes or luxury items and were referred to as ‘Hutu’.
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tection of a patron to avoid being at the mercy of Tutsi and this led to ‘the inter-
nalization of a set of values which tended to reflect and perpetuate a situation of 
inequality’. Interestingly, both Hutu and Tutsi inclined to identify social justice 
with power because, as Lemarchand put it, ‘in the value system of Rwanda might 
and right are but two faces of the same coin’ (Lemarchand 1966: 603). If a patron 
is powerful, he − and therefore also his client − is right, but if the patron is weak, 
both are wrong (Mair 1962, as cited in Lemarchand 1966: 603). 
Uburetwa clientship, which was first imposed on selected lineages, came to 
involve individual adult Hutu men. This changed relations considerably as ubu-
retwa clientship underlined the serf-like status and social degradation of the Hutu 
population (Mamdani 2002: 66, 74; Newbury 1988: 111-112). Poor men of low 
status endured real hardship and insecurity as they would be called to do the least 
desirable jobs (Newbury 1988: 10-11).25 The burden of uburetwa on Hutu culti-
vators grew and affected increasing numbers of Hutu families due to the unwill-
ingness of the Belgian administrators to replace the system with a monetary 
payment and the forced cultivation of coffee as a cash crop. This discriminatory 
measure polarized the social distinction between Hutu and Tutsi (Mamdani 2002: 
66). As a coercive and exclusive system in which the essential social norms of 
reciprocity and interchange were denied, uburetwa created a rupture in society 
(Newbury 1980: 110). The Rwandan state appeared to be increasingly based on 
Tutsi power (Mamdani 2002: 66), and bitterness among Hutu at the arbitrary rule 
of their Tutsi chiefs grew (Newbury 1978: 25). 
To understand the social degradation and rising resentment, a better understand-
ing of the position of the Hutu population is required. It was extremely rare for a 
Hutu to be a patron and Tutsi clients had a more profitable position because they 
received more cows from their patron than Hutu and carried out less onerous 
tasks. In contrast, a Hutu client was subject to ‘heavy, menial and despised 
work’, to humiliating acts like giving his daughter or unmarried sister to his pa-
tron as a concubine or house servant, deprivation of movement as he was not al-
lowed to leave his district, and severe punishment, or even death, because of (al-
leged) incompetence or disloyalty or for no reason at all (Codere 1962: 54-55). 
As a result of the constant power of patrons, clients (Hutu and Tutsi alike) need-
ed to always show their loyalty, for example by providing patrons with useful 
information about the conduct of other clients. In turn, the survival of Tutsi pa-
trons and chiefs depended on their persistent use of power and intrigue (Ibid.: 53, 
55, 59). The power that Tutsi exercised over their Hutu clients was ruthless. In-
                                                 
25 According to Newbury (1980: 100-101), uburetwa was usually performed by the poorest Hutu who 
could not afford to provide food supplies and therefore needed to give their labour. Hutu who were 
less poor often sought ubuhake clientship because, as a ubuhake client, they were not required to 
perform uburetwa.
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terestingly, Codere (1962: 57-58) sees this as a direct result of fierce internal 
power struggles because of the multiple power positions and an overlap of juris-
diction that caused every chief or councillor to fear deposition, deprivation, tor-
ture or death26 but also resulted in the maximum surveillance of Hutu and the 
extraction of dues. Codere concludes that ‘the use of power among the Tutsi was 
frequently of such ferocity that it should have served to further intimidate the 
Hutu, if they required anything more of the kind’ (Ibid.: 57). However, Le-
marchand (1970: 34) nuances Codere’s argument of violent Tutsi power and the 
powerless position of clients with the observation that the existing stratification 
was based on a shared image of society that was rooted in a ‘universally accepted 
code of values’, with strong support from Rwandan mythology in which Tutsi 
were depicted as a godsend. ‘Endowed with superior military skill, extraordinary 
courage, great wealth and commensurate intelligence’, they helped in ordering 
socio-political relations. As evidence, he argues that after the political reforms, 
many Hutu remained loyal to their patrons, which suggests ‘a deep cultural 
commitment to status differences as a natural and proper form of social organiza-
tion’ (Lemarchand 1966: 604). However, with regard to the powerless positions 
of clients, he also suggests that the political system was perhaps stable but not 
static and allowed for ‘occasional shifts in the balance of forces’ (Lemarchand 
1970: 38) because Hutu often had room to manoeuvre by gaining the support of 
one chief while resisting another, or by turning away from one patron and finding 
a different protector. Another important argument given is that the structure of 
power, and therefore the strength of the Tutsi chiefs, could vary and was some-
times different at hill level from higher levels. As a result, Hutu lineages re-
mained strong in some areas, had an important voice in the administration and 
could keep the power of local chiefs in check, while at a higher level, the authori-
ty of old Hutu kingdoms continued to be recognized by Rwandan Tutsi kings 
(Lemarchand 1966: 603-605). 
Concerning the administrative and military systems, the most important posi-
tions, i.e. the king, army commanders and chiefs of pasture who ruled over graz-
ing land and collected dues from stock and provincial chiefs, were held by Tutsi. 
Sometimes land chiefs who were in charge of agricultural land and collected 
dues were Hutu while lower-level administrators could be Hutu, Tutsi or Twa 
(Mamdani 2002: 68-69).27 Mamdani (Ibid.: 68) argues that Rwanda’s military 
system ‘combined economic, political, and military functions in a single organi-
                                                 
26 Violent and constant intrigue was significant at the royal court, with the King using merciless violence 
against fellow Tutsi (Codere 1962: 59).
27 Contrary to Mamdani, Pottier argues that pasture chiefs were Tutsi and land chiefs were Hutu, and that 
they worked independently of each other. The Hutu population was able to benefit from this situation 
because both chiefs engaged in continuous reciprocal surveillance and had to listen to each other’s 
complaints to safeguard or extend their own power (Reyntjens 1985, as cited in Pottier 2002: 14-15).
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zation through a combination of state cattle keeping, provincial government, and 
fighting’. This military system began to develop in the mid-18th century with 
umuheto groups or social armies that were mostly made up of Tutsi and were 
required to do some form of military service. Gradually, all the social groups 
were incorporated into the army but Hutu occupied merely administrative posi-
tions and had to provide dues on a permanent basis. Only later were they de-
ployed in a fighting capacity. Through umuheto groups, every Rwandan was tied 
to the state structure (Ibid.: 66-68).28 Although Mamdani suggests that the greater 
fighting role among Hutu in the Rwandan army mitigated polarization for some 
time, the newly conquered territories brought in new Tutsi chiefs. This resulted 
in an accumulation of cattle and land in the hands of Tutsi while the Hutu popu-
lation lost land and had to engage in patron-client relationships (with Tutsi) to 
gain access to land. This led to Hutu being associated with and defined by their 
inferior status (Ibid.: 66, 70). 
Although differences in the social status of Hutu and Tutsi became significant, 
both Mamdani and Newbury explain how Hutu and Tutsi were initially flexible 
categories and social mobility was possible (Mamdani 2002: 70; Newbury 1988: 
12-13). Mamdani (2002: 70) claims that two words were important to this mo-
bility: kwihutura or ‘shed Hutuness’ for those Hutu who were able to accumulate 
cattle and become Tutsi, and gucupira or ‘loss of status’ that referred to a Tutsi 
who had lost property and thus also his Tutsi status and became Hutu. From an 
elite perspective, Lemarchand (1966: 605) claimed that some of these ‘new’ Tut-
si were from powerful Hutu lineages that were absorbed into the Tutsi group the 
moment they gained enough power to threaten Tutsi supremacy. However, this 
enforced the differences in their social status because: 
the very fact that a Hutu who successfully made his way up the social ladder should ipso fac-
to be assimilated into the Tutsi caste, and henceforth regarded as a Tutsi, shows that as a 
group the Hutu were inevitably destined to remain in an inferior position. A Tutsi could be 
both client and patron; but a Hutu could only be a client. (Lemarchand 1970: 39) 
Another important point Mamdani made was that Hutu and Tutsi were merely 
socio-political, and not ethnic or socio-economic, identities because of 
the ‘petits Tutsi’ who could not be told apart from many Hutu in their socioeconomic cir-
cumstances […] At the same time, the petits Tutsi could always be told apart from the Hutu 
socially, on account of both the petty privileges and the more substantial exemption from 
forced labour (ubureetwa) they were entitled to as Tutsi under Rwabugiri. (Mamdani 2002: 
74) 
                                                 
28 According to Newbury (1988: 43, 47-48), each lineage had to contribute one or two men. From the 
mid-19th century onwards, the function of umuheto groups in patron-client relations became more 
important than their military functions, as collecting dues became more important than mobilizing 
people for military service, as was discussed above.
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The petits Tutsi were often as poor in cattle as Hutu were, while the moyens Tutsi 
frequently combined herding cattle with farming (Ibid.). This observation is 
shared by Newbury who points out that economic specialization was not as clear-
cut because both Hutu and Tutsi engaged in herding activities and cattle were 
esteemed by both groups (Newbury 1988: 11-12).  
Despite the flexibility and social mobility related to the bipolar Hutu and Tutsi 
ethnic categories, the main features of Rwandan society during and after King 
Rwabugiri’s reign were the unequal political and social relationships that resulted 
from the centralization and monopolization of Tutsi power and control over land, 
cattle and people by Tutsi political authorities (Ibid.: 23, 40). While Tutsi held all 
the important positions in the civil service and the military, powerlessness was 
the fate of almost all Hutu (Maquet 1954, as cited in Codere 1962: 60). How the 
weak position of Hutu came about is explained by Codere (1962: 84), who ar-
gues that: 
… had the Tutsi been merely a comfortable and secure aristocracy they might well have de-
veloped slack and easy-going ways, but the brutal and relentless struggle for power among 
them kept them harsh and undistracted in their use of power, and thereby maximized the 
power they held as a group.  
The next section demonstrates how the weak position of Hutu continued after 
Rwanda’s colonization.
Clientship and Land Tenure under Colonial Rule 
Before the arrival of the Germans and then the Belgians, land and uburetwa cli-
entship varied from region to region depending on the degree of central govern-
ment penetration.29 During colonial control, these clientship systems became uni-
form and much less flexible (Newbury 1980: 101). From 1917 onwards, Belgian 
colonizers started collecting head tax while akazi (unpaid labour for public works 
and compulsory cultivation) became common in the 1920s. In 1926 they official-
ly abolished umuheto clientship (Newbury 1988: 112). By that time igikingi land 
tenure that was granted to cattle-owning lineages was also abolished because hill 
chiefs, appointed from outside, took over these lands to turn them into agricultur-
al plots, which were subsequently distributed by sub-chiefs (Ibid.: 133). This 
caused growing personal insecurity so more people turned to ubuhake cattle cli-
entship for protection and access to cows30 and thus to patrons’ grazing land.31
                                                 
29 Although centralized land control and loss of autonomy by the rural population were common 
throughout Africa during colonial rule, Newbury (1980: 107) emphasizes that uburetwa existed only 
in Rwanda.
30 ‘For people who owned cattle, ubuhake clientship was a means of “protecting” that cattle. For those 
who did not own cattle, ubuhake could serve as a means of obtaining a cow to be used for bridewealth 
or for increased status; a cow was not an end in itself, but rather a means to a social goal’ (Newbury 
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Ubuhake clientship increased during the colonial period due to the political cir-
cumstances in which ‘the increased power of the chiefs and their arbitrary use of 
this power created conditions of great insecurity; consequently the motivation to 
accept clientship often resulted from direct or indirect coercion’ (Ibid.: 134-135). 
This insecurity is illustrated by the statements of two of Newbury’s informants: 
At Rukunguri in Abiiru, a certain Rubaba became a client of Gisazi to protect his three cows; 
had he not become a client, he would have risked losing the cows [Informant 1]. And 
Seekayanje, grandfather of a Kinyagan in Abiiru region, lived at Mururu when Rubago was 
hill chief there. Seekayanje found it necessary to become a client of Rubago because the 
chiefs and patrons at that time ‘were like robbers’. The man [Informant 2] named three 
members of his lineage who had been arrested and had their belongings seized. (Ibid.: 139) 
Clientship had been associated with long and affective ties between a patron and 
his client in the past but, in the colonial period, clients frequently had several 
successive patrons because hill chiefs, appointed from outside, were often re-
placed. As the administration and clientship relations became more integrated, 
clients began to identify clientship with the administration (Ibid.: 140). 
By 1934, the Belgians had replaced all dues in agricultural and other products 
and different forms of labour with taxes that had to be paid in cash (Mamdani 
2002: 97; Newbury 1988: 112).32 However, the Belgian administrators were al-
ways imposing new forms of unpaid labour with the explanation that they were 
‘anti-famine’ or ‘development’ measures (Mamdani 2002: 97). In addition, the 
much-hated uburetwa33 that targeted only the Hutu population became an indi-
vidual instead of a lineage obligation and was not converted into a monetary 
payment (Newbury 1988: 112; Mamdani 2002: 97; Prunier 1995: 27).34 There 
were two main reasons why uburetwa was not converted into a tax. The first was 
economic, as free uburetwa labour helped to expand the cultivation of coffee and 
other cash crops, lining the pockets of both the Belgian authorities and local 
chiefs who were pulled into the money economy as commercial entrepreneurs. 
The second reason was political: unpaid labour was seen as an expression of 
                                                 
1988: 136). However, another form of ubuhake also occurred that concerned land clientship relations 
in which no cattle were exchanged (Ibid.: 135-136).
31 Newbury (1988: 134-135) nuances this increase in ubuhake clientship (at least in Kinyaga) when she 
mentions that, with some 20% of the population involved in ubuhake, this form of clientship was 
limited because it involved mainly Tutsi lineages and some lineages successfully evaded it.
32 The first official act of the young King Rudahigwa was to abolish all dues in kind. He replaced his 
father King Musinga in 1931 after the latter was removed by the Belgians. As the chiefs and sub-
chiefs could access some of the taxes levied, this greatly stimulated tax collection (Newbury 1988: 
156).
33 Hutu would call uburetwa ‘ubunetsi’, i.e. ‘an obligatory corvée from which a person cannot escape 
and from which he receives no profit for himself’ (Pagès 1949, as cited in Newbury 1980: 110).
34 The Belgians tried to limit uburetwa in 1927 by issuing a decree proclaiming that such service should 
be carried out 52 times a year instead of on 146 days as in the past, and the number of days was 
further reduced to 13 days a year in 1933. Although this suggested that the Belgians wanted to prevent 
abuse, the individualization of the system meant that male Hutu had to perform uburetwa more 
frequently (Newbury 1980: 103).
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obedience among the Hutu population. The Belgian administration reasoned that 
its abolition would undermine the chiefs’ authority over their populations 
(Newbury 1988: 112, 141-142; Mamdani 2002: 97; Newbury 1980: 104). Ac-
cording to Mamdani, uburetwa
… testified to the existence of Tutsi privilege in colonial Rwanda and highlighted the social 
separation between the petit Tutsi and the average Hutu […] Tutsi privilege in colonial 
Rwanda set all Tutsi apart from all Hutu in their relation to power. (Mamdani 2002: 98, 
italics in original) 
Around 1950, ubuhake cattle clientship and uburetwa were both formally abol-
ished35 but the chiefs’ exploitative character was not affected and they still held 
control over pasture land and, in many parts of the country, they continued to 
force the population to perform uburetwa services. With the help of Belgian ad-
ministrators, a Tutsi elite had managed to control labour, land, wealth, and access 
to education and the administration (Newbury 1988: 147). The nature of political 
power and the structures of Rwandan society had changed radically by the 1950s 
and made it: 
… possible (officially) to abolish the most evident symbol of exploitation under Tuutsi colo-
nialism, but to leave the essential structure of this exploitation intact. Abolishing the institu-
tion still left power in the hand of Tuutsi chiefs. Pasturage was still controlled by Tuutsi, so a 
person could not own cattle without coming to those with power over land on their terms. 
(Ibid.: 146-147) 
With regard to land tenure, German colonizers had introduced a third system in 
addition to the ubukonde and igikingi land tenure systems. This involved private 
access and the occupation of land belonging to European citizens and religious 
missions that had been obtained from the king by gift or purchase and came un-
der written law (André 1998: 143).  
During the first half of the 20th century, land tenure changed under Belgian in-
fluence. Making use of the (royal) political administration, the Belgians planned 
to rationalize and standardize it into an even more oppressive system, which 
broke the fragile equilibrium between pastoral and agricultural relations and fa-
cilitated the abusive exertion of land privileges by political officials who expelled 
and confiscated land at will. At the end of the 1950s, ubukonde lineages36, espe-
cially those from regions that were recently or only partly integrated into the 
Rwandan state, protested against attempts at expulsion by reclaiming access 
rights to their ancestral land. Previous owners or occupants protested against the 
private property rights of religious missions. In regions where ubukonde still ex-
isted, ubukonde land clients also asked their patrons for more secure land rights. 
According to André, these protests led to violent conflicts against government or 
lineage authorities at times. To lessen peasants’ land-tenure insecurity, the Bel-
                                                 
35 Uburetwa was abolished in 1949 and replaced by a compulsory tax (Newbury 1988: 146).
36 Lineages that had come first and cleared the land.
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gians took positions in favour of land clients and demanded that the authorities 
involved limit the rights and privileges of patrons.  
Various legal measures were taken around 1960 that changed land access con-
siderably and strengthened individual access and occupation rights. Ubukonde
land clientship was abolished in 1961 and the state, which now replaced the King 
and ubukonde patrons, gave former land clients usufruct rights over the land they 
occupied.37 Igikingi was suppressed in 1960 and pasture lands were declared 
communal land or were redistributed to peasants, and the ownership of cattle was 
transferred to cattle clients (Ibid.: 142-145). However, Musahara & Huggins 
(2005: 296) argue that, despite claims by the first independent government that 
clientship structures were dismantled and replaced by a more equitable land ten-
ure system, the new elite more or less continued their practices of ‘(mis)using 
their power and influence to gain access to land as well as cheap agricultural la-
bour’. Struggles over access to land continued and land remained a source of lo-
cal conflicts, also after Rwanda gained independence in 1962 (Newbury 2011: 
227). 
With the abolition of the (pre-)colonial land tenure systems, a decree issued on 
11 July 1960 declared that all land, registered or unregistered, was now regarded 
as state property. The decree regrouped land in two categories: that governed by 
written law and that by customary rights. Land owned by the state, land allocated 
to missions38 and land registered in urban areas was all regarded as freehold 
property and governed by written law. All land in rural areas regardless of 
whether it was occupied or not was subject to customary rights. However, this 
was not freehold property but was leasehold, and the person who used and de-
rived profit from it had inviolable usufruct rights, which meant that it could not 
be expropriated without compensation. Usufruct rights were given to individuals 
who occupied and exploited land over a certain period of time, those who were 
allocated land by the state or from another individual either temporarily or per-
manently, individually or collectively or as a loan or a gift, and those who gained 
access to it via the land market or inherited it (Blarel 1994: 81; André 1998: 145-
148). Partially developed pastoral and other lands, marsh lands and some affor-
estation lands were declared communal land that local authorities could allocate. 
They managed these lands by afforesting them or granting part as a loan or for 
rent or keeping it for communal projects. They could also grant some areas of 
                                                 
37 André (1998: 145) notes that ubukonde was not abolished in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri provinces but 
only limited and this resulted in the co-existence of two land tenure systems. This is confirmed by 
Pottier (2002: 123). 
38 This was sometimes contested by families that regarded mission land as their property under 
customary law and certain families managed to reclaim some mission land even after 1994 (André 
1998: 153).
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communal land, often that on slopes, to young households for their permanent 
use to set themselves up (André 1998: 161-162).  
The 1960 decree also proposed unifying the two land tenure systems by regis-
tering customary rights and granting individual usufruct rights, as stated by writ-
ten law. Other reforms in 1967, 1978 and 1991 again proposed registering land 
and unifying land law into a uniform written law in order to convert customary 
land rights into private and individual property rights. However, such accompa-
nying measures were never taken39 and, except for a certificate of occupation, 
rural lands were never formally registered (Ibid.: 145-146, 163-164).40 Land was 
still regarded as leasehold property but the state tried to influence tenure by pro-
posing projects to intervene and impose intensification, and by limiting land 
transactions. For instance, a 1976 decree determined that sales were only permit-
ted if the seller had at least a minimum of 2 hectares afterwards and with the au-
thorization of officials to avoid the unequal distribution of land and the marginal-
ization of parts of the population due to transactions on the land market (Ibid.:
146). The regulations all failed as they were not respected in rural areas and (dis-
tress) land sales increased (Ibid.). 
Although these measures suggest that the state wanted to secure land access, the 
opposite happened. Insecurity was provoked by a growing individualization and 
exclusion with regard to access and occupation rights, by the development of a 
land market, and the co-existence of written law and a customary land system. 
The latter was the population’s main system of reference and was subject to 
evolving principles and local practices. In addition, certain former land clientship 
relations, even though they had been banned, reshaped themselves in monetary 
clientships that enabled clients to connect to financial resources (André 1998: 
146).
Another observation that is important here with regard to land insecurity is 
Rwanda’s lack of attention to peasants’ perspectives. A study by Leurquin into 
rural living standards in the mid-1950s showed that there were no significant dif-
ferences in income and access to food between rural Tutsi and Hutu, with Tutsi 
households having only slightly more access to cattle than Hutu. The divide was 
between rural and urban areas (Leurquin 1960, as cited in Newbury & Newbury 
2000: 867).  
                                                 
39 The reason behind it was a lack of political will at various levels (Musahara & Huggins 2005: 296) 
and Pottier (2002: 185). also argued that, at the end of the 1980s, President Habyarimana was not 
committed to ensuring food and livelihood security for the population as he did not regard it as the 
state’s responsibility. Pottier personally observed that during a famine in the less fertile south, food aid 
remained in warehouses in Kigali. 
40 In certain regions from the late 1980s onwards, peasants themselves started to register land and land 
transactions informally by putting in place local cadastres that were kept by local wise men as well as 
by local authorities and peasants who measured and demarcated plots (André 1998: 174).
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Tutsi Power and Colonial Rule 
Newbury & Newbury’s (2000) essay on historiography stressed the assumption 
of ‘corporate ethnicity’ by outsider observers, including the German and Belgian 
colonizers, as they applied the physical characteristics of Rwanda’s ruling aristo-
cratic Tutsi lineages (tall, slender, small hooked noses and fine hair) to all Tutsi 
and considered them to be members of the political elite (Newbury & Newbury 
2000: 838-839). The Hutu population was supposed to be short, sturdy, dark-
skinned and less intelligent because 
while all Tutsi in this racial matrix were seen as ‘refined’ and ‘born to rule’ − as befit the 
‘governing classes’ − all Hutu were seen as ‘native’, ‘stalwart’, and ‘easy-duped’ − as befit 
the labouring classes, in this sociological-cum-racial wonderland. (Ibid.: 839)  
As a result and while Belgian rule expanded and strengthened central administra-
tion, Belgian administrators were beginning to favour Tutsi to create a ruling 
class by the end of the 1920s (Newbury 1988: 115).41 Hutu chances were restrict-
ed as they could only participate in the administration in subordinated positions 
and were overtly discriminated against in Catholic schools, which offered the 
best education during the colonial period (Ibid.: 115-116). ‘Such changes in the 
government structures and educational system represented a marked reduction in 
status for Hutu, and introduced a more marked stratification between ethnic 
groups than had existed before’. This led to sharpened ethnic divisions and the 
emergence of Hutu as a broader identity group ‘based on the resentments of the 
dispossessed’ (Ibid.: 116).  
While Newbury stresses the ethnic aspect of the socio-economic Hutu-Tutsi 
divide that became increasingly marked under Belgian rule, Mamdani (2002: 99) 
argues that ‘Belgian power did not arbitrarily cook up the Hutu/Tutsi distinction. 
What it did do was to take an existing sociopolitical distinction and racialize it’.42
He describes the origins of what came to be known as the Hamitic Hypothesis in 
which African pastoralists groups, such as Ethiopians and Maasai were regarded 
by German, Belgian as well as English colonizers as ‘African Caucasians’ or 
‘whites in black skin’ and were seen as being different from Bantu people.43
These African Caucasians were seen as the great civilizers of Africa but also as 
                                                 
41 However, it is important to mention Prunier (1995: 28), who argues that ‘By “the Tutsi” we mean here 
those members of the high lineages who were in a position to play ball with the Belgian 
administration and to benefit from it. They were a minority among their own people’.
42 Interestingly, Codere, who conducted fieldwork in 1959-1960 in a period of social and political 
turmoil, presumed that race had been a feature of Rwandan society and its political structure since 
ancient times (Codere 1993; Codere 1962).
43 See Racializing the Hutu/Tutsi Difference for a detailed explanation of the Hamitic hypothesis and its 
consequences (Mamdani 2002, Chapter 3). I do not intend to contribute to the discussion about race or 
ethnicity here but I use Mamdani’s analysis to point out the growing Hutu/Tutsi divide and to show 
how this affected social relations between the two groups. 
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alien to the regions where they were found, and constituted a minority among the 
‘Negro population’ (Ibid.: 79-87). Mamdani also classifies Rwanda’s coloniza-
tion (and that of Burundi for that matter) as being halfway between direct and 
indirect rule. It resulted in the fatal flaw of all direct-rule colonies as ‘it con-
structed the colonized along a majority/minority axis, an indigenous majority and 
a so-called nonindigenous minority’ (Ibid.: 100).  
As a result of this distinction, Belgian administrators started to identify Tutsi 
as a race that was different from the indigenous Hutu of Bantu origin. This was 
reflected in an ‘Information Bulletin on Ruanda-Urundi’ that was issued by the 
Belgians in 1960 in which the inhabitants of Rwanda were described as ‘two 
main racial groups: the Tutsi feudal stock-breeders, comprising 14% of the popu-
lation, and the Hutu farmers, amounting to 85%’ (Ibid.: 99). Mamdani adds that 
‘only in Rwanda was the notion that the Tutsi were a race apart from the majori-
ty turned into a rationale for a set of institutions that reproduced the Tutsi as a 
racialized minority’ (Ibid.: 87, italics in original).  
According to Prunier (1995: 38-39), the racialization of Tutsi implied a racial-
ization of consciousness that affected everybody. Hutu who were repeatedly told 
that they were inferior and deserved their fate eventually believed this and con-
sequently started to hate all Tutsi, while ‘even the “small Tutsi” who did not ben-
efit from the system in any way, started to believe they were indeed a superior 
race and that under the same rags as their Hutu neighbours wore, a finer heart 
was beating’. Mamdani identified three institutions that inspired, embedded and 
reproduced this ideology: the Catholic Church, the educational system and the 
state administration.44
The Catholic Church had great difficulty Christianizing the Tutsi elite. It took 
over three decades and only came about after King Musinga was deposed in 
1931. He had been reluctant to give up his important role in traditional religion 
and was hated by the Catholic Church because he tried to use the missions for his 
own political benefit. After Musinga was removed, the Tutsi hierarchy converted 
because they understood the importance of doing so if they were to become part 
of a new elite. The Hutu population, believing that it was the new King Ru-
dahigwa who had given the order, then converted en masse to Catholicism 
(Mamdani 2002: 92-93; Prunier 1995: 31). 
From the early 1930s onwards, the Catholic Church became the main provider 
of education after government schools were phased out and were replaced by 
mission schools. Church leaders and the Belgian colonizers both favoured Tutsi 
and discriminated against Hutu. The aim was to turn Tutsi into an elite by creat-
ing schools and education programmes specifically for Tutsi chiefs’ sons to pre-
                                                 
44 Newbury & Newbury (2000: 847) also refer to the alliance between these three parties.
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pare them for citizenship and future positions in the administration. If Hutu were 
admitted to these schools, they were simply educated to do manual labour. Their 
education would only underline the political fact that even educated Hutu were 
not meant for full citizenship (Mamdani 2002: 89-90; see also Lemarchand 1970: 
74-75 and Newbury 1988: 115). When it came to post-secondary education, Hutu 
had no other choice than to become theological students at one of the two exist-
ing seminaries but after graduation they were often not able to find suitable em-
ployment (Prunier 1995: 33). 
A major reform of the state administration took place in the 1920s. Power 
shifted from the Rwandan king to local authorities and their power was reor-
ganized in such a way that it made them only accountable to the colonial power 
and the ‘Tutsification’ of chiefs became institutionalized (Mamdani 2002: 90-
91). In 1959, towards the end of Belgian rule, 43 (of the 45) chiefs and 549 (of 
the 559) sub-chiefs were Tutsi (Chrétien 1985, as cited in Prunier 1995: 27). 
These measures led to the reinforcement of colonial power in a despotic fashion. 
By replacing the land chief (often a Hutu), the pasturage chief (always a Tutsi) 
and the umuheto chief (usually a Tutsi) with a single chief, who was always Tutsi 
and had often been educated to perform this task, the chiefs’ power was central-
ized at the expense of the power of the king, who could no longer appoint his 
chiefs. Ordinary peasants were now unable to play the chiefs off against each 
other or appeal against a verdict. Mamdani suggests that, as chiefs were also 
granted judicial powers, local administrations became despotic in nature 
(Mamdani 2002: 90-92; see also Lemarchand 1970: 72-76). Helped by the local 
hierarchy of despotic Tutsi chiefs, the Belgians created what Mamdani (2002: 
93) called a ‘regime of compulsions’ in which:
… the despotic machinery was enabled by a highly administrative version of ‘customary 
law’, one which sanctified as ‘customary’ any exercise of force by authorities simply be-
cause they too were considered ‘customary’. (Ibid.: 94) 
By emphasizing agriculture and individualized taxes, the Belgians wanted to 
promote economic development, and coercion was an integral part of their strat-
egy. Unpaid labour and taxation increased significantly between 1920 and 1940 
and led to enforced sales of food and export crops. Local chiefs had to deal with 
targets and were made to understand that, in order to meet them, they had to whip 
Hutu workers or risk being whipped themselves.45 However, they benefited sig-
nificantly as they added their own demands to the list of ‘customary’ exactions 
                                                 
45 Prunier (1995: 35, Note 83) confirms that a UN Trusteeship Mandate Delegation on a visit in 1948 
learned that, of the 250 peasants interrogated, 247 had been beaten (often many times). Although non-
elite Tutsi were also subject to forced labour (except uburetwa and sometimes the compulsory 
growing of crops), they were often in a better position to escape this, for instance through ubuhake
clientship. Alternatively, they would receive supervisory roles (Newbury 1980: 105).
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(both labour and money) and applied the force required to ensure compliance 
(Ibid.: 95-97).  
Although the Belgian administrators made some attempts to humanize the rule 
of the Tutsi chiefs and sometimes threatened to depose them because of their 
abuses, Newbury notes that ‘such abuses were central to the way the system of 
chiefly rule functioned; they were not occasional aberrations, products of indi-
vidual moral “lapses”’ (Newbury 1988: 151). And the Belgians had to recognize 
that it led to fixed economic targets being achieved (Ibid.: 151, 169-170). Imposi-
tions on the rural population gradually increased, especially during the economic 
crisis in the 1920s and periods of famine when the Belgian colonizers attempted 
to increase agricultural production. Labour recruitment for plantations, construc-
tion work, mines and other enterprises increased and reinforced the chiefs’ pow-
er. They could decide who would be engaged and, until the beginning of the 
1930s, often took the wages of recruited workers. Eventually there was a situa-
tion of near-slavery where workers who ‘deserted’ their work before the end of 
their contract were first whipped and then forced to return to work, while their 
wives were sometimes forced to engage in unpaid labour or else their property 
would be taken (Ibid.: 167-171).46
An historically important event occurred in 1933 when the Belgians carried out a 
census in which they classified the entire population into Tutsi, Hutu and Twa 
and consolidated ethnic labels. This act is often mentioned with regard to the 
genocide, as identity cards enabled the Interahamwe militia and other killers to 
identify their targets more easily. It remains unclear, as Mamdani argues, which 
criteria were used in the census to distinguish Hutu and Tutsi. Many argue that 
the labelling was based on the ‘ten cows’ rule, i.e. anyone with ten or more cows 
was classified as Tutsi. According to Mamdani (2002: 98-99), this rule was ap-
plied but was not the main method used to identify Tutsis as information from 
churches, who knew their congregations well, and physical characteristics were 
also taken into account. Des Forges and Pottier have different views on the ‘ten 
cows’ rule. Des Forges (1999: 37-38) claims that each Rwandan was asked to 
declare his group identity and that, although taxation distinguished between own-
ers of ten or more cattle, the census did not take cattle ownership into account. 
While the recording of ethnicity highlighted its importance and rigidified it, some 
Hutu managed to become Tutsi soon after the census was completed. Pottier 
(2002: 117) dismisses the ‘ten cows’ theory because it ignored existing unequal 
patron-client relations and ethnically-based inequalities that had led to a ‘distinc-
                                                 
46 Formerly, contract workers and their families could pay their uburetwa services in cash in order to 
attract them into the labour market (Newbury 1988: 170).
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tion between overlord and serf [that] did not hinge on a “cow or two’’’.47 Des 
Forges (1999: 38) has concluded that the census led to the tendency that: 
… the ruling elite, most influenced by European ideas and the immediate beneficiaries of 
sharper demarcation from other Rwandans, increasingly stressed their separateness and their 
presumed superiority. Meanwhile Hutu, officially excluded from power, began to experience 
the solidarity of the oppressed.  
Towards the End of Colonization 
The above-mentioned developments regarding the increasing exploitation and 
coercion of the peasant population by chiefs and the overt discrimination against 
Hutu led to anger among the rural masses as well as aspirant Hutu leaders. Ac-
cording to Mamdani (2002: 106-114), a Hutu (counter) elite, which emerged in 
the 1950s, developed from three groups: the pre-colonial elite from regions in 
Rwanda that had been relatively recently incorporated into the Rwandan state; 
Hutu peasants who had escaped servitude by entering the labour market in Congo 
and Uganda; and the few Hutu who had managed to complete their education 
(mainly in seminaries). These Hutu, with local Hutu in better positions such as 
traders, transporters or catechists, were to join hands with peasants as:  
Aspirant Hutu leaders needed to link up with the simmering rural discontent which began to 
be overtly expressed after World War II, and which by the mid-1950s was reaching a boiling 
point. It was this rural anger which gave energy to the emergent national Hutu leadership and 
party organization. (Newbury 1988: 181)48
As a reaction to growing rural discontent as well as pressure from the UN,49 the 
Belgians decided that reforms were necessary and they abolished uburetwa and 
ubuhake (Mamdani 2002: 114-115). Lemarchand (1966: 602) argues that, with 
the abolition of ubuhake, the structural roots of stratification were destroyed and 
Rwanda’s political structure was affected because 
clientship served as the linchpin which held the political system of Rwanda together, and 
[why], once it was abolished, the entire structure collapsed, ushering in a bitter struggle for 
supremacy between Hutu and Tutsi.  
                                                 
47 Pottier (2002: 118-119) regards the ‘ten cow’ rule as a perfect ‘soundbite’ for the current Tutsi-
dominated government to rewrite Rwanda’s history by proclaiming that ‘the ‘silly business’ of 
ethnicity was just a question of cows, a colonial mistake’ and it sees it as ‘an exceptionally effective 
way of conveying to the world that the RPF is above ethnicity’. See his remarks about the rewriting of 
Rwanda’s pre-colonial history in the introduction. 
48 In another article with David Newbury, and making use of research done by Leurquin (1960) and 
Dorsey, she concluded that ‘rather than resulting from “ethnic differences”, rural class differentiation 
preceded and served as a catalyst for ethnic identity. Economic insecurities, therefore, contributed to 
political mobilization along ethnic lines’ (Newbury and Newbury 2000: 868).
49 Although Rwanda was administered by Belgium, it was a UN trust territory from 1945 until 1962 
(Mamdani 2002: 114).
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The Belgians organized local elections in 1953 and general elections in 1956. 
However, the local elections were indirect and, therefore, did not open up politi-
cal space for the Hutu population, while the general elections were only direct at 
the lowest administrative level but indirect at the higher levels (Mamdani 2002: 
114-116; Newbury 1988: 183-185). These reforms were very limited and it was 
the taste of reform instead of its absence that led the Hutu elite to believe that 
radical changes were necessary to end the Tutsi hold on social, economic and 
cultural resources (Mamdani 2002: 115-116; see also Reyntjens 1985: 196).  
The Catholic Church had, in the meantime, decided to change sides and sup-
port the Hutu and their demands for power. There were two reasons for this. 
First, the Church felt it was losing control as the Tutsi they had educated and 
employed had obtained more power within the Church while the broader Tutsi 
elite were starting to develop independency aspirations. Second, Belgian clerics, 
who had replaced earlier leaders and were more often Flemish than Walloon, 
came from a more humble social background and sympathized more easily with 
the oppressed Hutu (Prunier 1995: 43-44).50
In early 1957, the Rwandan High Council, which was dominated by Tutsi and 
heavily influenced by the King, proclaimed its desire for self-governance. A 
month later, on 24 March 1957, nine Hutu leaders responded to this statement, 
which completely ignored discrimination against Hutu, by issuing their own Ba-
hutu Manifesto that called for recognition of the Hutu-Tutsi problem (Mamdani 
2002: 116; Newbury 1988: 191). It stressed the severity of the racial problem 
between Hutu and the foreign ‘Hamitic’ Tutsi and the latter’s monopoly of pow-
er, and stated that they needed to be liberated from these ‘Hamites’ as well as the 
Belgian colonizers (Mamdani 2002: 116). The text of the Bahutu Manifesto 
showed that this racial ideology had become commonplace and was being used 
to explain a socio-political problem. To make matters worse, in 1958, court nota-
bles declared that since successive kings had conquered Hutu, there could be no 
fraternity between Tutsi and Hutu (Prunier 1995: 46-47). These same notables 
also appointed a new king after King Rudahigwa’s sudden death in July 1959, 
which demonstrated the Belgian administration’s failure to control the situation. 
It was in this tense and ethnicity-oriented context that four political parties were 
set up between 1957 and 1959 to run in local elections scheduled for mid-1960. 
MDR-PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA were dominated by Hutu and UNAR 
                                                 
50 Pottier (2002: 123-124) argues that the Church did not suddenly stop supporting the Tutsi aristocracy 
but, unlike the Belgian administrators and the Tutsi aristocracy, it had foreseen the Hutu struggle for 
democracy for some time and saw it as a people’s struggle for liberation.
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and RADER were Tutsi-dominated (Mamdani 2002: 119-123; Prunier 1995: 47-
48; Newbury 1988: 193).51
Before the elections could be held, ethnic violence erupted in 1959 in what 
came to be known as the Rwandan Revolution or the Hutu Social Revolution. It 
started with reprisal killings by Hutu after a MDR-PARMEHUTU sub-chief was 
attacked by young UNAR members. The violence resulted in some 300 deaths, 
1231 arrests and 22,000 internally displaced people by mid-1960 (Prunier 1995: 
48-51; see also Mamdani 2002: 123-124 and Newbury 1988: 194-195).52 The 
population was by then so opposed to Tutsi rule and refused to obey their chiefs’ 
orders that the Belgians decided to replace Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs with Hutu 
to restore order (Newbury 1988: 197). These new chiefs organized the persecu-
tion of the Tutsi population, which led to a mass exodus of about 130,000 Tutsi 
to neighbouring countries (Prunier 1995: 51). The 1960 communal elections saw 
a big victory for the MDR-PARMEHUTU party. Some 3126 Hutu chiefs and 
about 25,000 other people then assembled in Gitarama on 28 January 1961 and 
abolished the monarchy and proclaimed a republic (Mamdani 2002: 124; Prunier 
1995: 51-53). Since the Tutsi-dominated monarchist UNAR party rejected the 
Gitarama coup, elections and an official referendum were held in 1961. This re-
sulted in a rejection of the monarchy and was a huge victory for MDR-
PARMEHUTU (78%) (Mamdani 2002: 124-125).53
The Hutu-Tutsi Swap 
Rwanda was formally independent from 1 July 1962. Hutu were now in power 
and the country was governed by two Hutu presidents until 1994. The period un-
til the 1994 genocide can be divided into the First Republic under President Gré-
goire Kayibanda and the Second Republic under President Juvénal Habyarimana, 
who succeeded Kayibanda in 1973 following a coup. This period was marked by 
continuing violence and discrimination against Tutsi and a growing refugee prob-
lem under President Kayibanda, and economic decline and civil war under Presi-
                                                 
51 The Mouvement Démocratique Rwandais / Parti du Mouvement et de l’Emancipation Hutu (MDR-
PARMEHUTU) emerged from the cultural Mouvement Sociale Muhutu that had been established two 
years earlier and the Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse (APROSOMA) was a 
nationalist party that claimed to be open to both groups and spoke on behalf of the poor. The Union 
Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) was a monarchist and conservative party, and the Rassemblement 
Démocratique Rwandais (RADER) was more moderate and accepting of the Belgian presence 
(Mamdani 2002: 119-123; Prunier 1995: 47-48; Newbury 1988: 193).
52 According to Codere (1962: 64), the total number of deaths in this period did not exceed 1000. Many 
of the dead were Hutu.
53 This short account of the revolution stresses the anti-Tutsi sentiments of the time but Pottier (2002: 
123-124) argues that the revolution was not anti-Tutsi as such but mainly anti-monarchy and anti-
Tutsi aristocracy and that there was some degree of inter-ethnic solidarity because a number of the 
Tutsi clergy advocated social change.
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dent Habyarimana. Prunier describes post-independent Rwanda as an ideological 
state in which the new rulers just inversed the ideological construct of Tutsi as 
the foreign invaders and excluded them from citizenship. He argues that, in the 
new version of this ideology: 
… the Hutu had been the ‘native peasants, enslaved by the aristocratic invaders: they were 
now the only legitimate inhabitants of the country. Hutu were the silent demographic majori-
ty, which meant that a Hutu-controlled government was now not only automatically legiti-
mate but also ontologically democratic’. (Prunier 1995: 80) 
Like the petits Tutsi had experienced before, Hutu peasants also felt that because 
they were now governed by Hutu they somehow shared in their leaders’ power 
(Prunier 1995: 80-81). 
According to Mamdani, Prunier underestimated and played down the differ-
ences between the First and Second Republics. Mamdani claims that the Second 
Republic marked a shift from seeing Tutsi as a race foreign to the country to 
viewing them as an ethnic and historically privileged minority indigenous to 
Rwanda. This change meant that Tutsi did have rights in the civic sphere and 
were allowed to participate in the political sphere but only insofar as it fitted their 
minority status (Mamdani 2002: 136-141, 314, Note 34).54 Both authors agree 
that everyday life for Tutsi in the Second Republic was, as long as they refrained 
from political activities, ‘quite tolerable’ (Prunier 1995: 75-76), also because of 
the absence of anti-Tutsi violence (Mamdani 2002: 141-142; see also Reyntjens 
1993: 213). Prunier (1995: 58) considered that President Kayibanda adopted the 
leadership style of the former Tutsi kings during the First Republic as 
… the old monarchic patterns of governance (a narrow circle of leadership recruitment, re-
gionalism, lineage competition, favoritism, corruption) were quickly fused with the new ones 
explicitly derived from the ‘democratic revolution’ (social equality, justice, progress, moral-
ism). 
While most Tutsi were able to maintain their involvement in education,55 busi-
ness, church and government, they could no longer enter the political arena, 
which was now confined to Hutu who represented the majority of Kayibanda’s 
‘Hutu nation’ (Mamdani 2002: 134). From late 1960 until 1964, there were vio-
lent attacks by small groups of exiled Tutsi who operated from Uganda and 
whom Hutu labelled inyenzi (cockroaches). These attacks, in turn, led to violent 
reprisals on Tutsi civilians who were considered to be active or potential sup-
porters of the inyenzi. Many Tutsi fled into exile in neighbouring countries be-
tween 1959 and 1964 and again in 1973 (Mamdani 2002: 129, 160; Prunier 1995: 
                                                 
54 Despite these restrictions, Tutsi did participate politically, although they were prevented from joining 
the army and the local state (Mamdani 2002: 141).
55 Although only 10% of Tutsi were entitled to receive post-secondary education, university enrolment 
in the 1960s was nearly 90% Tutsi (Mamdani 2002: 136).
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54, 57).56 The last wave of refugees was caused by a bloodless coup in 1973 that 
was led by General Juvénal Habyarimana following growing criticism of Kayi-
banda’s policy on education and employment opportunities.57 One of his first acts 
was to ban political parties and introduce single party rule, forcing every Rwan-
dan into his Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Dévelopment (MRND) 
(Prunier 1995: 76-77).  
Under this new dictatorship, the authorities had unlimited power and were on-
ly accountable to their superiors as there were no electoral checks-and-balances 
(Mamdani 2002: 152). The country became very tightly governed from the top 
down. It was divided into ten prefectures with a prefect and 143 communes that 
were governed by a mayor. Each commune contained four or five sectors that, in 
turn, were divided into ten cells of ten households (Reyntjens 1985, as cited in 
Mamdani 2002: 314, Note 39). Both the prefects and the mayors were appointed 
from above and ruled like the colonial chiefs and sub-chiefs, with forced crops 
and labour and patron-client relationships (Mamdani 2002: 144). Prunier de-
scribes the effects of dictatorship as follows: 
All bourgmestres and préfets were chosen from among party cadres. The party was every-
where; every hill had its cell, and party faithfuls, hoping for promotion and a professional 
boost, willingly spied on anybody they were told to spy on and a few others as well […] 
Administrative control was probably the tightest in the world among non-communist coun-
tries. (Prunier 1995: 76-77, italics in original) 
Agricultural production decreased significantly in the mid-1980s and famine hit 
several parts of the country as food insecurity grew (André & Platteau 1998: 3; 
see also Uvin 1998: 53-54). Newbury & Newbury pointed out the growing ine-
quality and distress in this period, with wealth and power concentrated in the 
hands of urban elites. They concluded that those in power and those close to 
them ‘were implicated in the reproduction of inequalities that permeated Rwanda 
society’ (Newbury & Newbury 2000: 873-874; see also Verwimp 2013: 249-
250). In addition, Pottier (2002: 185) argues that, by the end of the 1980s, Presi-
dent Habyarimana was no longer committed to ensuring food and livelihood se-
curity among the population as he did not regard it to be the responsibility of the 
state. Pottier personally observed that food aid remained in warehouses in Kigali 
during a famine in the less fertile south. And Verwimp (2013: 112) felt that the 
main reason for Habyarimana’s non-response was that it did not comply with the 
                                                 
56 Prunier estimates the total number of Tutsi refugees living in exile to have been between 600,000 and 
700,000 while Mamdani argues that estimates generally range between 400,000 and 600,000 (Prunier 
1995: 63; Mamdani 2002: 161). Uvin (1998: 187) is less specific with his claim that more than half of 
Rwandan Tutsi departed (by death or flight).
57 The coup was bloodless but Kayibanda was sent to prison or placed under house arrest and died in 
1976, probably of starvation (Prunier 1995: 82). See for more details about the events preceding 
Habyarimana’s coup Reyntjens (1985).
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ruling principle of food self-sufficiency, which was the regime’s ‘flagship policy
objective’. He concluded that:
… towards the end of the eighties it became clear that the institutions built during the 
Habyarimana regime, meaning the monopoly power of the MRND party and its president 
over all party and state institutions, together with the policies undertaken by these institu-
tions (such as umuganda58, coffee policy and food self-sufficiency policy) were unable to 
prevent crisis, famine, rising poverty, corruption and self-enrichment. (Ibid.: 250)59
According to Newbury (2011: 227), rural grievances concerning land access and 
agrarian policies ‘boiled to the surface’ as many peasants were unable to make 
ends meet, while ‘corruption and accumulation increased among some high gov-
ernment officials’. Coffee and tin export revenues plummeted and affected both 
Rwanda’s economy and the country’s political stability. 
In this vulnerable context, some Western governments and donors, influenced 
by the collapse of communism, started to demand political reforms (Mamdani 
2002: 152-153; Prunier 1995: 84, 89-90). These would include giving Tutsi refu-
gees the right to return to Rwanda, something they had previously been denied. 
However, by the time this right was proclaimed, a section of the Tutsi refugees in 
Uganda had become a significant military force. They were now the Uganda-
based refugee movement known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and were 
preparing an armed invasion for October 1990. This was to start a civil war that 
would last until the end of the genocide in July 1994 (Mamdani 2002: 153, 159).  
Conclusion 
In an article on ethnicity in Rwanda, Newbury wrote in 1978 that:  
… for many Kinyagans [Southwestern Rwandans] today, the word “Tuutsi” is associated 
primarily with central government power and institutions, and particularly with the exactions 
of chiefs backed by central government. The Tuutsi who came with Rwabugiri imposed land 
prestations and ubureetwa, and made the majority of the population (classed as ‘Hutu’) feel 
inferior. (Newbury 1978: 21)  
In line with Newbury’s findings, Codere (1993: 107) experienced similar reac-
tions to a photo questionnaire she conducted during the revolutionary year of 
1959-1960. Rwandans turned out to be very aware of their ethnicity (which she 
refers to as ‘caste’) and ‘saw caste with the eyes of caste, and did so with preju-
dice and strong feelings’. Telling examples are the reactions of all three groups to 
                                                 
58 Umuganda was weekly communal labour that was compulsory for every adult male. It was a system 
of labour taxation, partly for the common good, that was also intended to control and mobilize the 
population. Due to its success, churches, development projects and civil organizations copied the 
policy. According to Verwimp, attendance at umuganda meetings dropped when the population 
realized that Habyarimana’s position was weakened when he had to accept a multi-party system 
(Verwimp 2013: 250, 253, 255). Monthly umuganda communal labour still takes place today (in 
2015). 
59 See also Verwimp (2013: 97-117, Chapter 5) on agricultural policy during the Habyarimana regime.
209573-L-bw-ASC
94
a picture of a seated Tutsi diviner who is being brought a pot of beer by two Hutu 
who consult him, which was generally interpreted as a scene of clientship with 
Hutu clients presenting their patron with beer (Ibid.: 99). A Hutu woman of 29 
reacted to the picture of the diviner as follows:  
The Tutsi well know how to act the great lord. You can see it clearly here. They are lordly 
and between them there is a Hutu holding a beer pot. He is looking at it thirstily. He is the 
one who has done everything, but he doesn’t even look like the owner of the pot. Progress 
has been good’, while a Tutsi woman of 56 said: ‘What is this? They are making fun of the 
Tutsi, that is all. Is there any Tutsi now who is drinking beer brought to him by his vassals. Is 
it that once again we can be at peace?’ (Ibid.: 103-104)  
In response to a picture of a Hutu mother giving her child some beer, a Tutsi 
woman of 56 stated:  
This Hutu woman is drinking and giving a drink to her child, because they are at peace. An-
yway their shortcomings will never go away. They will always stay the Hutu I have known. 
How dirty that woman is! How hideous! She never washes herself. Even though they are the 
Hutu of the Whites, they will always be Hutu’. The reaction of a Hutu woman of 38 was to-
tally different: ‘That must be a Hutu woman giving beer to her child. What do you expect? 
We are the only women who care for their children. In the past a Tutsi woman wouldn’t take 
care of her own child. It is because of that I said it was a Hutu woman. I wonder how the 
Tutsi women could even pretend to love their children when they did not even want to touch 
them out of their pride and laziness. After all that, now they are going to feel that we are like 
them’. (Ibid.: 105) 
One of the aims of this chapter was to explain how Newbury’s and Codere’s re-
spondents came to the associations and feelings described above. The chapter 
analysed how patron-client relations and ethnicity became the most important 
features of Rwanda’s political structure and manifested themselves in a hierar-
chically and top-down governed society that became dominated by one ethnic 
group at the expense of the other. It described a history of frustration, hatred and 
violence that culminated in civil war and a terrible genocide. In addition, the 
chapter considered the fragmentation and individualization of the population and 
the penetration and use of centralized control and coercion directed against it. 
The coming chapters will investigate how these characteristics and Rwanda’s 
troubled past explain and still influence more recent events.  
This chapter also described the history of land tenure, with land starting off as 
a collective asset that was scarce even in the pre-colonial era and turned into an 
individualized item of which the state ultimately became the owner. With regard 
to the themes of social relations and the construction of authority, the introduc-
tion already mentioned that social relations changed drastically in the pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras and became increasingly unequal for 
many peasants who were unable to raise their voice against a strong and coercive 
state. This chapter aimed to show that what happened throughout Rwanda’s his-
tory is what Peters (2004: 270, 304) warned against when she argued that land 
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relations are embedded in unequal social relations that are characterized by ex-
clusion, class formation and deepening social divisions. The development of sev-
eral clientship forms and the accompanying obligations also show how closely 
property rights and state formation processes are linked; how authority is reflect-
ed as well as produced by control over land and over political identity; and how 
both authority and political identity change over time. For instance, when the 
Hutu took power after independence, the political identity of the Hutu majority 
also changed as they felt that, like the petits Tutsi before them, they shared this 
power to some extent. With power moving into the hands of Hutu, the political 
identity of Rwandans under President Habyarimana also shifted as the Tutsi were 
gradually regarded as an ethnic minority rather than a foreign race. However, 
categorizing people into clients and patrons under Rwandan kings, and thus as 
Hutu and Tutsi, remained a significant feature of land control and influenced ac-
cess to authorities and, consequently, to the land that peasants had. This under-
lines the political nature of identity as a person’s status depended on the ethnic 
group they belonged to and determined their ability to gain access to land and 
other resources. 
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Sharing Scarcity: Land Sharing and 
Villagization after Exile 
By focusing on two policies that were implemented following the 1994 genocide, 
this chapter analyses how changes in land-tenure arrangements have had an im-
pact on land access and social relations in Mubinda. The policies involved (i) the 
compulsory sharing of land by the Hutu population with Tutsi refugees; and (ii) 
the forceful resettlement of the entire population from dispersed settlements in 
the hills into a group village structure. These policies can be regarded as forms of 
spatial engineering, as described in the introduction, and once again show the 
authority of the Rwandan government over land and its connection to identity. In 
addition, both policies have significantly influenced local land access and land 
relations, and have led to increased land scarcity among the majority of the popu-
lation. To put the policies into context, the post-genocide population movements 
and the RPF violence that Mubinda’s population faced during and after the geno-
cide are also discussed. However, the recent (agricultural) history of Rwanda 
cannot be studied without assessing the increasing scarcity of land. This is the 
theme of the next section. 
Land Access and Scarcity since the 1980s  
While Chapter 3 discussed land tenure and clientship under colonial rule, this 
section focuses on the more general issues of land access and land tenure as well 
as the increasing land scarcity and land conflicts in Rwanda since the 1980s. 
Land access at the local level was controlled by the family chief and, in areas 
where lineage chiefs were still in place, these chiefs controlled (access to) land 
and ensured that it was exploited and transmitted according to community rules.1
                                                 
1 Chapter 3 describes how their power diminished because of the appointment of hill chiefs.
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All land sales were conducted in the presence of lineage chiefs and wise men, 
family members and witnesses (André & Lavigne Delville 1998: 168-169).  
Until the 1999 Succession Law was enacted, only sons could inherit land from 
their father. A son would receive umunani land when he became an adult and 
was preparing to get married and this would enable him to provide a house for 
his family and to feed them. If a family did not have sons, umunani land would 
be granted to grandsons. After the death of both parents, any remaining family 
land, now called ingarigari, would be divided among the sons (Veldman & 
Lankhorst 2011: 21). Women were not able to inherit land but they could receive 
it as a gift, regardless of whether they were married or not. A father might grant a 
small parcel of land to a daughter when she gave birth or a parent could give her 
amalira land (‘land for the tears’) to console her after the death of a parent
(André & Platteau 1998: 36).2 Additionally, a father would often keep a parcel of 
land for emergencies and give this land (also called ingarigari) to a ‘troubled 
daughter’ (Pottier and Nkundabashaka 1992, as cited in Pottier 2002: 190-191; 
see also Jones-Casey, Dick & Bizoza 2014).  
Although land distribution was monitored by the community and performed in 
the presence of a community’s wise men, it was the father who controlled it 
(André & Lavigne Delville 1998: 169). When he passed away, the eldest son 
would become responsible for managing the land in the interests of the family, 
which meant that he would give his younger brothers enough land for them to 
make a living and would, for instance, take care of a divorced (and thus return-
ing) sister and her children (André & Platteau 1998: 34; André & Lavigne 
Delville 1998: 169). Since the youngest son had the responsibility of caring for 
his parents in their old age, he held a special position and was entitled to an addi-
tional plot of land and had first choice when it came to the final distribution of 
his father’s land after his father’s death (André & Platteau 1998: 35). André & 
Lavigne Delville (1998: 169) described how, when the amount of paternal land 
available decreased in the 1980s, inheriting sons became less willing to accept 
the allocation system and its inequalities and began to demand the equal distribu-
tion of parcels. Their protests often led to a redistribution of all the family plots 
after the father’s death. 
With ancestral land becoming more limited, other ways of gaining access to 
land emerged and peasants acquired land through loans or gifts, the allocation of 
communal land,3 or by renting or purchasing it (Ibid.: 170).4 In certain regions of 
                                                 
2  Veldman and Lankhorst (2011: 22) refer to this custom as icyamarira or impozamarira (which more 
closely resembles the word amalira if you bear in mind that Rwandans tend to swap the ‘l’ and the 
‘r’). For more examples of women’s access to parental and marital land, see Jones-Casey, Dick & 
Bizoza (2014), Veldman & Lankhorst (2011) and Chapter 6.
3 Blarel (1994: 77-78) claims that land that was allocated by the government at independence relieved 
some of the population pressure but that its importance varied across regions and decreased over time.
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Rwanda, 10% to 15% of plots were acquired through gifts, while gifts dropped 
gradually to about 1% of all land in other areas.5 For a certain period of time, 
local authorities gave part of the communal land to young households with little 
land, or to immigrants. In some areas, these allocations were an important source 
of land and up to 30% of cultivated land was obtained through allocation in one 
region in the 1980s. Renting allowed peasants to adjust the amount they had, de-
pending on the labour available and their economic needs. Households with 
small plots benefited in particular from this (Ibid.: 170-171).6 André & Lavigne 
Delville suggested that ‘these rents thus play a fundamental role in the re-
stabilization of land inequalities and the economic stabilization of families’ 
(Ibid.: 171, translated from French). The importance and nature of land purchases 
varied between regions and ranged from about 30% of cultivated land to only 3% 
or 4%. Land sales and purchases led, unlike with renting, to growing land ine-
qualities as households that already possessed relatively large parcels were able 
to purchase more land (Ibid.: 170-171). By 1984, half of all land was owned by 
15% of the country’s landowners (Musahara & Huggins 2005: 296; Pottier 2002: 
184). 
As a result of growing land distribution inequalities, informal land sales at the 
beginning of the 1990s resulted in greater economic as well as judicial insecurity 
regarding tenure. Economic insecurity was provoked by distress sales and result-
ed in the marginalization of families selling land, as they were unable to earn any 
income from subsistence farming, while wealthier families with off-farm in-
comes purchased these lands (André & Lavigne Delville 1998: 175; see also 
André & Platteau 1998: 21-27).7 Judicial insecurity was partly due to the fact that 
there was no official land market that could protect people involved in land sales 
and purchases and guarantee their rights or respond to developments such as the 
growth in distress sales. Another source of insecurity was the co-existence of 
customary and legal conflict resolution bodies, of which the latter gradually re-
placed local institutions and undermined the authority of local officials (André & 
Lavigne Delville 1998: 175). A new owner frequently wanted to keep this newly 
acquired land for his own personal use as a kind of pension fund that could not 
be claimed because he did not regard it as part of the inheritance or as being sub-
                                                 
4 According to Blarel (1994: 77-78), non-market land transfers, for instance when the extended family 
borrowed or gave land to relatives, were especially important to households that inherited little or no 
land as they provided a safety net and reduced landlessness. 
5 However, André & Lavigne Delville (1998: 170) suggest that these gifts were often clandestine sales.
6 This is supported by Blarel (1994: 73) who calculated, based on data from three densely populated 
areas, that more than two-thirds of land-poor households (with less than 0.37 ha) increased their land 
by 67% through renting, while land-rich households (with 1.5 or more ha) reduced their land by about 
7% on average because they rented out ‘surplus’ land.
7 According to Musahara & Huggins (2005: 296), traders with government connections would often 
buy these lands and act as absentee landlords.
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ject to social obligations, for instance with regard to a divorced sister or an ille-
gitimate child. If those excluded protested against their exclusion, this could re-
sult in violent conflicts (André 1998: 149-151). Eventually, increasing individu-
alization and privatization began to reflect a remodelled social fabric in which 
power relationships seemed to define occupation of and access to land (André & 
Lavigne Delville 1998: 175). This gave André reason to conclude that: 
Power relationships determine the manner of land access and occupation. Tension and con-
flicts are created in each of these systems [customary and written law] while they become 
exclusive and the excluded feel threatened in their subsistence. The law for its part is also not 
capable of better guaranteeing land access and occupation. On the contrary, in certain cases, 
it produces new insecurities. (André 1998: 154, translated from French)8
At the end of the 1990s, land scarcity and tenure insecurity increased even more. 
It was young households that were mostly the victims as they were unable to 
support themselves financially because they had little land.9 Selling family land 
was only allowed in cases of extreme hardship but informal land sales and pur-
chases increased significantly. Many peasants who sold their land became land-
less and, with a growing number of young men who were denied their inher-
itance, they had to eke out a living outside agriculture in an area where non-farm 
opportunities were rare.10 Land scarcity and the institutional insecurity resulting 
from a land tenure system that could not keep up with Rwanda’s rapid social, 
economic and demographical changes also led to vulnerable groups that had pre-
viously held familial rights facing exclusion or restrictions. Returning emigrants, 
orphans, the handicapped, young men who lacked status, illegitimate wives and 
their children, and divorced or widowed women (and their children) experienced 
how people disregarded social obligations and norms (Ibid.: 149-152).11 Pottier 
(2002: 192) argues that widows who had not had bride wealth and were therefore 
considered to be married in a non-customary way were also part of the group that 
lost their entitlement to land.12 While brothers of a ‘troubled daughter’ in the 
mid-1980s would not bully her and grant her ingarigari land, by the early 1990s 
they would be putting pressure on their sister to relinquish such land. This led 
                                                 
8 André (1998: 154) explained, for example, how custom recognized polygamy and protected the access 
rights of illegitimate women and their children to land, while the law did not.
9 André argues that, compared to older couples, young couples had little land. Those between 20 and 30 
years of age had, on average, five times less land than households aged between 50 and 60 (André 
1998: 151, Footnote 27).
10 The introduction already explained that, in communities where there was high population pressure and 
many unmarried young men (whose unmarried status was seen as an indication of landlessness), fewer 
Tutsi survived the genocide. This highlights the desperation of some of the landless.
11 For example, first-born sons who were supposed to take care of certain family members refused to 
fulfil these obligations (André & Lavigne Delville 1998: 175).
12 Pottier (2002: 192) explains that, in the 1980s, more women got married in a non-customary way 
because their parents were unable to pay bride wealth.
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Pottier to conclude that ‘women without husbands will be women without land, 
except where they have grown-up sons’ (Ibid.: 191). 
In the 1990s, customary law was no longer able to assure all community 
members of access to land and, hence, to economic subsistence. In the words of 
André & Platteau (1998: 3), whose 1998 article about Rwanda being caught in a 
Malthusian trap was discussed in the introduction: 
… growing land concentration and rising poverty do not only take place through disequaliz-
ing market transfers but also through the gradual erosion of customary social protection fol-
lowing the commoditization of land (when land is acquired through the market, it becomes 
exempt from customary rules and restraints).  
Local officials and institutions had trouble responding to social and land tenure 
changes and controlling land conflicts. These increased and were not only related 
to inheritance but also to rent arrangements, boundaries, problems between pas-
toralists and agriculturalists, and land transactions that took place without the 
consent of all concerned. In some areas, up to half of local conflicts involved 
land, while cases concerning land accounted for more than 80% of all cases in 
certain courts (André & Lavigne Delville 1998: 173-175). 
‘If I Hadn’t Fled, I Would Have Been Killed’
The introductory chapter to this volume described RPF violence that was targeted 
mainly at the Hutu population during and after the genocide and how this created 
population displacement, especially in southern and eastern Rwanda. Many Hutu 
in Mubinda had also fled to Tanzania when the RPF took control of the region. 
According to Overdulve and also Gersony, the media at the time reported that the 
northern and southern parts of the country were nearly empty (Overdulve 1997: 
54). Hilhorst & van Leeuwen (1999: 37) found a provincial document that stated 
that, of the estimated 600,000 inhabitants of Kibungo Province, only 200,000 had 
remained. Guillaume and Agathe, an old Hutu couple I interviewed in Mubinda, 
estimated that maybe 5% of the population had stayed, while the rest fled into 
neighbouring Tanzania. They were among the few respondents who were pre-
pared to share their personal experiences with Honorée and me. Guillaume re-
membered how many people had already left by the time the RPF arrived at the 
end of April and that people were leaving every day. Those who chose to stay 
had to hide from the RPF. He explained that, personally, he and his wife did not 
want to leave and hid in a pit in the forest for about a month with virtually no 
food. Agathe recounted how thirteen of their twenty children were killed by the 
RPF: 
The RPF came. … We could not expect security after the killings of Tutsi and before that al-
so in Kigali with the plane crash and important people who were killed; we could not hope 
for peace. … Mostly people spent the night together in the bush and that is where they mas-
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sacred us. They noticed that people did not spend the night in their homes. They besieged us 
and the men ran when they were chased. If I hadn’t fled, I would have been killed.13
As an example, she mentioned the case of her daughter and her daughter’s hus-
band. They were in hiding and when the RPF found her husband, her daughter 
had to watch while he was cut open and died. In the end, a nephew returned from 
Tanzania to pick up Agathe who then went back with him to Tanzania where 
displacement camps had been set up for Hutu refugees. Guillaume followed 
sometime later. Agathe stated that, in addition to her thirteen children, the RPF 
also killed seven of her brothers and six of their children. She could not even re-
count how many of her nieces, nephews and in-laws lost their lives. 
Since the story of Guillaume and Agathe is in line with the more general ac-
counts produced by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Gersony’s 
team, which was mentioned in the introduction, it cannot be ignored as being just 
anecdotal. Guillaume and Agathe’s account was also supported by a (Hutu) in-
formant who was in Rwanda during the genocide and did not go into exile. When 
sharing some of his own experiences, he claimed that the RPF committed crimes 
in which many families lost relatives and that sometimes entire families were 
wiped out. He told me that he lost several family members. Some other family 
members had to move into a camp but asked if they could go to a specific camp 
where they knew other people were going. The military told them that this was 
not a good idea because the inhabitants of that camp would be killed two days 
later, as was indeed the case. In his mother’s community, all the inhabitants were 
assembled and a genocide survivor had to say who had not participated in the 
genocide. The informant’s family and three other families were pointed out as 
non-participants and all the others were subsequently killed. 
Whilst talking to respondents, it became obvious that the memories of the geno-
cide and its bloody aftermath are still vivid in present-day Mubinda, also among 
the Hutu population. Another of Agathe’s quotes shows the enormity and intensi-
ty of the violence:  
You cannot find a family here that has not been touched [by the war and genocide]. Concern-
ing the Hutu, if they were not killed by the RPF, they were killed in exile. That is also an ef-
fect of war, isn’t it? … You cannot know how many Hutu were killed. We told ourselves that 
with the death of Tutsi there would be no Tutsi left and they thought it was the same for us. I 
have to say that the genocide destabilized me a lot. True friends were killed.14
Mention of the traumatic experiences suffered by Agathe, Guillaume and the in-
formant is necessary here to provide the context for the following sections on the 
                                                 
13 Interview with Guillaume and Agathe, 8 December 2010.
14 Interview with Guillaume and Agathe, 8 December 2010. By ‘true friends’ she meant both Hutu and 
Tutsi families, as she had made clear earlier in the interview. 
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land-sharing and the villagization policy.15 Although it is not often dealt with in 
the literature concerning the genocide, it should be stressed that both Tutsi and 
Hutu families have suffered enormously in this particular research area. Of 
course I do not want to suggest that the Hutu massacres can be equated with the 
genocide directed at the Tutsi population. However, by pointing out the distress 
of the Hutu population during and after the war and genocide, I want to argue 
that this must have influenced their reactions to and experiences of the land-
sharing and villagization policies. Furthermore, their feelings of distress and the 
fact that the issue of the Hutu massacres is highly sensitive and cannot be openly 
discussed have an enormous impact on inter-ethnic social relations. 
Population Movements 
When the RPF took power after the genocide ended, hundreds of thousands of 
refugees decided to return in the immediate aftermath.16 These were mainly Tutsi 
and their descendants who had fled earlier episodes of violence against Tutsi be-
tween 1959 and 1973. They were labelled ‘returnees’, ‘old caseload refugees’ or 
‘59-ers’ and they are referred to in this thesis as ‘1959 Tutsi refugees’ or ‘1959 
refugees’. They went back to Rwanda shortly after the genocide when many Hu-
tu were still in neighbouring countries. Most of these exiled Hutu, who will be 
referred to here as ‘1994 Hutu refugees’ or ‘1994 refugees’, returned to Rwanda
in 1996 and 1997.17 This period is marked by various events and measures that 
impacted heavily on land tenure and social relations. This section discusses the 
historical events between 1993 and 1997 but starts with some short personal sto-
ries about life in exile.  
Jean, a 1959 Tutsi refugee: ‘When we left Rwanda [around 1968], I was still a child. We left 
our father and his two brothers behind and they were killed soon after we left. When they 
were killed, we immediately went to Congo but we did not stay there for long and we con-
tinued to Burundi and then arrived in Tanzania. In Burundi we were sent to a forest that had 
tsetse flies and we decided to leave the forest to go into exile in Tanzania in 1968. And then 
in 1994 we returned to Rwanda. We came as far as Mubinda and I ask myself if I am not still 
a refugee as I did not return to Butare [his original place of residence in the south].’18
Pacifique, a genocide survivor: ‘The killings started in the Nyarubuye church [on 14 
April] at 3 pm and night fell before the killers had finished the massacre. They said to each 
                                                 
15 They also contextualize the next chapter on social life in Mubinda and the population’s interaction 
with the state.
16 It is not clear how many people returned. Des Forges (2006) speaks of 600,000 returning Tutsi 
refugees, while Bruce and Jones both put the number at 700,000 (Bruce 2007: 9; Jones 2003), Hilhorst 
& van Leeuwen (1999: 9) estimated the number to be closer to 800,000 and Musahara & Huggins 
(2005: 271) thought there were about a million refugees.
17  In his research on ordinary Rwandans’ perceptions of the political transition, Ingelaere (2010b: 280) 
noted that this category was no longer appropriate and replaced it with the categories ‘released 
prisoner’, ‘those accused in gacaca’ and ‘those not accused and never imprisoned’.
18 Interview with Jean, October 2008.
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other “we cannot finish this today, we will return tomorrow”, and left. Young people who 
still had strength and were not wounded left around 7 pm and went to Tanzania. … The Tutsi 
genocide survivors went to Tanzania when the Hutu population was still in Rwanda. The 
Tanzanian authorities set up camps for us and we stayed there for a month. Then the Tanza-
nians told us that the RPF had taken the whole of Kibungo and that security had been rein-
stated and we were safe to return. We sold everything that we had received and rented a ve-
hicle. We were pleased that the RPF was there, and we were well received by them at the 
border and taken to another camp. We left this camp after four months. We were scared to 
return to our hill but after the return of the [1959] Tutsi refugees we decided to live togeth-
er.’19
Mercia, a 1994 Hutu refugee: ‘We left for Tanzania in May 1994 when we heard fighting 
between the RPF and the army. … We stayed in a refugee camp where life was not good as 
we were strangers in someone else’s country. However, UNHCR gave us enough food. In 
the beginning there were a lot of illnesses like cholera and diphtheria and this took many 
lives. In the camp they [other exiled Rwandans] told us all the time not to return to Rwanda 
because the Tutsi were mean and would kill us. The people who said this were those who 
had committed genocide and they frightened us continuously so as to prevent us from leav-
ing. And we, innocent people who had left because we were afraid of weapons, never felt at 
ease and we wanted to return. But as we were with others who told us that there was no 
peace in Rwanda and said that they would kill us there, we stayed in the camp for three 
years.’20
Each of these stories shows the fear and distress the respondents faced before, 
during and after their life in exile. Their accounts are representative of the expe-
riences of the larger group, many of whom were confronted with exile.21 This 
exile ranged from one or two months (among genocide survivors) to two or three 
years (1994 Hutu refugees) and sometimes to more than 25 years (1959 Tutsi 
refugees).  
Peace and Property 
Before the genocide and during the war, President Habyarimana and the RPF 
negotiated and signed a peace agreement: the 1993 Arusha Accords. However, 
the Accords failed to bring peace and, with the start of the genocide, the RPF 
resumed the war. The 1993 Arusha Accords supposedly affirmed the inviolability 
of property but it was also feared that returning 1959 Tutsi refugees who re-
claimed their former land would cause serious conflicts. The Accords therefore 
                                                 
19 Interview with Pacifique, December 2010.
20 Interview with Mercia, July 2009.
21 In the case of Hutu refugee Mercia, it should be noted that it is not clear if her fears about returning to 
Rwanda were due to intimidating extremists or whether they are representative of all 1994 Hutu 
refugees’ experiences. On the one hand, Pottier (2002: 147-148) argued that UNHCR believed that 
refugees did not return because they were being held hostage by Hutu extremists and the former 
Rwandan army but that the political reality in the different refugee camps was not the same and the 
notion of a hostage crisis was misleading. Prunier, on the other hand, mentions that militia and former 
government officials used stories of RPF violence to keep refugees under their control and prevent 
them from returning and that ‘tales of violence coming out of Rwanda were a boon to the killer 
bourgmestres [mayors]’ (Prunier 1995: 301, italics in original).
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‘recommended’ that refugees who had lived in exile for more than ten years 
would not reclaim their abandoned properties.22 In return, the government would 
provide them with land and housing (Des Forges 2006: 361).23 Jones (2003: 204) 
felt that it was understandable that this recommendation was part of the original 
agreement because the signing parties feared that Tutsi refugees reclaiming their 
former properties would lead to wide-scale violence: 
… and perhaps provoke an escalation of the conflict the Accords were designed to stop. It is 
also possible that they did not think that huge numbers of refugees would repatriate, as it is 
debatable whether, had the Arusha Accords actually been implemented, the Tutsi refugees 
would have returned in the same overwhelming number as they did after the RPF came to 
power in 1994.  
After the war and genocide, the new RPF-led government adopted the Arusha 
Accords, including the ten-years-of-absence rule (Bruce 2007: 10). Jones (2000: 
135) suggests that the majority of the Tutsi refugees accepted this rule as a prag-
matic solution because they recognized that it was not possible to regain their 
former properties. Instead, their desire to return to their home country and shake 
off the label of ‘refugee’ was much stronger than the wish to recover their family 
homes and land. In addition, the then Ministry for Agriculture and Livestock is-
sued a ministerial decree about property inviolability in September 1996 that also 
declared property rights.24 In this case, the decree seemed to confirm the rights of 
more recent (Hutu) occupants over earlier (often Tutsi) owners of the property 
concerned and stated that the rightful owner could reclaim his property via the 
local authorities who would assist in its retrieval (Human Rights Watch 2001: 
46-47; Jones 2000: 137).  
The new government was hoping to place returning 1959 refugees into camps 
in Rwanda but the mass return of these refugees turned out to be uncontrollable 
and they flowed into Rwanda in large numbers (Bruce 2007: 9). The government 
had accepted responsibility for providing unoccupied land to the 1959 Tutsi refu-
gees and reallocated (parts of) national parks and forests, land belonging to cer-
tain state-owned projects, woody areas on fertile land, pastures and areas near 
shallow sections of marshlands (Hajabakiga 2004, as cited in Bruce 2007: 10). 
Only a small number returned to their former properties and most 1959 Tutsi ref-
ugees occupied the houses and plots that had been recently abandoned by 1994 
Hutu refugees (Des Forges 2006: 359). In addition, many of the 1959 Tutsi refu-
gees believed that the 1994 Hutu refugees would not return and made little effort 
to move to land they had in fact been allocated (Bruce 2007: 10). This is con-
                                                 
22 Jones (2003: 202) argues that ‘despite the conditional wording, the provision has largely been treated 
as mandatory in its implementation’. 
23 For a detailed account of the Arusha Accords and the protection they gave to returning Tutsi refugees, 
see Jones (2003).
24 The Ministerial Instruction on the Temporary Management of Properties (Jones 2003: 208).
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firmed by Jones who argues that for most 1959 Tutsi refugees, the ten-year rule 
was almost irrelevant as they just took over the homes and lands they wanted and 
felt free to choose with impunity (Jones 2003: 206). The spontaneous and uncon-
trolled settling on Hutu property was regulated by the above-mentioned ministe-
rial decree that entrusted the land abandoned by Hutu to the local authorities that 
could allocate it to secondary occupants, preferably 1959 Tutsi refugees, for tem-
porary use during the owner’s absence (Jones 2000: 137-138). Let us now turn to 
the east of Rwanda where many 1959 Tutsi refugees settled after returning in 
1994. 
Settling in the East 
Eastern Province was the first to receive large numbers of returning 1959 Tutsi 
refugees as it was among the first to be occupied by the RPF (Gasarasi & 
Musahara 2004: 3). In the end, most of these refugees settled in the former prov-
inces of Umutara and Kibungo because of their proximity to the border crossings 
with Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi and because they were well suited to cattle 
pasturage (Human Rights Watch 2001: 9) and agriculture. Most of the 1959 Tutsi 
refugees occupied the houses and parcels of still-exiled 1994 Hutu refugees. The 
former Kibungo Province, of which Mubinda is a part, mainly received refugees 
from Burundi and Tanzania (Gasarasi & Musahara 2004: 3) and according to 
estimates by Hilhorst & van Leeuwen (1999: 37), some 110,000 Tutsi refugees 
arrived in the area. In late 1996, 1959 Tutsi refugees accounted for about 19% of 
the population of Kibungo Province (Human Rights Watch 2001: 10). Gasarasi 
& Musahara claim that a significant number of these 1959 refugees were former 
Kibungo residents, while many others had their origins elsewhere in Rwanda and 
settled spontaneously on land parcels abandoned by 1994 refugees. They argue 
that the motives of the refugees who were foreign to the region were twofold: 
First, the land they had left behind when they fled the country several years before had been 
expropriated by the authorities of the time and given to others. They now felt it was their 
turn to be given the land and homes of the 1994 refugees, most of whom they labelled as gé-
nocidaires who would not dare return to the country. Second, the homes and crops on the 
abandoned land were absolutely needed mainly for immediate survival, but also for short to 
long-term settlement. (Gasarasi & Musahara 2004: 3, italics in original) 
Several survivors and 1959 Tutsi refugees in Mubinda explained that survivors 
and 1959 refugees often decided to live together. As most genocide survivors’ 
houses had been destroyed, they decided to occupy the homes of the exiled Hutu 
population and also stay in each other’s proximity in order to feel safe. 
At the time when the ministerial decree about property inviolability came out 
in September 1996, the Rwandan government was trying to convince 1994 Hutu 
refugees to return to Rwanda and it used the guarantee of property as an incen-
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tive (Human Rights Watch 2001: 47-48). Rumours started circulating in this pe-
riod about the imminent return of some 270,000 Hutu refugees from refugee 
camps in Tanzania, most of whom were from Kibungo Province.25 The majority 
did indeed return, starting in November/December 1996 and this continued 
throughout 1997 (Bruce 2007: 11).  
The Return of the 1994 Hutu Refugees 
Chaos, mistrust and fear surfaced when the 1994 refugees returned. Over the 
course of a few weeks, nearly 1.3 million people crossed into Rwanda, with 
many finding their houses destroyed, damaged or occupied.26 According to 
Jones, the situation led to a ‘potentially volatile mix’ of two refugee groups, 
some of whom laid claim to the same properties while the government did very 
little to respond to these claims. Some of the claimants successfully regained 
their properties but most did not (Jones 2003: 208). Many Hutu realized that they 
were at a significant disadvantage when it came to reclaiming land and other 
property (Huggins 2009a: 70). Jones argued that Hutu refugees ‘recognized the 
new social balance of power in the community and simply resigned themselves 
quietly to their loss’. The climate of fear in Rwanda at that time cannot be under-
estimated: 
… for a combination of political, legal and emotional reasons, nearly every allegation of 
someone’s involvement in the genocide must be acted upon by the authorities, even when the 
community is aware that an allegation is unfounded, and often results in a period of impris-
onment. This gives incredible power to individuals to take extreme action against neighbours 
or other members of the community for personal or non-genocide related reasons, such as 
property disputes. (Jones 2003: 208)27
People would denounce 1994 Hutu refugees as being a génocidaire without any 
supporting evidence in order to appropriate land, houses or tools.28 Huggins cites 
the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission of Human Rights René Degni-
                                                 
25 Earlier, in July and August 1996, many Hutu had returned from refugee camps in (then) Zaire after 
being attacked by the Rwandan army. These refugees often faced few problems reclaiming their 
property and land (Bruce 2007: 11).
26 Huggins (2009a: 69), citing a 1997 UN report on human rights in Rwanda, claims that 32,958 houses 
in Kibungo were occupied.
27 This is also supported by Rose (2007) and is described in the introductory chapter. Jones (2003: 209) 
also refers to Rwandans who claimed that, by the end of 1997, many 1959 Tutsi refugees had decided 
to vacate the house they had been occupying. These Rwandans argue that this happened after a speech 
by then Vice President Kagame who warned the occupants that they would be evicted if they did not 
leave of their own accord. Many of them therefore left and some took all the items they had found in 
the house with them.
28 This statement is supported by Wagner’s observations that, shortly after the genocide, the word 
génocidaire (someone who committed genocide) ‘rolled off tongues easily in Rwanda’ and that all 
those rounded up as genocide suspects would certainly deserve their fate as they were considered 
guilty by popular perception (Wagner 1998: 26).
209573-L-bw-ASC
107
Ségui who stated in 1997 that ‘violations of property rights take the form of ille-
gal occupation of property and lead to arbitrary arrests and detentions as a result 
of malicious accusations and to land disputes ending in murder’ (Huggins 2009a: 
70).
One Mubinda respondent and genocide survivor, Pacifique, referred to the dif-
ferent claims to land and the unequal balance of power between the 1959 Tutsi 
refugees and the 1994 Hutu refugees as follows:  
At first there was a terrible conflict when the returnees of 1959 said ‘We had land, you 
chased us away [between 1959 and 1963], you took over our land and now we also took 
yours when you left. That will do!’ So it was problematic, there were tensions.29
Pacifique’s account is supported by that of Olive, a Hutu widow, who recalled 
that, at the time, 1959 Tutsi refugees said that returning Hutu should not have 
access to their land as the latter had been able to reap the fruits of it for thirty 
years while Tutsi refugees had suffered in exile. I discussed the situation upon 
her return to Mubinda with Yolande, a Hutu widow of about 65 whose husband 
and eldest child had died in a Tanzanian refugee camp. She remembered it vivid-
ly:  
We came here [to Mubinda] and were received in a transit camp just next to here [her current 
house]. We did not spend a lot of time in this camp, about one or 1.5 months. … Very few 
people were provided with sheeting as there was not enough.30 … There were people who 
could buy it [sheeting], even new, and that is why poor people did not have sheeting. The 
rainy season started and sheeting was distributed, but not to everybody, and the sheeting that 
we had brought from Tanzania was used too much. Because of this, we did not stay in the 
transit camp for long. People slept in the open. That is why we went to our neighbourhood of 
origin, to our homes. We went there without the authorities and we found that our house was 
occupied by 1959 Tutsi refugees and people from here. They had only informed us about this 
occupation in the transit camp here in Mubinda. When we were in Tanzania, we didn’t know 
about it.31 We constructed small huts32 out of straw or banana leaves and we built this new 
shelter far from the house to avoid meeting the people in our house.33
Sylvestre, a 1994 refugee in his fifties, recalled that the situation was very tense:  
We were not allowed to take the house or the harvest. They [authorities] put us in a tent in-
stead. … We could not enter the house and take things. … If you would for instance peek in-
to your house or when children threw a stone, it was seen as a crime. It was tense. … Some-
times the 1959 refugees were mean; your children could die of hunger. They had the right to 
harvest, but sometimes they gave us some bananas. … The 1959 refugees could sell the har-
                                                 
29 Interview with Pacifique, December 2010.
30  Yolande refers here to the plastic sheeting that was provided by the humanitarian agencies.
31 I am not certain if this is true. Pottier (2002: 133), for instance, described the life in camps in eastern 
Congo and claimed that refugees knew whether their house was occupied or not and what chance they 
had of successfully reclaiming it.
32  Yolande, as well as others describing this period, used the French word blindé to describe the 
makeshift shelters they constructed. Ironically, blindé means tank or armoured personnel carrier in 
French and this meaning contrasts markedly with the fragile structures people made out of wood, 
leaves and pieces of plastic sheeting (Human Rights Watch 2001: 16).
33 Interview with Yolande, November 2010.
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vest and you could die of hunger. … It was hard; we did not say or reclaim a lot. … People 
could take you at night and beat you up. There was a lot of insecurity.34
Hutu widow Olive shared the analysis when she remarked: ‘There were times 
when a [Hutu] plot owner and his family were starving and that he took some-
thing from his plot and that a 1959 Tutsi refugee who was on his plot would 
quarrel with the land owner and this could end in fights and even in killings’.35
Edouard was one of the 1959 refugees who occupied the house of a 1994 Hutu 
refugee and had clear memories of the arrival of the 1994 refugees: 
[On our return,] the authorities showed us where we should stay and provided us with land 
parcels. We entered the houses of the 1994 Hutu refugees. These were vacant and it was bet-
ter to go inside instead of being in the rain. When the 1994 refugees arrived in 1996, the 
1959 refugees started to abandon their houses as we were given parcels in the village and 
wood and iron sheets. Then we left the house and the 1994 refugee could take it. In my case, 
I was in the house when I saw people coming. The owner of the house came to me and said: 
‘If it is you who has taken the house, you have to leave, as I have returned.’ But earlier there 
had been meetings to reassure us 1959 refugees to make sure that we had no fear if we were 
asked to abandon the house. They [the authorities] told us that we would not do this immedi-
ately, but that they [the 1994 Hutu refugees] would have to wait. I explained this to the house 
owner and said: ‘We will leave, but we have to follow the orders of the authorities. You will 
be informed.’ The owner was angry; he left and built a tent for himself, his wife and chil-
dren, and the next day we started to build a new house in the village.36
Edouard also explained that he did not feel scared because the population pa-
trolled at night and the military was omnipresent. He acknowledged, however, 
that the overall climate was fearful, with mutual mistrust between the two refu-
gee groups. Genocide survivor Françoise also described the climate of fear when 
she lived in the house of a returning Hutu family.  
There was fear amongst the genocide survivors towards these people [returning Hutu]. You 
slept in his house while he was in his tent, it was traumatizing. Then a dialogue started be-
tween some of these Hutu and there were some who very much regretted the genocide and 
that relieved the genocide survivors. Also the time that we spent with the 1959 refugees 
meant we got to know them and learned that there were certain family ties. This was a relief 
for us. To be honest, for the Hutu of my hill, I found that there were several who were kind 
and who did not participate in the genocide and that also relieved us.37
Francine, a 1959 refugee, also recalled how fear reigned and stressed that the 
1959 Tutsi refugees were also afraid. Since they came from outside and did not 
know who had committed crimes, they feared everyone. She argued, however, 
that the Hutu population was afraid too, in such a way that in the 1959 refugees’ 
perception they were not dangerous anymore. Genocide survivor Pacifique had 
similar memories and stated that, although he and other survivors were afraid of 
                                                 
34 Interview with Sylvestre, July 2009.
35  Interview with Olive, July 2009.
36 Interview with Edouard, November 2010. The villagization policy he refers to is explained later in this 
chapter.
37 Interview with Françoise, December 2010.
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the returning 1994 Hutu refugees, he realized that the government would no 
longer support these returning Hutu.38 The authorities also warned the 1959 Tutsi 
refugees and the genocide survivors that they should not aggressively address the 
returning Hutu refugees, as it was up to the state to punish the culprits and not to 
individuals. He explained: ‘We said “if there are people [1994 Hutu refugees] 
who act aggressively towards us, we will beat them.” But upon their arrival, 
these Hutu were too afraid because they knew what they had done. They felt real-
ly ashamed and fearful towards us and they did not dare to look at us’.39 So the 
situation in Mubinda was quite tense. 
Land Sharing 
It became clear after the mass return of 1994 Hutu refugees to Kibungo Province 
that the authorities had to find a solution for the housing and land problem before 
major conflicts arose. The Governor of Kibungo Province, Protais Musoni,40 re-
portedly asked 1959 Tutsi refugees to share the land they occupied with returning 
Hutu refugees (Bruce 2007: 11-12; Human Rights Watch 2001: 45).41 The idea 
was that every family would eventually have one hectare each. Musoni organized 
community meetings before and after the return of the 1994 refugees in which 
the population was consulted and sensitized about the returning 1994 Hutu refu-
gees. Land sharing was the result of these consultations (Gasarasi & Musahara 
2004: 4-5). According to Human Rights Watch, local authorities declared, how-
ever, that the land-sharing policy was imposed from above and they had no 
choice but to implement it (Human Rights Watch 2001: 45; see also Huggins 
2011: 258). Nevertheless they tried to persuade the Hutu population to share their 
land willingly by arguing that the 1959 Tutsi refugees had nowhere else to go 
and had a right to share in the national patrimony (Human Rights Watch 2001: 
45).42 What is certain is that the policy was proclaimed without any legislation 
having been passed that would outline procedures or provide any legal basis for it 
(Des Forges 2006: 363; Huggins 2009a: 70). Huggins also concludes that ‘alt-
hough there is a popular belief that there was a set of written principles to guide 
the land-sharing process, key government institutions are unable to provide cop-
ies, and it seems that they may never have existed in the first place’ (Huggins
2009a: 89). André (1998: 161) points out that the absence of any legal basis also 
                                                 
38 This is a reference to the new balance of power the returning Hutu refugees faced that was previously 
discussed.
39 Interview with Pacifique, December 2010.
40 Protais Musoni was a prominent RPF politician for many years but was sacked in May 2013. 
41 The practice of land sharing was also implemented elsewhere in Rwanda, mainly in the eastern but 
more northerly former Umutara Province and the region around Kigali (Human Rights Watch 2001: 
45).
42  This government discourse was often repeated by Mubinda respondents.
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concerned the status of the land transfer itself as it remained unclear if it would 
be temporary or permanent and, if the transfer was permanent, what judicial se-
curity and guarantees both parties would be given.
Land Sharing in Practice 
Except for people with very little land, every Hutu family had to share what they 
had and each parcel was supposed to be shared equally. Regardless of how they 
had obtained it (through inheritance, as a gift or a purchase), people who lost 
land after sharing it were not compensated in any way.43 To supervise the imple-
mentation process, each community established a land-sharing committee com-
prised of seven persons: someone from the local authority (often a genocide sur-
vivor); two 1959 refugees; two Hutu (1994 refugees or people who had not left 
Rwanda); and two genocide survivors. We spoke (separately) to two men who 
had been members of such a committee, genocide survivor Pacifique and Daniel, 
a Hutu who never left Rwanda.44 According to Daniel, the local people did not 
choose these people to represent them but they were instead appointed by the 
authorities in the sector. He explained that there were tensions from time to time 
when people were unwilling to share land and that, in such cases, the sector au-
thorities were asked to intervene. Genocide survivors were not involved in land 
sharing, although some of them did share some of their land with 1959 refugees, 
especially family members.45 In theory, the original (Hutu) owner of the plot was 
allowed to choose which (part of his) plot he wanted to keep. This practice was 
confirmed by various Hutu refugees and categorically denied by other respond-
ents. Among those who denied it was a priest who was residing in the Mubinda 
region at the time. He remembered that it was the committee that took the deci-
sions and that the owner did not usually have the right to choose which plot(s) he 
would share.  
As the plan was to ensure that every family had one hectare, this meant that 
someone with two hectares would have to give up one of them and could keep 
the other part or other plot. However, there were people who lost much more 
than one hectare. Paul, for instance, who is a Hutu respondent and spent ten years 
in prison on genocide charges before being released in 2006, returned to Mubin-
da only to discover that all his land and that of his family members had been 
shared out. He used to have 15 parcels with banana trees and 14 of them had 
been divided among the same number of Tutsi refugee families. Nowadays he, 
his wife and their six children have only a small parcel of 80 m x 100 m. He 
                                                 
43  According to Huggins (2009a: 70), this makes the policy essentially ‘a form of uncompensated 
expropriation’.
44 Daniel had been part of the sharing committee in a community neighbouring Mubinda.
45 Several respondents stated that genocide survivors were exempted as they were considered to have 
suffered enough as a result of the genocide.
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deeply regretted this situation but as an (ex-)prisoner, he has never dared to pro-
test. On the other hand, Hutu with little land themselves often did not have to 
share what they had. Some of them, and also genocide survivors with little land, 
even received extra land in order to also have one hectare. However, it is not 
clear if every party eventually received the proposed one hectare. According to 
1959 Tutsi refugee Séraphine, much depended on the initial size of the plot one 
occupied. If it was big, you were lucky. She set herself up on a small parcel and, 
after sharing it, received only half a hectare. Land sharing also depended on the 
number of 1959 Tutsi that had moved into a neighbourhood. Respondents there-
fore argued that land sharing in some areas took place on a much wider scale 
than in other parts of Mubinda.46
Sharing (with) Fear and Distrust 
There is very little on Rwanda’s land-sharing policy in the literature. It is thus 
difficult to make any analysis of the way land sharing was introduced. Huggins 
found two opposing views, with some people claiming that the practice of Tutsi 
genocide survivors sharing spontaneously with Tutsi 1959 refugees was made 
compulsory by the provincial authorities, while others claimed that authorities 
had come up with the policy. The origins of the policy thus remain unclear 
(Huggins 2009a: 70). Valentine worked in Kibungo Province for the Lutheran 
World Foundation (LWF), an international NGO that was active in Rwanda, and 
she recalled that:  
Here we are close to Tanzania and Burundi, and many 1959 Tutsi refugees came here. This 
is a specific problem in Kibungo Province. There were problems finding houses and land 
parcels. These 1959 refugees found bananas, beans etc. and did not want to move any fur-
ther. … When this idea [of land sharing] of Governor Protais Musoni came up, we did not 
see how we could do it. The sensitization campaign said: we have to live together and have 
land, so we needed to share. The 1994 Hutu refugees [when in exile] had lost hope of ever 
returning to the country. They were obliged [to share] so they were fearful in the beginning. 
The 1994 Hutu refugees said: ‘Go to your region of origin to regain your lands!’ But the au-
thorities said: ‘No, we cannot allow this’. So there were a lot of meetings to sensitize the 
population. Another idea that the local population came up with was to put the 1959 Tutsi 
refugees somewhere and the 1994 Hutu refugees somewhere else. But the 1994 refugees 
feared the RPF [and the 1959 refugees too] and did not like this segregation. They were 
afraid that they would not be safe. So the majority [of 1994 Hutu refugees] saw that there 
was no other solution possible [than land sharing].47
She added that she thought it was impossible to put the 1994 Hutu refugees to-
gether with the Tutsi genocide survivors (and the 1959 Tutsi refugees somewhere 
else) because the survivors feared that there were killers among the Hutu refu-
                                                 
46 One respondent revealed, for instance, that no land parcels had been shared in her neighbourhood. 
This was confirmed by another respondent who argued that about half of the land owners in some 
neighbourhoods were 1959 Tutsi refugees, while in other parts none were to be found. 
47 Interview with former LWF employee Valentine, December 2010.
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gees. Mubinda respondent Mathias, a 1959 Tutsi refugee, also remembered that 
the authorities had threatened the Hutu population to give the 1959 Tutsi refu-
gees land in a national park north of Kibungo Province, suggesting that these ref-
ugees would then live in peace, while the Hutu population would have to find a 
way to live together again with the Tutsi genocide survivors. Another former 
LWF employee spoke of fear of segregation when he argued that Tutsi survivors 
expressed their wish to move with the 1959 Tutsi refugees as they did not want to 
live close to people who had murdered their families. In line with Valentine’s 
observations, he referred to existing feelings of insecurity and fear among Hutu 
when he added that the Hutu population protested, arguing that segregation 
would make them feel isolated. 
Although these three accounts are not similar, they all show that the authori-
ties tried to persuade the population to support the land-sharing policy and that 
they often made use of the existing fear and mistrust of and between 1959 refu-
gees, 1994 refugees and genocide survivors.48 Although the level of fear and dis-
trust was high, 1959 Tutsi refugee Domitilla demonstrated that some 1959 refu-
gees were able to feel empathy for the 1994 Hutu refugees:  
In those days we also understood them, imagine someone who comes back from exile and 
had a bad life and he finds people using his belongings. When they returned, they were 
afraid of us and we were also afraid of them and we said ‘My God, these Interahamwes49
will kill us’ and they said ‘We can say nothing even though they have taken our goods and 
the government is going to support them and even protect them’.50
With her reference to Hutu refugees’ perceptions of the government’s position 
towards them, Domitilla underscores the point previously made by Jones and 
respondent Pacifique that many Hutu refugees felt they had to resign themselves 
to the new social balance of power in which 1959 Tutsi refugees and genocide 
survivors were being supported by the local authorities.  
The land-sharing arrangement was proposed in a climate of mutual fear and dis-
trust. This is understandable, and Sylvestre’s and Olive’s previous remarks on the 
tension and violence highlighted the high level of insecurity. In addition, many 
Hutu were already very fearful when they returned to Rwanda, as Domitilla ex-
pressed, some because they had committed atrocities and others because they 
feared reprisals, and many of them did not expect to regain their former proper-
                                                 
48 It was not only the authorities that used the climate of fear and mistrust but the population too 
sometimes made use of it. A clear example of this is the above-mentioned account by 1959 Tutsi 
refugee Edouard who related how he told an angry 1994 Hutu refugee whose house he was occupying 
not to reclaim his house but to wait for the authorities’ instructions. 
49 Interahamwe is a militia that carried out and supported a lot of the killings of Tutsi during the 
genocide. It means ‘Those who stand together’ or ‘Those who fight together’. The term is often also 
used for ordinary Rwandans who took part in the massacres.
50 Interview with Domitilla, October 2008.
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ties. Mercia, an older Hutu widow whose story was recounted above, was asked 
how she felt when she had to live in a tent on her land and why she did not ask 
the Tutsi family to go and live in the tent instead so that she could have her house 
back. She answered:  
There was nothing we could do; it was an order. And because we feared the things they had 
told us all the time in the refugee camp [that they would be killed upon their return because 
there was no peace in Rwanda],51 we respected everything we had to do, as it was compulso-
ry. Even if you were against it, there was nothing you could do.52
Yolande, another Hutu widow who had returned with one child from a refugee 
camp, argued that she did not have any hope of regaining her house and plots 
when she returned from Tanzania and said that she thanked God that she even 
got a small piece of land after land sharing.  
The climate of mutual fear and mistrust that existed in which both Hutu and 
Tutsi refugees were too traumatized and fearful to object to any government pro-
posal could suggest why, ultimately, the population willingly participated in land 
sharing. However, the following section shows that this is a premature conclu-
sion. 
Voluntary or Compulsory? 
During the first and second periods of fieldwork undertaken, most respondents 
were quite reluctant to discuss the land-sharing issue and many stuck to standard, 
socially acceptable answers: 
1959 Tutsi refugee Nadia: ‘There was really the wish to share. Even for those people who 
had not this desire, there had been instructions on the subject in such a way that the land 
sharing was well done. And it was also mandatory for those who did not want it, but the ma-
jority did it willingly.’
Q: ‘Do you have a good relationship with the person with whom you shared the land?’
N: ‘There are no real problems with this person; we have a good relationship with him. And 
especially because sharing was voluntary, there are not many problems concerning land shar-
ing.’53
1994 Hutu refugee Consolata: ‘There is no problem [with land sharing] because they [1959 
refugees] are Rwandans like us. They have the right to have land as they had their plots be-
fore they left for Tanzania and on their return they found other people on their land and did 
not reclaim it. That is why we are happy to have shared our parcels with them.’ 
Q: ‘Do you have a good relationship with the people that took over your land after land shar-
ing?’
C: ‘No problem.’54
                                                 
51 This remark is supported by Pottier’s observations in Congolese refugee camps in 1995 where people 
showed genuine concern about their safety as they had heard about killings, arbitrary arrests and ill-
treatment by the new RPF authorities (Pottier 2002: 132).
52  Interview with Mercia, July 2009.
53  Interview with Nadia, December 2008.
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Despite the suggestion made by some respondents that people were willing to 
share their land voluntarily after ‘sensitization’, many people, especially the 1994 
Hutu refugees, stressed the fact that sharing was compulsory and ‘a law’, and 
some readily argued that they disliked the policy. Mercia, for instance, was quite 
open about her feelings:  
I was not pleased when we had to share. To give a plot to someone you don’t know when it 
is not your will is something that really hurts. There are times that you lack something that 
you can find on the field that you gave and it is you who planted this and the other person 
will not give it to you. You gave this field for free and he even refuses to give you this thing. 
This really hurts. But because it was compulsory you had to do it.55
Although land sharing was not supported by legislation or a decree, Mercia’s 
remark shows that many respondents regarded it as compulsory. To explain this, 
a priest working in the region at the time of land sharing explained that people 
did not contest the policy because the same word in Kinyarwanda is used for 
‘law’ and ‘order’.
Due to the sensitivity of the subject, many respondents (1959 Tutsi refugees 
and 1994 Hutu refugees alike) would only cautiously express their frustrations 
with land sharing.56 A major complaint from many 1994 refugees was that, after 
sharing, they remained with little or no land. Rosalie, for instance, said that she 
and her family owned twelve plots and that after their return they discovered that 
the authorities had already shared all of their land with others. A second com-
plaint was that the authorities did not always share equally but favoured 1959 
Tutsi refugees, a third party or often themselves.57 According to Aloys (a geno-
cide survivor), this made the population very angry and higher authorities had to 
intervene and establish a commission to chase away corrupt authorities and redis-
tribute plots that had been shared unfairly. A third complaint concerned the be-
haviour of 1959 Tutsi refugees. According to 1994 refugee Sylvestre, some 1959 
Tutsi refugees (he did not want to say exactly how many) returned to their area of 
origin and successfully reclaimed their former land there or they sold the plot 
they received in Mubinda and moved to a region where there was more land 
available.  
A remark that Hutu respondents often made after they complained about land 
sharing was that there was ‘nothing they could do about it’. There was a certain 
                                                 
54  Interview with Consolata, October 2008.
55 Interview with Mercia, July 2009.
56 In interviews with peasants from the northeastern part of Eastern Province in 2007, Huggins found 
that land sharing had also caused grievances (Huggins 2011: 258).
57 This complaint is supported by Huggins and Gasarasi & Musahara who state that land-sharing 
problems were not related to land sharing as such, but to the way it was implemented. Gasarasi & 
Musahara also argue that authorities were not held accountable for malpractices that included: unfair 
land accumulation (also by local authorities), too much imposition, bribery, favouritism, arbitrary land 
distribution and the unnecessary uprooting of people by the local authorities (Gasarasi & Musahara 
2004: 6; see also Huggins 2009a: 71).
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degree of resignation more than real acceptance of the land-sharing policy. Oda, 
for instance, stated: ‘No, it made no sense to be angry because it [land sharing] 
was compulsory and there has been a lot of sensitization concerning this and, 
above all, the good things of sharing are often shown. This is why people were 
not dissatisfied with this.’58
Most 1959 Tutsi refugees benefited from the sharing policy because with the ten-
year rule in the Arusha Accords, they were discouraged from reclaiming their 
former plots. As the main beneficiaries of the sharing policy, they referred to 
fewer, and different, problems. Interestingly, their remarks also give a clear pic-
ture of the tense social relations at the time. One remark, for example, stressed 
that some Tutsi genocide survivors had taken land off exiled Hutu too and that 
they were later forced to return it. Other comments were that, after sharing, some 
1994 Hutu refugees moved the boundaries to extend their land at the expense of 
the part given to a 1959 refugee or that they lied about the number of plots they 
had in order not to have to share all their land. Some 1959 refugees referred to 
resistance among the 1994 Hutu refugees and declared that many were still frus-
trated and angry that they had to share their land. Séraphine, for instance, re-
called that, after sharing, some 1994 Hutu refugees showed their anger by saying: 
‘You can continue eating our things, but know that you will not finish it!’59
While many Hutu respondents had been rather reticent about expressing their 
feelings towards land sharing and the 1959 Tutsi refugees, Séraphine’s remark 
shows that some Hutu did, in fact, dare to demonstrate their true feelings.  
To evaluate the land-sharing arrangement, Gasarasi & Musahara felt that one 
has to take into account what might have happened if the arrangement had not 
been implemented. They were convinced by land-sharing supporters who 
claimed that the land-sharing agreement prevented potential land conflicts be-
tween the 1959 and the 1994 refugees as well as revenge by genocide survivors 
against the returning 1994 Hutu refugees (Gasarasi & Musahara 2004: 6-7).60
However, the stories and opinions displayed in this section clearly show that the 
implementation of land sharing in Mubinda was not without its problems. Alt-
hough the accounts given do not always match, they indicate that the sharing ini-
tiative was controversial, people had to be persuaded by authorities who took 
advantage of the reciprocal fear and mistrust, and that sharing was not voluntary 
                                                 
58 Interview with Oda, December 2008.
59 Interview with Séraphine, July 2009.
60 Later on in their study, they admit grudges among the 1994 Hutu refugees may have developed over 
the years because, as a result of sharing, their children could not inherit land or, in periods of shortage, 
people felt that they could produce less than before or might feel jealous if they turned out to be less 
successful than their 1959 Tutsi refugee neighbours (Gasarasi & Musahara 2004: 43). These grudges 
are dealt with in Chapter 7.
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but compulsory. Although not often expressed, a few accounts also demonstrated 
that, in some cases, land sharing took a violent turn. Despite the controversies, it 
can be concluded that both parties felt obliged to accept the land-sharing policy 
as it enabled the benefiting 1959 Tutsi refugees to gain access to land while the 
Hutu population felt it just had to abide by a new, unfavourable balance of pow-
er. Chapter 5 shows how grudges related to land sharing are still problematic and 
aggravated during the land registration process in 2010. Moreover, the policy has 
had an enormous impact on land-tenure security as well as access to land, both of 
which increased for some (1959 Tutsi refugees) but decreased for the majority of 
the (Hutu) population. In the end, it remains unclear whether people who had to 
give up part(s) of their land blame the authorities, who ultimately instigated the 
initiative and sometimes violated the rules, or the 1959 Tutsi refugees. When 
asking about the current relationship between people who shared land, both giv-
ers and receivers would usually say that there were ‘no problems’, carefully 
sticking to the ‘public transcript’, as explained in Chapter 2.
Villagization Policy61
The previous section discussed the 1993 Arusha Accords that the RPF govern-
ment adopted after the genocide. These regulated the fact that 1959 Tutsi refu-
gees who had been exiled for more than ten years could not reclaim their former 
land. Instead, the Rwandan government would compensate and resettle them by 
providing them with land and housing elsewhere. The authorities were to provide 
the 1959 refugees with building materials so that the latter could build their own 
houses, and the resettlement sites were supposed to be modelled as villages in an 
attempt to break with traditional patterns of scattered housing (Jones 2000: 137; 
Jones 2003: 205-206). These new settlements would include health centres, 
schools, roads and access to water. According to Human Rights Watch, it was the 
RPF negotiators at the Arusha Accords who were determined that the new houses 
would be built in villages, as they argued that dispersed housing had resulted in 
rural poverty in the past. They believed villages would promote economic devel-
opment. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, there was no housing crisis 
as many returning 1959 Tutsi refugees were able to settle in the houses of Hutu 
who had previously fled. Nevertheless, the RPF government was beginning to 
draw up plans for a villagization policy (Human Rights Watch 2001: 7-8) that 
had little to do with a possible housing crisis (Des Forges 2006: 361). Then a lot 
of 1994 Hutu refugees returned in the final months of 1996 and in early 1997, 
                                                 
61  The villagization policy is also called the National Habitat Policy, the resettlement policy and the 
Imidugudu policy. Imidugudu (singular: umudugudu) is the Kinyarwanda word for grouped 
settlement. 
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which led to an acute housing crisis,62 especially in the eastern part of Rwanda 
where many 1959 Tutsi refugees had settled. The government officially launched 
its villagization policy in December 1996 (Human Rights Watch 2001: 11) but it 
was never discussed or endorsed in Parliament and its implementation had no 
solid legal basis (Bruce 2013: 130).  
The policy was based on two documents: the National Habitat Policy of De-
cember 1996 and the Temporary Instruction on Housing of the Ministry of Public 
Works and Energy of January 1997 (Human Rights Watch 2001: 11; Jones 2000: 
139). Although the government initially intended to provide accommodation for 
returning 1959 Tutsi refugees and other homeless people, it linked the housing 
crisis to the policy’s aim to regroup the entire rural population in villages. This 
meant that people who had a house of their own were also supposed to move to a 
village (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen 2000: 266-267). The Temporary Instruction 
was clear about this and issued a statement announcing that a grouped village 
was the only acceptable form of settlement and that all construction outside any 
village was forbidden. The Instruction also declared that all Rwandans would 
receive plots on which to construct their own houses and local authorities would 
be expected to inform local residents about the advantages of living in a village 
structure. However, the Instruction did not mention the implementation proce-
dures, which land could be used for the villages and how plots would be allocat-
ed, what the nature of tenure would be and what compensation would be offered 
(Jones 2000: 140). According to a 2001 report by Human Rights Watch, the vil-
lagization policy violated the rights of tens of thousands of Rwandan citizens 
(Human Rights Watch 2001: 2).63 However, the policy met with little protest be-
cause the government defined villagization as a security issue − a monopoly of 
the state − that touched on psychological perceptions as well as lived realities. 
According to Newbury (2011: 230), ‘Rwandans hesitated to question villagiza-
tion openly, for such opposition could be − and often was − interpreted as unwill-
ingness to recognize the losses, trauma, and fears of genocide survivors’.64 In 
addition, the policy seemed to be built on a modernist ideology. Several govern-
ment officials assured Newbury that Rwandans living in scattered settlements 
                                                 
62 According to Hilhorst & van Leeuwen (2000: 266), the number of families in immediate need of 
housing was estimated at between 250,000 and 300,000.
63 According to Human Rights Watch (2001: 2), rights were violated as people were compelled to ‘reside 
other than where they choose, by arbitrarily and unlawfully interfering with their homes, by obliging 
them to destroy or cede their property without due process and without compensation, by punishing 
those who spoke out against this policy and by failing to provide adequate remedy for those whose 
rights were violated’. Jones (2000: 143) also argues that, with the implementation of the villagization 
policy, human rights were sometimes violated because of the massive pressure to move, fining and 
forced relocations. Human Right Watch (2001) gives numerous examples of coercion and the use of 
force.
64  Newbury (2011: 229) also states that Rwandan civil society did not dare oppose the policy.
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were ‘primitive’ and that living in a village would make them more ‘modern’ and 
‘developed’ (Ibid.: 230-231). 
Initially, UNHCR and other non-governmental organizations funded the vil-
lagization policy as an emergency measure. Human Rights Watch claims, how-
ever, that these NGOs then realized that the emergency settlement programmes 
were intertwined in a villagization programme to reorganize rural life that violat-
ed people’s rights (Des Forges 2006: 361; Human Rights Watch 2001: 2). By 
2001 and under international pressure, UNHCR and other international donors 
withdrew their financial support (Bigagaza, Abong & Mukarubuga 2002: 76; 
Huggins 2009a: 72).65 Although the villagization policy had to stop due to a lack 
of finances, the government has remained committed to the policy. Huggins no-
ticed signs that it was being resumed in 2007 with the use of unpaid community 
labour (Huggins 2009a: 72).66
Villagization in Theory and Practice 
Rwandans without a home, many of them 1959 Tutsi refugees but also genocide 
survivors, willingly moved to these new settlements. They were the first to be 
relocated and received houses or building materials, mostly from foreign NGOs. 
However, people who moved later often received little or no assistance (Human 
Rights Watch 2001: 1). The villagization policy67 was based on the assumption 
that resettling the population in villages would facilitate economic development 
and the provision of services, like schools and healthcare, and contribute to na-
tional security.68 Regarding economic development, the policy put forward five 
objectives: (i) to reduce pressure on land by creating non-agricultural employ-
                                                 
65 For a more detailed explanation of the withdrawal of NGOs, see Bruce (2013).
66 According to Bruce (2013: 133), the policy met opposition within government and an attempt to 
revitalize the programme through a draft law on habitat was eventually withdrawn in December 2006. 
The programme did not therefore expand but concentrated on the provision of services to existing 
villages instead. Only a limited number of people in other areas live in a village structure nowadays, 
with the exception being the former provinces of Kibungo and Umutara (90% of the population), 
Ruhengeri (more than 50%) and Gisenyi (13%) (Bruce 2009: 117).
67 For a more detailed account of the villagization policy, its implementation and consequences, see 
Human Rights Watch (2001), Hilhorst & van Leeuwen (1999, 2000), Jones (2000) and Newbury 
(2011). For a comparison of the Rwandan villagization policy with those in Mozambique, Tanzania 
and Ethiopia, see van Leeuwen (2001). 
68 There were security threats in some parts of Rwanda in 1997 and 1998 as former militia, who were 
responsible for many of the massacres during the genocide, attacked the northwest as part of an 
insurgency. In these cases, authorities often exploited the threats in an attempt to force people to move 
to a village. However, they also used the security argument in areas where such threats did not exist 
(Human Rights Watch 2001: 25-26). With regard to national security, Jones noted a hidden aim of the 
Rwandan government as ‘it is clear that in areas such as the North-West, where security has been an 
overriding concern, there was intense pressure on the population to relocate to imidugudu [villages], 
not only to protect the residents but also to monitor and control them’ (Jones 2000: 144). This is 
supported by André (1998: 160) who argued that young landless people who were forced to live in a 
village saw this as a way of controlling the population.
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ment; (ii) to counter the dispersion in a move to facilitate sensitization;69 (iii) to 
redistribute land and create terracing to reduce land scarcity; (iv) to protect the 
environment; and (v) to improve transportation and distribution networks 
(National Habitat Policy document, as cited in Human Rights Watch 2001: 11). 
As the policy aimed to benefit every group in society equally, villagization was 
also meant to contribute to reconciliation and reintegration. In the newly con-
structed villages, 1959 Tutsi refugees, 1994 Hutu refugees and Tutsi survivors 
would live close together and this integration would ideally lead to more relaxed 
inter-ethnic relations (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen 2000: 268). In addition, the poli-
cy was supposed to enable a more efficient and centrally controlled use of rural 
space that would result in improved land management. Space for habitation 
would be separated from agriculture and grazing, while houses would be built on 
the least fertile arable land (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen 2000: 267, Van Hoyweghen 
1999: 363). This would increase productivity because better land would be avail-
able for agriculture and because housing people in close proximity to each other 
would facilitate cooperation (Musahara & Huggins 2005: 327). Finally, the gov-
ernment intended to create modern, larger-scale agricultural production methods. 
Distancing peasants from their fields, a deputy reasoned, would cut their emo-
tional attachment to the land and make them treat it more as an economic good 
valued only in terms of its productive capacity (Human Rights Watch 2001: 39).  
The villagization policy was carried out first and most rigorously in the eastern 
part of the country, largely because the prefect of Kibungo Province played a 
major role in its implementation (Ibid.: 15-16). Nowadays, some 90% of the 
population live in a village and authorities claim that the policy has been most 
successfully implemented in this part of the country (Jones 2003: 217).70 The 
idea of villagization was not new to the region, as the colonial authorities had 
introduced the concept of paysannats back in the 1950s. In these small rural set-
tlements along main roads, each family received two hectares of land for housing 
and agriculture to stimulate the production of cash crops. People with land in a 
paysannat were not allowed to sell or divide their land. Many paysannats were 
established in the southeast of the country (Ibid.: 200,217) but they were not very 
popular and did not result in the development of villages because the population 
preferred scattered housing (Jones 2000: 130-131).71
                                                 
69  This aim should be seen as a way of forcing the population to comply with government orders and 
directives and is therefore much more far-reaching than the term sensitization suggests (Des Forges 
2006: 361).
70 Overall, some 14% of the Rwandan population had moved to a village by the end of 1999, mostly 
(60%) in the northeast (Human Rights Watch 2001: 18).
71 See Uvin (1998: 119-122) for an analysis of the negative outcome of a paysannat project in the former 
Mutara Province.
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The recent villagization policy had many consequences. It enabled 1959 Tutsi 
refugees to gain property72 but many others, especially the Hutu population, ex-
perienced resettlement as a loss and felt that their situation had deteriorated be-
cause, ultimately, hundreds of thousands of people were obliged to leave their 
homes to move into villages (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen 2000: 274). These people 
were forced to destroy their old homes while the newly built houses were often 
of an inferior quality (Huggins 2009a: 71). Those who constructed a house out-
side a village or were unwilling to move were fined or arrested (Human Rights 
Watch 2001: 1, 34). According to observations and informal conversations with 
UNHCR personnel in Tanzania and Kibungo, people who refused to leave their 
home were accused of being killers (Eltringham & Van Hoyweghen 2000: 238). 
Many Hutu objected to the policy and resented being displaced from their 
farmland. The main reason for this was that, after resettlement, they lived much 
further from their fields because the intended redistribution of land never took 
place. Hilhorst & van Leeuwen’s study suggests that people who had been relo-
cated put in fewer working hours in their fields and harvested less because of the 
difficulty of transporting the harvest home and taking manure to the fields. They 
were also less able to protect their fields from animals or theft.73 They felt that 
the resettlement policy served the interests of the ‘others’, meaning the 1959 Tut-
si refugees, and a lot of them were frustrated by the way they were treated by the 
authorities, many of whom were also Tutsi (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen 2000: 274-
276). A survey of land use and villagization that was carried out jointly by the 
Rwandan NGO Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development (RISD) and 
Oxfam in 1999 confirmed the problem of declining production due to the dis-
tance to farmland and also a scarcity of fuel wood, poor sanitation and bad hous-
ing conditions as a result of rushed construction (Rwanda Initiative for 
Sustainable Development 1999: iv). 
The sensitivity of the topic meant that only a few Mubinda respondents were 
willing to comment on the villagization policy. Mercia’s remark, for instance, 
supports Hilhorst & van Leeuwen’s analysis and is illustrative of the general 
feeling of resentment among Mubinda’s Hutu population: 
I do not need this village, it is better if the 1959 [Tutsi] refugees were here because they did 
not have fields [and houses] before. I could stay on my hill, where I was born, near my 
fields. Nowadays it is very far, it takes 2 to 2.5 hours to get there. You work, but not like 
someone who can be next to his field. There are even times that you plant something and lat-
er someone has already stolen this because it is too far [to guard it]. … At present we suffer 
                                                 
72 Note that for the 1959 Tutsi refugees in the eastern provinces, the land-sharing policy enabled them to 
gain property as they were granted land.
73 These findings are in line with those of Human Rights Watch (2001), Huggins (2009a: 71) and 
Newbury (2011: 234), who adds that the new settlements lacked space and pasturage to keep goats, 
cows and other livestock. 
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because we always have to buy food because we do not produce, the harvest is not like it 
used to be because it is far away and going there takes a lot of time. … The village does not 
help a lot, even when they say that it is development.74
Esther also regretted being unable to ensure her plots were secure as they were 
too far away. She even spoke of a ‘culture of looting’ and recounted how thieves 
would frequently come with small trucks to steal bananas before selling them. 
Mercia and Esther’s resentments were supported by former Lutheran World 
Foundation worker Valentine, who argued that living in a village had more dis-
advantages than advantages for the majority of the population.75
Mercia argued that she felt the village was more suitable for the 1959 Tutsi 
refugee newcomers because they had not had properties before. Many new vil-
lages in some areas of Rwanda were indeed inhabited by Tutsi (genocide survi-
vors or 1959 Tutsi refugees) because local authorities did not recognize Hutu as 
victims of the war and the genocide. However, this corroborated the suspicion 
that the villagization policy aimed to compensate Tutsi genocide survivors and 
1959 Tutsi refugees for not being allowed to repossess property under the Arusha 
Accords. In these areas, experiences with villagization resulted in the villagiza-
tion policy being perceived as ethnically discriminatory and in feelings of re-
sentment that were expressed in ethnic terms and led to increased social tension 
(Hilhorst & van Leeuwen 2000: 275-276). 
New houses in the village were often built on farmland. The policy stated that 
people whose land was taken to allow construction of the village had to be com-
pensated. However, the government decided that it was not the state but fellow 
villagers who received these parcels of land who should be the ones to provide 
this compensation, but this rarely occurred (Human Rights Watch 2001: 43; 
Huggins 2009a: 71; see also Bruce 2013: 130). The policy suggested that villag-
ization would make more land available for cultivation but, after moving to a 
village, many people lost land in real terms (Human Rights Watch 2001: 42; 
Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development 1999: 15), and this led to new or 
aggravated land conflicts (Newbury 2011: 232). A nationwide study in 2000 by 
the Rwandan human rights organization ADL76 showed that 66% of the popula-
tion living in a newly constructed village said they had no land,77 while some 
                                                 
74 Interview with Mercia, July 2009. Her opinion about the disadvantages of the villages was shared by 
Yolande, an old Hutu widow who had found that moving to a village had no advantages for old 
people.
75 This view is supported by Des Forges (2006: 363): ‘The perception of many residents of these 
settlements is that they are poorer now than they were before they moved’.
76 ADL is the French abbreviation for Rwandese Association for the Defence of Human Rights and 
Public Liberties (Rwandan Association for the Defence of Human Rights and Public Liberties).
77 Before they moved to a village, only 47% of these people were landless (Human Rights Watch 2001: 
42).
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21% claimed they had smaller parcels than when they were living in their previ-
ous houses (Human Rights Watch 2001: 42).78 A related problem was that flat 
fertile land was often used for houses, which meant that only steep slopes were 
left for cultivation. And many villages lacked basic services too (Huggins 2009a: 
71). 
A considerable number of people in Mubinda already lived in a village struc-
ture near the main road and the rest of the population were allocated plots of 20 
m x 30 m on or near this road when they moved. As already mentioned, houses 
were sometimes built on land belonging to other villagers and compensation was 
often not paid. A good example is Hutu widow Josephine. As she already lived 
near the main road, the authorities took most of her plot to distribute among 
families who had moved to the village and her land was reduced to about 75 m x 
100 m. ‘Here on the plot I had before, there are at least five houses and further 
down, near the road, there are three houses and there are again four houses that 
are a bit higher up. All these houses stand on our [former] plot but I did not re-
ceive money’.79
Integration or Segregation? 
As mentioned above, 1959 Tutsi refugees and Tutsi genocide survivors were the 
first to move and they received either houses or building materials. Those who 
moved later were mainly Hutu and were given little or no support and were fre-
quently made to abandon solidly built homes. Many of these people had no re-
sources to build a new house and ‘cobbled together temporary shelters of wood, 
grass or leaves, and pieces of plastic’ (Human Rights Watch 2001: 1). Some 
lived in temporary shelters for two years or longer and more than half a million 
village residents lived in such shelters or in unfinished houses (Ibid.: 1-2).  
The villagization policy was carried out in the eastern part of Rwanda in the 
same period as the land-sharing policy and the two policies affected each other. 
According to Hilhorst & van Leeuwen (1999: 38), the authorities did not go to 
any great lengths to ensure that the 1994 Hutu refugees could reclaim their hous-
es because, ultimately, everybody was supposed to move to a village. The 1959 
Tutsi families were encouraged to build new houses in the village while Hutu 
refugees had to remain in provisional housing. When the Hutu regained their 
houses, they could not live there for long as they were also obliged to move to a 
village. Human Rights Watch noted that they had to destroy their old houses and 
many took iron sheets and doors with them to their newly allocated village plots.  
                                                 
78 Newbury (2011: 234) argues that with people having smaller plots, they were unable to have a garden 
or small banana grove around the house to provide shade and protection against the wind and there 
was also not enough space or building materials available to build adequate latrines.
79 Interview with Josephine, October 2008. 
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Respondents were not very willing to discuss the villagization policy in detail 
during my first two fieldwork periods due to the sensitivity of the subject and the 
lack or low level of trust.80 Only gradually did we understand what happened, 
although respondents would often not discuss matters in detail. Some diplomatic 
comments by respondent Séraphine, a 1959 Tutsi refugee, in July 2009 were a 
first indication.  
The idea of the village is good. … Nowadays it is good, we are together. If you have a prob-
lem, you talk about it with someone. Before it was not good, we were scared because of the 
great distance to the other, we were afraid to be killed, also because of the situation. There 
was fear as we were in a difficult situation because we were in the house of another. As this 
owner had killed before he had left, we were afraid of being killed. Nowadays, while living 
together, we feel secure. 
When we asked more directly about how the different groups (genocide survi-
vors, 1959 and 1994 refugees) managed to live together in the village, she again 
diplomatically stated that, with time, the fear and problems had decreased and 
that since 2000/2001 the situation had been better. We then asked Séraphine if 
1959 Tutsi refugees and 1994 Hutu refugees actually lived near each other and 
received an unexpectedly outspoken and revealing answer:  
This neighbourhood is for Tutsi; down there it is for Hutu. The Tutsi have chosen before [the 
Hutu where to live in the village] and did not want to mix [with Hutu] because they were 
afraid. We did not know who had committed genocide.81 Nowadays it is better, they [Hutu] 
can come and ask for things that we will give, but we do not visit each other.82
In line with Séraphine’s account, other respondents also indicated that the geno-
cide survivors were the first to receive iron sheets and to build new houses in the 
village.83 Sometime later the 1959 Tutsi refugees were given building materials 
and then the two groups moved to the village, even if their houses were not com-
pletely finished. After genocide survivors and 1959 Tutsi refugees moved, 1994 
Hutu refugees were able to repossess their houses. While some respondents 
claimed that these 1994 refugees then decided to follow the 1959 refugees im-
mediately and moved their makeshift houses to the village, another respondent, 
Scholastique, estimated that only some 30% of the Hutu families did so. This 
respondent, a widowed 1994 Hutu refugee, confirmed that the 1959 Tutsi refu-
gees went to the village first and that some 1994 Hutu families moved with them. 
She, however, regained her house and lived there for about six months. Daniel, a 
Hutu who had not left the country, recounted: ‘The 1959 Tutsi refugees went 
                                                 
80 This was also the case with land sharing.
81 During a second interview in December 2010, Séraphine made a similar statement: ‘Each group [Tutsi 
genocide survivors, 1959 Tutsi refugees and Hutu] felt at ease within their own group. We were 
regarded as savages, while we considered them to be killers. There was even distrust between 
genocide survivors and [Tutsi] returnees’.
82  Interview with Séraphine, July 2009. 
83 They were often assisted by NGOs like the Lutheran World Foundation that constructed houses or 
helped to build them for genocide survivors and other vulnerable people.
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first. … After the 1959 Tutsi refugees had moved to the village, the others could 
regain their house’.84 However, his wife Beatrice intervened at this point telling 
him that he should not lie. According to her, most Hutu went directly to the vil-
lage and when Hutu families decided to regain their former house it was only for 
a couple of months.85
Séraphine openly mentioned that the way the villagization policy was enforced in 
Mubinda caused some degree of physical segregation within the village. Former 
LWF employee Valentine explained that many (widowed) genocide survivors 
decided to live together in the village for security reasons. In addition, I was able 
to distinguish between a neighbourhood with a lot of 1959 Tutsi refugees and 
another with mostly Hutu families in one area of Mubinda. I noticed this after I 
had interviewed some of the neighbours of Spéciose, a genocide survivor and 
local authority who lived on the main road. After interviewing her, Honorée and I 
decided to interview her grandfather, a 1959 Tutsi refugee, who we had met at 
her house. We then interviewed two of his neighbours who turned out to be also 
1959 Tutsi refugees. One of them, Esther, explained: ‘Everyone made his own 
choice about where to build his house. For instance in 1995 the [Tutsi] returnees 
took this area while others went elsewhere’.86 While Spéciose’s neighbourhood 
seemed quite well-off with solidly built houses near or on the main road, Mer-
cia’s area looked different. This outspoken 1994 Hutu refugee respondent lived 
in a neighbourhood off the main road which seemed generally much poorer than 
Spéciose’s area and where the majority of the people appeared to be Hutu. These 
observations were supported by Gérard, a Hutu respondent who lived in Mercia’s 
neighbourhood, who stated: 
Here a bit further up, there are two persons who came from Uganda [1959 Tutsi refugees]. 
They are the only ones. I don’t know if they came later [after people had settled in the vil-
lage]. Tutsi returnees and related genocide survivors are together in the best areas. They iso-
late themselves, how could you enter there?87
This physical segregation within the village was also mentioned in interviews 
with other respondents. For instance, Guillaume and Agathe, an older Hutu cou-
ple, confirmed Esther’s statement that all the people living near Spéciose were 
1959 Tutsi refugees. In their own neighbourhood, the segregation between these 
refugees and the Hutu population could also be seen. According to Agathe, the 
1959 Tutsi refugees had taken the better parts of the village while she and her 
                                                 
84 Interview with Daniel and Beatrice, December 2010.
85 It is not clear how long most Hutu lived in their houses after regaining them. Most respondents 
mentioned several months to six months, while Valentine, who worked for the NGO LWF that 
supported the building of houses for vulnerable people, declared that people stayed for up to 1.5 years.
86  Interview with Esther, November 2010.
87 Interview with Gérard, December 2010.
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Hutu neighbours lived on poorer land, as the many tree stumps in the land around 
her house indicated. In line with this, Daniel and his wife Beatrice stated that 
most of the houses on the main road were solid (built of bricks, cement and iron 
sheets) and inhabited by 1959 Tutsi refugees, while the Hutu population lived 
hidden away behind them in houses of an inferior quality. These statements 
matched our own observations.  
While there is some sort of physical segregation in Mubinda between neigh-
bourhoods in the newly constructed village, Human Rights Watch noted that 
across Rwanda in general, new villages were mostly comprised of one ethnic 
group. It concluded that ‘the move to imidugudu [villages] may even have pro-
moted ethnic segregation by disturbing previously existing housing patterns, 
which were often ethnically diverse (Human Rights Watch 2001: 61). 
In ethnically mixed villages, more resources were often available to Tutsi than 
to the Hutu population because donors considered that 1959 Tutsi refugees and 
Tutsi genocide survivors should be the main beneficiaries of their aid (Ibid.: 61-
62). In Mubinda, the discussion about resources concentrated on who had re-
ceived iron sheets and wood to construct their new houses. Genocide survivor 
Pacifique was certain that everybody had received iron sheets and that people 
were allowed to take construction wood from the state forests. He had, however, 
been a member of a land-sharing committee and claimed to have also been in-
volved in the implementation of the villagization policy. For this reason, it was 
not clear if his account was totally impartial. When asked why there were still so 
many grass-thatched houses inhabited by Hutu families, he claimed that it was 
most likely that these families had sold their iron sheets because, at that time, 
there were a lot for sale in the markets, especially in Kigali. Françoise, another 
genocide survivor, was less convinced that all the 1994 Hutu refugees had re-
ceived iron sheets. She thought that some of them had iron sheets and others 
were able to buy them, while many were not able to do so and had to live in 
grass-thatched houses instead. Other respondents, most of them 1994 Hutu refu-
gees, denied having received iron sheeting. According to Guillaume and Agathe: 
The iron sheets [on the current house] came from our former house. They [authorities] publi-
cally gave us iron sheets and afterwards they took these sheets away again. There have been 
families who received sheets, thirty per family, but those were only 1959 Tutsi refugees.88
Daniel and Beatrice, who did not leave Rwanda in 1994, had a similar story. ‘The 
1959 Tutsi refugees went first [to the village]. In general, they had the means to 
construct a house and the state also gave them iron sheets after the authorities 
had made up lists, and they were given wood’. His wife then intervened to add 
that the original (Hutu) residents did not receive any iron sheets. Daniel contin-
ued:
                                                 
88  Interview with Guillaume and Agathe, December 2010.
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Some two months [after regaining the house], residents like me who had not moved [into ex-
ile in 1994] left [to resettle in the village] and our houses were destroyed by the state. The 
state demanded that everyone destroyed their home. If they didn’t, the authorities did it. This 
was to bring the population closer together. There were threats: if you did not move, you 
would be killed. The country was not yet at peace, there were many killers. 
And his wife Beatrice added:  
We destroyed our houses and we had a strong house. We destroyed it ourselves and we paid 
people to destroy it so we could take the doors and iron sheets. Everyone had to go into the 
village. There were no houses yet, we were given a plot [by the authorities]. We made a tent 
with banana leaves. There was malaria all the time that would not cure, miscarriages and 
malnutrition caused by diseases. The rain was falling.89
In the previous section on land sharing, several respondents argued that this was 
implemented in a climate of fear, desperation and insecurity. The comments 
above by Daniel and Beatrice and other respondents indicated that this was also 
the case with the villagization policy. Scholastique, a widowed 1994 Hutu refu-
gee, stated: ‘On my hill there were many problems: people who committed geno-
cide were arrested, and people who were arrested during the night died. During 
daytime, people were put in prison’. When we asked how the people arrested at 
night died, Scholastique answered:  
Unknown people came and asked the husband to come out of the house and he did not come 
back. When people cried out for help, they [the authorities] said ‘Go to the village to have 
more security’. Since we are all in the village, there has not been this kind of action any-
more. 
The problem was that only about 30% of the Hutu families in her area moved to 
the village with the Tutsi 1959 refugees and the Tutsi genocide survivors imme-
diately. 
The rest followed later. The last people came after accusations of harvest thefts from people 
who already lived in the village. There were community meetings about these accusations 
and people were forced to move [to the village] as they were thieves. … You have to under-
stand that the people who stayed [on the hill] were Hutu. These people were treated like peo-
ple who disputed state policies, especially the villagization policy. Within the village there 
were night patrols, so there was security. On the hill there was chaos; we had to envy this se-
curity. People who had moved to the village were not supposed to go back to the hill at night 
to steal [because of better surveillance].90
Within a climate of fear, mistrust and insecurity, the inhabitants of Mubinda were 
forced to abandon their homes. Although the villagization policy intended to con-
tribute to reconciliation and integration, the stories told by Mubinda respondents 
show that, in fact, the opposite occurred. A number of people lost land only to 
see it allocated to new village inhabitants, while many more are still suffering to 
this day from the negative consequences of being (much) further from their 
                                                 
89 Interview with Daniel and Beatrice, December 2010. While she was talking, her husband gestured to 
her to stop as he believed that she was being too outspoken about the villagization policy.
90  Interview with Scholastique, December 2010.
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fields. These findings are in line with other studies, for example, those by Human 
Rights Watch and Hilhorst & van Leeuwen.  
Conclusion 
This chapter started with a description of the land situation in the 1980s and 
1990s and the increased individualization, privatization, land scarcity and land-
lessness where access to land was defined by power relations. This situation was 
characterized by ambiguities, such as those mentioned by Ribot & Peluso, be-
cause customary law in rural Rwanda was unable to keep up with the social, eco-
nomic and demographic changes that were happening and proved to be incapable 
of ensuring people’s access to land. In addition, legal institutions were replacing 
local arrangements and undermining the authority of local officials. With regard 
to Ribot & Peluso’s structural and relational access mechanisms, which were 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, it was seen that after the genocide many 
Hutu families returned from exile only to find that their access to land had de-
creased drastically while Tutsi 1959 refugees had been able to access land. This 
was due to the different positions of both groups vis-à-vis the mostly Tutsi local 
authorities that had weakened the position of members of the Hutu community 
and strengthened the position of 1959 Tutsi refugees and Tutsi genocide survi-
vors. The recognition of a new balance of power is clearly reflected in Ingelaere’s 
study on the rural population’s perceptions of Rwanda’s political transition that 
asked Rwandan peasants how they experienced political representation. The find-
ings show that since the RPF came to power, Hutu feel much less represented 
than before the war and genocide while 1959 Tutsi refugees see themselves as 
being the most represented. As injustice and prejudice are important features of 
political representation, this implies that many Hutu feel that they are experienc-
ing injustice and prejudice (Ingelaere 2010a).  
This chapter discussed the population movements that were a result of the 
genocide and the assumption of power by the Tutsi-dominated RPF. An im-
portant aspect here for Mubinda’s Hutu population was the distress they experi-
enced due to the violence committed against them by the RPF and the resulting 
mass flight into exile. Their feelings of anguish only intensified with the forceful 
implementation of the land-sharing and villagization policies that took place 
amid a climate of mutual fear, distrust and insecurity. For a majority of the Mu-
binda population, both policies have led to a decrease in their access to land and 
to an increase in land-tenure insecurity. They have also resulted in feelings of 
deprivation among many Hutu who think that the 1959 Tutsi refugees have 
gained enormously at their expense. Such feelings correspond to a remark made 
in the introduction about Hutu prisoners who believed that the land-sharing and 
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villagization policies were state-organized land-seizing initiatives. Another im-
portant consequence of the villagization policy in Mubinda is the physical segre-
gation that now exists to some degree between the 1959 Tutsi refugees, genocide 
survivors and Hutu families and that has further intensified feelings of depriva-
tion among the Hutu population and fear and mistrust among all three groups. It 
can, therefore, be concluded that both the villagization and land-sharing policies 
have had a hugely negative impact on social relations between the different refu-
gee groups. It is to these social relations and the role of (local) authorities that we 
turn in the next chapter. 
This chapter has demonstrated that the land-sharing and villagization policies 
are clear examples of social engineering by the Rwandan government and they 
have not only had a political and economic impact on ethnicity and livelihoods, 
but have also significantly influenced spatial, behavioural and social structures 
(Straus & Waldorf 2011: 4).91 Newbury’s comments on the implementation of 
the villagization policy allow us to conclude that all the aspects of high modern-
ism came together: ‘a highly bureaucratic state apparatus, a belief in the need for 
social engineering, an authoritarian political culture, and a disorganized civil so-
ciety lacking the capacity to influence policy collectively’ (Newbury 2011: 229). 
Ironically, the villagization policy did not contribute to reconciliation and rein-
tegration in Mubinda as the government had envisaged it would, but led instead 
to the physical segregation of Hutu and Tutsi, at least in some areas. And this 
again reinforced the political and economic nature of people’s ethnic identity and 
demonstrated the unequal balance of power. The new social balance of power 
that was established after the genocide resulted in 1994 Hutu refugees not daring 
to protest the occupation of their land and houses and the land-sharing and villag-
ization policies. This situation, together with the coercion and even violence that 
were used in the implementation of the policies and the fact that land sharing 
and, to a lesser extent, the villagization policy did not have any legal basis, gives 
reason to question how the legitimacy of the policies is perceived by the majority 
of Rwanda’s rural population. This issue is considered in the next chapter on so-
cial relations and the role of (local) authorities. 
                                                 
91 Recently (in 2013), land sharing was being carried out in northeastern Eastern Province and in 
Northern Province among newly returned refugees (Bruce 2013: 137).
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Photo 1 Plots in the area of Mubinda. 
Photo 2 Land consolidation and crop specialization in Mubinda. The peasants on this photo 
were ordered by the local authorities to grow maize. Due to unforeseen weather 
conditions, the harvest was going to fail. 
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Photo 3 Removed grass-thatched roofs as part of the Bye Bye Nyakatsi programme 
Authorities forced the inhabitants of Mubinda to demolish the grass-thatched roofs 
of their houses and annexes and replace them with iron sheets as part of a national 
programme to improve the health of the population.  
Photo 4 Main road in Mubinda. 
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Fearing Fines: Social Relations 
and the Rwandan State 
The previous chapter discussed Rwanda’s recent history of violence and how the 
war and the genocide have traumatized many Rwandans. Most of the underlying 
networks and the social fabric that held Rwandan society together were de-
stroyed, thereby producing a fragmented and atomized society in which people 
continue to be suspicious of each other (Fisiy 1998: 23). Ingelaere (2012: 249) 
observed how: 
The genocide, the war and its violent aftermath left communities not only devastated eco-
nomically but deeply divided along ethnic lines. Accordingly the degree of confidence to-
wards people belonging to the ‘other’ ethnic category dropped dramatically, especially in the 
recollections of Tutsi respondents.  
In a context of fear, despair and distrust, the population has had to re-establish 
their livelihoods and find a way of living together. This has resulted in a form of 
‘living apart together’ (sometimes literally, as was suggested in the previous 
chapter) with people avoiding interaction with others, hiding their true feelings 
and pretending that relationships are good. Not much has changed since the war, 
although several Mubinda respondents stated that the feelings of mutual fear and 
distrust have somewhat decreased.  
It is within this problematic context that we have to explore Mubinda’s current 
social relations and the role the Rwandan state now plays in rural daily life.1 Cur-
rent social relations in the research area are strained and are characterized by a 
lack of communal solidarity, a great deal of covert suffering and also tensions, 
especially between people from different ethnic groups. Regarding the role of the 
state, it should be noted that Rwandan local authorities penetrate citizens’ lives at 
all levels and their strong, authoritarian modes of governance have destabilized 
                                                 
1  For a similar analysis of the interplay between state power and peasants, see Ingelaere (2012: Chapter 
10).
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communities. This is leading to frustration and financial insecurity and has con-
sequently resulted in strained relations with these authorities. Communal soli-
darity is also deteriorating. To analyse how the Rwandan authorities interact with 
and influence the rural population, this chapter will first analyse the recent Bye 
Bye Nyakatsi programme that has significantly affected the poorer peasant popu-
lation in recent years. 
The Rwandan State in Action 
At the end of an interview on 2 December 2010, a respondent, Paul, mentioned 
that some of the grass-thatched houses in his neighbourhood had been demol-
ished and that the occupants had been chased away. The next day, my interpreter 
was visiting another part of Eastern Province and saw for herself the remains of 
some grass-thatched houses. She discussed what had happened with some eye-
witnesses who told her that the occupants had simply been told to leave and were 
not allowed to take any of their belongings. Some bystanders had asked the po-
licemen responsible where these people should go and they responded by saying 
that if the bystanders felt so concerned, it was up to them to accommodate the 
newly homeless. Some people expressed their anger, stating that these actions 
reminded them of the Interahamwe, a militia that was responsible for numerous 
killings and extensive violence during the genocide, including the burning of 
houses. Other respondents, such as Daniel and his wife Beatrice, also referred to 
the genocide when they claimed that the programme of demolishing roofs and 
houses resembled the situation in 1994. They explained how the houses of poor 
people were (partly) destroyed, as were adjoining grass-thatched buildings. In 
their own back garden, the grass-thatched roofs of their toilet, kitchen and cow-
shed had been removed and we could see their cow standing in the midday sun. 
Beatrice also pointed out their neighbour’s house where the roof had been re-
moved and said that the old woman who used to live there had moved in with 
another neighbour. She explained that it was the police who were forcing the 
population to demolish roofs or entire houses and that, as a ‘fine’, the house 
owner concerned had to pay the substantial sum of RWF 10,000 (about € 13).  
It gradually became clear that the practice of removing grass-thatched roofs or 
houses was part of a programme called Bye Bye Nyakatsi.2 The Belgian devel-
opment agency BTC had expressed its support for the programme that ‘fits in a 
larger programme to improve [the] health and social wellbeing of the popula-
tion’.3 It explained how more than 80,000 huts that had been blamed for poor 
                                                 
2 Nyakatsi is the Kinyarwanda word for grass-thatched hut.
3 Other internet sources explain that the Bye Bye Nyakatsi programme is also linked to the villagization 
policy, as families whose houses have to be removed entirely will have to resettle in a village. See, for 
instance, Terreblanche (2011).
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hygiene and causing disease would be replaced with brick houses with iron-sheet 
roofs by May 2011. According to the BTC website: 
The war against ‘nyakatsi’ has now become a national call; the population of all walks of life 
are involved in helping the most vulnerable amongst them to have cleaner and durable hous-
es. The army and police personnel and other groups, such as members of the Rwanda Dias-
pora, have been called in to build houses for the least disadvantaged as the government pro-
vides iron sheets and other building materials. Community members extend a helping hand 
through a monthly community service consisting in gathering materials, elevating walls and 
putting up roofs.4
Because of respondents’ remarks and the fact that we had seen for ourselves 
some roofless houses and annexes I became highly critical of the Bye Bye Nya-
katsi programme. When I revisited Stephan,5 the executive secretary of the sec-
tor, I asked him about the issue and questioned why the programme was being 
enforced as it repeatedly left people homeless. Stephan’s explanation was that the 
policy aimed to abolish grass-thatched houses by the end of 2010 and that, as the 
programme had been developed in 2008, the population was well aware of it. But 
why destroy a house or roof before building a replacement was one of my ques-
tions. Stephan replied that there were a lot of grass-thatched houses in his sector 
but there were only some thirty families that were regarded as very poor, implic-
itly arguing that all the other families would have been financially able to buy 
iron sheets themselves. He declared that authorities in other sectors had noticed 
that some time after removing the grass-thatched roofs, half of the families had 
bought their own iron sheets. I reiterated that I did not understand why houses or 
roofs should be destroyed before people were helped to rebuild them or to buy 
iron sheets and Stephan’s response was short: it’s a government order. When I 
suggested that local authorities should stand up for their citizens, he reiterated 
that the programme concerned a government order that had to be executed. He 
then tried to minimize its consequences by declaring that only annex roofs had 
been destroyed in his sector but, from my own observations, I knew that this was 
not true. At this point, I suggested that the Bye Bye Nyakatsi programme was a 
double punishment, as it deprived the people concerned of their house while they 
also had to pay an RWF 10,000 fine to have their punishment executed.6
                                                 
4 http://www.btcctb.org/en/casestudy/rwanda-all-out-resolve-against-nyakatsi. BTC supported the 
construction of houses for vulnerable families in Rwanda’s Northern Province. The BTC website 
claims that this text was submitted on 1 March 2011, months after our observations. It is surprising 
that BTC seems to be carrying out this national programme so uncritically.
5 My first visit to Stephan was on 10 November 2010 when I went to his office to introduce myself.
6 Interestingly, the Rwandan media also noted mismanagement and the use of force in the 
implementation of the Bye Bye Nyakatsi programme some months later. On 25 May 2011, Rwanda 
News Agency reported that ‘Rwanda has admitted that “some force” has been used to raze down 
grass-thatched houses in a controversial resettlement campaign which critics claim leaves destitute 
families with no homes’ (Rwanda News Agency 2011).
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Honorée and I felt quite uneasy after this visit, in the course of which Stephan 
had become increasingly tense following my criticisms. We feared repercus-
sions.7 These came about, unfortunately, and it was partly my fault.8 What was 
even more unfortunate was the fact that Daniel and his wife, the couple who had 
been critical of the programme and had shown us their roofless annexes, were 
also involved. During the last days of our fieldwork and about a week after our 
visit to Stephan, we were near Daniel’s house and although he and his wife were 
not at home to give permission, I decided to take some pictures of their cow in its 
roofless cowshed. I went into their back garden, closely watched by some chil-
dren, and quickly took some pictures. Some days later, Honorée contacted me to 
explain that she had received a phone call from Daniel who had told her that 
Stephan had come to his house to interrogate him about my picture-taking and 
that he had (truthfully) stated that he had not been aware of it. Honorée advised 
Daniel to refer Stephan to me but as Stephan never contacted me, I do not know 
how this story ended. 
Bye Bye Nyakatsi was not the only programme that (partly) destroyed houses. 
For several years, the Rwandan authorities had been applying strict rules regard-
ing house construction and regulating where houses could be built and to what 
standards. The Rwandan human rights organization ADL9 conducted several 
studies with other Rwandan human rights groups on the (partial) demolition of 
houses and annexes in various urban areas that were not constructed with the 
permission of local authorities or according to local planning regulations. These 
demolitions often involved pressure and harassment from local authorities who 
forced the people involved to take apart their own houses or annexes. ADL con-
cluded that these demolitions lacked permission by higher authorities as well as 
appropriate compensation measures. The people concerned did not dare to protest 
for fear of repercussions and often did not have the means to rebuild their house 
according to the required standards, which led to a marked deterioration in their 
personal situation (Munyankiko 2009).10
A Closer Look at Local Authorities 
As the previous section has shown, the government and its many programmes in 
the name of ‘development’ have significantly influenced peasants’ daily lives. 
                                                 
7 This fear was not unfounded as an informant told me later that a Catholic priest was arrested after he 
criticized the policy in a Christmas sermon and was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment (see also 
Human Rights Watch 2012; Ingelaere 2014).
8 This incident is also mentioned in Chapter 2.
9 ADL is the French abbreviation for Association Rwandaise pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme et 
des Libertés Publiques (Rwandan Association for the Defence of Human Rights and Public Liberties). 
10 Ingelaere gives voice to some people whose economic position deteriorated significantly because of 
the Bye Bye Nyakatsi programme (Ingelaere 2012: 280; Ingelaere 2014: 223-224).
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Some of these policies have been advantageous for the people involved, for in-
stance the associations and cooperatives that people are part of and that will be 
described in the section on Mubinda’s social life later in this chapter. However, 
other interventions have had negative consequences, as the example of the Bye 
Bye Nyakatsi programme has shown. The fact that executive secretaries at both 
the sector and cell level are appointed and paid by the government is problematic 
in this regard, as this section will show. In addition, the executive secretaries’ 
chain of accountability goes up to higher authorities rather than down to the resi-
dents because they are bound to performance contracts that they sign annually 
with higher placed authorities.11 According to Ingelaere (2007b: 37), they fear 
losing face and/or their jobs if they do not reach their performance targets and 
thus feel compelled to use force when implementing government programmes. 
While the most powerful local officials are appointed by the government, oth-
er authorities, which form consultation councils at the lowest administrative lev-
els of sector and cell and neighbourhood authorities, are elected by and come 
from the local population. Unfortunately, these local elections are far from fair 
and transparent.12 Longman conducted fieldwork in three local communities be-
tween 2001 and 2003 and found that RPF officials actively manipulated candi-
dates by pushing some to run while forcing others to withdraw their candidacy.13
When elected, no local authority can be sure how long they will remain in power 
as the RPF removes people it regards as insufficiently compliant, often accusing 
Tutsi of corruption and Hutu of participation in the genocide or of harbouring 
‘genocide ideology’ (Longman 2011: 38-39). In 2006, Ingelaere was present at 
elections for cell authorities and sector representative at district level and con-
cluded that they were manipulated by local RPF representatives who organized 
sensitization campaigns that put pressure on the population, and by soldiers who 
screened the candidates (who were all members of the RPF) and monitored the 
elections. In addition, when formally electing local authorities, inhabitants just 
form a queue behind the candidate of their choice, which clearly disregards the 
principle of the secret ballot and results in people feeling that they have been bul-
                                                 
11 These contracts are a homegrown form of accountability and referred to as imihigo. According to the 
Rwanda Governance Board’s website, imihigo is ‘a cultural practice in the ancient tradition of 
Rwanda where an individual would set himself/herself targets to be achieved within a specific period 
of time and to do so by following some principles and having determination to overcome the possible 
challenges’ http://www.rgb.rw/main-menu/innovation/imihigo.html. Accessed 9 January 2013. 
Introduced in 2006, these performance contracts are used at all levels of government and make 
appointed authorities accountable to higher level authorities, and ultimately the president. Since 2007, 
individual households have also signed an imihigo with their local authorities and this makes them 
accountable for their own development (Ingelaere 2011: 70, 75).
12 For an analysis of politics at the national level, see Chapter 1.
13 This observation is supported by one of my informants who recounted how RPF representatives drop 
by to tell people that they are a candidate but will not be elected, while to others they say that they will 
put themselves forward and will be elected. ‘How then, no one knows me here?’ this candidate may 
wonder and the officials will reply that they will make sure that s/he will be elected.
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lied into supporting RPF candidates (Ingelaere 2012: 279; see also Longman 
2011: 38). A member of the election committee explained to Ingelaere (2011: 71-
72) that more than one candidate is presented but this is only to give the impres-
sion of free elections, while voters admitted that they followed the wishes of the 
local authorities.14 Some candidates were rejected in advance and when a single 
pre-selected candidate for the sector representative at district level won, the elec-
tion committee would decide to add a significant number of ‘yes’ votes because, 
as one of the committee members explained, ‘In Rwanda you want to win “com-
pletely” by showing that a person is “popular” and entirely selected for the 
post’.15
The Rwandan authorities try to conceal the population’s lack of democratic 
power by incorporating a lot of people into the local administration, for instance, 
by having women and youth representatives or ‘companions for pregnant moth-
ers’. Such incorporation contributes to a horizontal surveillance system because 
‘incorporation in the power structure gives other “authority” figures the means to 
assess those “incorporated” by the standards of the reigning order’ (Ingelaere 
2012: 275-276).16
Another problematic fact that Ingelaere, Thomson and my own observations 
noted is that most local authorities are RPF members and 1959 Tutsi refugees. 
Thomson (2013: 142) found that, of the 46 local authorities she had contact with 
in her research area, 40 were 1959 Tutsi refugees. And in Ingelaere’s six sectors, 
all local authorities were RPF members and the sector’s executive secretary was 
usually Tutsi.17 This highlights Rwanda’s increasing ethnicization because ‘the 
ethnicity of power holders inevitably gives an ethnic dimension to the political, 
economic and judicial grievances experienced in rural Rwanda’ (Ingelaere 2012: 
275).18 These grievances are explicit in quotes by three anonymous Hutu inter-
locutors: 
1)  They [Tutsi] have all the power and power is on their side. Even when a Tutsi does 
wrong, one cannot punish [him] because authorities don’t want to ‘touch themselves in 
the stomach’’.19
                                                 
14 One respondent told Ingelaere (2012: 279): ‘Yes, I voted. But I only followed what the others did. If 
there are 40 persons queuing behind someone, you follow what the others do’.
15 For more details on manipulation and the ways Rwandans keep up appearances, see Chapter 2.
16 This surveillance adds to the extensive intelligence network within the administration as well as at the 
local neighbourhood level. For more data on government surveillance and spying, see Chapter 2. It is 
of course difficult to research intelligence activities. However, during one focus-group discussion in a 
community that had just experienced a presumably ethnically motivated murder, Ingelaere (2012: 277) 
encountered a man who wanted to attend the meeting and announced he was an intelligence agent who 
needed to listen in to verify if ‘what was said was in line with the “current policy of the government”’.
17 Before the genocide, the position of executive secretary was almost exclusively occupied by Hutu 
(Ingelaere 2011: 73).
18 The same is seen at the national level (see Chapter 1).
19 The interviewee means here that authorities do not want to sanction someone of the same ethnicity. 
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2)  Representation is only for some people, the Tutsi, not for the Hutu, we have no right to 
speak.  
3)  They [authorities] install divisions between people; I mean, the Hutu have nothing to say. 
(Ingelaere 2012: 256) 
Many Rwandans perceive the state as perpetuating (ethnic) cleavages and, 
consequently, a lot of Hutu did not feel politically represented (Ingelaere 2012: 
256; Ingelaere 2010b: 288). Despite denouncing it, the Rwandan government has 
continued with an ethnic division in practice and in perception because: 
As much as the former [Hutu-dominated] regime was overtly vested in the idea of Hutu su-
premacy, these state contemporary practices perpetuate in a much more tacit fashion what 
they are supposedly eradicating – Hutu and Tutsi sub-cultures or awareness. It signals an in-
creasing ethnicization’ (Ingelaere 2010b:291, italics in original). 
Ethnicization is also evoked in the way the executive secretary at sector and cell 
level relates to his constituency. This authority is often unknown in the area and 
many Rwandans thus worry about whether outsiders will have the ability to un-
derstand and appreciate their daily needs and problems.20 Thomson (2013: 142) 
argues that: 
For local officials who grew up abroad and whose life experiences have been shaped by con-
ditions of exile rather than by having lived through violence before and during the 1994 gen-
ocide, responding to the needs of ordinary Rwandans at the bottom of the social hierarchy is 
a challenge. In addition to having a different cultural worldview, many [1959 Tutsi] return-
ees see ordinary Rwandans solely in terms of their ethnicity.  
As a consequence, they ‘have little sense of how the violence of the genocide
has shaped their poverty’ (Ibid.). And as they previously lacked local knowledge 
and legitimacy, the executive secretaries have had to work together with elected 
authorities. However, these elected authorities are mainly local Hutu from the 
area, are always unpaid and, therefore, do not have any real power. They merely 
rubberstamp the executive secretary’s decisions. As a result, executive secretaries 
have gradually gained power over their constituency (Ingelaere 2010b: 288-290; 
Ingelaere 2011:72-73). 
Zeal and Force 
The element of force in implementing government programmes was referred to 
in the previous section but needs some closer attention. It has been argued that 
people appreciate the local government’s vision and dedication to improving 
their living conditions but that the zeal with which local authorities implement 
policies often surpasses the population’s capacities, as executive secretary Steph-
                                                 
20 For instance, one of Thomson’s respondents argued: ‘But this government holds power through 
officials that don’t even speak Kinyarwanda! How are we to negotiate our daily needs with officials 
that are strangers to us?’ (Thomson 2013: 107).
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an demonstrated with the Bye Bye Nyakatsi programme. Although aimed at im-
proving their well-being, peasants perceive these policies as being counterpro-
ductive and do not feel they are based on their needs and wishes (Ingelaere 
2007b: 36-38). To illustrate how the population feels forced into such policies 
and programmes, Ingelaere (2007b: 38) mentions an unpublished 2006 survey 
about confidence in government and governance that shows that 52% of the re-
spondents thought that the motor to participation in state activities was the use of 
force.21 In another survey, 60% of the respondents also indicated that the imple-
mentation of performance contracts involved coercion (Ingelaere 2012: 280). 
Interviewees declared that they felt voiceless and powerless and considered that 
state interventions were not rooted in local realities.22 One of the interviewees 
argued that:  
They [political dignitaries] seek a solution for the problems of the population, but they don’t 
want to know what our real problems are. If the state is not engaging in listening to the prob-
lems of the population, poverty will kill people in the shortest delay. (Ingelaere 2007b: 38-
39)  
Ingelaere (2007b: 38) concludes that: 
An ambitious and internally coherent national ideology and vision is translated to the local 
level where measures are taken by coercion irrespective of ‘real-world’ considerations and 
local authorities often demand a lot of investments of the population, often enforced through 
a system of fines.  
Ansoms (2009b: 307) also claims that tensions are created by the use of force 
and the fact that the local population cannot refuse state policies and activities. 
This then destabilizes communities.  
Ingelaere’s and Ansoms’s conclusions can be applied to the example of the 
above-mentioned programme aimed at removing grass-thatched roofs. In this 
case too, a sector authority forced a far-reaching measure on the population 
against their will. The measure significantly destabilized the situation of families 
who fell victim to this programme and left them, as well as bystanders, very an-
gry. It was a counterproductive initiative as people were left homeless and were 
forced to find significant funds to replace their roof(s) with iron sheets and/or pay 
a hefty fine. Executive secretary Stephan, who was new to the region, made it 
clear that he had to implement the programme as it was a government order and 
that he felt mainly accountable to the government he was paid by.  
                                                 
21 This survey was conducted by Rwanda’s National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), 
which is a government institute that was established in March 1999. Its main aim is to bring together 
Rwandans of all walks of life to discuss their coexistence and ways of promoting unity. From each 
district, it selected a ‘sample group’ of 300 persons consisting of cell and sector representatives, 
teachers, members of religious and women’s associations, youth, vulnerable people and ‘honest 
people’ (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 2002: 5, 11).
22 See also the previous section that mentions how ordinary Rwandans worry that their authorities do not 
understand their problems.
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Following Ingelaere (2012: 281-283), we conclude that the power of the state 
is omnipresent and weighs heavily on ordinary Rwandans. The state is present in 
all domains of society with lines of command that are deeply rooted in rural life. 
As there are no channels to voice disagreement or discontent and the appointed 
authorities, instructed by their superiors, cannot be voted out, the population feels 
compelled to adhere to all the top-down policies and programmes forced upon 
them because they see no other option. This comes at a price, both literally and 
metaphorically, as the following sections show.  
Fines and Other (Financial) Obligations 
Over the years, the Rwandan population has had to abide by more and more rules 
and regulations that attempt to upgrade rural life cosmetically ‘by inserting 
“modern” techniques and strategies into local realities, while hiding the extent of 
poverty and inequality’ (Ansoms 2009b: 302, 304). Among these rules are social 
obligations and prohibitions that are enforced by the use of fines, for instance 
wearing shoes in public, being clean and wearing decent clothes, the use of mos-
quito nets, buying health insurance and following its guidelines, constructing toi-
lets, digging compost pits and drying kitchen utensils on a table instead of on the 
grass (Ansoms 2009b: 304). Cows have to be kept in stables and people who are 
found tending livestock in public places face a fine of RWF 10,000 (about € 12) 
(Ansoms 2009b: 304; Ingelaere 2010a: 52). 
An elaborate system of fines for forbidden activities was laid out in a June 
2006 letter from a district mayor to his sector executive secretaries. This included 
29 punishable activities ranging from being with a second wife, refusing to par-
ticipate in nightly security patrols, selling homemade products like milk without 
a licence, having no clothes line or compost bin, and consuming beers in bars or 
at home with a straw (i.e. sharing beer). Most fines were RWF 10,000 while 
some others, like having no compost bin or closed toilet, were RWF 2000 (about 
€ 2.50). A fine of RWF 10,000 is a substantial amount for residents of rural 
communities since most peasant labourers earn as little as RWF 500 to RWF 700 
daily (which is about € 1). They are therefore frequently unable to pay a fine and 
risk being imprisoned. But to be released, they still need to pay their fine so have 
to borrow money, which then leads to debt and further poverty (Ingelaere 2010a: 
50-51).23 Instead of encouraging Rwandans to improve their health and hygiene, 
the fines and imprisonments are in fact likely to result in many people having 
significant difficulties in complying with these measures. Consequently, they 
                                                 
23 This is not only a local measure. Ansoms (2009b: 305) came across an example of people who were 
fined for uprooting coffee plants and if they were unable to pay the fine, they claimed they were put in 
prison until the fine was paid.
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may appear outwardly less poor and ‘traditional’ but, in reality, they are as poor 
as, or even poorer than, before (Ibid.: 50-52).  
Other measures to modernize the Rwandan countryside have involved making 
the poor invisible by hiding them, as Beatrice’s statement reveals. She argued 
that the 1959 Tutsi refugees are much better off nowadays and own nice houses 
in Mubinda, while people like herself have remained poor. She complained that: 
… with this planned settlement, the rich people with nice houses are situated along the road-
side, while the poor people are put behind [them]. … At the moment they [authorities] say 
that if your house along the road does not have metal doors and glazed windows you have to 
destroy it and go behind [the road]. Bricks and cement, it has to be like that. You also need 
to pay RWF 50,000 (about € 60) to be connected to the electricity grid.24
Again, these measures and the system of fines show that the Rwandan govern-
ment is using coercion to create an image of development and modernization 
while the reality on the ground remains quite different. 
Besides paying fines if they do not comply with rules, it is compulsory for lo-
cal inhabitants to support different programmes and activities financially. Some 
were mentioned during a community meeting with Mubinda’s executive secre-
tary (see below) and include: the FARG (the French acronym for the Genocide 
Survivors’ Support and Assistance Fund)25 and the One Dollar Campaign,26
which was a (temporary) programme that raised money to house genocide or-
phans. Local people have to pay when new schools are built and parents with 
school-aged children also have to contribute to an education fund (Karegeya 
2012).
A relatively new programme is the umurenge sacco or the savings and credit 
cooperatives at the sector (umurenge) level. This is a community microfinance 
programme that was implemented in 2009 and encourages people to put their 
savings in a bank and to borrow money if they need to. As with the elimination 
of grass-thatched roofs, several respondents suggested that authorities in fact 
forced rather than encouraged the population to deposit money in such schemes, 
which again negatively impacted their financial situation. Daniel and Beatrice, 
who complained about the Bye Bye Nyakatsi programme, were very critical of 
this new programme too. Beatrice claimed that: 
                                                 
24 Interview with Beatrice and Daniel, December 2010.
25 This fund, which was set up in 1998, offers financial support in the areas of education, health, shelter, 
social assistance and income-generating projects. http://www.farg.gov.rw/index.php?id=28&L=0. 
Accessed 22 January 2013.
26 The One Dollar Campaign was carried out by the government and a diaspora movement in 2009 to 
raise money to provide housing for genocide orphans.
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A big problem nowadays is umurenge sacco. You have to put RWF 10,000 (about € 12) in 
the bank, if not they put you in prison. They take you at night. We paid RWF 10,000 each.27
If you have to sell your plot to put money in the bank, what is the benefit? 
And her husband continued:  
They force everybody, we do not know their objectives. The demands multiply, that is the 
problem. RWF 5000 for the construction of schools, everyone has to pay, nowadays also for 
the registration of your plot. We are in trouble without a solution. They came here [to check] 
for the table [on which to dry kitchen utensils, also a rule] and the toilet [grass roof] has to 
go.  
Daniel explained in another interview how, at a community meeting some days 
earlier, people had suggested paying for the iron sheets with money borrowed 
from the umurenge sacco. But the suggestion was rejected by the authorities who 
claimed that the bank did not have enough money yet and insisted that people 
deposit their money. Then the local people asked if they could pay [it is not clear 
if Daniel meant for the iron sheets or to put money in the bank] with their bean 
harvest but the officials insisted that people paid right away.28
Another recent programme that hit Rwandans hard was the Agaciro29 Devel-
opment Fund that was set up in August 2012 to reduce the country’s dependence 
on foreign aid after several major donors withdrew (some of) their funding.30
This was in response to a UN report that revealed that the Rwandan government 
had been giving support to a newly formed rebel group operating in the east of 
neighbouring Congo since mid-2012. This fund is financed by contributions from 
Rwandan citizens, the Rwandan diaspora, private companies and others and alt-
hough contributions are supposedly voluntary, the majority of ordinary Rwan-
dans are forced to contribute. The international Syfia Grands Lacs press agency 
described how this has resulted in fierce competition as to who contributes the 
most among public and private officials, who have to make sure their own em-
ployees pay considerable contributions too. Local authorities go door to door and 
encourage poorer people to give money: they show them lists of contributions 
made by their neighbours to evoke feelings of shame and force them to contrib-
ute to save face (Durand 2012). 
                                                 
27 In another interview Daniel mentioned an amount of RWF 6500 per person that had to be paid, while 
RWF 5000 was mentioned at the community meeting. It is therefore not clear how much people are in 
fact supposed to deposit.
28 As with most government programmes or activities, for instance the One Dollar Campaign when it 
was suggested that it was merely put in place to finance the RPF’s election campaign, rumours 
circulated about umurenge sacco and how it was introduced to provide the RPF with access to funds. 
One informant from Kigali suggested that umurenge sacco was the RPF’s ‘bank’, arguing that he had 
spoken to someone who was present at an RPF meeting in 2008 or 2009 where they discussed how 
they could access additional money. An informant also argued that there were too many of these 
meetings at that time as the RPF was in need of money.
29 Agaciro is the Kinyarwanda words for dignity, pride or value (Durand 2012). 
30 The US, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden (Durand 2012).
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Syfia Grands Lacs also reported in articles in 2011 and 2012 that the system of 
fines and contributions is far from transparent as the Rwandan population has no 
idea about or control over the use of any money collected. In addition, many lo-
cal authorities abuse their position by imposing fines, as was shown by the Bye 
Bye Nyakatsi and the umurenge sacco programmes and the Agaciro Develop-
ment Fund. Its reporter found that some of the fines authorities imposed were 
illegal when they charge for activities that are not forbidden by law (for instance 
smoking or selling cigarettes) or force people to contribute to programmes that 
are not compulsory.31 And some fines are too heavy for the alleged infringement. 
However, authorities often adjust the fines they impose according to the financial 
position of the offenders, a gesture that is considered unfair by a woman men-
tioned in the article who had to pay a fine when her cow damaged a neighbour’s 
plot. In the end, people are forced to pay up because otherwise they risk ending 
up in prison until they have paid the fine (which is then often doubled), as was 
confirmed by Beatrice and Daniel (Twizeyimana 2011).  
Besides financial obligations, people also have to give their time and energy 
for tasks such as regular night patrols and monthly umuganda community work. 
This community work, when people plant trees or build houses for genocide sur-
vivors, is also supposedly an occasion for discussing development issues. How-
ever, the authorities in Kigali announce the discussion topics in advance and 
there is little time or space for real debate (Ingelaere 2011: 74). 
Relations between Authorities and the Local Population 
The coercion, abuse and sense of powerlessness Rwandans encounter often lead 
to strained relations with local authorities. This was especially visible when re-
spondents expressed their anger about the demolition of their grass-thatched 
houses or complained about the many (financial) obligations they face. Another 
important feature of this relationship is the often patronizing and contemptuous 
attitude of the authorities towards ordinary Rwandans. Many of the peasants that 
Thomson (2013: 143) spoke to mentioned the disdain the authorities had for 
them. The authorities at all levels see peasants as a homogeneous group that has 
to be re-educated and governed. For instance, an officer at the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission reported that Rwandans are ‘just mere peasants who 
need us to tell them what to do. Really, they are like infants. We need to parent 
them so they know about peace and reconciliation’ (Ibid.: 149). Another quote 
                                                 
31 A teacher told the reporter that he and his fellow teachers had to pay RWF 3500 (about € 5) to 
contribute to the Bye Bye Nyakatsi programme but no houses were ever reconstructed using their 
contributions. 
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from a district authority reveals a similarly negative attitude towards the rural 
population: 
I do not like to look at poor people and deal with them. In fact, when I worked in the minis-
try, I did not have to look at the poor. That was the level of policies and decisions. It is now 
in this new function that I am directly confronted with the poor. (Ansoms 2009b: 307) 
I observed similarly patronizing behaviour towards the local population at a 
community meeting held on an open space in a Mubinda neighbourhood in Au-
gust 2009. There were about a hundred inhabitants sitting on the grass, with local 
authorities seated on benches facing them. Eric, the executive secretary of Mu-
binda, stood in front of the local people, walking up and down and gesticulating 
while delivering his long speech.32 This is an extract of what Cécile translated 
from his speech:  
We want to engage with the population because you did well. The other time I was angry, 
but you have changed. There are no more conflicts and this pleases me. You are clean and ti-
dy, you get along. Especially cleanliness you have understood quickly, congratulations! You 
will continue to make an effort and not diminish it. Do you know that of the 15 neighbour-
hoods [in Mubinda], you were the first to give a lot of money for the One Dollar Cam-
paign?33
Eric’s speech initially seemed enthusiastic and encouraging but it was hard to 
miss its patronizing undertones. He continued to discuss other government poli-
cies and programmes, explaining what people were supposed to do, mostly re-
garding policies involving money although, interestingly, some people dared to 
express their discontent. One was a man we had interviewed a year earlier and 
who was known for his frequent drunkenness. He declared that people had given 
money for iron sheets, goats and cows but that none of these items had been de-
livered. Eric avoided answering his accusations and promised to respond some 
other time before continuing to declare that people should contribute to FARG. 
Several women claimed they had already donated to the One Dollar Campaign 
but Eric announced they still had to pay RWF 300 (about € 0,50), at which point 
more people started complaining about the amount expected from them and why 
they needed to donate again: ‘We gave for the orphans [through the One Dollar 
Campaign] so why do we have to pay for FARG? How many orphans are in-
volved?’ The discussion continued for some time until it was eventually cut short
by Eric. 
Eric’s speech and the way he reacted to questions and comments from the 
people he was supposed to serve clearly showed the powerful position of an (ap-
                                                 
32 Eric is a Tutsi genocide survivor in his twenties who is from the area.
33 Eric mentioned the amount that had been raised for the housing of genocide orphans and various 
informants talked about the enormous sums the campaign was supposed to have raised. However, 
there were numerous suggestions that this money would not (only) benefit the orphans but also the 
RPF’s 2010 election campaign.
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pointed) executive secretary. Although he allowed some space for complaints (at 
least at this meeting),34 he demonstrated his superior position by not responding 
to comments and by terminating any discussion when it suited him. Although I 
do not want to suggest that the Mubinda population is incapable of resisting poli-
cies and programmes that are forced upon them, they have little room to ma-
noeuvre in an environment where the state is powerful, omnipresent and careful-
ly monitoring every move they make.35
This and previous sections have highlighted the pressure that is being put on 
the Rwandan population to act according to Rwandan government guidelines. 
People are being pressurized into electing predetermined candidates, to fulfil (fi-
nancial) obligations and to swallow any criticism. These demands add to the fi-
nancial problems many peasant families are already facing36 while socially, pres-
sure and frustration negatively affect relations with authorities and lead to ever 
greater tensions. The fact that power relations are ethnicized only aggravates the 
tensions even more. These tensions and resentment inevitably influence commu-
nal relations and are the focus of the next section.  
Mubinda’s Social Life
A first impression when observing the social life in Mubinda is that people inter-
act with one another very frequently, exchanging greetings, gossiping and attend-
ing church services and community meetings. Since poverty is so prevalent, peo-
ple explained how friends and neighbours support each other in times of need by 
lending money and visiting each other when people are sick. In addition, re-
spondents often mentioned their membership of associations or cooperatives 
when discussing social relations.37 They would assure us that 1994 and 1959 ref-
ugees and genocide survivors were all represented in their associations and coop-
eratives and worked well together. Some 75% of respondents were a member of 
one or more of these and about 30% were members of several. If a person was 
not a member of any organization, this tended to be for financial reasons.  
An important economic goal of the government over the last ten years has 
been to encourage the population to work together in associations and coopera-
                                                 
34 It is not easy to ascertain whether this meeting was typical because Cécile’s and my presence may 
have influenced Eric’s behaviour and wording.
35 In Whispering Truth to Power: Everyday Resistance to Reconciliation in Postgenocide Rwanda,
Thomson (2013) convincingly argues that ordinary rural Rwandans are able to resist government 
programmes.
36 Although primary education is free, many parents have difficulty paying for school materials for their 
children. These costs add up to about RWF 50,000 (€ 60) per year per child (Karegeya 2012).
37 Associations are informal groups to which people contribute money for a common goal or to be 
distributed amongst its members. An association can become a formal cooperative when it meets 
certain criteria, like having a bank account, and then has access to credit.
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tives in order to save money, produce more and/or have better access to credit.38
About half of the interviewees declared they were a member of Dutabarane (‘to 
help each other’), which has existed for about 15 years and to which members 
contribute about RWF 100 or RWF 200 RWF (about € 0.15 or 0.30) a month. In 
cases of serious illness, Dutabarane members take the patient to hospital on a 
traditional stretcher and if a family member dies, money that has been collected 
is used to pay for the funeral and other related expenses. Dutabarane also helps 
provide access to health insurance and members can borrow money without pay-
ing interest on it if they pay it back within a certain period.  
Another similar association in which about 25% of my respondents were ac-
tive is an ikibina (mutuality). An ikibina works like a tontine with members con-
tributing money until a certain amount has been reached and it is then donated to 
one of the members.39 In another form of ikibina, members get together to work 
each member’s land in turn while members pay the ikibina RWF 1000 (about € 
1.25) for the services provided. When all the members have paid this, the total 
sum is given to one of its members. Besides associations, about 20% of the re-
spondents were also a member of a cooperative, usually the local banana cooper-
ative.  
When people were asked to describe Mubinda’s social life, the usual answer 
was that ‘relations were good’. This response and others that stressed the benefits 
of working together in associations and cooperatives might imply that the inhab-
itants of Mubinda feel a sense of communal solidarity. Both national and local 
authorities are trying to show how the Rwandan population has become united 
‘gradually and thanks to our government of unity and reconciliation that helped 
us to become one and to accept the situation’.40 However, we slowly established 
that peasant respondents were only trying to confirm the public transcript41 and 
quite a few statements that revealed the hidden transcript or the ‘offstage’ dis-
course highlighted how local social relations were not as harmonious as they first 
appeared. Let us now turn to these hidden transcripts to understand some of the 
issues related to communal solidarity, (ethnic) tensions and suffering.  
 
                                                 
38 Chapter 6 describes how the government uses cooperatives in their land-reform policy to distribute 
government-approved fertilizers and seeds and influence land-tenure management.
39 The word tontine is originally from West Africa and is used for rotating savings and credit 
associations (Uvin 1998:165). See Ansoms (2009a: 189) for a more detailed description of present-
day tontines and Uvin (1998: 164-166) for an account of pre-genocide associations, including 
tontines.
40 Interview with Spéciose, chairperson of a neighbourhood committee, December 2008. By ‘the 
situation’ she meant angry reactions by 1959 Tutsi refugees due to the loss of numerous family 
members who were killed during the genocide. 
41 See Chapter 2. Public transcripts appear in a context of social subordination in which the subordinate 
shapes his discourse in such a way as to appeal to his dominant conversation partner.
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Hidden Transcripts of Social Life 
The stories of respondents who dared to speak out about how they truly per-
ceived social life showed the worrisome nature of current social relations. To 
demonstrate this, we will discuss some of the experiences various respondents 
went through in recent years.  
The first story is that of Jean, a 1959 Tutsi refugee in his sixties. His wife has 
been sick for quite some time and, because of her illness, he finds it difficult to 
make ends meet. He often cannot go to his field as he has to take care of his wife 
and he is afraid that because of his frequent absence, he will harvest less. To pay 
for his wife’s medicine, he has had to sell most of his cattle and paying for school 
fees and materials for his school-aged daughter is problematic. He used to be 
member of an association but resigned when he could no longer afford the con-
tributions. He was bitter about social relations in Mubinda:  
There is no community life in Mubinda as no one can come to your aid. Imagine that a per-
son cannot come and cultivate for you. Even the people with whom you returned from Tan-
zania are not concerned with other people’s problems. It is to say that it is every man for 
himself. So there is no solidarity. … There is really no real contact between people, even 
neighbours. They will lend you money when they know that you can refund it fairly soon. 
But as they know that I have someone ill with an incurable disease, they cannot give me 
money because they tell themselves that I will not be able to pay back this money as I have 
problems. It is every man for himself. … Everyone in this association knew of my problem.
They know that my wife is very ill but I have never seen even one person coming here to vis-
it her. Me too, I have no drive anymore to go to the association. … Because I do not contrib-
ute anymore, if I return they will ask me to contribute for the months that I was absent with-
out considering the problem that I have … If there is misfortune in your family, with some-
one who died or fell ill, nobody is there to help you. In short, if you have problems, they will 
not come to your rescue.42
Another explicit answer to questions about Mubinda’s social life came from 
Evariste and Angeline, a couple who returned to Rwanda in 2002. They can be 
considered as outsiders because Angeline is Congolese and does not speak Kin-
yarwanda well, while Evariste grew up in another village in the same sector. 
They lived in Nairobi for about six years and had a fairly good life there, as the 
pictures they showed us confirmed. When the Kenyan authorities declared that 
all refugees had to leave Nairobi, they were taken to a refugee camp near the Su-
danese border where they stayed for two years. They decided to return to 
Evariste’s native country in 2002 and, since then, have lived in deplorable cir-
cumstances. They found it hard to integrate into the community and explained 
how they had not been aware of local prices at first, which resulted in many peo-
ple cheating them by doubling what they charged them. They regretted losing so 
much money and, as a result, were unable to put iron sheets on their house. They 
                                                 
42 Interview with Jean, October 2008. 
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also felt that local authorities had hindered their economic activities. Angeline 
explained: 
Here, there is not much solidarity, and the solidarity that exists is out of self-interest because 
even if you have good relationships with people, they try to profit from it and they also do 
not want you to be superior to them, they want you to be inferior to them. For instance, there 
is a secondary school near our house and I wanted to cater for it like our neighbour does. But 
as she is a member of the neighbourhood committee, she made sure that I did not get permis-
sion to open a restaurant and told me it was forbidden to open a restaurant at home.43
On social life in general, her husband Evariste declared: ‘Here in Mubinda, we 
live like in a city: everybody sticks to himself. No one wants to visit anyone else. 
It is thanks to the government that introduced cooperatives and associations that 
people have relations with others’. When discussing relationships between Hutu, 
Tutsi genocide survivors and 1959 Tutsi refugees, Evariste stated:  
The state always tries to prevent the segregation of people, but there is always something bad 
that stays in the hearts of people and that is hate. Of course the population always pretends to 
have good relationships, but there is always something. … There are people you find who 
have something like hate that is hidden. Of course it is not very noticeable but it is always 
there. 
Epimaque’s comments concerning relations between the Hutu population and 
1959 Tutsi refugees are telling as this young Hutu man served four years in pris-
on because he was (falsely, according to him) accused of genocide crimes.44 He 
was freed in 2003 by a presidential order that involved prisoners who were still 
children at the time of the genocide. In 2004 he was acquitted by a gacaca court. 
He explained that many people do have problems with the other groups but keep 
them in their heart. 
I, for instance, my wife is a Tutsi who came from outside, from Tanzania. That means that 
there was a big problem, her family did not want her to marry me. People asked her ‘How 
are you going to live with such a person? You yourself know that they are not good people.’
People who came from outside [1959 Tutsi refugees] always want to know: ‘Who are you? 
What do you do?’ They are always interested in ethnicity issues. … They [his wife’s family 
members] have not come to visit us since we got married. And I often tell my wife that she 
has to distrust what her family tells her because I believe that I have become her family. That 
is why I tell you that the problem of ethnicity is always there, except that people pretend that 
they do not discuss it. You can arrive somewhere where people are talking about this and 
when they see you, they shut up immediately. And my wife always told me what people said 
regarding us [Hutu] and even now people continue to talk about it, but as my wife loves me, 
she tells me everything.45
                                                 
43 Interview with Evariste and Angeline, December 2008.
44 Tertsakian (2011: 213) did research in Rwandan prisons and found that, after the genocide, there was 
nothing in many prisoners’ case files and they had been arrested on accusations of genocide without 
proof or any investigation having been done. ‘Thousands of arrests were carried out arbitrarily and 
indiscriminately, particularly between 1994 and 1999. Some denunciations were made in good faith 
by people who had witnessed killings during the genocide, but others were motivated by the desire to 
settle scores’.
45 Interview with Epimaque, October 2008.
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Some respondents from the 1959 Tutsi refugee group and genocide survivors 
also mentioned issues of ethnicity. For instance, Soline, a 1959 Tutsi refugee, 
claimed that the genocide ideology still exists in Mubinda and that people some-
times show this in their remarks.46 Unfortunately we were not able to elaborate 
on this as Soline’s daughter Valérie understood French and prevented her mother 
from saying more on the subject.47 In another interview with Triphine, we probed 
the issue of social relations after this genocide survivor declared that there were 
no problems. My assistant Cécile then asked how she and other survivors were 
perceived by community members who were not genocide survivors. To per-
suade Triphine to answer truthfully, Cécile explained how some students on her 
own university campus would say that genocide survivors just pretended that 
they were traumatized and sometimes exaggerated when they claimed that they 
were ill and weak. She asked if this was also the case in Mubinda. Genocide sur-
vivor and local authority Spéciose, who had come into Triphine’s house during 
the interview, answered instead of Triphine and confirmed this:  
Yes, it is always there, people always speak badly. They pretend that they sympathize with 
us, but they don’t. I can give you an example. Let’s say that my mobile phone falls on the 
floor and its display breaks. Even if it is not damaged, the telephone will not be like it was 
before. It is the same thing with us because the genocide has affected us Rwandans. We can-
not be as we were before, there is always something inside us.48
These statements were supported by Edouard, a 1959 Tutsi refugee. Although 
most respondents would pay lip service to the current policy of being Rwandan 
instead of Hutu or Tutsi, Edouard stated openly that frustration and resentment 
between Hutu and Tutsi families still exist, and this results in a lack of communi-
cation even between neighbours because ‘if someone has killed your family 
members, how can you be at ease with him?’49
The examples in this section show how, behind the public transcript of good 
social relations and communal solidarity, there is another reality in which dis-
trust, hatred and ethnic tensions prevail. Interestingly, quite a few respondents 
referred to the heart when they answered questions concerning tensions. For in-
stance, when asked about the current relationship between families who shared 
land, a 1959 Tutsi refugee answered that ‘it is difficult to look into the heart of 
someone else’. According to Ingelaere (2007a: 22-23), the heart is seen as the 
                                                 
46 Genocide ideology has become a dominant accusation and a label that seems to embrace other terms 
like negationism and divisionism (Waldorf 2009: 109).
47 Informative is the comment my research assistant Cécile added to this interview’s notes: ‘Valérie 
started to gesture to her mother to stop her saying more about ideology problems and I understood 
quickly that Valérie did not want her mother to say more about this ideology. It was when Margot 
asked how many genocide survivors lived in Mubinda and I told Margot to leave this question as I had 
already seen the signs Valérie made to her mother and Margot had not noticed this. When we were 
alone, I explained to Margot that I had seen how Valérie made gestures to her mother’. 
48 Conversation with Spéciose during the interview with Triphine, December 2008. 
49 Interview with Edouard, November 2010.
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force that unifies the human being in Rwandan culture: emotions, thoughts and 
will are all interconnected and unified in the heart. So the heart is where the truth 
lies but it is, at the same time, inaccessible to others. The next section concerns 
another matter of the heart and that is suffering, a theme that respondents did not 
often openly discuss. 
Silent Suffering 
‘If only everyone put himself in someone else’s position and forgot his suffering 
to understand the misery of the other. Everybody needs to be listened to and to 
pour out his heart as he has suffered, regardless of his ethnicity. This will take a 
lot of time; we see it mainly in church. For example, there are genocide survivors 
who pour their hearts out but behind them there are others who suffer and who 
have lost family members, who suffer alike. It is difficult; the suffering has been 
terrible, maybe with time. People cry quietly. The state does not yet understand 
that everybody could be listened when they cry out their suffering’.50
These are the words of Priest Gaspard, himself a genocide survivor, who has 
been priest in the region since the 1990s. He touched upon an important theme, 
as I had also noticed that the population of Mubinda did not discuss their suffer-
ing with each other. This was apparent in the stories of two 1959 refugees. The 
first was Edouard, a man in his sixties who went into exile in Uganda in 1961. 
When he returned to Rwanda in 1994 he remembered that the atmosphere in Mu-
binda was tense, and distrust and fear were prevalent. Although Edouard felt that 
he had been well cared for by the Ugandans while in exile, he still remembered 
these years as being hard, with a lot of suffering. This suffering was intensified 
when four of his children who had become RPF soldiers died on the battlefield. 
He related:  
My wife suffered a lot and she lost a lot of weight after the death of the first two children and 
after the other two died, she did not speak anymore. … It is hard. I worked at a firm with en-
gineers and sometimes they asked me if my younger children are my grandchildren as they 
knew my older [deceased] children. That really hurts; it makes you suffer a lot. Rwandans 
have to live together with their history. For instance, genocide survivors cry for their [mur-
dered] family members and say ‘you have your children’, but we have also lost children. 
Survivors may say ‘you have five’, but I have also lost children.51
During an interview with 1959 refugee Francine, we observed how people often 
do not recognize the suffering of others, even when it concerns friends. Francine 
is a widow of 70 who grew up in the south of Rwanda and went into exile in 
Tanzania. She often feels lonely as she lost all of her brothers and sisters and 
their children during the genocide as well as all but one of her own children. 
                                                 
50 Interview with Priest Gaspard, December 2010.
51 Interview with Edouard, November 2010.
209573-L-bw-ASC
150
Since she is old, she does not go out a lot and because her child or grandchildren 
are not always around, she is frequently in need of support. While we were talk-
ing to her, Julie, a female genocide survivor, came into the house. She is a friend 
and relative of Francine’s and joined in the discussion when we talked about 
former and current relations between the 1959 and 1994 refugees and whether 
the government’s reconciliation policy was successful. Julie explained that be-
fore the genocide, division and genocide ideology were gradually entering peo-
ple’s minds. We then asked: ‘After such a long history of division, how can peo-
ple think immediately of reconciliation?’ Julie then answered that we should not 
address this question to Francine because reconciliation was merely discussed 
with genocide survivors. This statement provoked Francine, who subsequently 
started explaining how she suffered in exile and still suffers: 
During our exile, we lost our cows, we were not on our ancestral land. People cannot say that 
I did not suffer because I was in exile for so long. … This [not regaining her ancestral land] 
still hurts. Here it is like another exile. Especially at the beginning, it was difficult because 
you felt that you were not at home. … Nowadays I am used to not thinking about my region 
of origin. I went there once to only find ruins, everybody had been killed and there was only 
one niece of mine left. Because of this, I do not feel like returning where there is no one left, 
even when it is home. To live here spares me the suffering as there are only ruins there.52
Julie was visibly touched by Francine’s words and, at one point, stated that she 
had believed that Francine did not remember her suffering anymore. Both wom-
en agreed with us that the 1994 Hutu refugees had also suffered during their exile 
and Francine admitted that she understands them and that, if they managed to 
exchange their experiences, acknowledging each other’s suffering would not be 
difficult.  
As Priest Gaspard had suggested, the examples of Edouard and Francine show 
that 1994 Hutu refugees, 1959 Tutsi refugees and Tutsi genocide survivors often 
do not see each other’s suffering. In the Rwandan context where people have to 
struggle to earn a living and deal with their often complicated personal histories, 
this should not come as a surprise. Therefore, it is not clear if they are not aware 
of or are simply unwilling to acknowledge their neighbours’ experiences. Either 
way, it is a strong indication that there is a lack of sincere communication among 
the Mubinda population.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that post-genocide Rwanda is still a fragmented and at-
omized society where people are very suspicious of one another. While discuss-
ing current social relations, Mubinda inhabitants revealed that they are ‘living 
apart together’, engaging in merely superficial relations in which fear, distrust 
                                                 
52 Interview with Francine, December 2012.
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and hatred prevail, solidarity is lacking and where the different groups (genocide 
survivors, 1994 Hutu and 1959 Tutsi refugees) are unable to understand the suf-
fering of others. The tense social relations among neighbours and their relation-
ship with authorities are further aggravated by the omnipresence, strength and 
weight of the Rwandan state. As ordinary Rwandans, both Hutu and Tutsi alike, 
are unable to engage and unite and lack democratic power, they are also unable 
to weaken the force of the state and change existing power relations. The prob-
lem of ethnicity, which was discussed in the previous chapter on land sharing and 
villagization, adds to peasants’ feelings of powerlessness, voicelessness and frus-
tration vis-à-vis their authorities and is yet another source of frustration and ha-
tred among Mubinda’s inhabitants.
Patronizing (local) authorities force local inhabitants to comply with pro-
grammes and policies that are often not rooted in local realities and have a huge 
impact on peasants’ lives. The next chapter considers recent land reforms, and 
the risks of a policy that influences the majority of Rwandans will become appar-
ent.  
As was the case in the previous chapter on land sharing and villagization, this 
chapter again demonstrated the political nature of people’s ethnic identity and the 
increasing ethnicization of Rwanda’s (local) government. It described how 
Rwanda’s post-genocide society is characterized by unequal power relations be-
tween the Hutu community on the one hand and the 1959 Tutsi refugees and Tut-
si genocide survivors on the other, but also between the population as a whole 
and local authorities. The example of the Bye Bye Nyakatsi programme revealed 
the strong social engineering agenda of the current government in the behaviour-
al, cultural, economic and spatial arenas that is being carried out using coercion 
with punishable activities, (financial) obligations, ‘encouraging’ community 
meetings and membership of associations and cooperatives. The issue of legiti-
macy was raised once again, as the chapter suggested that many Hutu do not feel 
politically represented by the current government. As the August 2009 communi-
ty meeting in Mubinda demonstrated, many people resent the numerous (finan-
cial) obligations that are imposed on them, as well as programmes such as the 
aforementioned Bye Bye Nyakatsi programme.  
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Controlled Commercialization: 
Land Reform in Rwanda
After it came to power following the 1994 genocide, the RPF-led Rwandan gov-
ernment recognized the potential of agriculture for economic development but it 
was felt that the agricultural sector had to change drastically if it was to contrib-
ute to national prosperity (Des Forges 2006: 354, 360). The RPF regime initially 
faced constraints finding appropriate strategies because the newly established 
political party was still dominated by soldiers and intellectuals who had predom-
inantly urban and elitist backgrounds and knew little of Rwanda’s rural realities. 
Des Forges (2006: 359) states that: ‘Many of the soldiers valued cattle-raising −
the association between military and cattle has a long history in Rwanda − but 
few had close links with growing crops’. Newbury (2011: 229) also indicated 
that most new leaders were newcomers who had no farming experience in 
Rwanda and ‘had only limited knowledge of local dynamics, let alone of local 
ecologies’.1 Another influential factor was the animosity of RPF and other Tutsi 
returnees towards Hutu cultivators, which was a consequence of the ‘genocidal 
propaganda that stressed the Hutu association with the soil and the glorification 
of “Hutu-as-cultivator’’’ (Des Forges 2006: 359). 
In 1996, the government drew up its Agriculture Development Strategy and 
organized a national conference on land issues, at which the delegates concluded 
that the agricultural sector could not be sustainably developed without a Land 
Law that would normalize land use and ownership (Musahara & Huggins 2005: 
286). Eugène Rurangwa (2002: 7) was the Director of Lands and Land Registrar 
                                                 
1 Economist An Ansoms (2009b: 295) comes to the same conclusion and argues that Rwanda’s new 
political elite are mostly 1959 Tutsi refugees from Uganda who lost their ties with their region of 
origin and have little incentive to go back to rural areas. This new elite took the place of the former 
Hutu elite who had often direct ties with the countryside as well as greater experience with rural 
policies.
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at the Ministry of Lands, Human Settlement and Environmental Protection and 
declared in 2002 that:  
The Government of Rwanda sees increased security of tenure or rights of access to land and 
more effective land management as important factors for improvement of the agriculture sec-
tor and the economy as a whole, helping to create the resources needed to reduce poverty and 
to consolidate peace and social cohesion. For this, land reform is envisaged: … [a list of 
measures and aims follows]2
Contrasting this prediction that land reform would lead to greater overall prosper-
ity and improved social relations is the trend that Rwanda, like other parts of Af-
rica and also as a result of globalization and liberalization, is increasingly being 
confronted with the commercialization of its agricultural space (Ansoms & 
Claessens 2011: 3). There are tensions between this commercialization and de-
agrarianization, a process characterized by the increasing detachment of rural 
livelihoods from farming and from access to agricultural land, while most rural 
Africans still depend on agricultural land as their main livelihood asset. This de-
pendence, combined with growing demographic pressures, has led to increasing 
competition for land (Ansoms & Claessens 2011: 3; see also Ansoms & Marysse 
2011: xvii-xviii). According to Ansoms & Claessens (2011: 3): 
The combination of these evolutions accumulates in a fierce clash in the land arena, where 
power relations clearly play to the advantages of large-scale, more powerful, and better con-
nected actors.  
This chapter describes and critically analyses the 2005 and 2013 Land Laws and 
the 2004 land policy that involved land registration, crop specialization and land-
use consolidation. It will be argued that this new law was not in the interests of 
most rural peasants but that it probably favoured larger-scale farmers and (for-
eign) investors. As a consequence, small-scale peasants are likely to face addi-
tional constraints in gaining access to farmland in the future. The chapter is di-
vided into four parts. The following section describes the drafting process and 
some documents that informed the 2005 Organic Land Law, the second section 
discusses the content of the new Land Law and policy, while the third section 
explains how the Land Law works both in theory and in practice. This is fol-
lowed by a conclusion. 
Drafts and Consultations 
The government started to draft the 2005 Organic Land Law in 1997 and a first 
draft was ready by early 1999. It mainly dealt with the issue of land-tenure inse-
curity and argued that if farmers produced and invested more, they would feel a 
greater degree of security in their property. Land-tenure security had been the 
                                                 
2 He declared this in a speech at a conference on land policy and land reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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main concern in 1998 during preliminary meetings that were organized across the 
country in efforts to consult local administrators, members of local organizations 
and civil-society and farmers’ representatives and at the National Consultation 
Workshop in November 2000 that discussed the first land policy draft (Musahara 
& Huggins 2005: 287).3 The workshop was organized in cooperation with the 
newly established LandNet Rwanda Chapter, a multi-stakeholder network of 
members of local and international NGOs, individual experts and government
representatives. It was mainly attended by national and local government repre-
sentatives, academics and NGO, church and media representatives who discussed 
Rwanda’s high population density and the resulting pressure on land, the exces-
sive subdivision of family plots, soil loss and degradation, the scarcity of land 
and the large number of landless. It recommended that land-tenure security 
would increase by legalizing the use, development and right to ownership of land 
and by equitably distributing land. Moreover, the government was advised to 
develop a legal body of management, allocation and land use by drafting a Land 
Law, implementing a land-use and allocation master plan, developing local land-
management plans and arranging for land to be granted to the landless (Palmer 
2000: 2, 7).  
The 2000 National Consultation Workshop led to additional consultations at 
grassroots level but these meetings tended to involve district authorities rather 
than the local population (Musahara & Huggins 2005: 287). In February 2004, 
the government adopted the land policy and, some months later, discussed a May 
2004 version of the Land Law with relevant civil-society organizations, including 
LandNet Rwanda Chapter.4
Oxfam GB’s Land Policy Advisor Palmer, who participated in the 2000 Na-
tional Consultation Workshop, claimed that the land policy draft was written by 
top-down planners who were probably not aware of the limitations of land-use 
planning because most government officials were ‘outsiders’ based in Kigali 
‘who do not know Rwandan rural realities well, and who have to operate within a 
typical government culture in which central planning is king’ (Palmer 2000: 8).5
To support this view, Palmer (2000: 5) mentions that the Secretary-General at the 
Ministry of Lands, Environment, Forestry, Water and Natural Resources asked at 
the workshop whether it was necessary for every Rwandan to own land, clearly 
underestimating peasants’ dependence on agriculture. In addition, Palmer ob-
served that during discussions on land use and productivity, there was the ten-
                                                 
3 LandNet Rwanda Chapter is part of LandNet, an Africa-wide network of policy makers, academics 
and civil society that works on land-related issues, especially land policy (Wyss 2006: 21; Bruce 2013: 
135).
4 For a more detailed account of the involvement in the drafting process of LandNet and other civil-
society organizations, see Musahara & Huggins (2005: 288-289) and Wyss (2006: 20-25).
5 This is in line with the above-mentioned comments by Des Forges and Newbury.
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dency to blame the poor. Huggins (2010: 46), who mentioned that some NGOs 
even directly participated in parliamentary debates, stresses the fact that: 
Much of the debate was kept within certain boundaries. Those who were particularly critical 
in the parliamentary debates were targeted by government-controlled media, and were pub-
licly branded by politicians as ‘troublemakers’, a loaded term in the sensitive context of the 
country.  
In the 2004 parliamentary report on genocide ideology to which Huggins refers, 
NGOs advocating on land issues and especially on the legal basis of land sharing 
were regarded as spreading ‘confusion’ and ‘conflicts’ among the rural popula-
tion because the government considered discussing certain legal and policy is-
sues with an inevitable ethnic dimension as ethnic ‘divisionism’ (Ibid.). And 
Wyss (2006: 25) stated that:  
… in the end the new land policy and law remained an achievement of the Rwandan gov-
ernment, not of the Rwandan population, whose needs are much too often said to have been 
neglected to a large extent.  
In line with Wyss’ claim, Des Forges (2006: 354) found that: 
… they [authorities] finally produced a policy and law that showed the same basic ideas that 
they had held from the beginning’ because the RPF had always been critical of Rwandan ag-
riculture and believed that radical reforms were necessary.  
With the implementation of its villagization and land-sharing policy, the gov-
ernment had already shown that it was willing and able to carry out similar re-
forms and drastically restructure Rwandan rural life (Ibid.).
From the above, it can be concluded that the consultative process was not truly 
participatory because it tended to involve authorities rather than peasants and, as 
Wyss (2006: 20-21) suggests, the meetings were merely meant to legitimize gov-
ernment decisions . It also made it difficult for Rwandan NGOs that were in-
volved in advocacy on land issues. The draft process showed that policy makers 
were particularly concerned with land-tenure security and wanted to grant full 
rights to landowners. However, it is questionable whether land-tenure security 
will be enhanced through official registration and titling as research that was car-
ried out on land registration programmes across Africa in the 1970s and 1980s 
shows that these programmes did not lead to improved tenure security or to an 
increase in agricultural investment and productivity (Peters 2004: 274). The top-
down approach of most policy makers, who were more often than not outsiders 
and had a tendency to blame the poor for their own predicament, has fuelled 
questions about whether the right choices were made.  
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Outsiders’ Views of Rwanda’s Land Reform
The new Land Law and land policy were significantly influenced by documents 
that were often prepared by external consultants working for various donors (Van 
Hoyweghen 1999: 366). One of the first studies that affected Rwanda’s thinking 
on the role of agriculture was a report written in 1995 by Michigan State Univer-
sity on food security and sustainable agricultural productivity. Based on data col-
lected between 1984 and 1994, it talked about ‘unsustainable land use practices 
…, insufficient nonfarm employment, and rapid population growth’ and recom-
mended promoting income-raising activities, especially through cash cropping 
and off-farm employment and a more secure land-tenure system to enhance 
productivity (Clay et al. 1995: v). In line with this report, UNDP/FAO, the World 
Bank and the Rwandan government undertook similar studies in 1997 and 1998 
that all concluded that Rwanda should increase its agricultural productivity by 
changing land use and adopting a market-oriented approach.6 Pottier (2002: 196) 
concluded from these studies that land-use change in reality meant investing in 
large landowners at the expense of poor, mainly subsistence, farmers. For in-
stance, the UNDP/FAO recommended that family plots become legally indivisi-
ble to avoid further fragmentation, a measure that would seem to protect small-
scale farmers,7 but it also suggested that Rwanda’s better-off farmers be support-
ed and that this support go hand in hand with land consolidation. Musahara & 
Huggins (2005: 286) argued that, although the UNDP/FAO study stressed the 
importance of the communal aspects of land, it situated its analysis ‘within a nar-
rative based on commercialization of agriculture; and it is this narrative, rather 
than one focussed on subsistence agriculture, which has taken precedence since’. 
This narrative can also be found in Rwandan studies.8 According to Van Hoy-
weghen (1999: 367):  
… while it is true that in 1990 the smallest farms delivered 50% of the produce for the mar-
ket and that therefore smaller plots were more productive, this system has reached its limits. 
It is no longer ecologically or economically sustainable, since increasingly smaller plots fail 
to sustain the households who own them, forcing them into an ever downward spiral of pov-
erty.  
                                                 
6 The titles of these studies were ‘Réforme foncière au Rwanda: propositions de fonds en vue de 
l’élaboration d’une législation foncière cadre. Formulation de la stratégie de développement agricole 
Mission d’appui (PNUD/FAO)’, ‘La Pauvreté au Rwanda: Situation Actualisée’ (World Bank), a 
report on a conference on land reform held in 1997 and the ‘Plan Global d’Actions pour la Sécurité
Alimentaire’ by the Rwandan government.
7 This recommendation was not, however, supported by the World Bank, which was in favour of 
continuing customary inheritance practices but with the registration of title deeds (Pottier 2002: 197).
8 These studies were the report on a 1997 conference on land reform and the Plan Global d’Actions 
pour la Sécurité Alimentaire (Global Plan of Actions for Alimentary Security) (Van Hoyweghen 1999: 
367).
209573-L-bw-ASC
157
The reason given was that poor peasants are unable to invest and are, for in-
stance, forced to eat their seeds after a failed crop, while richer farmers’ plots 
have greater potential for intensification. Another important element that should 
not be overlooked is the political aspect of these studies as they did not discuss 
the social and political factors that hinder agricultural development. For example, 
in about 1998, farmers disinvested in coffee, which is a cash crop, and this was 
not only a sign that farmers preferred to safeguard food security in times of un-
certainty but that they also did not believe that the government would protect 
their interests. It then becomes questionable as to whether farmers can be moti-
vated to participate in land reform (Ibid.).
While Van Hoyweghen indicates that the studies done by the Rwandan gov-
ernment were too apolitical, Pottier (2002: 199) considered the UNDP/FAO 
study to be a highly political document because of its historical references to land 
tenure. According to him, the author of this study, consultant Barrière, unjustly 
depicts a harmonious pre-colonial agricultural system in which all the land be-
longed to the Tutsi king. However he omits an essential feature of this system, 
namely the much-hated uburetwa labour duties discussed in Chapter 3 that con-
sidered the highly contested and politically sensitive issue of pre-colonial land 
tenure during the reign of Tutsi King Rwabugiri. While the current regime insists 
that pre-colonial history was a period of harmony and peace, many Hutu contest 
this view by pointing out the uburetwa labour duties they fell victim to in the 
Tutsi kingdom in this period.9 Pottier argues that it appears that the UNDP/FAO 
has unwittingly been a tool in establishing the RPF version of pre-colonial land-
tenure history.10
The observations by Van Hoyweghen and Pottier concerning the political as-
pects of various studies rightly draw attention to the political dimensions and 
consequences of land reform in Rwanda. Based on observations made by Pottier, 
Musahara & Huggins and Van Hoyweghen, it can be concluded that early studies 
on the need for land reform in Rwanda were clearly oriented towards commer-
cialization and support for the richer and more professional large-scale farmers. 
Other Relevant Documents on Land Reform 
Other policy documents were also written during the drafting of the 2005 Organ-
ic Land Law and 2004 land policy that deal with land use and land tenure. With 
                                                 
9 An indication of how unpopular uburetwa was can be seen in the fact that, in the run-up to the 
genocide, the authorities referred to these much-resented labour duties and threatened that the Tutsi-
led RPF would reinstall a Tutsi kingdom in an attempt to frighten the Hutu population into 
participating in the killings.
10 See also the introduction for more comments by Pottier on efforts by the RPF-dominated government 
to rewrite history.
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regard to the future of agriculture, the Vision 2020 document of July 2000 ex-
pressed the aim of raising incomes both within and outside the agricultural sector 
through commercialization (Musahara & Huggins 2005: 288). An important goal 
that was formulated in this document is that, by the year 2020, the farming popu-
lation will have been reduced from 85% to 50%. According to Ansoms (2009a: 
83), the reasoning behind this is that, with Rwanda’s population growing by 3% 
annually and a fixed land area, many people will have to find alternative liveli-
hoods. Another relevant document was the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) that the government released in 2002 and that connects poverty reduction 
to land-tenure security and land-conflict resolution. Under the heading ‘Agricul-
tural Transformation, and Rural Development’, the PRSP stated that:
Land is the most important productive asset owned by most Rwandese households. It has al-
so historically been a source of dispute and conflict. Rwanda has a legacy of disputed land 
rights, arising partly from the lack of legal status for land title and partly from the return of 
people whose land has been occupied by others. Hence the provision of security and the res-
olution of land disputes are important objectives of the Government. (Government of 
Rwanda 2002: 41)  
It claimed that the main aims of the future land policy and Land Law should be 
that households consolidate plots so that each holding is at least 1 ha (up to a 
maximum of 50 ha), all land is registered to improve tenure security (with a trad-
able title) and the community is involved in the process of allocating titles.  
Another document dealing with land tenure and food security was the 2004 
National Agricultural Policy (NAP) whose main objectives were to enhance food 
security and increase farmers’ incomes in a market-oriented economy (Ansoms 
2008: 11). The 2004 Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation (SPAT) was 
set up to operationalize the NAP’s aims and transform the agricultural sector 
from subsistence production into a professional, commercial and competitive 
economic activity. Ansoms argues that this document showed ambivalent views 
about the capacities of small-scale peasants to transform their production meth-
ods as it recognized the constraints that peasants face, such as a lack of credit and 
the inability to insure themselves against shocks and setbacks. It was also 
claimed that peasants are unable to adopt recommended productivity-enhancing 
methods that go beyond traditional subsistence farming because they are too ig-
norant and resistant to change. Ansoms (2008: 11-13) argues that ultimately, the 
SPAT strategy seemed to favour competitive and commercial farmers since it 
was more relevant to larger farmers who are willing and able to invest in new 
production systems than to risk-averse small-scale peasants.  
The studies described in the previous section that preceded the 2005 Organic 
Land Law and land policy argued in favour of commercialization and recom-
mended land consolidation and land-tenure security. These proposals can be 
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found in the documents described in this section. In line with the observations in 
the previous section, the government again showed a tendency to blame peasants 
for being poor as it claims that they lack education and insight and are too re-
sistant to changing their methods. In interviews held in 2007 with 26 high- and 
lower-ranking officials involved in poverty reduction and agricultural and land 
policies, Ansoms discovered that the poverty problem is often interpreted as an 
awareness and mentality problem as well as being due to a lack of vision 
amongst the Rwandan peasantry. This could be solved if peasants adopted a 
‘good mentality’ and decided to familiarize themselves with modern techniques 
(Ansoms 2009b: 297-298, 302).11 Again it can be concluded that the Rwandan 
government’s policy documents favour commercial, large-scale farmers at the 
expense of the many subsistence peasants who are currently working small plots. 
This will become apparent in the next section when the Land Law and land poli-
cy are discussed. 
The Land Law and Land Policy 
The land policy was adopted in February 2004. The introduction reads as fol-
lows:
Apart from a few scattered land regulations, most of which date back to the colonial period, 
Rwanda has never had a proper land policy nor has it ever had a land law, a situation that 
enhances the existing duality between the very restrictive written law and the widely prac-
ticed customary law, giving rise to insecurity, instability and precariousness of land tenure. 
The Rwandan government, therefore, found it compelling and necessary to establish a na-
tional land policy that would guarantee a safe and stable form of land tenure, and bring about 
a rational and planned use of land while ensuring sound land management and an efficient 
land administration. (Government of Rwanda 2004: 5)  
Hereafter the document argues that: 
On the whole, Rwanda’s land tenure system requires comprehensive reforms, from the elab-
oration of a national land policy to the establishment of a land law and land code, which will 
guide the judicious use and management of the land resource for the economy to be able to 
take off in such a way that our country is freed from the grips of poverty. (Ibid.: 9)  
The government claimed that improving the agricultural sector and increasing 
land-tenure security would help to consolidate peace and social cohesion 
(Musahara & Huggins 2005: 307). Focusing on rural land-use management, the 
land policy document also discusses land administration, land tenure, land regis-
try, land transactions and the use and management of rural land. Farmland own-
                                                 
11 A tendency to blame peasants for their poverty was clearly expressed by one high-ranking Rwandan 
government official that Ansoms (2009b: 297-298) interviewed who argued that ‘One should not wait
until one comes to help you as if you are a little baby. The head of state is angry with this spirit. 
Instead of depending upon others, one has to do things on one’s own ... We really have to convince 
everyone to be with this national slogan that everyone has to go forward in life’.
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ers should have full rights of ownership through title deeds with a lease of up to 
99 years and the system of land administration would be based on a reformed 
cadastre system that would facilitate taxation (Government of Rwanda 2004: 25-
30). Land property may be sold, mortgaged, given or bequeathed (Ibid.: 34) and 
owners have to develop their land and take measures to improve soil and water 
conservation. Agriculture should be based on specialization (Ibid.: 43). The poli-
cy argues that the fact that land will be clearly registered ‘gives comprehensive 
land tenure security and minimizes cases of disputes and lawsuits’ (Ibid.: 47). On 
the other hand, the document states that ‘priority will be given to tenants with a 
proven intention to develop and make rational use of the land. This is in order to 
promote professional agriculture’ (Ibid.: 30). This raises the question as to 
whether some farmers will be denied the right to register their land and what 
consequences this will have for tenure security and land disputes. Another con-
fusing issue is the redistribution of plots. The policy describes how people who 
have been dispossessed of their land (the document claims that these are mostly 
1959 Tutsi refugees) should receive land, if necessary through land sharing 
(Ibid.: 27). Concerning land redistribution, it states that ‘should the redistribution 
of land become necessary as a result of the government’s decision that a certain 
area must be divided out into plots for the benefit of a large number of landless 
people, the original residents will be compensated either financially or in kind’ 
(Ibid.: 42). Apart from its slightly vague phrasing, this statement raises questions 
about the tenure security of farmers and the effects on land disputes as well as the 
enforcement of compensation.  
The underlying reasoning for these policy statements is that ‘it will not always 
be possible for every Rwandan to possess a plot of land of his own. Agro pastoral 
land will only be allocated to those who are professional farmers or pastoralists. 
This is to avoid wastage by under-utilization’ (Government of Rwanda 2004: 
29). Like the previous land policy statement concerning the promotion of profes-
sional agriculture, this one also reveals the government’s wish to place agricul-
tural land in the hands of professional farmers, again raising questions about 
land-tenure security for small-scale peasants (Ibid.: 42).  
According to Des Forges (2006: 360), the reason for the government’s unwill-
ingness to take into account the position and opinion of small-scale peasants is 
because: 
… from the early days of its rule, the RPF recognized the potential of agriculture as a force 
for economic development. But if they foresaw its bright future, they also saw its dismal pre-
sent with too many Rwandans painfully eking out a living from holdings that were too small. 
They attributed low productivity in the agricultural sector to the size of holdings, the way the 
fields of a cultivator might be scattered in several locations and the dispersed settlement pat-
tern where farmers lived in or near their fields. In statements on land policy and in the land 
law, they qualified land tenure and farming as archaic, anarchic, lacking in specialisation and 
badly managed.  
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As previously argued, this position led to a belief that agriculture should be car-
ried out by modern, professional farmers working on consolidated plots where 
they would produce cash crops or raise cattle. This would mean that many farm-
ers would be displaced but they would work for these professional farmers or try 
their luck in the developing urban centres (Ibid.). Ansoms also concluded that 
peasant agriculture was expected to play a minor role in the desired economic 
structure. Many of the policymakers Ansoms (2009a: 80-82) interviewed sup-
ported the idea of a quick modernization and professionalization of the agricul-
tural sector that would focus on maximizing productivity and output and enlarg-
ing farm units. When the Land Law and land policy is discussed in more detail, it 
will become clear how problematic this vision of agriculture turned out to be.  
The 2005 Organic Land Law, which determined the use and management of 
land in Rwanda, was finally adopted in 2005 but was mainly a ‘framework law’ 
with an outline of legal principles but no implementation mechanisms. It also 
contained some 28 pieces of secondary legislation, ministerial orders and other 
subsidiary regulations (Huggins 2011: 256, 261, Note 5). The long process of 
drafting and negotiations and the numerous internal debates show both the im-
portance and the sensitivity attached to the reforms (Ansoms 2008: 14; Pottier 
2006: 510; Wyss 2006: 6). Musahara & Huggins (2005: 270, 288) considered the 
land policy reform as probably the most sensitive item on the government’s 
agenda because issues like plot consolidation and dispute resolution regarding 
land sharing were controversial and among the key issues of debate in govern-
ment. 
The government withdrew the 2005 Organic Land Law in June 2013 and in-
troduced the Law Governing Land in Rwanda in order to: 
… transform the Organic land Law into ordinary law in order to comply with the provisions 
of the constitution of the Republic of Rwanda. In addition, various weaknesses in the Organ-
ic land Law which made its application difficult, have been addressed […] The new Land 
law is found as a long term solution as it takes into consideration all aspects of the Land pol-
icy which has been adopted by the government of Rwanda in 2004. (Ministry of Natural Re-
sources)12
One of the most important changes made in the 2013 Land Law concerns the 
possible confiscation of land if it is not considered to be used in a productive 
manner (IZUBA Newspaper).13 Huggins (2014) refers to this when he claims that 
the 2013 Land Law is more explicit about peasants’ responsibilities regarding 
compliance with land-use regularization and mentions four articles that underline 
                                                 
12 http://minirena.gov.rw/index.php?id=61&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=180&cHash=352b7e3af44ca00 
eae78fe3b96d40794 Accessed 22 September 2014. 
13  This newspaper article was translated from Kinyarwanda by the LAND Project: 
http://www.rwandaland.org/images/pdf/The%20land%20which%20will%20not%20be%20exploited%
20by%20land%20owners%20will%20be%20confiscated.pdf. 
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his conclusion.14 In Article 2 of the Land Law, which defines the terms used, 
Clause 13 explains land assignment as being ‘a temporary transfer by the State of 
the right to use land to a third party when the lessee or owner has failed to fulfil 
land use directives and obligations’. Possible forceful confiscation of degraded or 
unexploited land was also mentioned in the 2005 Organic Land Law that stated 
that the owner was to be given six months’ notice of any planned confiscation. 
However, in Article 77 of the 2013 Land Law, this term is reduced to only 15 
days, while Article 37 stresses that the state can specify extra obligations that 
have to be fulfilled to conserve and exploit the land as intended and Article 27 
explicitly states that ‘all land leases and land transactions shall respect the land 
use plans of the area where the land is located’ (Huggins 2014b: 108; 
Government of Rwanda 2013). 
Both the 2005 and 2013 Land Laws make registration compulsory (Articles 5 
and 20 respectively) and each person or association is allowed to have land on a 
long-term lease in exchange for a lease fee (Article 43 of the 2013 Land Law). 
To implement land registration, the government set up the National Land Tenure 
Regularisation Programme (NLTRP) that started as a pilot in 2008 and was 
launched nationwide in 2009 (Huggins 2014a: 2; Rwanda Initiative for 
Sustainable Development 2012: 3). The idea was that issuing secure official land 
certificates would encourage peasants to invest more in land conservation and 
quality improvements (Ansoms 2008: 14).  
Article 30 of the 2013 Land Law states that it is forbidden to make plots of 1 
ha or less. In addition, it states that ‘for purposes of optimization of productivity, 
an Order of the Minister in charge of Agriculture and Animal Resources shall set 
up procedures and modalities of land-use consolidation for agricultural and live-
stock purposes’ (Government of Rwanda 2013). Comparing this article with the 
land-use consolidation article in the previous 2005 Organic Land Law that men-
tions that it is up to local authorities (with the respective peasants) to decide on 
consolidating small plots and that after consolidation each farmer will remain 
entitled to the rights over his/her parcel shows the government’s determination to 
submit peasants to land-use regularization.  
When the 2005 Land Law and 2004 land policy were published, the main cri-
tique regarding Article 30 could be divided into two themes: the problem that 
people might lose land if they did not own the required 1 ha that was deemed 
viable, and the consolidation of several small plots with different owners to en-
courage greater production. Regarding loss of land, which is connected to in-
creasing land scarcity, the land policy suggests that ‘not everyone will be able to 
                                                 
14 Huggins gives different articles and clause numbers because he worked with the draft version of the 
2013 Land Law.
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get back his farms, given the existing pattern of scattered settlement. However, 
those who miss out will be compensated’ (Government of Rwanda 2004: 41). 
What is problematic in this respect, as Musahara & Huggins pointed out, is that 
an estimated 73% to 77% of Rwandan households already own less than 1 ha of 
(often dispersed) plots. This would mean that between 25% and 33% of the entire 
population would have to give up land (Musahara & Huggins 2005: 314; see also 
Pottier 2006: 525-526). It is doubtful whether the compensation mentioned in the 
policy would be appropriate and, even if this was the case, it was not clear what 
alternatives the newly landless would have (Musahara & Huggins 2005: 313; 
Pottier 2006: 524).  
Van Hoyweghen (1999: 369) argued that land reform can only work if other 
economic sectors can absorb people. However, many peasants will find changing 
to a small business (too) risky and it is unlikely that poor landless or resource-
poor farmers will voluntarily consider leaving agriculture (Pottier 2006: 525; 
Musahara & Huggins 2005: 314). Furthermore, if land expropriation affects a 
number of households in the same region and at the same time, the labour market 
could be flooded with people trying to start up a small business. This might lead 
to a lot of people trying their luck in urban areas, which could create an urban 
underclass as neither the policy nor the law itself provides clarification on how 
the poor will be trained, housed or employed in the urban areas (Musahara & 
Huggins 2005: 313-314; Des Forges 2006: 370). Wyss (2006: 28) supported 
these concerns and said that various civil-society representatives were afraid that 
the policy would lead to large-scale landownership and the ‘purest capitalism’. 
Musahara & Huggins (2005: 313) questioned whether land-use consolidation 
as a means of commercialization and intensification would significantly improve 
productivity. Although they claimed that consolidation could lead, for instance, 
to economies of scale, mechanization and better-positioned associations, experts 
have argued that this will not result in a significant increase in production. Both 
Musahara & Huggins and Pottier cited World Bank consultant Blarel, who 
claimed, in the late 1980s, that consolidation in Rwanda was unlikely to boost 
productivity significantly. The benefits of fragmentation, like crop diversifica-
tion, better risk and labour management and the ability to buy and sell plots ac-
cording to peasants’ financial situation, may outweigh any negative aspects 
(Blarel et al. 1992, as cited in Musahara & Huggins 2005: 313; Pottier 2006: 
523). In addition, if farmers have to turn from more drought-resistant crops to 
cash crops, they will lose control of their land-based livelihood strategies and this 
could negatively affect their food security. Musahara & Huggins (2005: 315-316) 
anticipated that it would only be farmers who were land-rich and had better ac-
cess to markets who would benefit from the sector’s commercialization. This 
argument is fully supported by Ansoms (2009a: 288), who felt that the current 
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land reform was not pro-poor and would only ‘stimulate a path of rural change 
that enhances the increasing polarisation between rural classes and their liveli-
hood profiles’. Connected to this, Pottier (2006: 523) highlighted the lack of clar-
ity about how the government would implement consolidation and expressed 
concerns about the level of coercion that resource-poor peasants might expect. 
Suggesting that consolidation be compulsory, like other policies, because people 
will not adopt it of their free will, Musahara & Huggins (2005: 316) argued that: 
… even if the decisions made are technically appropriate, the very act of compulsory consol-
idation may be a source of discontent, partly because of the traditional ‘attachment to the 
land’ felt by Rwandan peasants, and because it will go against much of the democratic, par-
ticipatory language of the government. 
Apart from questions about making consolidation compulsory, Des Forges indi-
cated that it was unclear how consolidation should be interpreted. Would it be an 
operational process in which cooperating farmers retained rights over their own 
plots, or a process that would also entail redistribution of land in which people 
who lost land would receive some kind of compensation? According to Des 
Forges (2006: 367), the land policy and the Land Law contradict each other on 
this issue. 
Both the Land Law and land policy stress that Rwanda’s agriculture needs 
more specialization and intensification to increase food production. As part of 
wider agricultural reform, the Crop Intensification Programme (CIP) was set up 
to realize these aims (Huggins 2014b: 95).15 To increase production, peasants 
should turn to monocropping, i.e. the cultivation of one crop per plot. With crop 
specialization, each region would need to specialize in certain crops chosen ac-
cording to agricultural, biological and climatic conditions and market needs. Lo-
cal authorities would decide which crops should be grown and instruct peasants 
on how to cultivate them (Ansoms 2011: 131). However, it is questionable 
whether small-scale, risk-averse peasants would be willing and able to cultivate 
the specified crops, as most Rwandan peasants are used to cultivating a variety of 
crops, including food crops, to improve soil fertility and reduce the risk of total 
crop failure or the collapse of cash-crop prices (Musahara & Huggins 2005: 327-
328; Ansoms 2008: 17). Another important issue was whether these peasants 
would have strong enough positions of power to defend their own interests in 
regional markets (Ansoms 2008: 17). Musahara & Huggins (2005: 328) argued 
that ‘the rational nature of these diversified cropping patterns should not be ig-
nored by policy makers’. 
                                                 
15 Parts of this programme are discussed in this chapter. Huggins (2014b: 95-100) describes the main 
elements of the CIP: land-use consolidation, the delivery of government-approved seeds and 
subsidized fertilizers, agricultural extension focusing on CIP-approved crops and fertilizers, a ban on 
multi-cropping, post-harvest storage and transport; and the sale of crops through cooperatives. 
209573-L-bw-ASC
165
It has been suggested that the Land Law and the land policy were both heavily 
influenced by the neo-liberal vision of the World Bank (Ansoms & Claessens 
2011: 15; Huggins 2011: 256) and its rural development policies that advocate 
better-working markets in which more commercially oriented, entrepreneurial 
farmers tend to operate (Akram-Lodhi 2008: 1155). According to its World De-
velopment Report 2008, the World Bank has not encouraged small-scale farmers 
to farm their way out of poverty (Akram-Lodhi 2008: 1159). On the contrary, the 
World Bank claims that:  
… behind every farmer [there is] either a budding entrepreneur waiting to be unleashed by 
the power of the market or a worker who would be better off working for the entrepreneur 
than working his or her own piece of land. (Akram-Lodhi 2008: 1157)  
Akram-Lodhi (Ibid.) resents this vision and believes that: 
… commercially-oriented smallholder farming will create problems for smallholder farming 
as growth processes become engendered, in that those commercially-oriented smallholder 
farm entrepreneurs that are successful in their decision making will require enhanced access 
to resources in order to continue to grow. These resources are likely to come from the com-
paratively less successful and more market vulnerable smallholder farmers that are unable to 
make the leap into commercially-oriented farming and whose farming activity is, in global 
terms, not viable in the long term when set beside commercially-oriented entrepreneurial 
smallholder farming.  
As Chapter 4 showed, plot sizes have been diminishing since the end of the 
1990s while land scarcity and tenure insecurity have increased for the majority of 
Rwanda’s subsistence farmers. As there are currently few options outside the 
agricultural sector, the World Bank’s strategy has become highly problematic.
This section has summarized the content of the new Land Law and policies 
that aim to professionalize the agricultural sector through economies of scale. As 
the government was not willing to take the position and opinions of Rwandan 
peasants into account, the policies contained the same basic ideas that the gov-
ernment had held from the start. The World Bank’s neo-liberal vision has been 
seen to have significantly influenced these new policies. As a consequence, it can 
be concluded that many of the measures appear to favour better-off farmers who 
can be more commercial and competitive than their small-scale, poorer counter-
parts. The land-consolidation and crop-specialization policies and the one-hectare 
rule point to this in particular. In a country like Rwanda where there are few eco-
nomic opportunities and limited off-farm employment, such measures are likely 
to impact negatively on small-scale peasants, who form the majority of the rural 
population, as will be show in the next section. 
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The Land Law and Land Policy in Detail 
This section focuses on three of the main policies in the 2013 Land Law and the 
2004 land policy: land registration, crop specialization and land consolidation. It 
will consider their impact on tenure and food security and examine how they are 
working in practice. Scholarly comments are linked to various observations noted 
during fieldwork in Mubinda in 2010 when these policies were being implement-
ed. 
Some General Remarks on Land-Tenure Security 
Before land registration started in Rwanda, some general issues concerning land 
registration were debated by Rwandan scholars. One of the main issues con-
cerned land ownership. Rwandan farmers, in official debates with the govern-
ment on land issues, expressed the view that they owned their land (Des Forges 
2006: 365). One of my informants, who investigated the opinion of farmers in-
volved in a land-registration pilot, also found that they did not regard land held 
on a 99-year lease as ‘real property’. Instead, they wanted land rights to be abso-
lute because they felt that the land belonged to them. Huggins (2014a: 2) under-
stood from peasants he interviewed in 2010, 2011 and 2013 that they were ‘un-
pleasantly surprised’ by the lease certificate and feared that their land rights 
would not be secure. This view seems to be supported in the land policy, which 
states that ‘Rwandans consider that once a right has been acquired or recognized, 
even customarily, it is indefeasible’ (Government of Rwanda 2004: 26) and that 
‘the Rwandan peasant, just as the city dweller, considers himself as the owner of 
his plot of land, while the government considers itself as the prominent owner of 
the land’ (Ibid.: 51). However, Des Forges (2006: 365-366) pointed out that both 
the (2005) Land Law and policy contradict this. For instance, the documents treat 
‘ownership’ ambiguously when, seemingly referring to the same category of 
people, they talk about landholders and landowners and the right to use as well as 
the right to own the land. In addition, the law specifies that owning land means 
the right to a long-term lease that allows one to use the land rather than full rights 
of ownership as the term is usually understood. With this notion of a 99-year 
lease, which was only added in the final version of the 2004 policy, it appears 
that the government wants to stress that land holders are only assured of the right 
to use land and not of its actual ownership, ignoring the views of Rwandan farm-
ers (Ibid.: 366).  
Tenure security may have a different meaning for Rwandan farmers with re-
gard to the issue of tenure security, which the government wanted to guarantee 
through registration (Musahara & Huggins 2005: 319; Wyss 2006: 29). Accord-
ing to Musahara & Huggins (2005: 319), ‘experience demonstrates that what 
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most farmers want is security from land disputes – which typically involve mem-
bers of the family, neighbouring households, or agents of the state’. This view 
was shared by Van Hoyweghen (1999: 368), who argued that it is tension and 
conflicts over land that had to be reduced to increase tenure security. Musahara 
& Huggins (2005: 319-320) highlighted land sharing in Eastern Province to show 
that tensions over land, which were created because of the ad hoc nature of land 
sharing, had made people want some degree of guarantee regarding their right to 
land.16 Des Forges (2006: 364) referred to land sharing and the villagization poli-
cy when arguing that it was ultimately these state-implemented policies that had 
created much of the tenure insecurity in the past and would probably continue to 
do so in the future as the Land Law and land policy indicated that both policies 
would continue. Ansoms (2011: 134-136) found in her 2007 research that re-
spondents distrusted the bureaucracy surrounding land registration and expressed 
their reluctance to pay for it. Poorer peasants did not see the value of registration 
and feared state interference in production, while land-rich peasants were reluc-
tant to reveal the actual size of their parcels to ‘the research team, to one another, 
and most certainly to the authorities’. In line with these concerns, Huggins (2011:
257) stated another worry, namely that if the land registration process was im-
plemented too rapidly and without adequate (external) monitoring, local adminis-
trators might engage in land grabbing.17
Worries were expressed that popular perceptions about what the land-
registration process entailed would lead to fears that registration would not be 
possible for those with land parcels smaller than 1 ha (i.e. the majority of the 
peasant population)18 or for peasants who were unable to pay registration costs. 
Instead, wealthier and more powerful farmers would be able to claim rights at the 
expense of poorer farmers (Musahara & Huggins 2005: 320; Pottier 2006: 521-
523; Wyss 2006: 29).19 Des Forges pointed to this fear and reluctance and argued 
that the policy implied that authorities would give priority in the registration pro-
cedure to people with a proven intention of developing their land. Like Wyss, 
Pottier and Musahara & Huggins, she feared that, as the policy indicates that not 
everyone will have a plot of land, people who lack the resources need to increase 
                                                 
16 Huggins (2011: 258) pointed out that the land law retroactively legalizes land sharing but questions 
the validity of the law article.
17 This remark was made in the context of a critical article on the unaccountability and non-transparency 
of a Presidential Commission that was set up in 2007 to redistribute large tracts of land to landless 
families. These had been illegally acquired by military officers, politicians, former local 
administrators and other politically well-connected individuals (Huggins 2011).
18 Musahara & Huggins (2005: 314) pointed this out with regard to Article 30 of the Land Law on land 
consolidation and the prohibition of parcelling plots of (less than) 1 ha, arguing that about 75% of all 
households already owned less than this. 
19 Connected to this concern is the fact that the formal nature of the registration process gives an 
advantage to better-off farmers who have easier access to information and are more familiar with 
formal processes (Ansoms 2008: 14-15).
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their amount of land or who refuse to consolidate their plots ‘seem likely to be 
the losers and may be driven to sell their land to the more fortunate’ (Des Forges 
2006: 366-367). Another problem that Ansoms (2011: 135) touched on was the 
fact that many peasants revealed that they did not wish to consolidate inherited 
land (if this measured less than 1 ha) with any family members as they feared 
that the most powerful member of the family would take the largest part of the 
harvest. It was suggested that these kinds of problems could escalate and turn 
violent.
Another potential problem was that the ban on dividing plots of less than 1 ha 
would mean that, in times of distress, peasants could only sell a plot of 1 ha. This 
would leave them empty-handed and they would be unlikely to be able to buy 
back this or another plot at a later date as any other land available for purchase 
would also be a minimum of 1 ha (Ansoms 2008: 16). The measure to consoli-
date small plots into larger plots therefore suggests that land will ultimately be in 
the hands of fewer and more efficient farmers. This vision was supported by Des 
Forges (2006: 368) who, in line with her above-mentioned concern about the 
more fortunate, stated that: 
… it is clear that those with resources will meet the criteria for success under the new land 
system: they will be able to purchase large blocks of land, particularly as the poor are driven 
to sell their plots; they will have the capital to invest in the equipment, better seeds, and other 
expensive inputs to make their land productive. 
The fact that a ceiling of 50 ha was mentioned in a draft version but did not ap-
pear in the final Land Law is another indication that the government wants to 
create economies of scale. It reasons that larger plots are more suitable for mod-
ern techniques and can be managed more productively (Ansoms 2008: 14-15). 
As was the case with the afore-mentioned critique of Article 30 on the prohibi-
tion of parcelling plots smaller than 1 ha, this again raises the question about 
what would happen if many small-scale peasants had to abandon subsistence 
farming. As Ansoms (2009a: 83-87, 97) pointed out, the government is clear 
about its goal of reducing the number of people living off agriculture but is not at 
all clear about the alternatives that await them once they leave the sector.20
At present, there are few signs that off-farm employment and economic opportunities will be 
readily available at such a scale, nor does past experience suggest that any economic growth 
effects would trickle down quickly enough to assist the remaining population. (Ibid.: 87) 
A first observation regarding these critical remarks about plot size, registration 
costs, compensation and job alternatives in Mubinda, where many respondents 
owned less than 1 ha, is that I did not come across any land-poor respondents 
who had been unable to register. It appeared that all plots, regardless of their size, 
                                                 
20 As mentioned earlier, the government wants to reduce the peasant population from 85% to 50% by 
2020.
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were being registered and I also did not meet any respondents who had not paid 
for this process. With regard to land-tenure security, some respondents did, how-
ever, talk about their suspicions that the state would eventually take their land. 
Similar concerns were also expressed by respondents in Ansoms’ study (Ibid.:
201).
The government’s track record has not been encouraging concerning the pro-
posed compensation when land is confiscated. Many people in Mubinda had had 
to move to the village in 1996-1997 as part of the villagization policy and had 
been allocated tracts of land that had previously been owned and cultivated by 
other peasants. All the respondents who had lost land this way claimed that they 
had never received any compensation, either in cash or in land. If some Mubinda 
respondents’ concerns prove to be correct, people who have to give up their land 
are unlikely to be compensated and will face difficulties providing for their fami-
lies. Finding new means of making a living will be all the more difficult as non-
farm alternatives are almost non-existent. Many respondents do not have enough 
land to provide for their families at present and have to work on someone else’s 
land to earn additional income. If people in Mubinda lose their land, the pool of 
agricultural labour could become so large that people would have to compete 
with each other, which would further aggravate social tensions and lead to in-
creased destitution. In addition, only a small minority of people have alternative 
work and, even if they do, this does not usually provide enough for them to live 
off. As there was no electricity in Mubinda at the time and hardly any means of 
public transport, people are not encouraged to leave agriculture to start a small 
business. On the contrary, people in Mubinda still rely heavily on agriculture and 
they will do everything in their power to hold on to their land. 
The Registration Process 
The land-registration process was as follows: local people who had been appoint-
ed and trained for the special Land Committees demarcated the plots using aerial 
photos with the help of local authorities and peasants. The committees pre-
registered the owners of the plot, issued claim receipts and, in cases of conflict, 
registered the contested plot in a ‘dispute register’ (cf. Sagashya & English 2010; 
Santos, Fletschner & Daconto 2014). By August 2013, 10.3 million parcels had 
been registered and 8.4 million certificates had been issued. This left 1.9 million 
parcels subject to further investigation (Huggins 2014a: 2). 
A family − a husband and wife and their children – had to pay RWF 1000 
(about € 1.25) per plot and all their names were put in the register and later on 
the official land certificate. In cases where there was a second or third wife to 
whom the man was not officially married, the husband could also register a plot 
jointly with her. These couples could register as ‘partners’ with one registered as 
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the owner of the plot and the other as the primary heir, or with one registering as 
the owner and their children as the heirs. The option that a couple that was not 
officially married chose usually depended on their relationship. Couples that 
trusted each other would, for instance, in the case of two plots, register the wom-
an as the owner and her informal husband as the ‘partner’ and heir of one plot 
and the husband as the owner and the wife as the partner of the other, while less 
trusting couples would register their respective parcels in their own names 
(Jones-Casey, Dick & Bizoza 2014: 46). Pritchard (2013: 190), who conducted 
fieldwork in 2009 on the land reforms and held more than hundred interviews 
with peasants, local land administrators and policymakers across Rwanda, states 
that most peasants who were willing to register their plots (5 on average) were 
financially able to do so. The government seemed to cooperate well in this pro-
cess by keeping the costs of registration low and giving peasants the opportunity 
to postpone payment (and the collection of their certificates) until they had ac-
cumulated the amount required.21 However, a 2013 countrywide study by the 
Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development (RISD), a Rwandan NGO, de-
clared that many peasants could not afford the registration fee and often decided 
to put their plot together with those of other owners and pay the fee collectively. 
Unfortunately, when plots were registered as one plot under a single name, peas-
ants whose names did not appear on the land certificate as the owner then found 
themselves dispossessed ‘of a vital resource by a document whose power they 
did not anticipate’ (Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development 2013: 17). In 
other cases, the RISD found that individuals managed to appropriate individual 
ownership over land that had previously been cultivated collectively. Concerning 
the victims of these appropriations, RISD (2013: 17) stated that: ‘Unaware that 
their land rights could be transferred to one individual by a single document, en-
tire families have lost their access to land through the registration process’. It 
concluded that there was a ‘serious reluctance’ to participate in the land-
registration process and that only 45% of its respondents had collected their final 
land certificate (Ibid.: 15): ‘many rural residents are leaving their titles at the reg-
istration office due to prohibitive titling fees, the taxes that come with a title, and 
an overall lack of incentive to own a title’ (Ibid.: 10).  
During my final fieldwork period in November and December 2010, land regis-
tration was being carried out in Mubinda and, as previously mentioned, we ob-
served that all respondents had paid for registration and most people had regis-
tered. However, our interviews took place during the registration process itself, 
so it could well be that the problems the RISD encountered occurred after regis-
                                                 
21 Registration costs were significantly lower than those connected to the informal land market where 
people have to pay 6% of the total sale price to protect the land they purchase (Pritchard 2013: 190).
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tration. A young man, who was a member of the Land Committee in one of Mu-
binda’s neighbourhoods, explained the procedure for registering a land conflict 
and showed us an empty dispute register. This confirmed the National Land Ten-
ure Regularization Programme’s claim that less than 1% of all claims were dis-
puted. However, in April 2012, the pro-government newspaper New Times men-
tioned that land conflicts referred to the National Ombudsman had more than 
doubled between 2009 and 2011 because of intensified competition over land and 
due to alleged negligence and corruption by local authorities (Huggins 2014a: 2-
3). The RISD study also found that land conflicts continued after registration 
(Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development 2013: 10). In line with these 
observations and concerns and in contrast to the government’s view that registra-
tion would reduce land conflicts, I also found that land conflicts in Mubinda had 
increased as a result of land registration, as will be discussed in the next chapter.  
Land-Tenure Security after Registration 
Although respondents reported that they had been able to register their plots, we 
noticed that many people in Mubinda felt uneasy about land registration. Mercia, 
for instance, believed that land registration would only benefit the state and not 
the peasants involved because the latter knew their boundaries very well and did 
not, therefore, need to register their plots. She feared that once they were regis-
tered, the state would levy taxes on every parcel. This fear corresponds with the 
above-mentioned reluctance found in the 2013 RISD study to collect land certifi-
cates. Ansoms’ respondents were concerned that their registered plots would be 
subject to taxation and there was a reluctance to inform authorities about their 
actual sizes (Ansoms 2011: 134-135). This was also mentioned in another RISD 
study carried out between October 2011 and January 2012 on the impact of the 
land lease fee. In this study, 98% of respondents claimed that they had never 
been informed about the fee. The majority of the people (about 75% of rural and 
urban respondents) had only heard about it when they came to collect their certif-
icate(s) or when they were given information by neighbours or relatives who had 
collected theirs (about 25%). Although some 96% of all rural landowners were 
exempt from paying a land lease fee because they belonged to ‘vulnerable’ 
groups and/or owned less than 2 ha, RISD (2012: 16-22) claimed that, in many 
areas, these people were forced to pay. The reason for authorities keeping quiet 
about the lease fee is unknown but: 
… it could have been to encourage people to tell the truth about the size and use of their land 
because if they knew that the lease fee could be proportional to the land’s size and location 
some landowners would be tempted to provide false information. (Ibid.: 21)  
In addition, Mercia believed that the fact that the state used an expensive aerial 
method (with a plane taking photos) to facilitate demarcation was a sign that the 
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government had other goals too. A 2014 USAID study on gender and land and 
property rights mentions women in Eastern Province who explained that some 
families did not want to register their land because they feared that once it had 
been registered, the government would confiscate it (Jones-Casey, Dick & 
Bizoza 2014: 48). And Pritchard (2013: 190) found that 68% of his peasant re-
spondents feared that the government would take their land as well. One of his 
respondents from Northern Province explained that they felt that ultimately noth-
ing could protect them:  
If someone from the community tries to take away your land, then you can go to the leader-
ship [village level] and they can protect you. If the Government tries to take your land, there 
is nothing you can do.  
In a district adjacent to Ngoma District (of which Mubinda is a part), Huggins 
(2009b: 301) found examples of where land had already been confiscated. This 
involved fields that peasants had left fallow to promote soil fertility and that had 
been temporarily reallocated by local authorities for other peasants to cultivate. 
These confiscations were arbitrary and illegal as the Land Law states that land 
has to be unused for three or more years before it can be reallocated for another 
three years. There were also examples of the use of physical violence, such as 
that of a military man who beat peasants who left parts of their plots uncultivat-
ed. 
When I asked respondents during my 2008 fieldwork about the (then 2005) 
Land Law, a large majority of the people who had heard of the law declared that 
they believed that land registration would give them more security and would, 
consequently, enable them to produce more. Pritchard (2013: 193) too found that 
many peasants who lived in regions where land registration had not yet started 
were excited about it and about receiving fertilizers and hybrid seeds that would 
come with crop specialization. However, once people had experienced land reg-
istration and crop specialization, they became frustrated with the policies and 
fearful of the negative impact on their food and tenure security. In areas where 
registration and land consolidation had taken place, 21% of Pritchard’s respond-
ents felt ‘severely frustrated’ but continued to support the long-term goals of pri-
vate land ownership and intensification as they were simply waiting to see how 
these policies would affect them, while 60% showed ‘significant fear and frustra-
tion’ with the reforms’ goals and methods. Based on these findings and the fact 
that land is an essential component of Rwanda’s social, political and economic 
relations, Pritchard concludes that ‘as registration and intensification expand 
throughout Rwanda, increasing feelings of frustration and helplessness within 
and across regions could significantly undermine the potential success of rural 
reforms’ (Ibid.). The next section looks more closely at the land-consolidation 
and crop-specialization policies.  
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Land Consolidation and Crop Specialization and the Effect on Tenure and Food 
Security 
Pritchard (2013: 190-192) found that land consolidation and crop specialization 
and their simultaneous implementation with land registration reduced land-tenure 
security even further.22 Many peasants feel vulnerable as they have come to real-
ize that formalizing their land rights has gone hand in hand with ‘centralizing all 
aspects of agricultural decision making away from farmers, turning them into 
agricultural labourers’ (Ibid.: 190) who can no longer invest in environmental 
protection and production according to their own wishes and plans. One of 
Pritchard’s respondents summarized this feeling by claiming that ‘the Govern-
ment gave us titles just to blindfold us’ (Ibid.: 191). In line with this increased 
vulnerability, Huggins also recounts how local authorities forced certain land-
management plans on the population in many areas, notably as a result of per-
formance contracts that the government signed with local authorities.23 Peasants 
were forced to join cooperatives that lack transparency, are sometimes plagued 
by corruption and have to implement decisions concerning all aspects of farming. 
They are often obliged to sell their harvest on severely restricted terms through 
this cooperative24 or to buy a certain seed or fertilizer from the local authorities 
that they may not be able to afford and that are supplied on credit but that they 
have to pay back after harvesting (Huggins 2009b: 299-301).25 Criticizing the 
aggressive and forceful implementation of these land policies, Pritchard (2013: 
191) concluded that: 
… in theory, registration is meant to provide farmers with greater security over their proper-
ty. In practice, mandatory intensification and the ensuing threats of eviction completely re-
strict household rights over private lands, and in doing so, undermine any sense of security 
obtained through formalization.  
Even before the implementation of land consolidation and crop specialization, 
Ansoms (2009a: 201-202) found that peasants from Southern Province regarded 
land consolidation and crop specialization as problematic. Many of those she in-
terviewed considered land consolidation to be impossible because they saw land 
ownership as an individual right, had their own way of doing things and valued 
                                                 
22 Ansoms (2011: 131) has argued that crop specialization and monocropping are not new and that there 
were ‘disastrous results’ related to these policies under the pre-genocide Habyarimana regime.
23 These performance contracts are discussed in Chapter 4. Each district sets out its agricultural targets in 
a contract and if these are not met, ‘district authorities can expect their careers to be negatively 
affected’ – a situation which pushes them into using coercion (Huggins 2009b: 299). 
24 Peasants in Eastern Province, for instance, said that authorities would search their bags for maize and 
threatened them with imprisonment or fines if they sold their harvest before a specified date (Huggins 
2009b: 301).
25 In turn, Huggins (2014a: 5) found that local authorities are also encouraged to sell fertilizer to 
peasants because the former are paid for every kg used. A private firm is often that selected to provide 
agricultural extension services and has an exclusive contract to sell seeds and fertilizers, which 
encourages its representatives to focus on distribution rather than on farmers’ demands. 
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this individuality. One respondent went as far as stating that ‘pleading for plot 
consolidation would be considered as an act of aggression towards others’ (Ibid.:
202), while another peasant argued that ‘you cannot touch upon the land of an-
other. If you do that, he will cut you into pieces’ (Ansoms 2011: 135). More 
practical objections that peasants mentioned included the fact that adjacent plots 
did not necessarily have the same soil type and/or fertility that was suitable for a 
certain crop and that peasants might have different capacities and attitudes re-
garding their physical and moral strength. Another important obstacle that was 
mentioned concerned the different living conditions of peasants. For example, 
poorer peasants have smaller plot sizes, are more inclined to harvest premature-
ly26 and are also more at risk of famine if a crop fails than better-off farmers. 
This results in different interests and needs, and increasing hesitation among 
peasants in different categories to work together. Those who were better-off did 
not seem willing to work with poorer peasants, while the latter feared that coop-
eration would lead to weaker land rights (Ansoms 2009a: 202). The arguments 
about soil type and fertility and different living conditions were also used by An-
soms’ respondents when discussing crop specialization, as respondents from dif-
ferent regions had had bad experiences with crop diseases. With their own specif-
ic levels of food security, the various categories of peasants (very poor, poor and 
(somewhat) better-off) prefer to grow different crops and may not, therefore, 
agree with specialization (Ibid.: 197-198). Respondents also argued that speciali-
zation ‘would make peasants entirely dependent upon food markets that function 
poorly’ (Ibid.: 198) and where intermediary brokers set the prices (Ibid.: 199). In 
relation to this, respondents, and especially poorer peasants, referred to their lim-
ited bargaining power and to price fluctuations for a particular crop27 and also 
between crops (Ibid.: 198-199).28
The obstacles that Ansoms’ respondents envisaged were closely linked to food 
security, and Pritchard found that it had effectively decreased in regions where 
land registration and crop specialization had been implemented. To prepare for 
crop specialization, peasants are forced to clear their plots of all crops, some-
times even in the middle of the growing season, and have to leave their plots fal-
low until they receive the hybrid seeds they are supposed to plant. Fertilizers, 
which are essential for monocropping, are often arriving late and some peasants 
find they have to wait several growing seasons because local authorities fail to 
                                                 
26 One respondent gave an example of better-off farmers who harvested cassava after five years, while 
poorer peasants were forced to partially harvest some after several months (Ansoms 2011: 135).
27 For example, the price of a crop is much higher at the time when one has to buy seeds than it is at 
harvest time (Ansoms 2009a: 199).
28 As the price of certain crops, like cassava, is much lower than other crops, like potatoes, some regions 
could lose out, while others win (Ansoms 2009a: 199).
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deliver these vital inputs.29 Another complicating factor is the ban on multi-
cropping that can ‘significantly reduce exposure to disease and drought while 
enabling households to plant different crops for different purposes, and stagger 
harvest times across a single growing season’(Pritchard 2013: 192). The large 
majority of Rwandan peasants prefer this risk-averting practice that can improve 
soil fertility, reduce the risk of total crop failure and/or the collapse of cash-crop 
prices (Musahara & Huggins 2005: 327-328). Especially poorer peasants, who 
often lack manure, believe this strategy helps them to avoid famine and one-sided 
food patterns, also by combining complementary crops. Ansoms (2011: 132) 
found that all the peasants participating in her focus-group discussions believed 
that the potential benefits of monocropping would not outweigh the risks that 
poorer peasants in particular would have to take.  
Huggins discovered peasants who were continuing to grow ‘banned’ crops 
alongside ‘approved’ crops in 2008 and who were fined by authorities and had 
their crops uprooted. In addition, he came across examples of problems peasants 
were encountering concerning food security: sheets were promised by local au-
thorities to dry the maize harvest but these did not arrive and there were unfa-
vourable price regulations and non-functioning markets. He also found that the 
2008 maize harvest in Kirehe, the district adjoining Ngoma, was only a quarter of 
that projected (Huggins 2009b: 301) and that maize production across eastern 
Rwanda in 2014 was 50% below normal production levels. This was partly 
caused by the poor quality of seeds and also by delays in their distribution 
(Huggins 2014a: 5).  
In line with these findings, the international press agency Syfia Grands Lacs 
reported pessimistic stories in 2009 about the results of land consolidation and 
crop specialization. In its article ‘Rwanda: Malnutrition Eats into the Country-
side’ (Rwanda: La malnutrition ronge les campagnes), a farmer from the south-
east argued that, after a period of serious drought, the new land consolidation and 
specialization policies had worsened the situation as the failure of the maize har-
vest had left people empty-handed, whereas if they had grown several crops, it 
would have been possible to harvest at least something (Twizeyimana 2009a).30
It was also argued in an article in October 2009 that, as a consequence of unfa-
vourable climate conditions in combination with land consolidation, 25% of the 
Rwandan population was starving. A northern farmer had reported that the sow-
ing seeds provided by the authorities were insufficient in quantity and the quality 
of the fertilizers was poor, which led to a bad potato harvest. Farmers who did 
                                                 
29 Huggins (2009b: 300) also found an example in Northern Province where peasants were waiting in 
vain for potato seeds while local authorities insisted that they plant potatoes and threatened them with 
fines or relocation to other areas if they did not. 
30 See http://www.syfia-grands-lacs.info/index.php?view=articles&action=voir&idArticle=1408. 
Accessed 1 August 2014.
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not have the required sowing seeds were also not allowed to grow other crops 
(Twizeyimana 2009b).31
Although national radio and newspapers are less likely to publish negative re-
sults about consolidation and crop specialization, there were stories on Radio 
Rwanda on 17 November 2011 about the overproduction of cassava and maize in 
southern Rwanda. As local farmers could find neither a market for their produce 
nor storage facilities, they lost most of their harvest. 
Land Consolidation Attempts in Mubinda 
If we consider some of the initial results of the attempt to consolidate plots in 
Mubinda in 2010, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn. These are in line 
with the comments by Ansoms, Pritchard, Huggins and Syfia Grands Lacs that 
were mentioned in the previous section. Overall, it can be concluded that consol-
idation was likely to fail in the location we visited. Ironically, I had in fact as-
sumed this even before seeing the consolidated plots myself because the authori-
ty responsible tried to discourage us from visiting a particular spot, claiming it 
was too far and impossible to reach by car. Although we persuaded him to go 
with us, we did not manage to see him again to confirm the appointment and he 
then disappeared for almost a month. By chance, however, one of our respond-
ents put us in contact with the consolidation project’s supervisor and this enabled 
us to visit the spot. This supervisor told us that the local authorities and the local 
agronomist had initially wanted to consolidate 60 ha of land in total but that, in 
the end, only about 18 ha were consolidated and sown with maize.32 After sow-
ing, there was a period of drought and when the rains eventually came, many 
maize plants rotted, as we had also noted. The supervisor was convinced that the 
harvest would fail and he knew that a lot of the farmers involved were very wor-
ried about the financial implications because they would be forced to pay back 
the costs of fertilizers. He also believed that the harvest could have succeeded if a 
proper irrigation system had been in place. Apart from one part (15 m x 80 m) 
that was cultivated by a woman and seemed successful, we saw several parcels 
where the harvest was clearly going to fail. We met three peasants and they ad-
mitted that they were very pessimistic as they were supposed to repay half of the 
costs of their fertilizers from selling a harvest that was likely to fail. Only a few 
maize plants had come up on one parcel, another peasant had planted something 
else on his plot when it became clear that his maize was not going to grow and 
the third had hoped that his maize would come up but when it did not, it was too 
                                                 
31 ‘Rwanda: A Quarter of Rwandans Are Hungry’ (Rwanda: Un quart des Rwandais ont faim). See 
http://www.syfia-grands-lacs.info/index.php?view=articles&action=voir&idArticle=1565. Accessed 1 
August 2014.
32 Three or four crops have been designated for each region in Rwanda. For the Mubinda area, one of the 
crops selected is maize.
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late to replant another crop. The latter farmer had planted 2 ha and needed to re-
pay about RWF 37,000 (about € 50). When we were taking some pictures of their 
plots at the end of our visit, one of the farmers joked that he believed he would 
soon be imprisoned for failing to repay his debt.33
Although definitive conclusions cannot be drawn from a single visit to see ini-
tial attempts to consolidate plots, our conversations and observations demand 
some critical remarks. First of all, it is clear that land consolidation in Mubinda 
has not been a matter of choice but of coercion. The local authorities decided 
what plots had to be consolidated and, as a result of crop specialization, what 
crop should be planted, even if there were no proper irrigation facilities or a func-
tioning market in place. Another problematic issue was that, even though the 
harvest had primarily failed due to unforeseen weather conditions, the peasants 
involved were forced to repay part of the costs of the fertilizers they had re-
ceived. If they could have reconsidered matters, they would most likely not take 
part in consolidation again because their move away from more drought-resistant 
crops to a cash crop had resulted in a worsening of their financial situation and, 
in some cases, their food security. 
Although the farmers we met at the consolidation site still probably had some 
other (small) plots somewhere where they could cultivate what they wanted to, 
we noticed that there were concerns among land-poor peasants regarding food 
and land-tenure security as well as about the intentions and methods of the au-
thorities. This was the case with Paul, an ex-prisoner who used to have 15 parcels 
before land sharing but now only has one parcel measuring 80 m x 100 m. When 
discussing land consolidation, he expressed concern and made some gloomy pre-
dictions. Since it is the state that is investing in the system by handing out sowing 
seeds, he was convinced that it would take most of the harvest and only leave a 
certain amount for the peasants involved regardless of their plot sizes. He fore-
saw a lot of problems.  
Let’s say that consolidation concerns 30 parcels. Every farmer involved will receive a bag of 
fertilizer. After harvesting, everyone has to pay RWF 12,500 (about € 15). That will not be 
possible. There will be farmers who will sell these fertilizers and even the sowing seeds and 
there will be problems. Sowing seeds are free. Therefore it is the state that profits and the 
peasants who suffer [as they will be forced to repay everything]. People will die, malnutri-
tion has already increased. How will you find money to pay for health insurance and school 
fees? It will be like this: the land belongs to the state and it can do whatever it wants.34
Paul’s concerns were shared by a local priest who was well informed about the 
daily struggles of the rural population and claimed that the consolidation policy 
                                                 
33 Huggins (2014a: 5) also found that peasants in Kirehe District who refused to plant maize risked a 
fine and those who were unable to repay a fertilizer debt could be imprisoned in local cachots or have 
(some of) their household possessions confiscated. 
34 Interview with Paul, December 2010.
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in a way traumatizes peasants as it does not take their habits and living condi-
tions into consideration.  
Conclusion 
The editors of Natural Resources and Local Livelihoods in the Great Lakes Re-
gion of Africa35 argue in its preface that the viability of smallholder farming in 
this region is in doubt:  
… all of Africa, to varying degrees, is experiencing ‘deagrarianisation’, a process character-
ised by an increasing detachment of rural livelihoods from farming and from access to agri-
cultural land.36 In the Great Lakes, however, as in much of Africa, there are few alternatives 
outside this sector. As a result, competition within the land arena is becoming increasingly 
fierce while the options to generate a decent livelihood are turning bleaker. This engenders a 
profound societal crisis in which conflicts over land are becoming more numerous and more 
intense. In a number of cases, they even take a violent turn. (Ansoms & Marysse 2011: xvii-
xviii)  
It is in this context that the 2013 Land Law and 2004 land policy are being im-
plemented. This chapter has discussed how the new Rwandan Land Law and pol-
icy are following the World Bank’s neo-liberal vision and largely favour better-
off, commercially oriented, entrepreneurial farmers in Rwanda.37 Early studies on 
the need for land reform in Rwanda were already clearly oriented towards com-
mercialization and support for richer, large-scale farmers and it is now clear that 
this orientation is likely to have a negative impact on the many small-scale, sub-
sistence farmers who tend to be blamed for their own poverty. With the govern-
ment’s focus on official land registration and more productive land use through 
land consolidation and crop specialization, it can be concluded that the imple-
mentation of the 2013 Land Law and policy is leading to an increase in food and 
land-tenure insecurity for the majority of small-scale subsistence peasants. These 
insecurities could, in turn, result in more land conflicts, land scarcity and even 
landlessness, which are the themes of the following chapter. 
Based on extensive fieldwork, Huggins (2009b: 302) concluded that: 
The forced commoditization of household production will result in winners and losers. The 
principal winners will be those business-people in a favorable position to negotiate with the 
state for the rights to purchase the harvest at beneficial terms. The principal losers will be the 
rural poor, for whom a delay or an increased level of uncertainty in the direct consumption or 
sale of the harvest can mean immediate food insecurity or financial disaster, and whose tradi-
tional markets have been undermined.  
                                                 
35 I contributed a chapter entitled ‘Sharing Scarcity: Issues of Land Tenure in South-east Rwanda’ to this 
(2011) volume.
36 For a definition of the term ‘deagrarianization’, see Bryceson (1997).
37 Foreign investments and large-scale land acquisitions are also encouraged by this neo-liberal vision. 
This was not discussed in this chapter because no specific examples were found in my research area.
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The fact that the Land Law and land policy as well as broader agricultural re-
forms are being implemented using coercion is problematic. This coercion con-
cerns decisions related to crucial production and consumption processes that are 
‘critical for household survival and are psychologically sensitive in both univer-
sal and culturally-specific ways’ (Ibid.). Many aspects of the Land Law are very 
unpopular and this will, in the longer term, ‘undermine the concept of a Rwandan 
state founded on human rights and democratic decision making. Farmers feel like 
cogs in a machine, rather than participants in the development process’ (Ibid.: 
303). This is troubling because, as was noted in the previous chapter on the role 
of the Rwandan state, its strong social engineering in the behavioural, cultural, 
economic and spatial arenas is leading to an increase in resentment against gov-
ernment policies and could, in the long run, jeopardize the legitimacy of the cur-
rent government.  
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Frustrated Farmers: Land Conflicts in Mubinda 
To show that land conflicts have increased in Mubinda as a result of land regis-
tration, this chapter starts with a description of an Abunzi session that Honorée 
and I attended. Meaning ‘those who reconcile’, Abunzi are local mediators who 
work at village and sector level to solve local conflicts in an attempt to reduce the 
number of court cases and increase access to justice (Veldman & Lankhorst 
2011: 28). The cases that are brought before them involve conflicts that could not 
be resolved by disputants and local authorities.1 It is estimated that about 80% of 
the conflicts that are taken to court concern land (Lankhorst & Veldman 2009: 
15).
Abunzi have their mediation meeting in Mubinda every Tuesday. When we ar-
rived at the office of the village authorities on Tuesday 30 November 2010, a 
large group of about 40 people were already waiting by the entrance. Both the 
president of the mediators and the social affairs’ authority, who came to greet us, 
claimed that many people had come because of land problems. When we went in, 
the small room was already full and, after half an hour when the quorum of me-
diators was reached (there has to be a minimum of six), the mediators started 
hearing cases. Of the eight cases they handled that day, only one was not related 
to land. The persons involved in each case were requested to sit on the bench in 
front of the mediators. The first three cases did not seem to be difficult for them 
to resolve. The first concerned a man who had bought a plot that turned out to 
already be mortgaged and was being farmed by others. Since the seller was no-
where to be found, the complainant was now accusing his father, who claimed he 
could not be held accountable for his son’s transactions as the latter had already 
inherited the plot. The mediators agreed with the father and told the complainant 
                                                 
1 Veldman & Lankhorst (2011: 1, 24-29) give an overview of the many local institutions that are 
involved in land conflict resolution (family councils, local authorities, people of integrity: 
inyangamugayo) and argue that this makes it relatively easy for disputants to go forum shopping.
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to go to the police about the son. The second case was a father who had a conflict 
with his son because his son’s goats had come on to his plot several times and 
destroyed his crops. The son was told to pay compensation for the losses. In the 
third case, a family had become involved in a dispute with their daughters over 
land registration. The father refused to put the names of his daughters on the reg-
istration form because he reasoned that they were already married and he had 
provided for them when they got married. He argued that, after his death, the 
family would take care of inheritance matters. The mediators pointed out that, 
according to Succession Law, both sons and daughters should inherit and that he 
had to add the names of his daughters to the land registration form.  
The fourth case was more complicated and concerned a family with multiple 
land problems and an orphan who had received a piece of land from his grand-
parents in 1997. Local authorities had sent this case to the mediators because the 
agreement had never been executed. The grandmother explained that the problem 
had to be solved by Thaddée, the head of the family, but he was not present. Alt-
hough he had been summoned to appear several times, he had never shown up at 
the mediators’ session, presumably to avoid the mediators’ involvement in the 
conflict. While dealing with this case, it turned out that there was another land 
problem in the family that involved a sister and two half-sisters of Thaddée’s 
who he did not regard as heirs. The fact that Thaddée had (again) refused to at-
tend the mediators’ session caused considerable frustration among his family and 
some of them left the room. This led to tensions among the remaining complain-
ants, the audience and the mediators. And then, all of a sudden, Thaddée arrived 
just after the mediators had decided that the orphan’s case should be referred to 
the mediators at the (higher) sector level.2 From his appearance (he was wearing 
a suit) one could tell that Thaddée was not a simple peasant but a well-to-do man 
who probably did not live in Mubinda. He immediately started to show his au-
thority by openly rejecting the mediators’ decision in the orphan’s case and he 
was angry that they had been handling his family’s land problems in his absence. 
Regarding his (half-)sisters, he made it clear that he refused to give them a share 
of the family land. At this point, the whole audience and all the parties involved 
became quite agitated and started shouting. The chaos continued as the mediators 
ruled that Thaddée had to write the names of all three sisters on the land-
registration form. Thaddée started shouting as he did not accept this ruling and 
the audience commented on this and his statements. The mediators had by now 
totally lost control of the situation and, according to Honorée, it was only our 
presence that meant that things did not get any worse. The mediators’ president 
tried to persuade Thaddée and his family to leave and when they finally did, al-
                                                 
2 I assumed that Thaddée had been close by all the time and only felt compelled to present himself 
when the mediators took a decision that he did not want to accept.
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most half of the audience followed them to continue the heated discussion just 
outside the building.  
This short description of an Abunzi session in Mubinda reveals two points. 
First, the huge number of land(-related) conflicts that these mediators have to 
deal with (seven out of the eight cases that day) and, second, the fact that there is 
often not much ‘mediation’ involved.3 Additional in-depth research into the func-
tioning of Abunzi committees has drawn similar conclusions. As in the case of 
Thaddée who refused to acknowledge his (half-)sisters’ land rights, many con-
flicts are within families, as was shown by a 2008 USAID report on the local 
resolution of land disputes. In the four villages of research, most of the land con-
flicts within families concerned inheritance, followed by others related to polyg-
amy (Rural Development Institute 2008: 11, 29; see also Lankhorst & Veldman 
2009: 35 and Veldman & Lankhorst 2011: 18). A study conducted by RISD be-
tween 2010 and 2012 on land registration and land conflicts also mentions intra-
family conflicts as the most frequent source of dispute, with inheritance (26%) as 
the most important cause of conflict, followed by conflicts between husbands and 
wives (13%) and between other family members (20%). According to RISD 
(2013: 16), intra-family (within family) and inter-family (between two families 
that have family ties) account for over 60% of all land conflicts. This study also 
found that about 60% of the documented conflicts were handled by Abunzi at 
village and sector level (Ibid.: 20) The law on Abunzi requires that the conflicting 
parties have first to be persuaded to settle their conflict and only if this fails can a 
decision be enforced that is in line with relevant laws. However, studies suggest 
that many Abunzi do not regard themselves as mediators but as judges. This per-
ception is also motivated by the fact that disputants often distrust each other as 
well as the mediators. As a result, mediators tend to consider an adjudicatory ap-
proach to be safer and more workable. This approach affects disputants’ willing-
ness to accept the Abunzi’s decisions. The fact that mediators often do not medi-
ate was suggested in interviews with disputants (41%) and after the monitoring 
of Abunzi sessions (44%) (Veldman & Lankhorst 2011: 34-39).4
About 90% of Rwanda’s population today is still dependent on land and 84% 
of cultivating households have less than 0.9 ha. The 2010/2011 Integrated 
Household Living Conditions Survey estimated that two-thirds of households 
cultivate less than 0.5 ha. The average plot size in Eastern Province is 0.78 ha 
                                                 
3 I made similar observations when I attended an Abunzi session at sector level where mediators handle 
unresolved cases at village level. The land-related cases we observed there are described below.
4 Several studies found that the mediators lack any basic knowledge about mediation as well as the 
tools required to handle adversarial cases. They are poorly trained and often do not have copies of the 
relevant laws. This has consequences for the quality of the Abunzi judgements (Lankhorst & Veldman 
2009; Rural Development Institute 2008; Veldman & Lankhorst 2011). See also Rwanda Initiative for 
Sustainable Development (2013: 19) that mentions problems of (perceived) corruption.
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(National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda 2012: 3). This chapter deals with the 
growing scarcity of land and the increasing number of conflicts, especially within 
families, that are related to land.  
It has already been argued that land conflicts and contested land access have 
been a connecting thread throughout the history of Rwanda and the Great Lakes 
Region as a whole. Land conflicts are prevalent in Rwanda, as the mediators’ 
session above indicates. With land registration, which is regulated by the 2013 
Land Law and the 2004 land policy that were discussed in the previous chapter, 
conflicts seem to be on the rise. The first two parts of this chapter describe the 
situation of increased land(-related) problems in Mubinda, focusing on the land-
registration process that was being carried out during my last fieldwork period in 
2010 and that was significantly impacting on land problems. The last part dis-
cusses some Rwandan reports on the consequences of land sharing and depicts 
the land-sharing grudges that are often the main source of land conflicts in Mu-
binda.
‘Of Course I Cannot Inherit Land’ 
A considerable number of people lost large parts of their land as a result of the 
land-sharing agreement that was implemented in 1996 and 1997. In addition, the 
(mainly Tutsi) beneficiaries received only about 1 ha and were not always able to 
acquire more land through purchase. As a consequence, many respondents admit-
ted that families frequently do not have enough land to cultivate or to give to 
their children.5 Since a young Rwandan man needs a plot of land to build his fu-
ture house on before he can get married, this creates socio-economic problems. 
‘Of course I cannot inherit land, because first of all my parents do not have 
enough land to give me a part. That is why I work a lot for others to have money 
with which I will buy my own plot and I cannot reclaim a plot from my parents 
while I know that they don’t have enough land’.6 This was 21-year-old Laurent’s 
answer when asked if, once he decided to get married, his parents would give 
him land. He added that this situation applied to his younger brothers and young-
er sister too but that, fortunately, they had been able to finish school and would 
therefore eventually have the opportunity to find a job and buy their own plots. In 
line with Laurent’s resignation is a remark made by Mercia, who claimed that 
children see and understand how awkward the current situation is and remain 
silent unless land is divided illegally or in an unjust way.7
                                                 
5 This problem, however, is not restricted to the eastern part of Rwanda. In other areas too, parents are 
having more and more difficulty passing land on to their children, as was mentioned in Chapter 4. 
6  Interview with Laurent, December 2008. He indicated that he cultivated other peasants’ plots and also 
rented a small parcel to cultivate his own crops.
7 Interview with Mercia, November 2010.
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These examples are not isolated cases. Often parents would hint at the fact that 
they did not have enough land to give to their children and argue that education is 
nowadays their inheritance.8 However, as poverty is prevalent in Mubinda, many 
parents are not able to pay secondary-school fees and their children leave school 
at a young age. Jean expressed these parents’ feelings when he stated that: ‘For 
us parents, we feel uncomfortable or guilty because we cannot help our children 
with choosing their future prospects’.9 Another couple claimed: ‘At present, we 
as parents do not have land anymore to give them [their children]. They have to 
manage themselves to find their own land’.10 In the words of young Patrice, ‘the 
hope of the youth is not founded on land because it is not there. We put our hope 
in education’.11
After some more questions concerning the future of youth in the region, Pa-
trice had to admit that a lot of young people are currently unemployed. ‘The 
youth have a remarkable force, they are able to work but they don’t see how they 
can use this force. Because the means are not there and they are unemployed 
even when they have the force’. He explained that he finished secondary school 
two years ago and had not found a job since then and that he was starting to 
wonder if he would ever be able to buy a plot of land on which to construct a 
house, which would also allow him to get married. Plots are not handed out by 
the state anymore as it did when the villagization programme was in progress. 
People today have to buy a plot and this is extremely difficult for young people, 
even for those with a job. Grégoire, for instance, works irregularly as an assistant 
bricklayer. He works from 8 am to 4 pm and earns about € 1 a day, from which 
he has € 0.60 left after he has bought food. Like Patrice, Grégoire is far from sure 
if he will ever have land, unless his future wife has inherited enough. He is very 
pessimistic about the future of unemployed youth. When asked if young people 
have any hope of eventually being able to buy land, he responded: ‘Such a per-
son, can he have hope for something? He will die with nothing, he has to work, 
otherwise he will die like this’.12
Based on fieldwork in 2006 and 2007, youth expert Sommers (2012) wrote an 
alarming book entitled Stuck about the current position of Rwandan youth.13 He 
                                                 
8 In a 2014 USAID report on gender, land rights and property rights, most interviewees indicated that 
they considered education to have replaced land inheritance. Furthermore, many parents revealed that 
they had to make significant sacrifices, such as selling small pieces of land (Jones-Casey, Dick & 
Bizoza 2014: 26).
9 Interview with Jean, October 2008.
10 Interview with Guillaume and Agathe, November 2008.
11 Interview with Patrice, December 2010.
12 Interview with Grégoire, December 2010.
13 Elsewhere in Africa, the situation is often not much better. For instance, Abbink (2005: 1) mentioned 
that the well-being and social advancement of youth across Africa are deteriorating and they are 
‘growing up in conditions of mass unemployment and are facing exclusion, health problems, crisis 
within the family due to poverty and the AIDS pandemic, and a lack of education and skills’.
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interviewed youth in both rural and urban Rwanda and found that they were, lit-
erally, stuck. Culturally, youth in Rwanda are only accepted as adults after they 
are married, but a male adolescent needs to build a house first and show that he 
can take care of a wife and children, which means that he needs land. Almost all 
the male youth that Sommers interviewed explained that they were unable to take 
this first step of constructing a house in order to gain manhood. He noted that:  
… even while admitting that they ‘had no choice’ but to leave school so they could work to 
save money to build a house, many said that they might never complete it – and, thus, never 
have the opportunity to be accepted and recognized as a man in Rwandan society. (Sommers 
2012: 6-7)  
Most interviewees expressed anxiety and frustration about the situation in which 
today’s youth − both male and female − find themselves.14 Youth and adults ex-
plained that unmarried youth are seen as failures and are frequently ridiculed 
(Ibid.: 137, 193-194). Being unable to buy land and get married creates other 
problems too. There are, for instance, more secret and informal − sometimes only 
sexual − relationships. Since many marriages nowadays have to be postponed, a 
man will normally avoid having sex with his fiancée. According to Patrice, the 
reasoning behind this is that: ‘I will keep her [fiancée] for marriage because if 
she becomes pregnant I cannot marry her and this is not good’. Such a man often 
turns to other girls instead, and as he cannot usually afford condoms, this may 
result in an illegitimate child.15 Besides increasing promiscuity, unemployment is 
also leading to an increase in crime as some of the unemployed young men en-
gage in drinking and stealing and sometimes rape girls too.16
These findings are in line with Sommers’ observations regarding the dangers 
of youth waiting to get married. He sums up the views of youth and adults by 
saying: ‘when youth can’t marry, bad things happen’ (Sommers 2012: 137) and 
explains that often male youth turn to unmarried women for sex. These women 
are motivated by money, beer or items like soap or lotion and face social stigma-
tization as they are regarded as prostitutes. Such sexual relations often lead to 
informal marriages, illegitimate children and increased rates of HIV/AIDS. As a 
22-year-old male respondent explained, ‘the girls in that family are getting older 
and there’s no one to marry. At some point, boys will get them pregnant’, while 
another 26-year-old man stated that ‘these “old ladies” [i.e. unmarried young 
women over the age of 25], they are desperate. If you meet her in a bar and give 
                                                 
14 The legal age of marriage is 21 in Rwanda. However, an unmarried girl who has reached the age of 28 
– and even at times when she turns 24 or 25 – may be labelled an ‘old lady’ or called a ‘prostitute’ and 
becomes marginalized. This means that girls only have about five years in which to marry (Sommers 
2012: xvi).
15 Interview with Patrice, December 2010.
16 Interview with Grégoire, December 2010. He stated that ‘people [men] without work steal and drink 
and rape girls. They look for them on the road after they have drunk. For instance, higher up this road 
near the aerial where there is a small forest, some guys raped and killed a girl there in 2008’. 
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her a beer, you can have sex with her and she gets pregnant. This leads to AIDS’ 
(Ibid.: 137).17 Other negative aspects include male youth who turn to drinking 
beer and smoking marijuana or become involved in crimes like theft, especially 
of roof tiles as they are relatively expensive (Ibid.: 116-117, 137-139). 
Land scarcity is not only a (future) problem for the younger generation. As men-
tioned earlier, land in Rwanda is also becoming increasingly scarce among the 
adult population and people have to find other means to make ends meet. How-
ever, only about a third of the respondents (mostly men) have some off-farm em-
ployment from which they can generate additional income, for instance as a pas-
tor, repairman, teacher, trader or bricklayer. The fact that only a small minority 
have a salaried job is due to the low level of education in the community and the 
lack of off-farm employment opportunities. Some 60% of the respondents I ques-
tioned had only attended (and not always completed) primary school,18 a quarter 
had some form of secondary or tertiary education and nearly 15% (mostly wom-
en) did not have any formal education at all.19 More than half of the interviewees 
cultivated for someone else to earn additional income, mostly working four hours 
a day on two or three days a week. They earned about RWF 500 (about € 0.65), 
while some were paid in kind, usually in bananas. According to an article by the 
international press agency Syfia Grands Lacs in March 2010 that was entitled 
‘Rwanda: The Most Poorly Nourished Are the Farmers’ (Rwanda: Les plus mal 
nourris sont les agriculteurs), 39% of Rwandan farmers earn about US$ 100 a 
year and the other 61% between US$ 120 and US$ 170 annually (Twizeyimana 
2010).20
Land Conflicts in Mubinda
With land becoming scarcer, people are being forced to work for others and it is 
impossible for many parents to give their children (enough) land. This is leading 
to increasing numbers of conflicts over land. Respondents in my first fieldwork 
                                                 
17 Sommers (2012: 34, 179-180) found that HIV/AIDS is a major risk for Rwandan youth and suggests 
that the current prevalence rate among 15-24-year-old youth is much higher than the official 3.4%, 
especially among urban youth. 
18 Of these respondents, only two-thirds had completed primary school. The other third had stopped 
before completing it.
19 These figures are based on a survey among 37 respondents, of whom 5 had no education whatsoever, 
23 had attended primary school (8 up to the third class, 15 completed), 7 had completed secondary 
school and 2 had been to university. According to a 2011 World Development Report that uses IMF 
and World Bank figures, rural enrolment rates are still low with 85.4% primary and 7.9% secondary 
enrolment and with only some 3.5% of the total population completing secondary education and 0.4% 
attending tertiary education (McDoom 2011: 15).
20 See http://www.syfia-grands-lacs.info/index.php?view=articles&action=voir&idArticle=1687. 
Accessed 10 April 2012.
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period in 2008 were reluctant to mention land conflicts, usually stressing the fact 
that local authorities managed to resolve them or denying that they even existed. 
Nevertheless, a third of these 43 respondents mentioned that conflicts occurred 
over boundaries. In the words of Thierry: 
There have been people who moved the boundaries of their plot to steal land from their 
neighbour and if you were not aware of this, you would find half of your plot already gone. 
And this caused problems when the person who had been robbed became aware of this. And 
when there are problems like this, the authorities intervene to resolve them.21
When registration was taking place during the last fieldwork period in 2010, 
many more land conflicts were reported. These involved conflicts between par-
ents and children if parents did not share land equally among their children, and 
conflicts between children too. Enid, for instance, revealed that her brother want-
ed to take all her parents’ land, while Alain, a genocide survivor who adopted 
nine orphans after the genocide, explained the problem many of them currently 
face:  
These orphans who I have here, when they grow older they don’t understand how they will
inherit. And while their parents also had land, they will be obliged to ask us where their par-
ents’ plots have gone as, by then, these plots will already have been divided with little or 
nothing remaining. And if these children do not understand, this will cause problems.22
Another problem that causes conflict within families involves the return of pris-
oners. Most of them spent many years in prison and found when they returned 
that family members had confiscated their land or given it away during the land-
sharing agreement. The latter happened to Paul who had been in prison on geno-
cide charges for ten years until he was released in 2006. The rest of his family 
still live as refugees in Tanzania but he returned to Mubinda, only to discover 
that all his land and that of his family had been shared out. He used to have about 
15 parcels with banana trees and now is left with a small plot of 80 m x 100 m 
for him, his wife and their six children. He naturally regrets this situation but did 
not dare to reclaim his parcels as he feared further imprisonment. Another exam-
ple concerns a man who approached us after the mediators’ session we attended 
in Mubinda. He explained that he was an illegitimate child and had been in pris-
on for 15 years. While he was in prison, his grandparents had assigned him a plot 
but his maternal uncle gave up this plot for land sharing. This ex-prisoner told us 
he could not reclaim his land as both his uncle and the authorities stated that the 
land-sharing process could not be reconsidered. 
In contrast to the government’s view that registration would lead to increased 
tenure security and fewer land conflicts, the opposite occurred in Mubinda where 
land registration led to an enormous increase in land conflicts, as was shown by 
                                                 
21 Interview with Thierry, September 2008.
22 Interview with Alain, November 2008.
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the mediators’ session in Mubinda. Veldman & Lankhorst (2011: 17-18) drew 
the same conclusion in their 2011 study of a pilot project on community-level 
dispute resolution and women’s land rights. They argue that registration initially 
led to a rise in land conflicts and that it may lead to an increase in conflicts in the 
long term as inheritance remains an important way of accessing land. Since peo-
ple are attached to their land and pressure on it is growing, land conflicts, also 
within the family, can escalate and even turn violent. For instance, one interlocu-
tor reported the case of a grandmother who was murdered by her family so they 
could gain land, and another person mentioned a son who murdered his parents 
to avoid his sisters inheriting the family land.23
What my observations also reveal is that grudges concerning land sharing, 
which took place about fifteen years prior to registration, often underlie these 
more recent conflicts. This issue will be considered after a discussion of land 
conflicts within families. Many conflicts involved women and we recorded cases 
between husbands and wives, children and mothers, daughters and their fathers 
and/or brothers, widows and their in-laws, illegitimate wives and/or illegitimate 
children, and (genocide) orphans and their adopted family members.  
Women and Land 
The position of women in land inheritance and land registration remains deli-
cate.24 Under customary law, a daughter was not allowed to formally inherit land 
from her parents and only had access to her husband’s land. However, there are 
several instances when she could (and still can) receive family land, for instance 
if her marriage failed, after performing a burial ceremony for a deceased parent 
or by presenting a first-born child to her parents and her parents-in-law. Howev-
er, gifts of land are less common as a result of scarcity, and money or livestock 
are frequently given instead (Jones-Casey, Dick & Bizoza 2014: 29-31; Veldman 
& Lankhorst 2011: 21-22). The Succession Law means that women are nowa-
days legally entitled to inherit land from their parents. The Law of Matrimonial 
Regimes, Liberalities and Successions was passed in 1999 and gives women the 
same inheritance rights as men. It was developed because after the genocide 
many families were headed by widows or orphaned daughters whose land rights 
needed to be protected (Jones-Casey, Dick & Bizoza 2014: 3). This law means 
that not only boys will inherit from their father but that all legitimate children 
will inherit property without discrimination. A woman who enters into a civil 
marriage and has community of property or limited community of acquests with 
                                                 
23 These were not the only times that I was confronted with a land-related murder during my last 2010 
fieldwork. Honorée told me she heard a story on the radio about an orphan who had murdered her 
brother in order to inherit family property. 
24 See also Chapter 4.
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her husband has the same equal rights to land and other common property as her 
husband, also in the case of divorce. And when he dies, she will inherit half of 
their commonly owned property while the other half will go to her children. If 
there are no heirs, it will all go to her (Ndangiza et al. 2013: 9, 19). The land pol-
icy also declares that: 
… according to the constitutional principle of equality of all citizens, all Rwandans enjoy the 
same rights of access to land without any discrimination whatsoever. According to this prin-
ciple, women, married or not, should not be excluded from the process of land access, land 
acquisition and land control, and female descendants should not be excluded from the pro-
cess of family land inheritance. (Government of Rwanda 2004: 23)25
And Article 4 of the Land Law states that: 
Any discrimination either based on sex or origin in matters relating to ownership or posses-
sion of rights over the land is prohibited. The wife and the husband have equal rights over 
the land’. Article 33, on the transfer of land rights, stipulates that ‘succession of land is al-
lowed, and it shall be conducted in accordance with procedures of succession provided for in 
the law that governs succession. (Government of Rwanda 2005: Article 4, Article 33)  
These formulations do not provide clear information on how women are sup-
posed to exercise their rights. According to Pottier (2006: 531), the fact that the 
Land Law does not mention gender and merely refers to other laws ‘may cause 
discomfort and frustration’. He found that many female genocide survivors in 
particular who had often become heads of households felt that the Rwandan gov-
ernment had not done enough to ensure their land rights, while many men still 
expected women not to talk about such issues in community meetings (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, many men reason that the law is unfair in the way it allows a wom-
an to receive land from her parents as well as from her husband (Musahara & 
Huggins 2005: 324-325; Wyss 2006: 30).26 Musahara & Huggins (2005: 325) 
conclude that: 
… clearly, gender-based inequalities cannot be merely ‘legislated away’. Customary atti-
tudes and the pragmatic approaches of local administrators − who often combine statutory 
and customary law in their decisions − will determine how the law is implemented.
The above-mentioned RISD study underlines this conclusion too, claiming that 
women’s land rights are often denied by customary practices. Its survey showed 
that 80% of women and 74% of men do not know about the laws that deal with 
land tenure and base their perceived rights and decisions on family and social 
obligations (Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development 2013: 18-19).  
                                                 
25 Veldman & Lankhorst (2011: 23) note, however, that lawyers often interpret ‘discrimination’ as 
meaning that if a woman has acquired sufficient land through marriage, she can be awarded a smaller 
part of her family land than her brothers. 
26 This is felt in particular by young men who are more uncertain about their future as they have to 
compete with their sisters for land, which again conflicts with the rights of women to acquire land 
(Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development 2013: 16).
209573-L-bw-ASC
190
Customary barriers and prejudices were also found in Veldman & Lankhorst’s 
study. Land is regarded as belonging to the family and a married daughter is con-
sidered to be part of her husband’s family and she is expected to support them in 
times of need. Therefore, assigning land to give it away to another family is seen 
by many as problematic. With daughters inheriting, family land needs to be 
shared between more siblings. Brothers feel they risk that because their share of 
land decreases also their appeal as a marriage partner is reduced. Another preju-
dice is that a woman who inherits land and takes this considerable asset to her 
husband’s household would behave more independently and with less respect for 
her husband because, in the case of divorce, she would be able to keep her land 
and remain independent of her father and/or brothers (Veldman & Lankhorst 
2011: 42-43).27
An additional problem is that the 1999 Succession Law only applies to legally 
married women. A USAID report in 2004 on gender, land rights and property 
rights concluded that women who were legally married were able to benefit from 
improved land access following land registration. Compared to the previous gen-
eration, more daughters were managing to access some family land in adulthood 
as well as after their parents’ death, although they and any brothers were often 
not treated equally (Jones-Casey, Dick & Bizoza 2014: 19-21, 50; Veldman & 
Lankhorst 2011: 41-42). Unlike legally married women, women who are not le-
gally married and their children are often denied land rights under customary law 
and it influences the attitudes and actions of many rural Rwandans, including 
those of the women themselves (Veldman & Lankhorst 2011: 23-24; Rwanda 
Initiative for Sustainable Development 2013: 19). As a result, not-legally married 
women lack the bargaining power they need to have a voice if their husband 
wants to buy or sell land and they are unable to stay on his land following a di-
vorce or if they are abandoned or separated (Jones-Casey, Dick & Bizoza 2014: 
19-21, 50; Veldman & Lankhorst 2011: 41-42). The USAID report suggests that 
there are gaps between theory and practice in women’s land rights and concludes 
that these are ‘likely to persist and women’s tenure security will continue to be 
undermined’ (Jones-Casey, Dick & Bizoza 2014: 22).  
Another 2008 USAID report listed six barriers that women (both legally mar-
ried and others) face in accessing land. The first is ignorance − among men and 
women − of the law and women’s rights and, related to this, women’s fears that 
asserting their rights could create tensions within the household that might esca-
late to violence. Women may also fear retaliation by the family because a woman 
who raises a land conflict, especially with her husband, risks physical violence. 
The third barrier concerns fear of abuse in the community because a woman who 
                                                 
27 The authors note, however, that it is also in men’s interests if they own more land through their wives 
(Veldman & Lankhorst 2011: 43). 
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publicly raises a conflict is regarded as being disrespectful of her husband. 
Fourthly, there is the perception of bias because women can feel that male local 
authorities or mediators are biased towards men as they drink together and/or are 
friends with them. This discourages women from seeking assistance. One wom-
an, for instance, said that mediators should apply the law but that ‘when it comes 
down to wives, they apply custom’.28 The other barriers relate to a lack of time 
and of legal aid (Rural Development Institute 2008: 15-16).29 Let us now turn to 
the family-related land conflicts that we encountered during the land-registration 
process in Mubinda. 
Wives, Widows, Sisters and Daughters 
The mediators’ session at the beginning of this chapter that included a descrip-
tion of two cases of land conflict involving daughters and half-sisters revealed 
how girls often run into difficulties because their father or brother(s) refuse to 
register them as beneficiaries. At another mediators’ session we attended at sec-
tor level, many other land-related family conflicts also arose. We witnessed a 
case between a man and his stepmother, between brothers and sisters and be-
tween children and their mother. Several Rwandan civil-society organizations 
(CSOs) were closely following the land-registration process and I spoke to some 
of their representatives who highlighted recurring problems that are encountered 
all over Rwanda. A lawyer from a women’s organization indicated that his or-
ganization was engaged in many conflicts concerning sisters and brothers be-
cause, in general, men tend to appropriate family land. He claimed that brothers 
and sisters used to share the land without problems before registration but that 
afterwards brothers often wanted the land to be registered in their name. This was 
usually due to ignorance as they did not know the underlying jurisdiction but in 
many cases they know it very well and were abusing their sisters’ ignorance as 
many women are unaware of their legal position.  
In some cases, the refusal by, for instance, a brother to register his sister as a 
beneficiary or to give her an equal share in the family land is, again, connected to 
the land-sharing agreement. As one female mediator indicated, some brothers 
within Hutu families that were involved in land sharing refused to register or 
share land equally because they argued that not enough land had remained after 
land sharing. Some girls confronted her with this situation within her own family, 
                                                 
28 In a study on the proximity of justice with regard to land conflicts, Lankhorst & Veldman (2009: 71) 
found that local authorities and mediators tended to be guided by tradition rather than the law, often 
because they have not read the law(s) they should be applying or have never received a copy of them. 
29 See also the 2014 USAID report that mentions bias by local authorities, shunning by family members 
and beatings or other forms of violence directed at women who raise a land conflict (Jones-Casey, 
Dick & Bizoza 2014: 49).
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she said. They were told by their brother that the land that remained was for his 
children alone as the part reserved for his sister(s) had been shared.  
Besides sisters and daughters, there are also husbands who deny their wives 
the right to register. Widows too may have difficulty registering land if their in-
laws do not accept the registration, as was confirmed by various widow respond-
ents. When a woman is widowed, it is often the deceased husband’s brother who 
proclaims that the land she cultivated with her late husband has to return to his 
family and that the widow and her children should turn to her own family for 
assistance instead. Something similar happened to Scholastique whose husband 
died some ten years ago and who subsequently had three more children by anoth-
er man to whom she was not married. She registered herself as the owner of her 
late husband’s plot.30 Recently her brother-in-law was released from prison and 
contended that the children she had with her current partner should not be regis-
tered on his brother’s plot.31
In line with these findings is the 2008 USAID study that argues that widows 
feel they face more barriers than women generally as they do not have enough 
power to raise a land conflict issue and feel that local authorities or mediators 
will be on the other party’s side (Rural Development Institute 2008: 16-17). As 
one widow stated: ‘Sometimes when you are a widow, family heads have more 
power than you and can influence local authorities − sometimes if you keep 
fighting for your rights, they kill you’ (Ibid.: 16). 
Illegitimate Wives and Children 
As already mentioned, the second most common type of intra-family land con-
flict is related to polygamy, which is officially prohibited but is still widespread 
in Rwanda (Uwineza & Pearson 2009, as cited in Veldman & Lankhorst 2011: 
23-24). It is not uncommon for a man to be legally married to one wife and in-
formally married to one or more other women at the same time. Many couples in 
rural areas are married according to custom or religion and have never had a civil 
marriage because of the cost and bureaucracy involved and also, it seems, be-
cause they are not aware of any possible legal implications (Veldman & 
Lankhorst 2011: 23).32 Many respondents in Mubinda, especially women and 
                                                 
30 As they were not legally married, she is not registered as his wife but as a ‘friend’. See Chapter 6 for 
more details on the registration process.
31 The fact that a widow’s position in present-day Rwanda is still weak is demonstrated by an absurd 
phenomenon that two CSO representatives told me about. They knew of cases in which a man married 
his (widowed) mother-in-law in order to keep the family land.
32 A 2014 USAID study on gender, land rights and property rights mentions that almost a third of 
married women are in an informal marriage (either polygamous or monogamous) or just cohabitate 
(Abbott & Alinda 2012, as cited in Jones-Casey, Dick & Bizoza 2014: 18). The number varies from 
region to region, ranging from just a few informal marriages to almost 95% (Jones-Casey, Dick & 
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representatives from civil society, mentioned current land conflicts concerning 
illegitimate wives and illegitimate children. As one female respondent put it: 
‘There are many men who have had other [illegitimate] children. … Making ba-
bies is like an occupation’.33 A representative from a women’s organization ar-
gued that a man who has a child with his concubine often warns her that she can-
not claim that he is the father, i.e. he is unwilling to acknowledge (and accept 
responsibility for) his illegitimate child. This observation is supported by widow 
Scholastique, who was mentioned above and who stated that many of these men 
refuse to recognize their illegitimate children, even when the children resemble 
them or when the blood tie is publicly known. 
The impact of a second wife on a first wife was well expressed by Erica, who 
legally married her husband in 2005 after they had been together for 13 years and 
after she was confronted with a second wife in 2003. When I interviewed her for 
the first time in 2008, she mentioned that her husband had a second wife in an-
other part of Mubinda with whom he had two children. This woman is an ac-
quaintance of Erica’s as they went to primary school together. Erica told us that 
in 2003 her husband turned up one day with this woman and let her stay in the 
house that Erica and he had bought together. As Erica was not legally married to 
him at that time, she did not protest but when most of the money her husband 
was earning from selling bananas in Kigali started to go to this second wife, the 
situation began to torment Erica. In 2010, we discussed this situation again and 
she explained how it bothered her but that there was still nothing she could do 
about it. She explained that the reason she legally married her husband in 2005 
was due to the presence of this second wife. By marrying him, Erica strengthened 
her own position34 as she was then able to take back control over the house and 
the plots her husband had given to his other wife, to whom he was not legally 
married.35 However, sometime later her husband and his second wife decided to 
rent a house together and to buy several plots of land. Her husband has rarely 
visited Erica since although they spend the night together once in a while. Nowa-
days she has difficulty paying school fees as her husband gives most of his in-
come to his second wife. Erica cannot go to the authorities and accuse her hus-
                                                 
Bizoza 2014: 34, Note 17). Polygamous marriages are, however, reported to be declining steeply 
(Ibid.: 40).
33 Interview with Erica, December 2010.
34 Women involved in the 2014 USAID study on gender, land rights and property rights also indicated 
that a formal marriage was regarded as a way of securing rights to a husband’s property and all the 
women interviewed, except for one, wanted to be in formal marriages. However, the study found that 
some men avoid formal marriage because they want to protect their property in case of divorce and 
feel that informal marriage or cohabitation preserves the power dynamics that favour men (Jones-
Casey, Dick & Bizoza 2014: 35-37).
35 It is not clear if this claim is true, as Scholastique (who was a kind of concubine herself) had told us 
earlier that Erica’s husband had been frustrated when she took back the house and land. Scholastique 
also declared that Erica’s husband’s second wife was much wealthier than Erica.
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band of desertion because he generally provides her with enough money. She 
recognizes that she is in a very difficult position as she feels that:  
Normally when a man has two wives, the children of the wife with whom he lives benefit 
from his money. … You win nothing when you leave your husband, you will [have to] aban-
don your children and your husband will even have more time to engage with other women. 
… It is a question of choice: a difficult life with him or alone with a house and problems like 
the cows that you cannot attend alone, the education of your children and the need for pro-
tection.36
The 2014 USAID report mentions several land conflicts related to polygamy: 
some husbands try to divide the legally married wife’s property with the second 
wife, children of the two (or more) wives fight each other over land or the chil-
dren of a legally married wife claim land from the not-legally married widow 
(Jones-Casey, Dick & Bizoza 2014: 49). In the four cells that were studied in the 
2008 USAID report, the percentage of polygamy-related conflicts as part of all 
intra-family land conflicts was 33%, 0%, 29% and 6% respectively, and many 
respondents considered conflicts between legal and illegitimate wives after the 
death of the husband as the most serious and difficult to resolve (Rural 
Development Institute 2008: 5, 30-35). Despite these problems, many women 
who are informally married try to register themselves on their informal husband’s 
land, so as at least to have the children she had with him included on the land 
certificate. As many men do not recognize their illegitimate offspring, such at-
tempts often fail. Furthermore, these registration attempts have a significant side-
effect as they confront many first wives with another woman and/or children they 
were frequently not aware of. Understandably, these confrontations lead to ten-
sions within families. Besides having to deal with this situation, first wives also 
have to agree to the registration of their husbands’ illegitimate children on the 
family plot, as the husband needs the formal consent of his legal wife. This can 
result in both the man and his wife refusing to accept the illegitimate 
child/children’s registration, and sometimes the man wants to accept it while the 
wife contests the matter. However, as the position of women in Rwandan society 
is weak, the result is often that, even without the approval of their legally married 
wives, these men are able to register their illegitimate children.37
Not only men have illegitimate children but women sometimes have children 
with other men, for instance if their husbands have been in prison on genocide 
charges. When these men return home, often after many years of imprisonment, 
they are confronted with these children and will often negotiate with the father 
about their care. The fathers in turn often deny fatherhood as they do not want to 
register such children on their own land.  
                                                 
36 Interview with Erica, December 2010.
37 Interviews with several NGO representatives, November and December 2010.
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An interesting side-effect of registering illegitimate children on their fathers’
own land was mentioned by Honorée, who claimed that the normal procedure for 
acknowledging an illegitimate child is signing an act of paternal recognition. She 
wondered if men who have conflicts with their legally married wives over their 
illegitimate children nowadays avoid this and instead use land registration as an 
alternative way of acknowledging their children. 
Orphans 
Another vulnerable group in Rwandan society are orphans, whose parents were 
often killed during the genocide. Family members frequently deny them the right 
to own or register their land or people make use of the weak position of orphans 
to appropriate their land. During the mediators’ session at sector level, we heard 
a case involving two young orphans whose land had been sold by relatives. An-
other example, recounted by a Rwandan human-rights activist, was the story of a 
woman who had pretended to be the aunt of two orphans in order to appropriate 
their land. The aforementioned women’s organization’s lawyer pointed out the 
problematic role of orphans’ guardians, using the example of family members 
taking the land of their brothers’ orphaned children who were still minors. After 
orphaned children reach adulthood, a guardian should give them their inheritance 
but most do not want to give up this land and try to keep it for themselves, for 
instance by claiming that the child is illegitimate. Orphans may face the same 
barriers as women when it comes to accessing land: the fear of reprisal from fam-
ily members, perceptions of bias and a lack of time and of legal assistance (Rural 
Development Institute 2008: 17). 
This section has discussed the many family-related land conflicts that have 
emerged since the introduction of land registration in Mubinda, as elsewhere in 
Rwanda, and highlighted conflicts within families that are often related to gender 
inequality. Aside from these conflicts that obviously increase tenure insecurity, 
many people already feel insecure about land registration in general, as was dis-
cussed in the previous chapter. The observations in Mubinda show that tenure 
security has not increased and land conflicts have not diminished with land regis-
tration but have instead become more common. What became clear is that grudg-
es concerning land sharing that took place some fifteen years prior to registration 
were often the underlying cause of these more recent conflicts. The next section 
considers the problem of exacerbated land-sharing conflicts. 
Land-Sharing Conflicts in Perspective 
This section starts by discussing two Rwandan studies that concern land conflicts 
in general, and land sharing in particular. The study by the National Unity and 
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Reconciliation Commission (NURC) is of specific interest as this government 
institute is highly politicized and its reports tend to be uncritical and to support 
government policies (see also Thomson 2013).38 The other is by Rwandan scien-
tists Charles Gasarasi and Herman Musahara (2004) and is the most detailed and 
comprehensive study dealing with land conflicts that has been undertaken in my 
area of research. 
Land Sharing as an Indicator of Division 
From April to June 2001, the NURC held consultations on the state of social rela-
tions and coexistence with the Rwandan people (Report on the Evaluation of Na-
tional Unity and Reconciliation 2002). Participants had to name indicators of 
harmonious coexistence and of division, and one subject that was named as an 
indicator of division was the land-sharing process. It was argued that, although 
Rwandans were not against the land-sharing process in principle, its implementa-
tion had resulted in problems regarding all the parties involved in the agreement: 
authorities, beneficiaries, and those who were supposed to share their land. Some 
authorities took advantage of land sharing by giving themselves big plots of land. 
Land sharing was only done on small land parcels that belonged to poor people, 
while the larger properties of rich people went untouched. Some beneficiaries 
sold the land they received and moved to other places and some genocide survi-
vors did not accept the sharing process. In many regions, the land that was being 
shared belonged to people who had gone into exile in 1994 (i.e. Hutu refugees) 
(National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 2002: 16-17). Between the lines 
of this rather brief and often veiled summary, it can be seen that land sharing has 
caused grievances between beneficiaries, who were mostly returned Tutsi, and 
the people who lost land, who were mainly returned Hutu refugees.  
In 2003, Gasarasi & Musahara from the Centre for Conflict Management at 
the National University of Rwanda researched the land issue in former Kibungo 
Province (now part of Eastern Province) where Mubinda is situated to ‘add to the 
scanty knowledge on the nature and magnitude of land conflict in Rwanda’ 
(Gasarasi & Musahara 2004: 100).39 Data related to land conflicts were collected 
from 197 household heads in all ten districts (about twenty from each district). 
                                                 
38 The NURC is a government institute that was established in March 1999. Its main aim is to bring 
together Rwandan people of all walks of life to exchange ideas on coexistence and ways of promoting 
unity. The NURC selected a sample group of 300 persons from each district consisting of cell and 
sector representatives, teachers, members of religious and women’s associations, youth, vulnerable 
people and ‘honest people’ (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 2002: 5, 11).
39 Gasarasi & Musahara used the terms ‘conflict’ and ‘dispute’ but did not give a definition of these 
terms.
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One of the districts included in this research was the current sector that Mubinda 
is a part of.40
Their data showed that land conflicts accounted for 41% of all the reported 
conflicts.41 Many of the reported conflicts in 2003 were thus related to land.42
Official records revealed that the causes of land conflicts were land sharing 
(37%), family conflicts (19%) and problems of land grabbing (29%), which 
could be connected to sharing as well as to family-related conflicts. In these offi-
cial records, the district that Mubinda was part of and also another district had the 
highest number of land-sharing conflicts (Ibid: 41).43
Of the respondents in the ten districts in Kibungo Province, 63% considered 
land to be the primary cause of conflicts, while the percentage in the district of 
Mubinda was 70% (Ibid.: 50-53). In all the districts, 43% of respondents had ex-
perienced land conflicts in the past and the district of which Mubinda was part 
had the highest percentage (Ibid.: 49). Most respondents said that the conflicts 
they had experienced were related to land-sharing grudges (52%), while inher-
itance and family problems (24%) and land scarcity (16%) were also mentioned 
(Ibid.). These percentages were all significantly higher than those from the 
aforementioned officially reported conflicts. 
When asked what the whole community considered to be the most frequent cause 
of land conflict, 40% of respondents mentioned land-sharing grudges. An addi-
tional 4.2% can be added to this figure as they referred that referred to problems 
selling a shared plot. Pasture problems came second and land scarcity (mentioned 
in conjunction with access problems) was ranked third (15%), with family-
related conflicts in fourth place (11%).44 Interestingly, respondents from the dis-
trict of Mubinda quoted the highest number of land conflicts of all the ten dis-
tricts and also scored highest regarding land-sharing grudges (Ibid.: 45).45
Gasarasi & Musahara also looked at land conflicts among the very poor, who 
accounted for 32% of all households.46 The very poor are more often landless 
                                                 
40 The number of districts was reduced in 2005 and, as a result, the former district in which Mubinda 
was situated became the current sector, i.e. a subdivision within a district.
41 The data are from four of the ten districts and are based on official records.
42 According to Gasarasi & Musahara (2004: 40), most land conflicts, except for a few incidents like 
assault, were non-violent.
43 Further explanation about the reasons behind the types of land conflicts was not given. For their 
explanation on the frequency of land-sharing problems, see the sub-section ‘Downplaying (Ethnic) 
Consequences of Land Sharing’.
44 No further explanation was given. Pasture problems are interpreted here as conflicts between 
pastoralists and agriculturalists. 
45 In total, land-sharing grudges were named 106 times by the community as a whole as the most 
frequent land conflict.
46 They suggest that the very poor were mostly among the 1994 Hutu refugees (60%) and, to a lesser 
degree, 1959 Tutsi refugees (25%), but as they failed to take into account the overrepresentation of the 
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than people from less poor households. Moreover, they indicated that they expe-
rienced land conflicts more often than other households and were more likely to 
be affected by land sharing (56% vs. 48% of all households) (Ibid.: 54-57). Data 
from 1959 Tutsi refugees showed that they felt that land sharing was the most 
important cause of land conflict (28%). For the 1994 Hutu refugees, the main 
cause of conflict they experienced was scarcity (28.4%), followed by sharing 
(22.7%). This latter percentage is higher than the average for all households 
(17.7%) (Ibid.: 61-63).  
Although the labelling of the land conflicts mentioned are not always clear or 
consistent and the findings are often not explained and may be difficult to com-
pare, Gasarasi & Musahara’s research indicates that land sharing in the eastern 
part of Rwanda was seen as the main cause of land conflicts in 2003, especially 
among the 1994 and 1959 refugees who were those primarily involved in shar-
ing. This corresponds with the results of the NURC’s report that land sharing had 
caused grievances and was seen by the population as an indicator of ‘division-
ism’. The district of which Mubinda was part had the highest number of land 
conflicts and scored highest on land-sharing grudges, both in the respondents’ 
perceptions as well as in official records.47 These data correspond with my find-
ings from Mubinda, as the following section shows.  
‘Those Who Cannot Change the Situation Content Themselves with Laughing’
On 18 November 2010, Honorée and I decided to visit a demarcation team that 
was demarcating some fields in the presence of the local authorities and peasants 
involved. This visit gave us the opportunity to meet the two parties in a land-
sharing dispute. After we had introduced ourselves to the demarcation team and 
the local authorities, we asked some general questions concerning the demarca-
tion procedure. While the team continued its work, three people started to discuss 
land conflicts openly.48 The first was a woman who had lost land as the authori-
ties claimed that it belonged to the state. The others were two men: a returned 
Tutsi refugee and a Hutu. In 1996, the Hutu had been ordered to share his land 
equally with the Tutsi returnee. He explained why he felt that sharing had been 
unfair because he had two wives and thus two families to support and did not 
know, after the sharing, where to put his second wife and family. He then decid-
                                                 
1994 Hutu refugees by 57%, these figures are not correct and recalculation suggests that there is no 
significant difference in poverty between the two household groups.
47 See also Huggins (2011: 258) who discovered that while some peasants had accepted land sharing, it 
remained a source of grievance for others as they felt that their land had been unfairly given to others 
and that land sharing was still a major cause of land conflict in the southeast. 
48 I assume that our presence encouraged the people involved in these conflicts to speak out about their 
cases.
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ed to go to the local authorities and managed to have his case revised. He re-
gained some of his former land but told us that he had been very unhappy with 
the sharing agreement because, according to him, the Tutsi returnee had obtained 
land elsewhere also through land sharing. For his part, the Tutsi man claimed that 
the land he received was his ancestors’ land and that it had been unfair to take 
away part of it because he also had two wives. This comment provoked a lot of 
laughter among the listeners. One neighbourhood authority then got up to speak 
and told both men they just had to register their current parcels without reconsid-
ering past decisions. All the people surrounding us were then laughing and claim-
ing that it would be better for us to leave because these kinds of discussions nev-
er finish.49
Several respondents in Mubinda indicated that they resented having had to 
share their land and that land sharing had impoverished them. This resentment 
was also expressed by representatives of two Rwandan human-rights organiza-
tions who claimed that land sharing had led to frustration and, at times, even ha-
tred. This opinion was supported by two Dutch researchers who were working 
for a Belgian NGO and who stated that ‘of course there are problems with land 
sharing’.50 In addition, a Rwandan NGO representative claimed that it was to be 
expected that people would try to reclaim land they had to share.  
One of the clearest statements on land sharing was made by Gérard, a 39-year-
old Hutu who had inherited a plot of only 20 m x 20 m from his parents. When 
we asked him about the land-sharing agreement, he responded very negatively 
and claimed that land sharing had been bad, especially for his father who had 
seven children but could only keep half of his plot. He thought it wrong that the 
number of children of the giving party was not taken into consideration. When 
we then asked who people believed were to blame − the authorities who enforced 
the land-sharing agreement or the 1959 Tutsi refugees who benefited from it − he 
replied: ‘If you have a plot and someone [the state] comes to force you to share 
[it] with your neighbour, the neighbour is very satisfied, and you get angry with 
the one that gives your land away [the state]. But what can you do?’51
This response contrasts with the opinion of Mercia, a 68-year-old Hutu who 
lives in one of the most dilapidated houses in Mubinda. With land sharing, she 
lost two plots of land and after selling another one she was left with only one plot 
that she had already divided between her five children. She clearly blamed the 
1959 Tutsi refugees:  
                                                 
49 Unfortunately, some minutes later some authorities who had come after us demanded our telephone 
numbers, which made us decide to leave and not to contact these men again to discuss their grievances 
as we thought this could put them in an awkward position. 
50 Interview with Marco Lankhorst and Muriël Veldman from the Belgian NGO RCN Justice & 
Démocratie, November 2010.
51 Interview with Gérard, December 2010.
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It is deplorable that there are very poor, poor and rich people. Among the rich people, the 
majority have come from outside [1959 Tutsi refugees], as they have come and taken the 
properties of those who were not there. They did not make any effort and they continue to 
have advantages. They have come with their cows and have received plots that were shared 
with them. They exploited our goods in our absence: banana plantations, forests, everything. 
When we arrived, they accumulated their fortunes. How can they not be rich? The injustice 
lies in the fact that these repatriates did not install themselves in their places or origin. … 
They installed themselves everywhere, which impoverishes the owners of the property where 
they installed themselves.52
Mercia stated that numerous Hutu families were so destitute after land sharing 
that they had to sell the only plot of land they had left and that these plots were 
often bought by 1959 Tutsi refugee families.53
Mercia was not alone in her grievances concerning the 1959 Tutsi refugees 
and their perceived wealth. Others, like Daniel and his wife Beatrice, an older 
Hutu couple, supported her observations. According to them, the returning 1959 
refugees had either cows or money (after selling their cattle and/or other property 
in Tanzania) and this had made them wealthy. When land sharing had taken 
place and security increased, these wealthy Tutsi refugees had, they claimed, 
been able to buy more plots of land. According to Beatrice, ‘they are the ones 
that are rich. Where you see well-built houses, they belong to them. We are poor 
people’.54 Like Mercia, this couple deeply regretted that the 1959 Tutsi refugees 
could benefit to such an extent from the situation and were not asked to share 
their cows in return with the Hutu families that had provided them with land.55
This frustration reminded an informant of an incident that showed the sensitiv-
ity of the ‘cow issue’. This informant remembered a story from the time of land 
sharing of a priest who advised the beneficiaries of sharing to show their grati-
tude to the previous landowner by giving them a cow. However, instead of ac-
cepting his advice, people called the police, arguing that the priest was stirring up 
hatred as he was unwilling to carry out the land-sharing agreement. 
The accounts above highlight the resentment that Hutu respondents often de-
scribed when we asked about their land-sharing experiences or discussed the 
                                                 
52 Interview with Mercia, November 2010.
53 Another example of destitution was Laetitia, who declared that she found it hurtful to see how her 
family sometimes had to work for the owners of their former plot and only received a bunch of 
bananas in return. She stated: ‘Imagine, working on your [former] field while you will be paid with 
something that comes from your field’. Interview with Laetitia, July 2009. 
54 Interview with Daniel and Beatrice, December 2010.
55 This regret was clear in a 2003 study on peace building in Rwanda by the Rwandan Institute of 
Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP). Consultations were held across the country with groups of 
25-30 people that were regarded as representatives of the community’s population. The study learned 
that land management was intensely debated and that many people were very critical of land sharing. 
Participants raised questions about why the principle of land sharing was not subject to law and 
applied nationwide and why the assets of the beneficiaries, including cattle, were not taken into 
account with respect to the principle of equity (IRDP 2003: 168).
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plots they used to have.56 According to some of the relatively open Hutu re-
spondents, many of whom were 1994 refugees who participated in land sharing, 
this agreement benefited the 1959 Tutsi refugees enormously, and at their ex-
pense. Analysis of Gasarasi & Musahara’s data, however, showed that there was 
no significant difference in poverty levels between the two refugee groups. Many 
respondents described their hardship but, like Gérard, indicated that there was 
nothing they could do to change this situation. To explain the powerlessness and 
anger many Hutu feel, Gérard said: ‘Those who cannot change the situation con-
tent themselves with laughing’.57 However, the fact that respondents suggested 
that they could not change the situation does not indicate true resignation but is 
merely a sign of their (perceived) weak position in society. 
Another sensitive issue that was mentioned by some respondents was that 
many beneficiaries of land sharing sold their land and moved away, as was men-
tioned in the study by Gasarasi & Musahara.58 A priest who was working in the 
region during land sharing remembered how people often came to him to com-
plain and express their grief when they found out that the land they had shared 
had been sold by the beneficiaries. Gérard was convinced that 1959 Tutsi refu-
gees who sold their land and then moved had plots of land as well as family 
members in their new areas of residence. He estimated that three out of ten Tutsi 
refugee families had already sold their land. In addition, a national human-rights 
organization’s representative claimed that land sharing was not well registered. 
As a consequence, she argued, some families receiving land later resettled else-
where so that they could participate in land sharing again. This representative 
also stated that not only 1959 Tutsi refugees benefited from land sharing but that 
sometimes other Rwandans were attracted by the land-sharing agreement too. 
These people then moved to the eastern part of Rwanda where they could, after 
just a year, participate in land sharing, even though they also owned land in their 
places of origin. Guillaume and Agathe, an old Hutu couple that had lost a con-
siderable amount of land and now only own a plot measuring 34 m x 80 m, 
stressed that it upset them to see that shared land was being sold. Agathe re-
counted:  
A 1959 refugee has sold the land that used to belong to Guillaume’s uncle to other people, 
not even to Guillaume’s family. This was about a year ago. They have installed themselves 
in Rusomo, maybe they have also been involved in land sharing there?59 This shows that 
                                                 
56 As mentioned in Chapter 4 on land sharing, the Tutsi genocide survivors in Mubinda did not take part 
in it. This meant that it was only Hutu who lost land, although some land-scarce Hutu gained land 
through the land-sharing agreement too.
57 Interview with Gérard, December 2010.
58 It is also mentioned in a 2001 Human Rights Watch report that states that some 1959 Tutsi refugees 
who had settled in southeastern Rwanda were dissatisfied and returned to the west to repossess family 
land (Human Rights Watch 2001: 49).
59 Rusomo is in another district near the border with Tanzania.
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they did not need the land they sold in Mubinda. People who now own it are not even culti-
vating it, it is just bush, while we have nothing. We can’t ask to rent it, they will not do it.60
When we suggested that the new owners might be afraid that Guillaume or his 
family would take the land back (instead of renting it), Agathe added that it was 
malicious to deny them the possibility of renting it. This quote shows a lot of re-
sentment, which some respondents expressed more overtly than others, as well as 
tension with the new owners of shared land. First of all, Agathe hinted that she 
considered it unfair that the land was not sold to Guillaume’s family who had, 
after all, given it to this refugee family. And she was upset by the fact that the 
new owners did not seem to need the land as they were not cultivating it.  
A final and most alarming observation on land-sharing grievances is in a remark 
that Mercia made. When we discussed land sharing and its socio-economic im-
pact, she said that there were not only Rwandans in Rwanda but also others liv-
ing outside the country and that one day they would perhaps come back to 
Rwanda to change things. As I did not understand what Mercia was suggesting I 
did not follow up on this comment. However, Honorée explained to me later that 
Mercia had indicated that FDLR fighters and other Hutu refugees might come 
back to Rwanda and change the regime.61 When I suggested that the idea was 
rather extreme, Honorée argued that many Hutu might consider it a possibility 
and that the land-sharing agreement had played a role here as people were hope-
ful that one day they would regain the land they had had to share. This opinion 
was supported by two Kigali-based informants62 who also believed that many 
people who had shared their land considered it to be a provisional arrangement 
that could be revised one day, probably after Hutu were back in power. These 
informants reasoned that the current registration process had made people realize 
that the land-sharing agreement had become permanent. Although I have not 
been able to verify Honorée’s suggestion with other Mubinda respondents, I con-
sider Mercia’s lamentations as clear confirmation that many Hutu have cherished 
                                                 
60 Interview with Guillaume and Agathe, December 2010.
61 FDLR is the French abbreviation for Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, a group of 
Hutu rebels that is made up of new recruits but also former militia responsible for carrying out the 
genocide. They operate from the eastern Congolese Kivu Provinces.
62 In the literature, this view is supported by journalist Philip Gourevitch who wrote the influential book
We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families (1998) about the 
Rwandan genocide. He is a controversial figure because he is seen to favour the Rwandan 
government, and President Kagame in particular. In 2009, Gourevitch returned to Rwanda and 
described in The New Yorker how a confessed génocidaire had hoped for a long time that his former 
comrades who had stayed behind in Congo would return to Rwanda and topple the current 
government. This released prisoner told Gourevitch that ‘In prison, we all thought there was still an 
army outside the country that would come to liberate us and now we see that it is not true’ (Gourevitch 
2009: 44).
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the idea that one day they will be able to repossess the plots of land they had to 
abandon as part of land sharing.  
Downplaying the (Ethnic) Consequences of Land Sharing  
The previous section showed how many Hutu respondents in Mubinda deeply 
resented land sharing and were frustrated about the perceived wealth of Tutsi 
1959 refugees. They feel that land sharing has impoverished them while enrich-
ing the other party, and they were also upset that some of the Tutsi families on 
the receiving end had sold their land and moved away. Selling the land that they 
had to give up is perceived by many Hutu as another indication of Tutsi benefi-
ciaries’ wealth, as they believe it shows that these families did not in fact need 
the land. Another important conclusion to draw here is that land sharing has a 
strong ethnic element, as it divides Hutu and Tutsi into givers and beneficiaries 
of a scarce necessity.  
Surprisingly, these rather sensitive conclusions cannot be found in Gasarasi & 
Musahara’s research on land conflicts and land sharing. The main reason for this 
is most likely their position as public figures working for a national university, 
which would make them vulnerable if they commented negatively on a national 
policy. Although their statistics clearly show that land sharing has been a cause 
of conflict, they seem to downplay it in parts of their study. Firstly, they put for-
ward the argument that ‘in all the interviews and discussions, nowhere was [it] 
indicated that sharing as a post-genocide intervention on land access was bad’ 
(Gasarasi & Musahara 2004: 42). According to these researchers, all the grudges 
were related to the way the intervention was carried out and to people’s experi-
ences afterwards, for example when a beneficiary sold land they had received. In 
addition, they highlight the national context in which the resettlement of return-
ing 1959 Tutsi refugees was necessary. The fact that these returnees did not re-
claim their previously owned land shows ‘a remarkable level of success in con-
taining a potential land and settling crisis. In this regard, Kibungo Province could 
be considered as a success story’. To support this argument, Gasarasi & 
Musahara state that Kibungo Province is not among the top three of provinces 
with the highest numbers of land conflicts. They also mention that it has relative-
ly more (fertile) farmland and pastures than other parts of Rwanda, suggesting 
that this could explain the grudges (Ibid.).
After these attempts to minimize the problem of land conflicts in Kibungo Prov-
ince, the authors turn their argument and discuss other factors that might contrib-
ute to land problems. They state that plot sizes have diminished due to land shar-
ing and that land scarcity has increased, especially where older children or young 
adults are concerned and are unable to inherit land. It is argued that ‘the relative-
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ly large number of responses expressing land problems related to land sharing 
may be an outward expression of growing pressure on the ability of a household 
to sustain a minimum level of livelihood’ (Ibid.: 42-43) and that ‘the land-sharing 
problem is another expression of land scarcity as the latter exerts pressure on 
demand for land by households’ (Ibid.: 46). They appear to be substituting the 
ethnically loaded term of land sharing for the more neutral descriptions of land 
scarcity and lack of access to land. They also ignore the link in former Kibungo 
Province between land scarcity and land sharing. Although land scarcity in other 
parts of Rwanda is a significant problem, many Hutu respondents in Mubinda, 
who often claim that they had much more land before sharing, feel that their lack 
of land is a result of land sharing, while a lot of Tutsi families have also only re-
ceived 1 ha of land and have difficulty passing such a small amount of land on to 
their children. 
To support their argument that land scarcity is the main problem, Gasarasi & 
Musahara show the weighted average ranking of the causes of land conflict. Un-
fortunately it is not clear how they came to this ranking but they indicate that: 
… land scarcity comes out as the single biggest problem because it was ranked first by 40% 
of the respondents.63 Land sharing comes second with 18% of the respondents, followed by 
land looting with 17% of the respondents, then pasture-related conflicts with 13%, leadership 
problems 8% and ethnic feuds 4% ‘only’. (Ibid.: 46-47)  
Gasarasi & Musahara use the fact that 4% of conflicts are related to ethnic feuds 
to argue that ‘ethnic feuds as a component of the land problem is insignificant. 
These findings diminish the possibility that land-sharing grudges are embedded 
in historical rivalries among ethnic groups in Rwanda’ (Ibid.: 44).  
As a way of further mitigating the ethnic connotations of land scarcity caused 
by land sharing, they refer to the context in which land sharing took place, stress-
ing the level of mutual understanding between the parties concerned. Potential 
grudges were somehow minimized because the population admitted that 1959 
Tutsi refugees had a right to land and they had not reclaimed their original land 
(Ibid.: 43). However, Gasarasi & Musahara admit that this mutual understanding 
may be undermined due to the lack of a land law to frame the land-sharing 
agreement, the inclusion of property like trees and banana plantations in sharing, 
and resentment when beneficiaries sell the shared plot or jealousy if they are suc-
cessful. They conclude by stating: ‘As time wears on, the policy of land sharing, 
however good it has been, may breed dissent especially if the draft law is not 
passed soon enough and the land policy implemented’ (Ibid.: 44). Contrary to 
their conclusion related to ethnic feuds as previously mentioned, they state in 
                                                 
63 Elsewhere, the authors compare outcomes for specific types of households (very poor, urban, 1959 
(Tutsi) refugees, 1994 (Hutu) refugees, female-headed households and households with little or no 
land) and claim that the figure is 44.5% at provincial level (Gasarasi & Musahara 2004: 63).
209573-L-bw-ASC
205
their recommendations that problems concerning land sharing ‘may easily de-
generate into ethnic tensions’ (Ibid.: 103). 
Although Gasarasi & Musahara’s study clearly demonstrates that both 1959 
Tutsi refugees and 1994 Hutu refugees in Eastern Province feel that land sharing 
is one of the main causes of conflict and that post-sharing grudges are prevalent, 
the researchers have tried to downplay these results by claiming that land-sharing 
problems are just another element of land scarcity. They appear to be trying to 
mitigate any possible (ethnic) consequences of land sharing, which is in contrast 
to my findings in Mubinda where grudges related to land sharing are still preva-
lent and have a strong ethnic element as many Hutu who had to participate in this 
agreement resent Tutsi who have benefited from it.  
When Gasarasi & Musahara conducted their research, there was no Land Law 
and policy to frame the land-sharing agreement and they argue that this could 
have been a reason for growing discontent over the agreement. Although a Land 
Law and policy are now in place, the next section will show that land conflicts 
and land-sharing grudges have not decreased but have, on the contrary, intensi-
fied as a result of land registration. 
Land-Sharing Grudges 
Family conflicts and resentment regarding land sharing are the main sources of 
(land) conflict in present-day Mubinda. This observation is in line with the 
aforementioned conclusions of research by Gasarasi & Musahara in former 
Kibungo Province. Surprisingly, a first indication of the growing number of con-
flicts and their links with land sharing came from an unexpected source: local 
authorities. This in itself was a sign that land-related problems loomed large, as 
normally these authorities would do everything possible to keep up appearances, 
especially before outsiders like Western researchers.64
The first authority to mention land sharing as being the source of various prob-
lems was the district executive secretary. As I needed to show respondents that 
the authorities agreed to my research, Honorée and I had visited the district office 
to obtain an updated letter of permission. The mayor was not there so the district 
executive secretary saw us. I had not met him before and was therefore a bit cau-
tious when explaining my research area and topic to avoid giving the impression 
that my project was politically sensitive. After giving a brief explanation about 
how my research concerned people’s access to land, the executive secretary 
heaved a deep sigh and turned to Honorée exclaiming in Kinyarwanda: ‘Ah, this 
land sharing’. In an attempt to minimize the political and ethnic undertone of his 
                                                 
64 For a more detailed explanation of keeping up appearances, see Chapter 2 on ‘Appearance or Reality’. 
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remark (and of our research too), Honorée hastened to reassure him that we were 
not only looking into this issue but that the research was much broader. He asked 
us to wait, according to Honorée while he verified matters with the authorities in 
Kigali, and then returned after ten minutes and told us that his secretary would 
prepare a new letter for us. 
A few days later, the same thing happened with Stephan, the executive secre-
tary at sector level. As he was also new to us, I told him the purpose of my re-
search. Without my mentioning land sharing or land conflicts, Stephan immedi-
ately started to explain how land-registration problems were connected to land 
sharing, while others were connected to succession. According to him, there were 
no problems when land sharing was completed in 1997 but that conflicts were 
arising today and people were reclaiming the land they had been forced to share. 
As this conversation was merely supposed to be a way of introducing ourselves 
and gaining this authority’s trust, we did not delve deeper. After our visit to 
Stephan, we headed to see Eric, the cell’s executive secretary, who I had met the 
previous year. When we went into the cell building, we saw that an old man and 
three women were sitting on a bench opposite Eric’s office. As soon as Honorée 
and I joined them, they started to tell us how everybody was now coming to Er-
ic’s office because they could not register their land. The old man complained 
that it was not difficult for rich people to register but that poor people were hav-
ing difficulties and sometimes their land was being taken from them. He con-
cluded by saying that: ‘If you are not rich, you do not have the right to talk’. At 
the same time, and as an illustration of this, we overheard a woman in Eric’s of-
fice who was complaining that she had nowhere to go as she had not inherited 
any land. The only land she had was given to her through land sharing, and now 
this land was being reclaimed.  
After about five minutes, Eric asked Honorée and me to wait in a nearby of-
fice. From here, we could in fact overhear people presenting their land problems 
to Eric. We were not able to fully grasp the two men’s problems but the woman’s 
story became quite clear. Again, it was related to land sharing as her old mother 
had shared her land with a 1959 Tutsi refugee. When the woman returned home, 
her mother had already died and she discovered that the 1959 refugee had made 
her mother sign papers stating that he would take care of her land after her death. 
Eric asked her if her mother had really written this and the woman answered that 
this is what people were telling her. Then Eric informed her that if her mother 
had indeed left her land to this 1959 refugee, there was nothing he could do. Af-
ter considerable discussion, Eric said that she should come back some other time, 
while the woman insisted that Eric come to her place to see the situation for him-
self. Unfortunately, we never found out how this story ended. When we finally 
talked to Eric, he started to explain the advantages of land registration and sug-
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gested that most peasants owned about 1 ha following the land-sharing agree-
ment. We inquired whether there were problems with land registration because of 
land sharing and although he initially tried to deny this by arguing that even peo-
ple who did not leave the country in 1994 had land problems, he then admitted 
that people who had given up land for sharing were now reclaiming it. According 
to him, even though people had not been forced to share land, had not contested 
the agreement and had accepted it, they were now trying to reclaim it because 
they knew that, on registration, the land would be given to the other group. Eric 
tried, however, to minimize the impact of his statement by arguing that not many 
people had reclaimed land and that this had happened before land registration 
started. 
After we had heard complaints about land sharing for several weeks, I noticed 
that resentment surrounding land sharing was rarely expressed in public.65 The 
main reason for this was the sensitivity of the subject. Just how sensitive it was to 
local authorities became clear in an interview Honorée and I had with some of 
Mubinda’s mediators in 2010. We held this interview a week after we had at-
tended the heated mediators’ session described at the beginning of this chapter. 
What started as a calm, friendly discussion about their tasks and the conflicts the 
mediators were trying to resolve turned into a highly charged debate the moment 
we suggested that land sharing might lie behind some of the conflicts. The medi-
ators’ president, a 1959 Tutsi refugee, played a key role in this debate and it was 
only later that we discovered that he had been the president of the land-sharing 
coordination committee.  
As two of them (the president and a young man) already knew me from previ-
ous visits,66 the three mediators who were present at the start of the interview 
were quite cooperative and we discussed the differences between the 2009 medi-
ation sessions (of which I attended one) and the current sessions. The president 
spoke first, stating that many conflicts nowadays are related to land registration 
and that most occur in families when illegitimate children claim a part of their 
fathers’ land. Although we did not insinuate anything, he told us that the media-
tors’ observation was that land sharing with 1959 refugees did not cause prob-
lems and that all land problems were within families. Afterwards, Honorée sug-
gested that the president made this remark to warn his colleagues that they should 
not discuss land sharing as a cause of conflict even though it is the main reason 
behind many problems. There were seven mediators present by then and after 
discussing some other land-related conflicts, I decided to go on the offensive and 
                                                 
65 This observation is supported by a 2009 study conducted by RCN Justice & Démocratie that found 
that few cases concerning land sharing were ever brought before the Abunzi (Lankhorst & Veldman 
2009: 74). 
66 I attended another mediators’ session in 2009 and interviewed some of the mediators.
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claimed that, as people’s primary asset, namely land, had been shared and chil-
dren could not inherit land anymore, I did not understand how this was not caus-
ing problems. To this provocative question, the president declared that land shar-
ing had been the outcome of negotiations between the owners of the land and 
1959 refugees without any pressure from the state and that, on the contrary, there 
would have been problems if the state had facilitated the 1959 refugees’ with-
drawal from their former land. After this evasive response, we tried again to ask 
why there were no land-sharing problems since the people we had spoken to had 
mentioned them to us. At this stage, the atmosphere changed completely. The 
president started to speak much more nervously and the question seemed to trou-
ble him. He tried to move the discussion on by claiming that not everybody could 
be satisfied and that there were only a few discontented people. He stated that 
85% of the people involved had accepted land sharing and that the other 15% 
should not stir up trouble. In addition, people who complained were just egoists 
who do not want to share their belongings while they have not been the only ones 
who have had to share. After these remarks, the conversation became increasing-
ly confusing, with mediators discussing how long 1959 Tutsi refugees had stayed 
in Hutu owners’ houses and with the president again trying to steer the discussion 
by explaining the role of mediators in resolving local conflicts. Afterwards, we 
reasoned that all this had happened because we had touched on a very sensitive 
issue and one on which there was no consensus even among the mediators and 
that some of them were worried that they might betray themselves. As I felt quite 
confident after having spoken to some very outspoken Hutu respondents, I re-
mained tenacious. I reformulated our previous question and asked why the popu-
lation did not talk publicly about problems related to land sharing. Then some-
thing unexpected happened. One of the mediators, a woman who had arrived on-
ly a few minutes before, spoke her mind and said:  
Because they know that they are not the only ones who have shared their land, everyone has 
done it. They cannot change anything and they keep this bad attitude inside. They see that 
they are poor and they tell themselves that they had land before. They have difficulties pay-
ing the school fees for their children. Inside they are in conflict. 
And another female mediator continued:  
There are inheritance problems caused by land sharing. Nowadays, for instance, a brother 
can claim that he cannot share land with his sisters. He tells them that the land is for his chil-
dren and that the part intended for his sisters has been shared. Family problems are thus 
caused by a decline in the amount of land owned and this is aggravated by land sharing.  
Neither woman dared to look the president in the eye while talking. Afterwards 
some other mediators, including the president, tried to downplay this statement 
by repeating that such discontented people were just acting in a selfish way and 
that most were positive about the land-sharing agreement. The discussion contin-
ued for some time about other less sensitive issues before we wound it up.  
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All my three encounters with local authorities at the beginning of our field-
work in Mubinda indicated the huge number of land conflicts and the connection 
these conflicts often had with the 1996-1997 land-sharing agreement.67 The dis-
cussion with the Mubinda mediators some weeks later also made us aware of the 
sensitivity of land-sharing grudges and these observations would reoccur on 
many occasions during my fieldwork, for instance in the mediation session that 
this chapter started with. Previous sections have already shown that, contrary to 
the first two field visits, respondents were often very outspoken and frank about 
their land conflicts and the feelings of resentment they had towards the registra-
tion process and/or the land-sharing agreement. I was initially surprised about 
this change of behaviour towards me but finally realized that it was a combina-
tion of Honorée’s excellent interviewing skills, our informed questioning and the 
overall anxiety level among the population that had resulted in a willingness to 
talk. What became clear was that, in contrast to earlier statements by both peas-
ants and (local) authorities, people who were forced to share their land, i.e. the 
Hutu population, deeply resented this. 
Conclusion 
Land registration in Mubinda has resulted in an increase in land conflicts, partly 
those related to land-sharing grudges and partly to family(-related) conflicts. In 
their 2013 report, RISD describes how land conflicts are still widespread. In a 
countrywide study into the causes and implications of land conflicts between 
2010 and 2012, the RISD found that over 85% of conflicts concerned parcels that 
had already been registered. These were seen as indicative of how such conflicts 
had previously been latent or were the result of land registration. As one of the 
reasons, RISD mentioned that the rather ‘ambiguous’ nature of land ownership 
before registration, whereby different people could work on the same plot and 
claim access rights to it, strongly contrasts with the principle of registration that 
defines a single holder (or holders in the case of a legally married couple). This 
has sparked conflict as ‘many Rwandans found themselves dispossessed of land 
they previously considered theirs’ (Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable 
Development 2013: 10, 14, 17). Connected to this is the view that land and there-
fore also land disputes are embedded in social institutions and social practices 
such as gifts, inheritance and marriage that are not so much market-based, while 
at the same time registration and the corresponding commodification of land 
have led to a growing awareness of the economic value of land. A third reason 
                                                 
67 In an interview in Kigali in November 2010, Muriel Veldman and Marco Lankhorst from the Belgian 
NGO RCN Justice & Démocratie also claimed that current land conflicts are clearly related to the 
land-sharing agreement.
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that land registration has created conflict is the fact that many peasants see their 
future as uncertain and insecure and feel they have to fight for fast-disappearing 
plots (Ibid. 6-7, 14-15). To illustrate this, RISD reveals that nearly 50% of dis-
puted plots are less than 1 ha and that ‘many land disputants are not only facing 
being dispossessed of their land, but losing their social positions and sense of 
belonging as they watch the ground literally disappear below their feet’ (Ibid.: 
15). This observation corresponds with the data that were presented in this chap-
ter. 
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Conclusion
Honorée and I interviewed Paul, a Hutu respondent in his forties, in December 
2010. He was born in Tanzania after his parents left Rwanda following anti-Tutsi 
violence in 1959 but he came back to Rwanda in 1972. Paul took refuge in Tan-
zania again in 1994 and after he returned to Rwanda in 1996, he was sentenced to 
ten years in prison on genocide charges. He was released in 2006 when, accord-
ing to him, the gacaca courts both in prison and in Mubinda decided that he was 
innocent.1 Before the genocide, Paul had a substantial amount of land, livestock, 
a shop and a car but now has only a small parcel of land for his family of eight 
persons. He told us about his life following his release from prison and we dis-
cussed whether he could continue to be a trader and if he still had his driving li-
cence. This conversation went as follows: 
Paul: ‘After my liberation, I was given another driving licence in December 2009 and I start-
ed transporting bananas to Kigali. On my return from Kigali I was arrested. I had only been 
working for two weeks. The police confiscated my driving licence and I was put in prison for 
ten days. The police chief told me: “I tell you the truth. It is a conspiracy against you, people 
said that you returned from prison and are resuming your life. That is the reason that you are 
here.” I was told to pay RWF 200,000 (about € 240) for the driving licence and I left it at 
that. The police chief gave me his phone number so that I could approach him because he 
knew that I would be too scared to approach a police officer. I have had a big problem, even 
though I followed the law, I did not commit fraud, I followed orders’.
Margot: ‘Did people know about what happened to you?’
Paul: ‘People knew, but you cannot denounce someone. However, I know who they were 
[who plotted against him] but I keep silent’.
Honorée (addressing Margot): ‘He cannot ask for his driving licence. He could talk to hu-
man-rights people so that if he was put in prison again he would have a voice’’
Paul: ‘If I had my driving licence, I could return to Tanzania and not stay here’.
                                                 
1 As argued in Chapter 5 (Footnote 44), this could be the case as many former prisoners had been 
arrested arbitrarily and indiscriminately.
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Honorée (addressing Paul): ‘How can people say that everything is fine [in the community]?’
Paul: ‘To say that everything is fine is saying too much. If I had not discussed my problems 
with you, you would never know that I was suffering. That is why people say that everything 
is fine’.
I believe that Paul’s story highlights some of the most important points in this 
dissertation concerning present-day social relations in Rwanda: the enduring ten-
sions, the distrust and lack of solidarity within communities, issues of ethnicity 
and land-related problems. In addition, it exposes the problematic role of the 
Rwandan state in a context of structural violence, and evokes questions related to 
its authority and legitimacy.  
The central question in this thesis is: how do government policies concerning 
access to land and land tenure in rural post-conflict Rwanda influence local 
community relations (including ethnicity) and land conflicts? This concluding 
chapter deals first with the historical link between authority, legitimacy and land 
and informs sub-question 1 (What is the role of the Rwandan state in land access 
and land tenure?) and sub-question 2 (How are land access and ethnicity related 
historically?). The second section discusses structural and land-related violence 
and its repercussions regarding the credibility and legitimacy of Rwandan author-
ities and informs sub-question 3 (What is the influence of the Rwandan state in 
daily life and how does this affect social relations, including ethnicity?). The 
third section provides answers to this sub-question and looks into current ethnic 
relations and the effects of ethnically related tensions, divisions and prejudices 
on the credibility and legitimacy of the Rwandan state. The fourth section deals 
with sub-question 4 (What are the consequences of the recent land reforms and 
how are they affecting community life?) and the final section wraps up the thesis. 
Authority, Legitimacy and Land 
The title of this dissertation, Sharing Scarcity, underlines how Rwandan peasants 
are sharing an increasingly scarce resource: land. Due to recent, but also older, 
land-tenure policies like villagization, the land-sharing agreement, crop speciali-
zation and land consolidation, Rwandans have increasingly been forced to share 
this scarce resource and/or its management. The top-down implementation and 
the coercion with which these policies were applied show the prominent role that 
the Rwandan state plays in land access and land tenure. Although the Land Ten-
ure Regularization Programme, which was initiated as a result of the 2013 Land 
Law, suggests that Rwandans feel more secure about their land, it is ultimately 
the state that owns the land and it is controlling it by determining what Rwandans 
produce and how they manage it. This is similar to the way land was managed by 
(pre-) colonial authorities.  
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Land was already a scarce resource in the pre-colonial era. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, land access and land tenure in Rwanda then were linked to processes 
of state formation, in which authority was reflected and produced by control over 
land and political identity, and defined by clientship, (unequal) power relations 
and oppression. In the reign of King Rwabugiri, Rwanda developed into a strong 
centralized state with an administration of chiefs and sub-chiefs from central 
Rwanda of whom most were only accountable to him. After the Belgians had 
colonized Rwanda, these chiefs closely monitored the population and forced 
peasants to cultivate cash crops, participate in much-hated forced labour and oth-
er duties and collected taxes that were often justified as ‘development’ measures. 
This ‘regime of compulsions’, as Mamdani (2002: 93) called it, worked in much 
the same manner as the current state with its top-down authoritarian methods. 
With mostly appointed local authorities, the state today forces peasants to work 
in cooperatives, join in monthly umuganda community work,2 donate to funds 
and contribute to and/or participate in the construction of schools and other gov-
ernment-initiated and government-controlled development-oriented programmes.  
Throughout history, authority has been exercised through coercion and op-
pression, and violence against the population has always been a part of everyday 
life. In the reign of King Rwabugiri, power became centralized, monopolized and 
ethnicized with a Tutsi elite controlling land, cattle and people. It was extremely 
rare for a Hutu to be a patron. In addition, Tutsi clients had a more profitable po-
sition than Hutu because they received more cows from their patrons. Tutsi also 
carried out less onerous tasks than Hutu, while the latter were subject to menial 
and humiliating tasks, lacked freedom of movement, and were punished and 
sometimes even killed. This resulted in social polarization between Hutu and 
Tutsi and created political and social inequality. The bitterness among Hutu 
about the arbitrary rule of the authorities affected social relations and reflected 
the increasing socio-economic inequality in which Hutu had a subordinate status. 
After independence, Hutu took power and the ruling style of two Hutu presidents 
resembled that of the former Tutsi kings. Their governments made the Tutsi pop-
ulation the target of discrimination and recurrent violence. It was in this context 
that the RPF, a Uganda-based refugee movement dominated by Tutsi, invaded 
Rwanda in October 1990 to start a civil war that culminated in a genocide in 
which killing one’s neighbours, family members, patients or pupils was common. 
The power of the current state is as centralized and monopolized as before and 
Rwanda has developed into a one-party state with the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) having a tight grip on the Rwandan population. Although land clientship 
                                                 
2 Uvin (1998: 131) found that, before the genocide, many people resented the (then weekly) compulsory 
umuganda labour programme that was intended to help the community develop by building 
infrastructure, schools and offices because they did not see the benefits of it themselves.
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does not exist anymore, access to land and land tenure are still controlled by au-
thorities that ultimately control the land. All peasants, regardless of their ethnici-
ty, are nowadays affected by the recent land reforms as well as other policies and 
obligations, and they are increasingly resenting them. Power and authority are 
linked to legitimacy, as was discussed in the introduction. Tight government con-
trol over land, increasing resentment among Rwandan peasants and the problem-
atic role of authority in the past raise concerns about legitimacy.  
The ethnic dimension of land ownership is still significant today because it is, 
as in (pre)colonial times, a Tutsi-dominated government that nowadays rules 
over the Hutu and petits Tutsi population. Ethnicity, which remains an important 
feature in social relations and is therefore still politicized and polarized, is as 
closely connected to land access as before because the current government is per-
ceived by many to favour Tutsi and curtail the land rights of the predominantly 
Hutu population. For instance, land sharing between the 1959 Tutsi refugees and 
the 1994 Hutu refugees and the simultaneous implementation of the villagization 
policy means that many Hutu see these policies as primarily serving the interests 
of the 1959 Tutsi refugees. They feel that Tutsi refugees have gained land, and 
thus wealth, at their expense while ‘the Hutu suffered and suffered. The one who 
takes your land, your wealth, impoverishes you’.3 Although the government 
promotes ‘one Rwanda for all Rwandans’ (Thomson 2013: 113), has a discourse 
of an all-inclusive ‘Rwandaness’ and is urging the population to accept reconcili-
ation while mitigating ethnicity and its importance (Buckley-Zistel 2006: 142), 
these land policies have only reinforced Hutu and Tutsi ethnic categories in Mu-
binda. This reinforcement may be less pronounced in other parts of Rwanda but 
the impact of the government’s land policies is likely to be felt elsewhere too. 
The next section discusses the role that structural and land-related violence is 
playing in the lives of ordinary Rwandans. 
Everyday Structural Violence 
The introduction discussed Uvin’s Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise 
in Rwanda in which he analysed the failure of Western aid agencies to 
acknowledge and react to the dynamics that led to the 1994 genocide as they ig-
nored ethnic exclusion and the structural violence in pre-genocidal Rwanda. He 
concluded that: 
… for the large mass of poor Rwandans, life was characterized by a constant reduction of 
life chances and increase of socioeconomic vulnerability; the absence of opportunities to ac-
quire information and education; oppressive, authoritarian, and condescending treatment by 
the development system; growing social, ethnic, and regional inequality; and a history of im-
                                                 
3 Interview with Mercia, November 2010.
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punity, corruption, and abuse of power by local and national elites, often committed in the 
name of development. (Uvin 1998: 109-110) 
Uvin (Ibid.: 103) mentions Galtung’s typology of violence in which structural 
violence is seen to take four forms: (i) direct, acute violence; (ii) poverty or the 
deprivation of basic material needs; (iii) repression or the deprivation of human 
rights; and (iv) alienation or the deprivation of higher needs that, according to 
Uvin, refers to psychological and emotional harm and the denial of dignity and 
integrity.4 I adopt this typology here to demonstrate that the Rwandan population 
is still being confronted with structural violence.  
Examples of all four forms of structural violence have been described 
throughout this dissertation. They are connected with Rwanda’s social-
engineering agenda that aims to drastically change the political, spatial, econom-
ic, behavioural and cultural spheres of Rwandan lives. All the chapters dealing 
with (land) policy implementation have shown the top-down approach and the 
coercion that is being applied in implementing this agenda.5 This coercion has 
resulted in direct and acute violence (i), as was indicated by respondents’ stories 
about, for example, the implementation of the villagization policy when people 
who had been apprehended sometimes died or disappeared, when the population 
was forced to move into a village or peasants were beaten up if they did not 
comply with the 2013 Land Law. Imprisonment can be regarded as a form of 
violence too. Paul’s aforementioned imprisonment is an example of this kind of 
violence against the population, as are people who were unable to pay a fine or 
repay the costs of fertilizers that were used in the Crop Intensification Pro-
gramme and who risk being sent to prison for their ‘crimes’. Since most of the 
policies discussed have impoverished a substantial number of people, these ex-
amples are linked to the deprivation of basic material needs (ii). This has been 
the case, for instance, for peasants who, when confronted with the Bye Bye Nya-
katsi programme that aimed to remove grass-thatched roofing, were forced to 
leave their (partly) destroyed houses and annexes and pay for compulsory iron 
sheets and/or a fine. Some of these people had already fallen victim to the same 
fate when the villagization policy forced them to demolish their houses and con-
struct a new one in the village. In addition, the 2013 Land Law and 2004 land 
policy seem to have resulted in increased land-tenure and food insecurity as well 
as generating financial problems among the majority of the rural population. 
People have tended to become increasingly impoverished because, as Ingelaere 
                                                 
4 Uvin takes Galtung’s typology from Khan (1978). Galtung’s paper was entitled ‘The Specific 
Contribution of Peace Research to the Study of the Cause of Violence: Typologies’ and was presented 
to the Unesco Interdisciplinary Expert Meeting on the Study of the Causes of Violence in Paris, 12-15 
November 1975.
5 Chapter 4: Sharing Scarcity: Land Sharing and Villagization after Exile, Chapter 5: Fearing Fines: 
Social Relations and the Rwandan State and Chapter 6: Controlled Commercialization: Land Reform 
in Rwanda.
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(2010a: 50-52) suggested, they are required to pay fines if they fail to participate 
in night controls, use a mosquito net or pay contributions towards health insur-
ance and/or the numerous government programmes and activities including the 
construction of schools, credit cooperatives or other funds. Séraphine and Mercia 
described how these policies and other additional financial obligations make life 
difficult for a large part of the population:  
This is our life. Our Rwanda does not want poor people. You have to become rich without 
support. There are two categories of people: the rich are rich and continue to be rich and the 
poor are becoming poorer. They force us into poverty, that’s all. They destroy what I try to 
do myself and they ask me to give what I do not have. It is deplorable.6
What is also difficult: they leave you with a small parcel and every time the state asks you 
for money. All government programmes are supported by the population: the construction of 
schools is RWF 5000 (about € 6) per peasant. We have neither bananas nor cassava. They 
ask and you have to absolutely give this; if not, you are put in prison.7
Again there is a connection between the above-mentioned government practices 
with regard to direct violence and the deprivation of basic material needs and the 
third form of Galtung’s structural violence typology, namely repression. This 
thesis has demonstrated that Rwanda is far from being a democracy and that the 
RPF-led government and its omnipresent intelligence service have infiltrated all 
parts of Rwandans’ daily lives and continuously spy on the population. The most 
powerful officials in the local administration are appointed by the government 
and are often patronizing in their attitude towards the population. And they and 
the intelligence service have created an atmosphere of constant surveillance and 
intimidation to manipulate and pressure people into complying with government 
policies and keeping silent. As reflected in Paul’s imprisonment story with which 
this chapter started and the previous quotes by Séraphine and Mercia, constant 
exposure to such violence, repression and intimidation and the lack of education-
al opportunities and objective information as well as having no voice in the de-
velopment and implementation of land(-related) policies are clearly affecting 
people’s sense of dignity and integrity and causing severe psychological and 
emotional harm (iv). As a consequence of the war, the genocide and their experi-
ences in exile, most people feel insecure, fearful and distrustful of others. Many 
respondents − 1959 Tutsi refugees, 1994 Hutu refugees and Tutsi genocide sur-
vivors alike − lamented their daily lives, stressing the grinding and enduring pov-
erty and poverty-related problems they face. Living in Rwanda today is a contin-
uous struggle. 
I suggest that Uvin’s analysis and his description of structural violence in pre-
genocide Rwanda is still applicable today. At the end of the 1980s, he found that 
a large majority of Rwanda’s population, especially young rural Rwandans, felt 
                                                 
6 Interview with Séraphine, December 2010.
7 Interview with Mercia, November 2010.
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that the future would not deliver what they had hoped for and that ‘peasant life 
was perceived as a prison without escape in which poverty, infantilization, social 
inferiority, and powerlessness combined to create a sense of personal failure’ 
(Uvin 1998: 117-118). This observation is confirmed by my and Sommers’ 
(2012) data that show that many young Rwandans of both sexes cannot start their 
adult lives today because they are literally ‘stuck’: they are unable to buy land, 
which is a prerequisite to marriage. For the population as a whole, Rwanda has 
become a very unequal society and is among the top 15% of most unequal coun-
tries in the world, with poverty having become increasingly a rural phenomenon 
(Huggins 2009b: 296).  
Land-Related Violence 
With regard to violence and land, direct violence is historically related to land 
pressure and scarcity. André & Platteau (1998: 38-40) placed the 1990-1994 civil 
war and the 1994 genocide in a context of extreme land pressure, with people 
taking the opportunity to settle old scores during the genocide and/or expand 
their land holdings. Verpoorten (2011: 16-19) found that the death toll during the 
genocide was significantly higher in communities with high population pressure 
and many young single men. Rose (2007: 53-56) also found a connection be-
tween land and the genocide because Hutu tried to seize land from Tutsi victims 
and prevent any loss of land to the invading RPF rebels. Both Hutu and Tutsi 
tried to gain land by using the uncertainty and insecurity surrounding land rights.  
The discussion in the introduction about whether Rwanda was caught in a 
Malthusian trap concluded that there was indeed a relationship but no direct 
causal link. To support this, Uvin (1998: 180-184) argued that ecological scarcity 
alone, which he describes as a social rather than a natural construct, cannot cause 
violence because history, politics and economics also determine if and to what 
extent violence is likely to occur. In addition, he reasoned that agricultural inten-
sification was still a possibility in the 1990s. However, Ansoms (2009a: 149) 
feels that the question about Rwanda being in a Malthusian trap remains unre-
solved for the time being and that much depends on finding sustainable strategies 
to deal with existing land scarcity and resource depletion. The findings in Chap-
ters 6 and 7 suggest that the implementation of land reforms, such as land consol-
idation and crop specialization, are likely not to be the sustainable strategies that 
she had in mind. The next section considers the probability of future violence.  
Future Violence? 
When I was considering studying land access in the former Kibungo Province in 
September 2008, a Rwandan economist told me that if I found that people in 
Kibungo Province had no issues with the (land) policies, it would be the same in 
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the rest of the country too. The analysis of recent land reforms in this area in the 
last two chapters of this thesis has shown that the number of land conflicts has 
increased significantly in Mubinda as well as elsewhere in Rwanda, and that the 
intended commercialization of agriculture through policies like crop specializa-
tion and land consolidation have had an negative impact on food and land-tenure 
security across the country. In their 2013 study of the Land Tenure Regulariza-
tion Programme, RISD (2013: 23) stated that: 
Our research has found that for many Rwandans land is much more than a material resource. 
Land is woven into the very fabric of Rwandan social life, making the work of abstracting 
land into a commodity that can be traded on the market all the more complex. 
The data in this dissertation show that it is very likely that the recent increase in 
land conflicts, which was described in Chapter 7, will further influence Rwanda’s 
social fabric and negatively affect already tense social relations. An important 
question is whether land could be a reason for future violence. A connection be-
tween land and violence was made in the introduction to this thesis because land 
scarcity and land pressure played a role, albeit not a decisive one, in the geno-
cide. Since independence, violence has been mostly ethnic and the data collected 
in this research show that ethnic tensions and prejudices are still omnipresent in 
community life in Mubinda. Uvin (1998: 107) found that structural violence re-
sulted in humiliation and disempowerment in the 1990s and this has led to ‘frus-
tration, anger, ignorance, despair, and cynicism, all of which greatly increase the 
potential for acute violence’. This potential is again present today and is aggra-
vated by the above-mentioned problems of Rwanda’s young, often ‘stuck’, popu-
lation, an increase in land scarcity and poverty and a lack of off-farm possibilities 
and by mounting frustration, anger and fear that are being caused by land(-
related) conflicts. Therefore, Rwanda runs the risk of renewed land-related vio-
lence. The next section looks into the current state of ethnic relations to see if, at 
least in the case of Mubinda, this violence could be ethnic by nature.  
‘We Always Have Hate in Our Hearts’
This dissertation has revealed that the social fabric of Mubinda’s community life 
has still not been restored and that tensions, prejudices and a lack of solidarity 
prevail. It has also shown that ethnicity remains an important feature of people’s 
identities and continues to dominate Rwanda’s social life, despite coercive gov-
ernment discourses and its promotion of an all-inclusive ‘Rwandaness’. In anoth-
er interview in December 2008, former prisoner Paul declared that relations with 
Tutsi genocide survivors and 1959 Tutsi refugees were strained: ‘We always 
show that we have good relationships, but what happened in our country created 
209573-L-bw-ASC
219
many problems. We have always something in our heart; we always have hate in 
our hearts’. 
Genocide survivor and local authority Spéciose acknowledged this as well 
stating that:  
When we tell the population to come and help build houses for genocide survivors during 
umuganda [community work], there are those who refuse to come. But as the state forces 
them to come, they always come but half-heartedly, they do not want to come.8
I deliberately chose to do research in an area where there were many Hutu and 
Tutsi who had been in exile and, upon their return, had been forced to share land 
and live closely with each other in a village structure. I did not, therefore, acci-
dentally find ethnicity-related divisions, tensions and prejudices that might im-
pact on social relations. Particularly in the eastern part of Rwanda, many Hutu 
feel they have been mistreated because, even though they have suffered in the 
aftermath of the genocide and many of their family members were killed by the 
RPF, they are still not officially recognized as victims of some kind. It did not, 
therefore, come as a surprise that my data confirm analyses by Zorbas and Buck-
ley-Zistel that were mentioned in the introduction and showed that divisions be-
tween Hutu and Tutsi are still clear-cut and that prejudices and antagonisms con-
tinue to dominate present-day relations (Zorbas 2004: 42; Buckley-Zistel 2006: 
131-139).
The way in which the villagization policy was implemented led to a degree of 
physical segregation between Tutsi genocide survivors, 1959 Tutsi refugees and 
Hutu because, in the words of 1959 Tutsi refugee Séraphine, ‘each group felt at 
ease within their own group. We were regarded as savages, while we considered 
them to be killers. There was even distrust between genocide survivors and [Tut-
si] returnees’.9 The land-sharing and villagization policies have thus had a nega-
tive impact on already tense ethnic relations. Nowadays, the inhabitants of Mu-
binda are ‘living apart together’ metaphorically and often literally and are, be-
cause of their own sorrows and everyday struggles, not capable of seeing the 
misery of others.  
What struck me was the anger and frustration that many respondents showed 
during my last fieldwork period, which coincided with land registration in Mu-
binda. The recent history of forced land sharing and the compulsory resettlement 
of many inhabitants into a village structure resulted in numerous Hutu respond-
ents losing significant amounts of land. This has led to much resentment and 
frustration against 1959 Tutsi refugees as well as local authorities. Many Hutu 
                                                 
8 A remark by Spéciose in an interview with Triphine, December 2008.
9 Interview with Séraphine, December 2010. This quote also features in Chapter 4 (Footnote 81).
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feel that they are worse off than the Tutsi returnees10 who were allocated land 
and were not asked to give anything, such as livestock, in return. This was voiced 
by respondents like Mercia and Beatrice who claimed that: ‘They are the ones 
who are rich. When you see well-built houses, they belong to them. We are like 
poor people’.11
The perception by many Rwandans that the state engenders inequality and ex-
clusion and is perpetuating ethnic cleavages is not limited to Mubinda and has 
been intensified by an increasing ‘Tutsification’ and ethnicization as officials are 
mostly of Tutsi origin (see the introduction and Chapter 5). These officials have 
to enforce government policies, even if this means that they violate human rights 
by making people homeless or arrest them arbitrarily. Ethnicization and injustic-
es are taking place within a context of impunity for crimes that were committed 
by RPF soldiers against the Hutu population during and after the genocide. In 
addition, the problematic collectivization of Hutu guilt and the politicization of 
Tutsi victimhood, as discussed in the introduction, is further aggravating ethnici-
zation and limiting the opportunities of many Hutu to participate in community 
life (Thomson 2013). Historically, inequality and its accompanying exclusion 
and prejudices were deeply embedded in pre-genocidal Rwandan society and 
were aggravated by failed development projects. This undermined the society’s 
social fabric through the mechanisms of impunity and loss of credibility and le-
gitimacy (Uvin 1998: 109-130).  
The consequent effects on the credibility and legitimacy of the current Rwan-
dan authorities should not be underestimated. The introduction suggested that a 
quest for legitimacy can be conducted by illegitimate means (Sikor & Lund 
2009: 14-15). This dissertation indicates that many Rwandans do indeed see this 
to be the case, often as a result of the pressure and coercion being brought to bear 
on them. Chapter 5 revealed that many Hutu do not feel that they are represented 
by authorities, who frequently do not know the area but have been appointed in-
stead of elected and are accountable only to their superiors. We observed that the 
strong social-engineering agenda is leading to increased resentment against gov-
ernment policies, especially the current land reforms, and that this is affecting the 
legitimacy of the present government as well. The legitimacy of the land-sharing 
agreement, which has never had a legal basis, was particularly contested by many 
Hutu families, who saw their aspirations of regaining their former land evaporate 
when land registration confirmed the status quo. This could well mean that future 
violence in Mubinda takes on an ethnic dimension if Hutu families use violence 
                                                 
10 I did not conduct a socio-economic survey among my respondents and cannot, therefore, estimate 
whether Mubinda’s 1959 Tutsi refugees are better off than the Hutu population. Interpreting the data 
collected by Gasarasi & Musahara in 2003 reveals that there were no significant differences in poverty 
then between 1994 Hutu refugees and 1959 Tutsi refugees (see Chapter 7, Footnote 47).
11 Interview with Daniel and Beatrice, December 2010. This quote also appears in Chapter 7.
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to repossess their former land. We will now turn to the issue of land conflicts and 
the current land reforms. 
Land Conflicts and Land Reform  
Chapter 7 discussed the numerous land conflicts that flared up during land regis-
tration in Mubinda and suggested that these conflicts are a problem for Rwanda 
as a whole. As land becomes increasingly fragmented and scarce, frustrations are 
mounting. Land conflicts are now usually within families and the position of 
women and illegitimate wives and their children is particularly vulnerable. An 
important conclusion that was drawn is that many of the current conflicts are 
caused by grudges about the land-sharing agreement.  
It is within this context of mounting pressure on land and aggravated land con-
flicts that the Rwandan government implemented the 2013 Land Law and 2004 
land policy that had such far-reaching consequences for the peasant population. 
The majority are small-scale subsistence peasants who are being confronted with 
the forced and controlled commercialization and commoditization of their land. 
Land registration has led to higher numbers of land conflicts and the land consol-
idation and crop specialization policies are increasing food and land-tenure inse-
curity. This, in turn, is negatively influencing already strained social relations. As 
a result, peasants feel vulnerable and are increasingly resenting all reforms. This 
resentment jeopardizes the legitimacy and credibility of the Rwandan state. The 
problematic role of the Rwandan state and its recourse to structural violence, 
which is to a certain extent exposed by the story of Paul at the beginning of this 
chapter, raise additional questions related to its authority and legitimacy. 
Remaking or Rebreaking Rwanda? 
Many of the authors mentioned in this dissertation contributed to the 2011 vol-
ume entitled Remaking Rwanda that critically examined Rwanda’s post-genocide 
reconstruction.12 In its introduction, Straus and Waldorf discuss how the current 
Rwandan government is engaged in strong social engineering in the political are-
na, the economic sector, the spatial arena and the behavioural and cultural arena, 
something that has been demonstrated throughout this thesis. Recent, and also 
older, land and land-related policies have led to considerable changes in most of 
these arenas. Peasants now need to consolidate their land and change the way 
they farm and work.  
                                                 
12 They include Nigel Eltringham, Paul Gready, Bert Ingelaere, Timothy Longman, Catherine Newbury, 
Carina Tertsakian, Scott Straus, Susan Thomson, Lars Waldorf, Sarah Warshauer Freedman, Harvey 
Weinstein, K.L. Murphy and Timothy Longman. Other works by many of them are also cited.
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Straus & Waldorf (2011: 7) conclude that most of the contributors 
acknowledge the achievements of the current Rwandan government but are, at 
the same time, deeply concerned about Rwanda’s recovery and the fact that the 
country’s stability is not sustainable. It is also mentioned that Rwanda’s growth, 
order and stability are not new phenomena and the volume ‘calls attention to the 
social and political costs of repression, exclusion, growing inequality, a general 
climate of fear and intimidation, and impunity for crimes against humanity and 
war crimes committed in Rwanda and in the DRC’. This dissertation supports 
and strengthens this analysis with data collected at micro level in a peasant com-
munity in rural Rwanda. By focusing on the micro level, I have brought the 
‘peasants into the understanding of politics and politics into the understanding of 
rural society’ (Newbury & Newbury 2000: 834), as these researchers suggest in 
their work on historiography in Rwanda.  
I share the concerns expressed in Remaking Rwanda that Rwanda’s recovery 
and stability will not last. As long as the population’s access to land and land-
tenure policies favour better-off, commercially oriented, entrepreneurial farmers, 
community life will continue to disintegrate and the majority of the peasants will 
be the losers and face ever greater impoverishment if no alternative sources of 
economic activity are found. Their weakened and vulnerable position is due to 
recent and historical policies as well as to increasing land conflicts that are af-
fecting especially the young due to land scarcity and a lack of off-farm employ-
ment and educational opportunities. If this is linked to the eroding legitimacy of 
the Rwandan government, the fragile condition of Rwanda’s social fabric with its 
continuing ethnic tensions and divisions and the risk of renewed land-related vio-
lence, I believe that Rwanda’s long-term prospects are gloomy. 
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Land is a crucial yet scarce resource in Rwanda, where 
about 90% of the population is engaged in subsistence 
farming, and access to land is increasingly becoming a 
source of conflict. This study examines the effects of land-access 
and land-tenure policies on local community relations, including 
ethnicity, and land conflicts in post-conflict rural Rwanda. Social relations have been characterized 
by (ethnic) tensions, mistrust, grief and frustration since the end of the 1990-1994 civil war and the 
1994 genocide. Focusing on southeastern Rwanda, the study describes the negative consequences 
on social and inter-ethnic relations of a land-sharing agreement that was imposed on Tutsi 
returnees and the Hutu population in 1996-1997 and the villagization policy that was introduced 
at the same time. More recent land reforms, such as land registration and crop specialization, 
appear to have negatively affected land tenure and food security and have aggravated land 
conflicts. In addition, programmes and policies that the population have to comply with are 
leading to widespread poverty among peasants and aggravating communal tensions. Violence has 
historically often been linked to land, and the current growing resentment and fear surrounding 
these land-related policies and the ever-increasing land conflicts could jeopardize Rwanda’s 
recovery and stability.
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